



Situation Report on International Migration 2019

The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration
in the Context of the Arab Region



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The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration in the Context of the Arab Region



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Foreword

The adoption of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) in December 2018 marked a historic milestone in migration governance, driven by the realization that only through cooperation will it be possible to capitalize on migration's potential for development and address its risks and challenges. GCM offers a 360-degree vision of international migration governance, and provides a non-binding blueprint for countries to improve their ability to effectively manage migration and provide better outcomes for migrants and for countries of origin, transit and destination. GCM represents a convergence of States on a rights-based approach to migration, and a commitment to making migration work in a manner that complements the promise of dignity and shared prosperity for all, as set out in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

This comprehensive framework comes at a critical time for the Arab region, which is witnessing unprecedented levels of migration as a region of origin, transit, and destination. In 2017, the region hosted over 38 million migrants and refugees, including close to 9 million refugees representing almost 15 per cent of international migrants worldwide. An estimated 29 million people migrated from Arab countries, almost half of whom stayed within the region. Over 9 million refugees have sought protection in the Arab region, including 3.7 million refugees under the UNHCR mandate and 5.4 million Palestine refugees registered with UNRWA. Drivers of migration in the region are as complex as its patterns and trends. The dramatic variation between levels of stability and development across the region is a significant driver

shaping intra-regional and international migration. While some Arab countries continue to struggle with conflict, destruction and poverty, others are leading the way in groundbreaking research and development, building cities of the future and attracting migrants from across the globe.

The 2019 Situation Report on International Migration provides new insights into migration trends and patterns in the region, in terms of the nature of movements and the profiles of migrants, and with regard to new policies and regulations adopted in the region. The present Situation Report is produced by the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) and the International Organization for Migration, in collaboration with 15 United Nations agencies and members of the Working Group on International Migration in the Arab Region established in 2013. Building on the 2015 and the 2017 reports, the present report places migration in the Arab region squarely within the framework of GCM. It also showcases the relevance of GCM for the region, and identifies good practices to support countries in realizing that vision.

Migration has gained salience in the policy debates of all Arab States, given the severe demographic, economic and social shifts that have resulted from large scale migration in most countries. However, to meet the 23 objectives of GCM, States are required to take ambitious yet concrete steps to address their policy implications at the national level.

The present report aims to provide policy guidance and encourage multi-stakeholder debates and discussions to strengthen

effective management of migratory flows, and ensure dignity for all girls, boys, women and men migrants, while harnessing the


potential of migration in driving sustainable development.



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We would like to express our gratitude to the members of the Working Group on International Migration in the Arab Region: the Economic Commission for Africa; the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; the International Labour Organization; the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights; the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS; the United Nations Development Programme; the United Nations

Environment Programme; the United Nations Population Fund; the United Nations Human Settlements Programme; the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; the United Nations Children's Fund; the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East; the United Nations Entity for Gender Empowerment; the World Food Programme; and the World Health Organization.

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Introduction

Migration has become a defining feature of our globalized world, with numbers of international migrants growing exponentially over the past couple of decades. Migration has been recognized as a key accelerator for development in both countries of origin and destination; however, it also poses challenges. Consequently, a holistic approach to migration governance is crucial to optimize its overall benefits, offset the risks and challenges it may pose, and make migration work for all individuals and communities in countries of origin, transit and destination. Given the scale of international migration and its transboundary nature, cooperation between countries at the bilateral, subregional, regional and global levels has become an urgent necessity.

Recognizing these facts and determined to enhance cooperation on international migration in all its dimensions, the majority of Member States of the United Nations adopted the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) at an Intergovernmental Conference held in Marrakech, Morocco, on 10 December 2018.

GCM is a milestone in the history of the global dialogue on migration. Rooted in existing international laws, conventions and frameworks, such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, it aims to foster international cooperation among all relevant actors on migration. GCM adopts a whole-of-society and whole-of-government approach, and advocates respect for the recognized rights and obligations of migrants as well as those of sovereign States under international law.

Through its 23 objectives, GCM offers a 360-degree vision of international migration.

It recognizes that the key to transforming migration into a source of prosperity, innovation and sustainable development for countries of origin, transit and destination is to protect and empower migrants, which cannot be achieved without mainstreaming migration in development planning and in all sectoral and cross-cutting policies.

The diverse and complex patterns and trends of migration in the Arab region, and the often-protracted displacement dynamics, underline the importance of a robust global framework and comprehensive approach to achieve good migration governance. In 2017, the region hosted over 38 million migrants and refugees, representing almost 15 per cent of a total of 258 million international migrants worldwide. Over 9 million refugees have sought protection in the region, including 3.7 million refugees under the UNHCR mandate and 5.4 million Palestine refugees registered with UNRWA. Conflicts and environmental pressures in the region have also led to internal displacement of around 15 million people. Migration and displacement in the region have had a strong influence on political, economic and social developments, not only in Arab countries where almost half of the region's migrants reside, but also in neighbouring and more distant regions.

