

# Country risk analysis: **Libya**




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**Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia**

# **Country risk analysis: Libya**



**United Nations**  
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# Key messages

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- **Conflict risk in Libya is “Significant”.** *The country’s history of conflict and political instability are key drivers of vulnerability. In the past decade, the country has experienced upheavals including civil war, foreign intervention, and factional power struggles. A 2020 ceasefire brought some respite, but delayed elections in 2022 fueled tensions. Limited territorial integrity contributes to low resilience. Weak state institutions foster a fragmented political landscape and allowing armed non-state actors to flourish. Prolonged displacement and migrant risks exacerbate the humanitarian crisis.*
- 
- **Current climate risk is “Significant”.** *Water scarcity, temperature rises and extreme events threaten water resources, agriculture and livelihoods. Governance deficits and a lack of national strategies magnify the impact of climate-related disasters, exemplified by the 2023 Derna incident.*
- 
- **The economic landscape faces “Minor” risk.** *A key driver of vulnerability is food insecurity, brought about by declining agricultural outputs and heavy reliance on food imports. Prolonged conflict, the disruption of agricultural services, and global food price shocks contribute to the difficult economic situation. Libya's resilience is hampered by overreliance on hydrocarbons, a lack of diversification, and external shocks. Although Libya is an upper-middle-income country, challenges from conflicts, the COVID-19 pandemic and oil blockades persist, limiting its growth potential.*
- 
- **Libya is facing “Moderate” social risk.** *The situation has improved marginally since 2010. High unemployment, especially among young people and women, contributes to economic disenfranchisement. Limited resilience stems from low participation of women in the labour force. Health coverage and water and sanitation services have been improving, but deteriorating infrastructure and a lack of coordination pose challenges. The country’s healthcare system faces obstacles including inadequate resources, limited access in certain areas, and the lingering effects of conflict. The roll-out of COVID-19 vaccines was slow compared with the rest of the region because of territorial insecurity, financial constraints, and a lack of medical equipment.*
- 
- **Institutional risk in Libya is “Severe”.** *The situation is marked by fragmentation, competing power centres, and a lack of an effective central authority. Competing armed factions and conflicting interests contribute to the division of the nation and the deepening of mistrust. Corruption and tribalism persist, hindering governance and financial control. Although Libya produces oil, budget deficits persist because of institutional shortcomings and a general lack of accountability. A Government of National Unity has been set up; although this is a positive step, the Government has struggled to unify contested institutions.*
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# Contents

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Key messages	iii
Introduction	1
<b>1. Libya risk assessment</b>	<b>3</b>
A. Overall risk	3
B. Trends in key risk drivers	4
<b>2. Conflict risk</b>	<b>9</b>
A. Conflict vulnerability	9
B. Conflict resilience	10
<b>3. Climate risk</b>	<b>13</b>
A. Climate vulnerability	13
B. Climate resilience	14
<b>4. Economic risk</b>	<b>17</b>
A. Economic vulnerability	17
B. Economic resilience	18
<b>5. Social risk</b>	<b>19</b>
A. Social vulnerability	19
B. Social resilience	20
<b>6. Institutional risk</b>	<b>23</b>
A. Institutional vulnerability	23
B. Institutional resilience	23
<b>7. Recommendations</b>	<b>27</b>
A. Conflict risk	27
B. Climate risk	27
C. Economic risk	28
D. Social risk	28
E. Institutional risk	28
<b>8. From assessment of vulnerabilities and resilience to forecast</b>	<b>31</b>
Annex 1. Definition of risk dimensions	33
Annex 2. Detailed risk scores for 2022	34
<b>List of tables</b>	
Table 1. Libya Risk Assessment 2022	3
Table 2. Trends in risk levels in Libya since 2010	4
Table 3. Key drivers of vulnerability in Libya ranked from highest to lowest risk (2022)	5
Table 4. Key drivers of Resilience in Libya ranked from highest to lowest risk (2022)	6
Table 5. Conflict risk in Libya, 2022	9

Table 6.	Drivers of conflict vulnerability in Libya	9
Table 7.	Drivers of low resilience in Libya	10
Table 8.	Libya Climate Risk, 2022	13
Table 9.	Drivers of climate vulnerability in Libya	13
Table 10.	Drivers of climate resilience in Libya	14
Table 11.	Libya Economic Risk, 2022	17
Table 12.	Drivers of economic vulnerability in Libya	18
Table 13.	Drivers of economic resilience in Libya	18
Table 14.	Libya social risk, 2022	19
Table 15.	Drivers of social vulnerability in Libya	19
Table 16.	Drivers of social resilience in Libya	20
Table 17.	Libya Institutional Risk, 2022	23
Table 18.	Drivers of institutional vulnerability in Libya	23
Table 19.	Drivers of institutional resilience in Libya	23

### List of figures

Figure 1.	Conceptual framework for the Arab Risk Monitor	2
Figure 2.	Relationship between vulnerability and resilience, Libya, 2022	3
Figure 3.	Drivers of vulnerability, 2010-2022	7
Figure 4.	Drivers of resilience, 2010-2022	7
Figure 5.	Percentage change in risk by dimension in Libya, 2010-2022	8
Figure 6.	Battle-related deaths in Libya, 2010-2022	9
Figure 7.	Forcibly displaced persons in Libya, 2010-2022	11
Figure 8.	Renewable internal freshwater resources per capita, Libya	15
Figure 9.	Agriculture, forestry, and fishing, value added, Libya	15
Figure 10.	Value of food imports as a percentage of total merchandise exports, Libya	18
Figure 11.	GDP growth, Libya	18
Figure 12.	Mortality rate, under five years of age	19
Figure 13.	Total unemployment as a percentage of total labour force	20
Figure 14.	Predicted probability of State-based deadly violence in September 2024 (left) and 2026 (right)	31



# Introduction

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After the uprisings in 2011, Libya quickly descended into a destructive conflict. The country has been in a continuous and devastating conflict with fluctuating intensity since the fall of the regime led by Muammar Gaddafi. Nevertheless, the signing of a ceasefire agreement in 2020 marked a potential turning point in recovery and development.

Risk-informed policy making in Libya is essential. Such an approach not only helps to prioritize and tackle current challenges. It also helps in foreseeing future risks and designing policies to prevent or, at least, mitigate them. To address the drivers of risk that exacerbate development challenges in Arab countries, ESCWA has developed a Risk Monitor. The Risk Monitor provides measures of risk grouped into three “risk pathways” concerning factors that are associated with a greater risk of conflict, crisis and instability in the Arab region.<sup>1</sup> Within each pathway, the Risk Monitor report provides one or more risk domains:

- The “Conflict” pathway looks at historical grievances, one of the strongest predictors of future conflict, as well as the security environment of a country. It produces one risk domain (**Conflict**).
- The “Climate” pathway looks at the impacts of climate hazards, as well as the availability

and management of natural resources. It produces one risk domain (**Climate**).