The present report provides a multidisciplinary and comprehensive overview of migration trends, policy developments, and priority issues in the region to inform policymakers, researchers and practitioners. It builds on previous editions of the Situation Report on International Migration, published in 2015 and 2017, and thus provides an increasingly comprehensive and up-to-date picture of

migration in the Arab region over time. In addition, the present report examines regional migration governance in the light of GCM objectives, with an emphasis on full inclusion, access to basic services for migrants, reducing vulnerabilities of migrants, and preventing and combatting the smuggling and trafficking of migrants.

The present report follows a mixed-methods approach, combining quantitative and qualitative analysis. In addition to desk research on the most recent literature, complemented with news resources where needed, it relies on data from multiple United Nations agencies, including the International Organization for Migration, The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the United Nations Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and the World Bank. The report uses the United Nations definition of an international migrant as “any person who changes his or her country of usual residence. A person’s country of usual residence is that in which the person lives, (...) where he or she normally spends the daily period of rest.”¹

Chapter 1 provides an overview of the latest migration and displacement trends and figures in the Arab region and at the subregional

level, in line with the first GCM objective on migration data as a basis for evidence-based policies. The chapter also includes information on remittances to and from the region, and analysis of the main drivers of migration and displacement in the Arab region.

Chapter 2 presents an update of policy developments and international efforts on migration governance involving Arab countries between April 2017 and March 2019. Main policy areas under scrutiny include nationality and statelessness, labour migration, irregular migration, human trafficking and migrant smuggling, forced displacement and refugees, and admissions and residency procedures. The chapter also describes developments in subregional, regional and global cooperation relating to migration that Arab countries have been involved in.

Chapter 3 examines regional migration governance priorities in the light of GCM objectives. It provides a policy map for each priority area showcasing policies and programmes adopted across the region, identifies gaps and makes recommendations for policy interventions. The chapter provides a benchmark for countries on the status of existing national frameworks and policies for migration governance in selected priority areas, namely migrants’ inclusion and access to basic services, vulnerabilities in migration, and smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons in the context of migration.

1. Overview of Migration and Displacement Trends in the Arab Region





“Behind every number is a person – a woman, a child, a man, who simply dream for what any of us dream – opportunity, dignity and a better life.”

António Guterres, Secretary-General, United Nations

1. Overview of Migration and Displacement Trends in the Arab Region

Data on migration and displacement trends and patterns are essential for better understanding migration and displacement in the Arab region, and for creating evidence-based policies and programmes. The present chapter provides data demonstrating the main migration trends in the region, including the number of people on the move, and migrants and refugees' countries of origin and destination and their socio-demographic profiles. Chapter 1 provides updates in this regard since the last reporting period, and comparisons of historical trends for the period 1990-2017; owing to the time lag in data availability, it does not cover the most recent developments after 2017. The chapter also includes information on remittances to and from the Arab region, and analysis of the main drivers of migration and displacement in the region.

The main data source for this chapter is the dataset entitled *Trends in International Migrant Stock: the 2017 Revision*, issued by the United Nations Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA). In its dataset, DESA defines migrants as those living in a country who are either foreign-born or foreign-citizens (see annex I for definitions of terminology used in the present report). In this dataset, refugees are usually, but not always, included in total migrant estimates (see annexes II and III for total migrant estimates).¹ For more detailed and updated information on refugees, the present report complements DESA data using data produced by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, Population Statistics Database, Mid-Year Trends 2018), and by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA, 2018c).²

The present report analyses migration and displacement patterns at the regional and subregional levels, based on a division of the region into four groups of countries:


- **Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries:** Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates;
- **Maghreb:** Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia;
- **Mashreq:** Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, the State of Palestine and the Syrian Arab Republic;
- **Arab least developed countries (LDCs):** the Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia, the Sudan and Yemen.

To provide insight into some of the economic dynamics of migration, the present chapter also includes data on remittances sent from and to the Arab region. This is based on information from the 2018 December update of the World Bank's Annual Remittance Data and the World Bank's 2017 Bilateral Remittance Matrix. Other international sources include the Displacement Tracking Matrix of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the International Labour Organization (ILO).

A. Migration to and displacement in Arab countries

Migration and displacement are prominent features of the Arab region, with over 38 million international migrants and refugees in 2017, representing 14.8 per cent of migrants and refugees globally (figure 1).

Figure 1. Number of migrants and refugees in the Arab region (millions), 1990-2017



Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.


There has been significant growth in the number of international migrants in the region. In 1990, there were 14.2 million international migrants in the Arab region, representing 9.3 per cent of the total number of international migrants worldwide.³

The distribution of migrants and refugees within the Arab region varies across subregions, with GCC countries receiving the most migrants in the region. In 2017, 74 per cent of migrants in the region lived in GCC countries, 19 per cent in the Mashreq, 4 per cent in the Arab LDCs, and 3 per cent in the Maghreb (figure 2).

The migrant population in GCC countries has grown substantially compared with the number of migrants in other subregions, from 8.2 million in 1990 to 28.1 million in 2017. The migrant and refugee population in the Mashreq has also grown significantly, from 2.9 million in 1990 to 7.2 million in 2017. In contrast, the number of migrants and refugees has decreased in the Arab LDCs from 2.5 million in 1990 to 1.4 million in 2017, and has only slightly


increased in the Maghreb from 0.8 million in 1990 to 1.2 million in 2017 (figure 3).

Figure 2. Number and percentage of migrants and refugees in the Arab region, by subregion, 2017




Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Figure 3. Number of migrants and refugees in the Arab region (millions), by subregion, 1990-2017



Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Figure 4. Number of migrants and refugees in the top 10 countries of destination in the Arab Region, 2017, and trends since 2015



Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

GCC countries, except Bahrain, were among the top 10 countries of destination for migrants in the region in 2017 (figure 4). Of these, Saudi Arabia had the largest number of migrants (accounting for over 12 million), followed by the United Arab Emirates (over 8 million), with the number of migrants in the other GCC countries ranging between 0.7 and 3.2 million. GCC countries


are characterized by their demand for high numbers of migrant workers.

Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, the Syrian Arab Republic and the Sudan are also among the top 10 countries of destination for migrants and refugees and large proportions of displaced persons owing to ongoing conflicts. In 2017, 3.2 million migrants and refugees were living

in Jordan, 1.9 million in Lebanon, 1 million in the Syrian Arab Republic, and over 0.7 million in Libya and in the Sudan. Except for Lebanon,

all countries saw an increase in the number of migrants and refugees within their borders since 2015, as indicated by the arrows in figure 4.⁴

Figure 5. Migrants and refugees in the Arab region as a percentage of the total population, by subregion, 1990-2017



Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Box 1. Migrant workers in the Middle East and North African countries

In 2017, there were 164 million migrant workers worldwide, defined as “international migrant individuals of working age (15 and older) who are either employed or unemployed in their current country of residence”. The number of migrant workers in the 18 Middle East and North African countries* for which data is available amounted to 23.8 million, representing 14.5 per cent of the global number of migrant workers (table A). Of these, 22.7 million migrant workers resided in Middle Eastern countries and 1.1 million in North African countries. Migrants in the Middle East represent 13.9 per cent of global migrant workers, while migrants in North African countries represent 0.7 per cent.

The global average of migrant workers as a proportion of the total workforce is 4.2 per cent compared with 40 per cent in the Middle East, meaning that 2 of every 5 workers are migrants – the highest proportion of all global subregions. However, this share varies widely between countries, especially given that GCC countries have a very high number and share of migrant workers. Jordan and Lebanon are also countries with significant numbers of migrant workers. In contrast, the proportion of migrant workers in North Africa is only 1.6 per cent, highlighting that labour migration is not as dominant in that global subregion.

In both the Middle East and North African subregions, migrant workers have higher labour force participation rates than the non-migrant population. This pattern also holds true for all other global subregions, save Latin America and the Caribbean and sub-Saharan Africa, but the difference in labour force participation rates between migrants and non-migrants is much higher in the Middle East at 33.2 per cent compared with 8.4 per cent globally.

In the Middle East and in North Africa, 8 out of every 10 migrant workers are men. This proportion varies by sector: sectors largely dependent on manual labour are often over-represented by male migrant workers,



whereas a large portion of domestic workers are female migrant workers, although Arab countries host the largest number of male migrant domestic workers of any global subregion. In the Middle East, male migrant workers have a higher labour force participation rate than non-migrant men at 85.9 per cent and 72 per cent, respectively. Conversely, in North Africa, non-migrant male workers have a labour force participation rate of 72 per cent, while the rate for migrant male workers is 70.9 per cent (table A).

In both global subregions, the labour force participation for female migrant workers is higher than that of the female non-migrant population. In the Middle East, the participation rate for female migrant workers is more than three times that of non-migrants (table A). This is due to the low labour force participation rate of women in Middle Eastern countries and the high demand for domestic and hospitality workers, who are often women. The labour force participation rates for migrant women in both global subregions is approximately half of that of migrant men (table A).