- The “Development” pathway represents all of the complex set of direct and indirect causes of risk in a country. It produces three risk domains (**Economic, Social, Institutional**).

The five risk domains are expressed as a combination of two elements: vulnerability and resilience. For each risk domain, an aggregate score is produced based on a composite model that measures vulnerability and resilience according to the matrix provided in annex 1.<sup>2</sup>


This report is part of a suite of knowledge products produced on ESCWA’s initiative to support risk-informed policymaking. The report will serve to enhance and coordinate the generation and sharing of evidence-based information and analysis for preventing and mitigating risks in Libya. The paper is mainly directed at civil servants in Libya as well as other national development stakeholders; it is intended as a guide for incorporating risk analysis into policymaking, programming, and planning. This assessment will also be useful to development and humanitarian bodies such as United Nations agencies, other international organizations, and non-governmental organizations whose work touches upon Sustainable Development Goals 16 and 17.

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1 For more details on the conceptual framework see ESCWA (2023) [Arab Risk Monitor: A Conceptual Framework](#).

2 For more details on the methodology see ESCWA (2023) Arab Risk Monitor: Quantifying the drivers of risk of conflict. [Additional indicators on technology -e-governance- and gender- female labor participation, maternal mortality- have been added. 2.0 technical paper forthcoming soon.](#)

**Figure 1.** Conceptual framework for the Arab Risk Monitor



**Source:** Authors.

**Note:** Figure differs slightly from the one in the Arab Risk Monitor Conceptual Framework because of the lack of data on the Climate Hazards domain which is consequently considered here.

# 1. Libya risk assessment

## A. Overall risk

In 2022, the overall level of risk in Libya was high. The “Institutional” risk component was rated as **Severe**, the highest risk rating. The

“Conflict” and “Climate” risk components were rated as **Significant**, the second-highest rating. The “Social” risk component was rated as **Moderate**, while “Economic” risk was **minor**.


**Table 1.** Libya Risk Assessment 2022

Pathway	Risk domain	Risk level <sup>a</sup>	Risk component			
			Vulnerability		Resilience	
			Score	Category	Score	Category
Conflict	Conflict	Significant	0.51	High	0.19	Very High
Climate	Climate	Significant	0.60	High	0.29	Very High
Development	Economic	Minor	0.39	Low	0.50	High
	Social	Moderate	0.56	High	0.55	High
	Institutional	Severe	0.91	Very High	0.14	Very High

**Source:** ESCWA.

<sup>a</sup> Definitions of risk levels are provided in annex 1. Risk categories for vulnerability and resilience range from “high risk”, indicated by dark red, to “low risk”, indicated by dark green.

**Figure 2.** Relationship between vulnerability and resilience, Libya, 2022



**Source:** ESCWA.

The ESCWA Arab Risk Monitor provides a breakdown of the core **vulnerability** and **resilience** of each of the risk areas. It defines vulnerability in terms of a country's likelihood to experience shocks and its structural exposure to such shocks. It defines resilience in terms of a country's policy-driven capacity to absorb the negative impacts of these shocks. For example, in Libya, conflict risk is driven by "medium" vulnerability together with "very low" resilience, while institutional risk is driven by "very high" vulnerability and "very low" resilience. Figure 2 provides a snapshot of the five risk domains in Libya for both of these components.

The scatterplots above illustrate the relationship between vulnerability and resilience in Libya in











2022. The upper-left quadrant is the worst-case scenario: high vulnerability and low resilience. Three out of five risk domains fell into the worst-case scenario quadrant: institutions, climate, and conflict.

## B. Trends in key risk drivers

The overall level of risk in Libya has deteriorated in the past decade; the country is more vulnerable and less resilient to conflict.

For 2022, the main drivers of high vulnerability in Libya were **water scarcity**, **corruption**, and **unemployment** followed by **political instability**. (Table 3).

**Table 2.** Trends in risk levels in Libya since 2010

Pathway	Risk domain	Component	2010	2015	2022	Trend	2022 vs. 2010		2022 vs. 2015	
Conflict	Conflict risk	Vulnerability	0.13	0.86	0.51		+100%	Deteriorated	-40%	Improved
		Resilience	0.50	0.19	0.19		-61%	Deteriorated	4%	Improved
Climate	Climate risk	Vulnerability	0.60	0.65	0.60		0%	Same	-9%	Improved
		Resilience	0.29	0.29	0.29		0%	Same	0%	Same
Development	Economic risk	Vulnerability	0.20	0.37	0.39		91%	Deteriorated	6%	Deteriorated
		Resilience	0.53	0.25	0.50		-6%	Deteriorated	97%	Improved
	Social risk	Vulnerability	0.59	0.56	0.56		-4%	Improved	-1%	Improved
		Resilience	0.52	0.53	0.55		5%	Deteriorated	4%	Improved
	Institutional risk	Vulnerability	0.85	0.92	0.91		7%	Deteriorated	-1%	Improved
		Resilience	0.25	0.16	0.14		-46%	Deteriorated	-16%	Deteriorated

**Source:** ESCWA.

**Note:** Risk categories for vulnerability and resilience range from "high risk", indicated by dark red, to "low risk", indicated by dark green.

**Table 3.** Key drivers of vulnerability in Libya ranked from highest to lowest risk (2022)

Vulnerability driver	2010	2015	2022	2022 vs. 2010		2022 vs. 2015	
				%	Category	%	Category
Water scarcity	0.91	0.91	0.92	1%	Deteriorated	1%	Deteriorated
Corruption	0.85	0.92	0.91	7%	Deteriorated	-1%	Improved
Unemployment	0.79	0.79	0.81	2%	Deteriorated	2%	Deteriorated
Political instability	0.37	0.79	0.79	115%	Deteriorated	0%	Same
Maternal Mortality	0.54	0.57	0.57	6%	Deteriorated	0%	Same
Food insecurity	0.46	0.53	0.56	22%	Deteriorated	7%	Deteriorated
Youth bulge	0.60	0.51	0.52	-13%	Improved	2%	Deteriorated
Conflict intensity	0.00	0.83	0.47	--	--	-43%	Improved
Conflict history	0.00	0.83	0.47	--	--	-44%	Improved
Income inequality	0.43	0.44	0.43	1%	Deteriorated	-2%	Improved
Infant mortality	0.42	0.38	0.34	-19%	Improved	-10%	Improved
Conflict proximity	0.17	1.00	0.33	100%	Deteriorated	-67%	Improved
Reliance on agriculture	0.29	0.39	0.27	-4%	Improved	-31%	Improved
Financial dependence	0.04	0.14	0.18	294%	Deteriorated	30%	Deteriorated

**Source:** ESCWA.

**Note:** Higher values indicate higher vulnerability. Risk categories for vulnerability and resilience range from “high risk”, indicated by dark red, to “low risk”, indicated by dark green.

The main drivers of low resilience were **limited territorial integrity and e-governance**

followed by government effectiveness and water resilience. (Table 4).

**Table 4.** Key drivers of Resilience in Libya ranked from highest to lowest risk (2022)

Resilience driver	2010	2015	2022	2022 vs. 2010		2022 vs. 2015	
Territorial integrity	0.78	0.00	0.00	-100%	Deteriorated	0%	Same
E-governance	0.14	0.06	0.10	-27%	Deteriorated	59%	Improved
Government effectiveness	0.28	0.19	0.14	-49%	Deteriorated	-28%	Deteriorated
Water resilience	0.15	0.14	0.14	-3%	Deteriorated	0%	Same
Rule of law	0.34	0.23	0.17	-50%	Deteriorated	-26%	Deteriorated
Displacement resilience	0.46	0.19	0.22	-53%	Deteriorated	17%	Improved
Women's Participation	0.33	0.33	0.34	2%	Improved	2%	Improved
Voice and accountability	0.26	0.37	0.36	40%	Improved	-2%	Deteriorated
Land resilience	0.43	0.43	0.43	1%	Improved	0%	Same
Economic development	0.55	0.51	0.49	-11%	Deteriorated	-3%	Deteriorated
Economic growth	0.51	0.00	0.51	0%	Same	0%	Same
Education	0.57	0.54	0.54	-4%	Deteriorated	1%	Improved
Health coverage	0.56	0.54	0.56	0%	Same	3%	Improved
Water and sanitation services	0.63	0.71	0.77	21%	Improved	8%	Improved


**Source:** ESCWA.

**Note:** Higher values indicate higher resilience. Risk categories for vulnerability and resilience range from “high risk”, indicated by dark red, to “low risk”, indicated by dark green.

The main driver of deterioration was conflict risk, which increased as a result of the post-2011 hostilities. This is reflected in higher levels of **political instability** (more than +100 per cent compared with 2010 levels) and **conflict proximity** (+100 per cent), as well as a lower level of **territorial integrity** (-100 per cent). Libya is more vulnerable to economic risk owing


to **increasing financial dependence** (more than 100 per cent). However, resilience improved, mainly as a result of positive **voice and accountability** (+40 per cent). Libya also saw a marked deterioration in institutional risk, driven by increasing **corruption** (+7 per cent), and reductions in **government effectiveness** (-49 per cent) and the **rule of law** (-50 per cent).

**Figure 3. Drivers of vulnerability, 2010-2022 (Percentage change)**




**Source:** ESCWA. "Conflict intensity" and "Conflict history" are excluded from this figure, and indeed from the analysis, as the value for each in 2010 was zero.

**Figure 4. Drivers of resilience, 2010-2022 (percentage change)**



**Source:** ESCWA.

**Figure 5.** Percentage change in risk by dimension in Libya, 2010-2022



**Source:** ESCWA.

In figure 5, the graph on the left illustrates how vulnerability has developed in Libya. Since 2010, there have been increases in conflict vulnerability (more than 100 per cent), economic vulnerability (+91 per cent), institutional vulnerability (+7 per cent). climate vulnerability remained stable, and social vulnerability has declined (-4 per cent). All this illustrates the magnitude of the impact of conflict in Libya, and demonstrates that political instability remains a prominent risk driver in the country.

The graph on the right of figure 5 shows the trends in different measures of resilience. Climate resilience has remained stable. Three measures of resilience have worsened since 2010: conflict (-63 per cent), institutional resilience (-46 per cent) and economic resilience (-46 per cent). This weakening of resilience is mainly attributed to the lingering ramifications of the conflict that ravaged the country. Since 2010, only social resilience (+5 per cent) has improved.



## 2. Conflict risk

**Table 5.** Conflict risk in Libya, 2022

Conflict risk						
Overall risk	Significant	■	■	■	■	■
Vulnerability	Medium	■	■	■	■	■
Resilience	Very Low	■	■	■	■	■

**Source:** ESCWA.

**Note:** Definitions of risk levels are provided in annex 1.

Conflict risk in Libya is rated as **Significant**. The level of conflict vulnerability is rated as **Medium** (0.51), down from its 2015 peak (0.86) but still higher than pre-war levels (0.13). The level of conflict resilience is rated as **Very Low** (0.19). Conflict **resilience** has also deteriorated since 2010, from 0.50 to 0.19 in 2022.

### A. Conflict vulnerability

As shown in the following table, key drivers of conflict vulnerability in Libya are conflict history and conflict intensity (both 0.47 in 2022). Historical grievances are among the strongest predictors of future conflict. Protracted conflicts, as in the case of Libya, lead to divided and fragmented societies.

In little more than a decade, Libya has experienced a popular uprising, the overthrow of a Government, civil war, and foreign intervention. The failure of a central authority to emerge after the Government was overthrown in 2011 led to power struggles among armed factions vying for control over state institutions and resources. This strife evolved into conflict in 2014, with severe

ramifications for people and institutions. In 2016, control of the country was split between factions; this led to the establishment of parallel political, economic, governance, and security institutions. The complex challenges of armed conflict and the COVID-19 pandemic led to a humanitarian crisis in 2019-2020.


**Table 6.** Drivers of conflict vulnerability in Libya

Driver	2010	2015	2022
Political instability	0.37	0.79	0.79
Conflict intensity	0.00	0.83	0.47
Conflict history	0.00	0.83	0.47
Conflict proximity	0.17	1.00	0.33

**Source:** ESCWA.

**Note:** Risk categories for vulnerability and resilience range from “high risk”, indicated by dark red, to “low risk”, indicated by dark green.

**Figure 6.** Battle-related deaths in Libya, 2010-2022



**Source:** ESCWA, based on data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Event Dataset, Global Version 23.1.

**Note:** Includes three types of violence: state-based, non-state and one-sided violence.

The United-Nations-brokered ceasefire agreement in October 2020<sup>3</sup> between the Government of National Accord and the Libyan National Army brought a significant reduction in violent conflict. However, the implementation of a roadmap for national elections, agreed upon in the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum in 2020 encountered obstacles. Despite the formation of a national unity Government in March 2021, stability was threatened in 2022 after presidential and parliamentary elections were indefinitely postponed, which fuelled tensions between parties. In late 2023, the security situation remained fragile, with frequent armed clashes indicating fragmentation and a lack of control.<sup>4</sup>

## B. Conflict resilience

The fragmented political geography of Libya and the high prevalence of internally displaced persons highlight the country's limited ability to cope with conflict-related shocks.<sup>5</sup> The key driver of low conflict resilience is **limited territorial integrity**, as shown by table 7.

**Table 7.** Drivers of low resilience in Libya

Driver	2010	2015	2022
Territorial integrity	0.78	0.00	0.00
Displacement resilience	0.54	0.19	0.22
Voice and accountability	0.26	0.37	0.36

**Source:** ESCWA.

**Note:** Risk categories for vulnerability and resilience range from "high risk", indicated by dark red, to "low risk", indicated by dark green.

The structural weakness of civic and democratic culture, as well as the rising influence of the periphery at the expense of the centre, has interacted with the politicization of public administration, exclusion and mistrust. All of these factors have contributed to reducing the State and its institutions to a position approaching non-existence. Since the outset of the Libyan uprising, there were early signs that some forces rejected institution-building, particularly the military and security institutions. Some of these forces advocated politically exclusionary policies, in particular through support for the Political Isolation Act, which excluded all former middle- and high-ranking officials from carrying out roles in the post-revolutionary State on the grounds that they had served under the former regime. These signs should have been understood as early warning signals that the political transition was fraught with risks.

The weakness of the State and its institutions has led to an increase in the number of armed non-state actors. This was facilitated, and mutually reinforced, by porous borders and arms proliferation. Institutions have been hijacked and appropriated for partisan or tribal and regional interests, creating more drivers of risk that will feed into future low- and medium-intensity conflicts. Many new ad hoc institutions have been established to serve existing actors or to cater for the interests of particular factions. Institutions have become tools in the conflict, deepening the divide and entrenching the struggle rather than reconciling the opposing forces with the need for State-building.


3 <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/security-council-press-statement-libya-10>.

4 S/2023/967, United Nations Support Mission in Libya – Report of the Secretary-General. [https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/sg\\_report\\_.pdf](https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/sg_report_.pdf).

5 IOM. Libya — Migrant Report 49 (July – September 2023). <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/libya-migrant-report-49-july-september-2023>.

Another driver of low resilience is **forced displacement**. Internally displaced persons, especially those facing prolonged displacement, have struggled to return home due to conflict-related damage to houses and infrastructure, limited services, and security concerns. Migrants and those in need of international protection face the risks of deprivation of liberty, forced labour and discrimination. Many have also risked their lives crossing the Mediterranean to reach Europe.<sup>6</sup>

**Figure 7.** Forcibly displaced persons in Libya, 2010-2022



**Source:** ESCWA, based on data from the Refugee Data Finder of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, accessed January 2024.



### 3. Climate risk

**Table 8.** Libya Climate Risk, 2022

Climate risk						
Overall risk	Significant					
Vulnerability	High					
Resilience	Low					

**Source:** ESCWA.

**Note:** Definitions of risk levels are provided in annex 1.

Climate risk is rated as **significant** for Libya, with a high level of **vulnerability** (0.6) and a low level of **resilience** (0.29). The overall risk related to climate has increased since 2010.

#### A. Climate vulnerability

As shown in the following table, the key driver of climate vulnerability in Libya is **water scarcity**. Libya is chronically water stressed and has been ranked as the sixth most water-stressed country globally. Demand for water is rising as temperatures increase and the country's population grows. Libya relies primarily on groundwater resources, particularly fossil/non-renewable transboundary groundwater aquifers such as the Nubian sandstone aquifer system and the north-western Sahara aquifer system. Surface water sources are very limited. Water scarcity and dependency

on shared water resources, together with the effects of climate change, create an environment conducive to waterborne diseases, malnutrition, economic and political instability, and potential conflict.<sup>7</sup>

Freshwater in Libya has become less available, and an increasing number of Libyans have been relying on agriculture as a source of income and livelihood. This was especially true during the most intense phase of the conflict in 2015. Increasingly severe water scarcity and protracted conflict have led to a significant decline in water, sanitation, and hygiene services and facilities. Only 65 per cent of households have access to the public water network, and only 44.7 per cent are connected to the wastewater network.<sup>8</sup>

**Table 9.** Drivers of climate vulnerability in Libya

Driver	2010	2015	2022
Water scarcity	0.91	0.91	0.92
Reliance on agriculture	0.29	0.39	0.27

**Source:** ESCWA.


**Note:** Risk categories for vulnerability and resilience range from "high risk", indicated by dark red, to "low risk", indicated by dark green.

7 UNICEF, 2022 <https://www.unicef.org/mena/documents/unicef-libya-water-scarcity-and-climate-change-analysis-wash-enabling-environment-libya>.

8 UNSDCF 2023-2025

According to projections from the Regional Initiative for the Assessment of Climate Change Impacts on Water Resources and Socio-Economic Vulnerability in the Arab Region (RICCAR), in large swaths of the country, precipitation will remain about the same until 2025. However, variability in precipitation is expected to increase. This poses a challenge to the agriculture sector and other water-intensive economic sectors.

Mean temperatures in Libya are projected to increase by about 1°C by 2025 in comparison with the reference period (1981-2000). Currently, the temperature is increasing by an average of 0.07°C each decade. Until the end of the century, RICCAR’s hot day indicator (SU35 – days over 35°C) is predicted to increase significantly along the Mediterranean coast of eastern Libya.<sup>9</sup> Rising temperatures will continue to contribute to an increase in the frequency and intensity of climate extremes and disasters.



## B. Climate resilience

As shown in the table below, **water withdrawals** are the main driver of low resilience in Libya. As a result of climate change, rainfall anomalies increase. Water availability in Libya has become an alarming issue as withdrawal rates have begun to exceed the rate of replenishment. Since the 1960s, rainfall in the dry season has fallen by nearly 10 per cent, further entrenching water scarcity.<sup>10</sup> In addition, due to the lack of safe, functioning sanitation systems and wastewater treatment facilities, water sources are often contaminated with sewage.<sup>11</sup>

**Table 10.** Drivers of climate resilience in Libya

Driver	2010	2015	2022
Water resilience	0.15	0.14	0.14
Land resilience	0.43	0.43	0.43

**Source:** ESCWA.

**Note:** Risk categories for vulnerability and resilience range from “high risk”, indicated by dark red, to “low risk”, indicated by dark green.

9 ESCWA et al. 2017. Arab Climate Change Assessment Report – Main Report. Beirut, E/ESCWA/SDPD/2017/RICCAR/Report.  
 10 World Bank. Climate Change Knowledge Portal for Development Practitioners and Policy Makers. Country – Libya. Available at <https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/country/libya/climate-data-historical>.  
 11 UNICEF (2023) A Climate Landscape Analysis for Children in Libya. Available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/climate-landscape-analysis-children-libya>.


Despite the country's vulnerability to climate change, there has been little progress in Libya towards the development of national disaster risk reduction or climate change adaptation strategies or plans.<sup>12</sup> The 2023 Derna disaster serves as a reminder of how extreme weather events can have particularly acute consequences in States weakened by conflict and political instability.<sup>13</sup>

On 10 September 2023, Storm Daniel hit eastern Libya, resulting in widespread flooding, the collapse of two dams in the Derna district, and extensive damage to communities and infrastructure, worsening an already poor humanitarian situation. The disaster affected more than 250,000 people, leaving over 5,800 people dead, 44,800 people internally displaced, and 18,500 houses destroyed or damaged.<sup>14</sup>

As the situation unfolded, accountability issues emerged. These issues led to the Derna mayor being suspended. Investigations and arrests of officials followed. There were concerns about different factions in the east and west of the country competing for control over reconstruction funds, with the risk of further deepening existing divisions and impeding reconstruction efforts.<sup>15</sup> The Derna disaster brought to light multiple governance deficits, which manifested themselves in a lack of maintenance, inadequate natural resource management, and the absence of effective mechanisms for disaster management and prevention. The lack of unified political decision-


making at national level made matters more challenging. As the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and the Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya in his remarks to the Security Council, if governance issues had been addressed at national level, it could have mitigated the impact of the disaster.<sup>16</sup>

**Figure 8.** Renewable internal freshwater resources per capita, Libya (Cubic metres)



**Source:** ESCWA, based on data from the World Bank world development indicators databank.

**Figure 9.** Agriculture, forestry, and fishing, value added, Libya (Percentage of GDP)



**Source:** ESCWA, based on data from the World Bank world development indicators databank.

12 UNSDCF 2023-2025 <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/united-nations-sustainable-development-cooperation-framework>.

13 ESCWA (2023). Addressing climate, peace and security in the Arab region. <https://www.unescwa.org/publications/climate-peace-security-arab-region>.

14 <https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/libya/>.

15 Report of the Secretary-General António Guterres on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya - 07 December 2023 [https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/sg\\_report\\_.pdf](https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/sg_report_.pdf).

16 Remarks by SRSG Abdoulaye Bathily to the Security Council 16 October 2023 [https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/srsg\\_bathily\\_remarks\\_to\\_the\\_un\\_security\\_council\\_-\\_as\\_delivered.pdf](https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/srsg_bathily_remarks_to_the_un_security_council_-_as_delivered.pdf).





## 4. Economic risk

**Table 11.** Libya Economic Risk, 2022

Economic risk						
Overall risk	Minor					
Vulnerability	Low					
Resilience	Medium					

**Source:** ESCWA.

**Note:** Definitions of risk levels are provided in annex 1.

Economic risk in 2022 is rated as **minor** for Libya, with a **medium** level of **vulnerability** (0.39) and a **medium** level of **resilience** (0.50). Between 2010 and 2022, economic vulnerability rose from 0.20 to 0.39. This rise is mainly a consequence of the conflict and subsequent economic losses.

### A. Economic vulnerability

As the following table shows, a key driver of economic vulnerability in Libya is **food insecurity**. Libya is rich in natural resources and has a small population. As a result, the per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of Libya is one of the highest in Africa. Nevertheless, Libya is increasingly relying on food imports to meet demand, as agricultural outputs have been declining. This poses several risks, since economies that are dependent on imports are

more vulnerable to global shocks in price and supply. The 2022 humanitarian response plan reports that the number of people in need of assistance decreased from around 1.5 million in 2021 to around 800,000 in 2022. Nevertheless, Libya still struggles with food insecurity, malnutrition, and low agricultural production.<sup>17</sup>

Farmers face limited access to agricultural production inputs and lack support for animal healthcare as a result of prolonged conflict in the country's main agricultural areas. Together with the disruption of agricultural extension services caused by COVID-19 and the resulting instability, this led many households to abandon agricultural activities, reducing food availability.<sup>18</sup> More recently, the war in Ukraine has led to global food price shocks, including in Libya, which relies heavily on cereal imports from Russia and Ukraine, 88 per cent of its grain being imported from those two countries. The price of food has risen by 18 per cent compared with pre-war levels, while the country's compensation system (subsidies etc.) for necessities has been falling ever since 2011, causing tensions with food producers and making prices sensitive to economic fluctuations.<sup>19</sup> The diminishing purchasing power of vulnerable households has affected their ability to afford nutritious foods and essential staples, raising concerns about overall food security. This, in turn, has compelled them to adopt negative coping strategies such as

17 HRP 2022.

18 Food Security Cluster. Libya Food Security Sector - 2021 Year in Review. <https://fscluster.org/libya>.

19 WFP Libya country strategic plan (2023–2025). [https://executiveboard.wfp.org/document\\_download/WFP-0000145845?\\_ga=2.217571093.2090346692.1707727914-2019312173.1705306491](https://executiveboard.wfp.org/document_download/WFP-0000145845?_ga=2.217571093.2090346692.1707727914-2019312173.1705306491).

consuming cheaper foods, eating smaller portions, or reducing the number of meals, particularly among women.<sup>20</sup>

**Table 12.** Drivers of economic vulnerability in Libya

Driver	2010	2015	2022
Food insecurity	0.46	0.53	0.56
Income inequality	0.43	0.44	0.43
Financial dependence	0.04	0.14	0.18

**Source:** ESCWA.

**Note:** Risk categories for vulnerability and resilience range from “high risk”, indicated by dark red, to “low risk”, indicated by dark green.

## B. Economic resilience

Libya is classified as an upper-middle-income country,<sup>21</sup> but it ranks 104th out of 191 in the latest Human Development Index<sup>22</sup>. It is also a large oil exporter, holding about 3 per cent of the world’s oil reserves.<sup>23</sup> Hydrocarbons account for around 95 per cent of Libya’s export and government revenue.<sup>24</sup> The impact of conflict, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the 2022 oil blockade have posed challenges for the country. Economic growth and contraction have fluctuated significantly over the past decade, leading to uncertainty and capital flight. Overreliance on natural resources and a lack of economic diversification further limit the country’s economic potential. Conversely, the economy is expected to grow with higher oil prices.


**Table 13.** Drivers of economic resilience in Libya

Driver	2010	2015	2022
Economic development	0.55	0.51	0.49
Economic growth	0.51	0.00	0.51

**Source:** ESCWA.


**Note:** Risk components categories’ colors for vulnerability and resilience ranges from dark red meaning high risk to dark green meaning very low level.

**Figure 10.** Value of food imports as a percentage of total merchandise exports, Libya (Percentage, three-year averages)



**Source:** ESCWA, based on data from the Food and Agriculture Organization Statistics (FAOSTAT).

**Figure 11.** GDP growth, Libya (Percentage annual)



**Source:** ESCWA, based on data from the World Bank world development indicators databank.

20 United Nations Common Country Analysis 2022 [https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/un\\_libya\\_cca\\_2021\\_final\\_1.pdf](https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/un_libya_cca_2021_final_1.pdf).

21 World Bank Country and Lending Groups <https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups>.

22 Country Insights \_ Human Development Reports <https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/country-insights#/ranks>.

23 Libya Overview \_ Development news, research, data \_ World Bank <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/libya/overview>.

24 IMF. Libya\_ 2023 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Libya in\_ IMF Staff Country Reports Volume 2023 Issue 201 (2023) <https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2023/201/article-A001-en.xml>.

## 5. Social risk

**Table 14.** Libya social risk, 2022

Social risk					
Overall risk	Moderate				
Vulnerability	Medium				
Resilience	Medium				

**Source:** ESCWA.

**Note:** Definitions of risk levels are provided in annex 1.

Social risk in Libya is rated as **moderate**, with a **medium** level of **vulnerability** (approximately 0.56) and a medium level of **resilience** (approximately 0.55). Although the changes are marginal, social risk has been gradually improving in recent years, with **vulnerability** decreasing slightly from 0.59 in 2010 to 0.56 in 2022, and **resilience** increasing from 0.52 in 2010 to 0.55 in 2022.

### A. Social vulnerability

**Table 15.** Drivers of social vulnerability in Libya


Driver	2010	2015	2022
Unemployment	0.79	0.79	0.81
Maternal mortality	0.54	0.57	0.57
Youth bulge	0.60	0.51	0.52
Infant mortality	0.42	0.38	0.34

**Source:** ESCWA.

**Note:** Risk categories for vulnerability and resilience range from “high risk”, indicated by dark red, to “low risk”, indicated by dark green.


High unemployment rates, particularly among young people, contribute to economic disenfranchisement and hinder opportunities for personal and societal growth. Unemployment rates remain **high** (approximately 20 per cent), especially compared with the Arab region (approximately 10 per cent) and the world (approximately 5.7 per cent). Unemployment is particularly high for women (26 per cent), youth (51 per cent) and young women (71 per cent), and it continues to rise.<sup>25</sup> On the other hand, child mortality rates in Libya remain significantly lower than the average rates for the world and the Arab region.

**Figure 12.** Mortality rate, under five years of age (Per 1,000 live births)



**Source:** ESCWA, based on data from the World Bank world development indicators databank.

**Figure 13.** Total unemployment as a percentage of total labour force



**Source:** ESCWA, based on data from the World Bank world development indicators databank.

## B. Social resilience

The main driver of low social resilience is limited participation by women in society. High levels of female unemployment result from a failure to acknowledge the significant contribution women make to the economy. Enduring social norms have led to an increase in unpaid care work, leaving women economically vulnerable. Women are notably underrepresented in politics, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding.<sup>26</sup> Violence against women and girls, including those who openly advocate for gender equality and women's rights, impedes their equal participation in the political, economic, and social life of the country. The absence of a robust legal framework further complicates the challenge of protecting women from various forms of gender-based violence.<sup>27</sup>

**Table 16.** Drivers of social resilience in Libya

Driver	2010	2015	2022
Women's participation	0.33	0.33	0.34
Education	0.57	0.54	0.54
Health coverage	0.56	0.54	0.56
Water and sanitation	0.63	0.71	0.77

**Source:** ESCWA.

**Note:** Risk categories for vulnerability and resilience range from “high risk”, indicated by dark red, to “low risk”, indicated by dark green. More positive drivers of resilience in Libya include **health coverage** and **water and sanitation services**. However, despite progress made in water sanitation, water infrastructure and services are deteriorating. The availability and reliability of water, sanitation and hygiene services are uneven across the country, affecting public health and sanitation standards.

In 2019, Libya carried out a national assessment of water supply systems and institutions. The resulting report highlights accelerated infrastructure deterioration in Libya due to a shortage of spare parts, consumables, and insufficient maintenance caused by financial constraints. A lack of effective coordination among key agencies complicates the establishment of proper institutional mechanisms and decision-making processes for sustainable water supply.<sup>28</sup> The absence of a robust social protection system also leaves vulnerable communities without adequate support and safety nets, heightening socioeconomic disparities and leaving many at risk of falling through the cracks.

26 UN WOMEN <https://arabstates.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2020/12/deepening-stabilization-in-libya>.

27 UN WOMEN <https://arabstates.unwomen.org/en/countries/libya>.

28 UNICEF 2022 <https://open.unicef.org/sites/transparency/files/2023-05/Libya%20CER%202022.pdf>.

The healthcare system in Libya is also beset by numerous obstacles, including inadequate resources, limited access to medical services in certain areas, and the lingering effects of conflict on healthcare facilities. Around one in three health centres in Benghazi and one in six in Tripoli were damaged during the conflict, and

almost 20 per cent shut down completely.<sup>29</sup> The rollout of COVID-19 vaccines was also slow compared with other countries in the region, with delays being caused by territorial insecurity, strained public finances, and a lack of medical equipment.<sup>30</sup>

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29 World Bank (2021) Libya Economic Monitor, Spring 2021. Available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/libya-economic-monitor-spring-2021>.

30 Ibid.



## 6. Institutional risk

**Table 17.** Libya Institutional Risk, 2022

Institutional risk						
Overall risk	Severe					
Vulnerability	Very high					
Resilience	Very low					

**Source:** ESCWA.

**Note:** Definitions of risk levels are provided in annex 1.

Institutional risk in Libya is rated as **severe**, with a **very high** level of vulnerability (approximately 0.91) and a **very low** level of resilience (approximately 0.14). A decade of political crisis and violent conflict have contributed to a deterioration in institutional risk.

### A. Institutional vulnerability

Since the beginning of the war, there has been an increase in institutional **vulnerability**. The level of this type of vulnerability rose from an already very high level of 0.85 in 2010 to 0.91 in 2022. Control of corruption has been declining since 2011. Better governance is needed to address crises and implement sound policies to mitigate the drivers of conflict.

**Table 18.** Drivers of institutional vulnerability in Libya

Driver	2010	2015	2022
Corruption	0.85	0.92	0.91

**Source:** ESCWA.

**Note:** Risk categories for vulnerability and resilience range from “high risk”, indicated by dark red, to “low risk”, indicated by dark green.

### B. Institutional resilience

A similar decline has been observed in institutional **resilience**. Resilience dropped from an already low level of 0.25 in 2010 to 0.14 in 2021. The main contributor to this decline is the lack of government effectiveness in Libya.

**Table 19.** Drivers of institutional resilience in Libya

Driver	2010	2015	2022
E-governance	0.14	0.06	0.10
Government effectiveness	0.28	0.19	0.14
Rule of law	0.34	0.23	0.17

**Source:** ESCWA.

**Note:** Risk categories for vulnerability and resilience range from “high risk”, indicated by dark red, to “low risk”, indicated by dark green.

Government institutions in Libya have faced significant challenges since the 2011 revolution. The country has been beset by political instability, fragmentation, and the presence of multiple competing power centres. As a result, governance structures have struggled to establish a strong central authority and effective administration across the nation. With competing political and military factions operating different and often conflicting systems of governance, Libya has become a divided nation.<sup>31</sup> The interim Government (backed by the Libyan National Army) controls most of the eastern, central, and southern parts

31 World Bank (2021). Libya Economic Monitor, Spring 2021. Available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/libya-economic-monitor-spring-2021>.

of the country, while the Government of National Accord controls the country's western regions around the capital, Tripoli.<sup>32</sup> The absence of a central government has led to regional divisions, conflicting interests, and limited state control over various areas. Nevertheless, efforts are being made to set the stage for a future unified government.

Since 2012, with its ineffective and deeply flawed governance system in a context dominated by diverse armed groups, nepotism, tribalism, and exclusionary political process, Libya has progressed ever further down the path of institutional breakdown. Therefore, it is paramount that institutional development is given priority. Government formation and power-sharing arrangements are not sufficient on their own. The failure to reach an agreement and a lack of vision on the desired form of the State have further weakened the country's already ineffective institutions. The number of civil servants is unnecessarily high, and structural dysfunction has become commonplace. There is a critical lack of control over public spending; this has led to further corruption and misuse of public funds, which have been used by successive governments to buy allegiance at unprecedented levels. Despite oil production and exports, Libya has been facing a continuing budget deficit, with no obvious prospect of improvement.

Institutional shortcomings in the transition process have caused a reversion to fragmentation and the re-emergence of local identities. This has severely affected the country's military. Mistrust and division among Libyans have grown for various reasons,

including the 2011 uprising and its repercussions. Therefore, any attempt to resolve the conflict and rebuild the State must start with a comprehensive national dialogue that excludes no party and tackles the issue of the military and its relationship with society and the State. Libyan society is splintered into a multitude of groups and factions, all of which need to be given a stake in Libyan stability.

The installation of an interim Government of National Unity in March 2021, with a mandate to hold presidential and parliamentary elections on 24 December 2021, was a major positive development. But it contributed little to the effective reunification of the fiercely contested institutions between the competing powers within Libya. The chronic multi-level fragmentation of governance structures since the collapse of the State in 2011, particularly key institutions such as the Central Bank of Libya and various bodies in the security sector, has been severely detrimental to stability in Libya. This institutional fragility stalled the implementation of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum Roadmap<sup>33</sup> agreed upon in the Berlin Conference in 2021, as the national elections planned for 24 December 2021 had to be indefinitely postponed as a result of schisms and disputes among Libyan political actors and institutions on numerous issues including the constitutional basis for elections and eligibility requirements for presidential candidates. The political crisis deepened polarization and tensions among political and security actors. Shifting alliances among armed groups resulted in periodic armed clashes, mainly in the Tripolitania region, resulting in civilian casualties and destruction of civilian

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32 Ibid.

33 United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) Libyan Political Dialogue Forum. Available at <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/libyan-political-dialogue-forum>.



infrastructure.<sup>34</sup> This scenario could repeat itself in future if the question of State formation remains unanswered.

Elections are an important tool for establishing a legitimate government. However, in the absence of a State itself, elections can become problematic. So far, the focus has been on electoral processes, while the institutional crisis in Libya continues unabated, with successive interim arrangements and transitional

Governments, and legislative bodies having lost their legitimacy in the eyes of the Libyan people. The protracted nature of this crisis further threatens the future of Libya and its territorial integrity, with the country likely to sink deeper into economic collapse, political and social turmoil, and increased insecurity. State-building and institutional development process urgently need to be given priority, so that any new Government could regain trust and re-establish the legitimacy of the State.

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34 Reuters (August 28, 2022) Deadly battles erupt across Tripoli, raising fears of wider Libya war. Available at <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/shootouts-blasts-erupt-libyan-capital-amid-political-standoff-2022-08-27/>.



## 7. Recommendations

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### A. Conflict risk

- Reach agreement on a binding political settlement that paves the way for a peaceful electoral process – the only way to provide the country with unified legitimate institutions and a peaceful future. **Hold inclusive, credible, and transparent national elections** with the active inclusion of women and young people, conclude the transitional phase and address the country's legitimacy and democratic deficits.
- **Cease widespread deportations and collective expulsions** of migrants and asylum seekers from Libya to neighbouring countries, a practice which is prohibited under international law. Provide the required international protection and assistance to migrants and asylum-seekers. Find alternatives to detention for migrants and asylum-seekers, emphasizing humane treatment and access to legal proceedings. Libya is not a safe port of disembarkation and any refugees and migrants intercepted along the central Mediterranean route should be assigned a safe port in accordance with the law of the sea, international maritime law, international human rights law and refugee law. Prioritize addressing **the root causes of vulnerability among internally displaced persons**, including socioeconomic and protection factors, to foster sustainable and durable solutions.
- Implement security sector reform, **unifying institutions under civilian oversight to**

### **enhance peacekeeping capabilities and restore legitimate State authority.**

Adopt an integrated approach to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed group members, improving security and managing explosive hazards.

### B. Climate risk

- Address **water scarcity as a key risk driver** by implementing measures to reduce migration to water-scarce regions, promote climate change adaptation and prevent tensions and conflicts over dwindling water resources.
- Establish a **unified national platform to coordinate reconstruction efforts for Derna**, involving representatives from affected communities to amplify their voices and perspectives. Prioritize transparency and accountability in the allocation and use of reconstruction funds as a crucial step toward rebuilding the trust of the people of Libya in their leaders.
- Implement **proactive measures for addressing climate vulnerability** by developing strategies to prevent, mitigate and respond to the impacts of climate change and environmental degradation in Libya, with a view to reduce the country's environmental footprint and enhance the population's resilience to shocks.
- Support energy transition, focusing on **building resilience for local populations**, especially vulnerable groups,

through inclusive and comprehensive approaches.

### C. Economic risk

- Diversify the economy, **reducing reliance on the state-controlled hydrocarbon sector**, and remove obstacles to sustainable private sector development. Support women and youth entrepreneurship and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises which generate rights-based employment.
- Increase and ensure **equitable access to decent work and employment opportunities** for inclusive poverty reduction. Decrease dependency on the public sector as a main employment provider. Promote upskilling through education and training, focusing on women and youth for a diversified labour market. Improve formal employment opportunities in historically marginalized areas, such as the south and remote communities with minorities. Encourage greater labour market participation by women, especially in emerging sectors, to enhance empowerment and independence.
- Enhance financial sector reform by **unifying the Central Bank of Libya**, aiming to transform financial institutions into effective facilitators of private sector development. Support the announced unification of the Central Bank, emphasizing the importance of continued efforts to harmonize banking procedures and executive management. Encourage the full implementation of the United-Nations-facilitated international audit recommendations issued in July 2021, with a particular emphasis on reactivating the Bank's Board of Directors.

### D. Social risk

- Implement measures to **improve equitable access to quality and people-centred social services**, including health and education, with a focus on the most vulnerable populations. Promote the decentralization of social services to reach marginalized populations on the periphery, ensuring broader and more effective service delivery. Enhance information management with appropriate disaggregation to facilitate more effective sectoral and cross-sectoral planning for social services. Develop and implement an integrated and holistic approach to water management, ensuring sustainable, equitable, safe, and gender-sensitive access to water, sanitation and hygiene services.
- Develop and implement **shock-responsive social protection services** to enhance the resilience of vulnerable populations in times of need. Prioritize access to protection services, particularly for victims of abuse, neglect, and violence, with a specific focus on the well-being and safety of women and children.
- Strengthen human capital by **investing in education and skills** development and build a competent and adaptable labour force that meets emerging market needs.

### E. Institutional risk

- **Adopt a national constitution** based on global best practices, incorporating agreed arrangements, human rights, and gender-equality considerations. Develop a **gender-responsive national development plan** to provide a coherent and aligned framework for United Nations and international support.

- Promote **active Libyan leadership and ownership** in resolving the crisis, fostering constructive dialogue and securing ongoing support from regional organizations, concerned member States and the international community. Encourage a unified and coordinated approach within the Security Council to demonstrate unwavering support for the democratic aspirations of the Libyan people, ultimately contributing to sustainable peace and development.
- Strengthen **justice and human rights institutions** through legislative reform to address inequalities, protect vulnerable populations, especially women and girls, and hold perpetrators of human rights violations accountable. Initiate reconciliation efforts at national and sub-national levels, incorporating transitional justice and involving women, youth, and minority ethnic groups to address grievances and strengthen social cohesion. Ensure the protection of civil and political rights to facilitate meaningful civic engagement, especially for women, youth, and minority ethnic groups.
- Unify government institutions and reform them to make them efficient, responsive, and cost-effective. **Strengthen national public institutional capacities**, including through expansion of e-governance, at all levels of government.



## 8. From assessment of vulnerabilities and resilience to forecast


Complementing the ESCWA Arab Risk Monitor, the ViEWS (Violence Early Warning System) model is a quantitative early warning tool for the Arab region. It is designed specifically to analyse the probability of an outbreak of deadly violence in which the State is at least one party. By doing so, it helps to identify the emergency hotspots that may lie ahead.

The model generates monthly forecasts of the probability of deadly violence between 1 and 36 months into the future for individual countries in the Arab region, as well as for subnational areas of approximately 55x55 kilometres within these countries. By providing a systematic, quantitative assessment of the

risk of deadly violence, the ViEWS model provides a common understanding of the challenges and issues faced by countries and communities in the region, which in turn facilitates an integrated response from the humanitarian, development and peace and security sectors.

At the subnational level, the probability of at least 25 or more fatalities in each grid-cell is predicted. Examining the forecasts and their progression from September 2024 to 2026, a rise in the risk of violence and consequently of fatalities can be observed, specifically in and around the cities of Tripoli, Zawiya, Jafara, Jufra, Murzuq, Sabha and Sirte.

**Figure 14.** Predicted probability of State-based deadly violence in September 2024 (left) and 2026 (right)



**Source:** Uppsala University and Peace Research Institute Oslo, Violence Early-Warning System.

**Note:** Each grid cell corresponds to an area of approximately 55x55 kilometres.





## Annex 1. Definition of risk dimensions

Depending on the dimension (vulnerability/resilience) and the relative score, the level of risk by theme (e.g. conflict risk,

climate risk, economic risk) can be identified. It can range from “negligible” to “severe”, as depicted in the matrix below.

		Level of resilience				
		Very low 0-0.20	Low 0.21-0.40	Medium 0.41-0.60	High 0.61-0.80	Very high 0.81-1
Level of vulnerability	Very high 0.81-1	Severe	Severe	Significant	Moderate	Moderate
	High 0.61-0.80	Severe	Significant	Significant	Moderate	Moderate
	Medium 0.41-0.60	Significant	Significant	Moderate	Minor	Minor
	Low 0.21-0.40	Moderate	Moderate	Minor	Minor	Negligible
	Very low 0-0.20	Moderate	Moderate	Minor	Negligible	Negligible

Source: ESCWA.

## Annex 2. Detailed risk scores for 2022

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Pathway	Risk	Vulnerability		Resilience		Risk level
		Score	Category	Score	Category	
Conflict	Conflict risk	0.51	Medium	0.19	Very Low	Significant
Climate	Natural resource risk	0.60	High	0.29	Low	Significant
Development	Economic risk	0.39	Low	0.50	Medium	Minor
	Social risk	0.56	Medium	0.55	Medium	Moderate
	Institutional risk	0.91	Very High	0.14	Very Low	Severe

**Source:** ESCWA.



Risk-informed policymaking is essential not only for prioritizing and tackling current challenges, but also for foreseeing future risks and designing policies aimed at mitigating or preventing them. This report offers evidence-based analysis aimed at preventing and mitigating risks in Libya. It analyses the risk of violence as a function of two elements – high vulnerability and low resilience. These two elements are examined in connection with conflict, climate and development. Various types of risk affecting Libya are at notably high levels. Institutional risk affects development, and contributes substantially to the overall risk situation in Libya. The main risk factors leading to vulnerability, including water scarcity and unemployment, as well as the main risk factors leading to low resilience, namely water withdrawals and security, are also at high levels.