In the 18 Arab countries for which data is available, there is a total of 1.5 million youth migrant workers (aged 15-24) and 0.3 million older migrant workers (aged 65+) (table B). According to ILO, in both global subregions, 9 out of 10 migrant workers are aged between 25 and 65, totalling 22 million working-age migrants. Youth migrant workers represent 6.1 per cent of migrant workers in the Middle East and 5.8 per cent in North Africa, and older migrant workers represent just 1.4 per cent of migrant workers in the Middle East and 5.8 per cent in North Africa.

Table A. Migrant workers in the Arab region, by global subregion, 2017

	Middle East			Northern Africa		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Number of migrant workers	22.7 million	19.1 million	3.6 million	1.1 million	0.9 million	0.2 million
Share out of global migrant workers	13.9%	20%	5.3%	0.7%	0.9%	0.4%
Migrant workers as a proportion of all workers	40.8%	41%	39.9%	1.6%	1.6%	1.5%
Labour force participation rate for migrant population	75.4%	85.9%	45.7%	56.7%	70.9%	33.0%
Labour force participation rate for non-migrant population	42.2%	72.0%	13.6%	46.7%	72.0%	21.7%

Source: ILO, 2018.

Table B. Age and sex of migrant workers in the Arab region (millions), by global subregion, 2017

	Middle East			Northern Africa		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Youth (15-24)	1.4	1.1	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.0
Working age (25-64)	21	17.7	3.3	1.0	0.8	0.2
Older persons (65+)	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0
Total	22.7	19.1	3.7	1.1	0.9	0.2

Source: ILO, 2018.

* For this box, the Middle East is understood to be comprised of: Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, State of Palestine, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen; and North Africa is understood to be comprised of: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia.

Note: The ILO defines the labour force participation rate as: a measure of the proportion of a country's working-age population that engages actively in the labour market, either by working or looking for work; it provides an indication of the size of the supply of labour available to engage in the production of goods and services, relative to the population at working age.


Numbers may not add up due to rounding.

Source: ILO, 2018.

The proportion of migrants and refugees as part of the total population in the Arab region has steadily increased over the last three decades, from 6.3 per cent in 1990 to 9.2 per cent in 2017 (figure 5). The same trend can be observed in


GCC countries, with slight decreases between 1995 and 2000. In contrast, the proportion of migrants and refugees has only slightly increased in the Mashreq, has remained stable in the Maghreb, and has decreased in the Arab LDCs.

Figure 6. Number of migrants and refugees from and in the Arab region (millions), by subregion, 2017



Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Figure 7. Proportion of migrants and refugees from and in the Arab region by subregion, 2017



Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.


Since 1990, the Arab region has been characterized by more international migrants and refugees living in Arab countries than Arab nationals living abroad (figure 6). However, the trends vary significantly within the subregions. While GCC countries have 40 times more international migrants than nationals living abroad, the other subregions show the opposite trend. The Maghreb has 4.7 times more nationals living abroad than international migrants living in the subregion. The Arab LDCs have 3.9 times more nationals living abroad than international migrants living in the subregion, while the Mashreq has 2.3 times more.

The proportion of international migrants and refugees compared with the total number of nationals also varies considerably (figure 7), ranging from a high of 51 per cent in GCC countries to a low of 1 per cent in the Maghreb. The number of nationals living outside of the country compared to the total population is the highest in the Mashreq (10 per cent) and the lowest in GCC countries (1 per cent).

In 2017, women made up 32.8 per cent of the migrant and refugee population in the Arab region, a proportion that has remained steady since 2010, after slowly decreasing from 39.5 per cent in 1990 (figure 8). Though their proportion has slightly decreased, the number of female migrants and refugees has increased from 5.6 million in 1990 to 12.5 million in 2017, with an additional 766,000 women migrants and refugees in the region since 2015.

In 2017, women represented nearly half of the migrant population in the Mashreq and in the Arab LDCs (49.7 per cent and 48.3 per cent, respectively). Women migrants comprised 35.3 per cent of the migrant population in the Maghreb, and 27.6 per cent in GCC countries. These diverging trends can be explained by the proportionally higher number of men who migrate to work in GCC countries and the Maghreb, in contrast to the often conflict-induced displacement dynamic in the Arab LDCs and the Mashreq, which generally includes a

Figure 8. Number and proportion of female migrants and refugees among the total migrant and refugee population in the Arab region, 1990-2017




Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

more even gender distribution. For example, in Jordan and Lebanon, which host large numbers of refugees and displaced persons from the State of Palestine and the Syrian Arab Republic, women represented 50 per cent and 52 per cent of the migrant and refugee populations, respectively. In contrast, in GCC countries, which are prominent destinations for male migrant workers, starker differences appear in the gender balance of the migrant population, with the number of women migrants varying from a low of 16 per cent in Oman to a high of 32 per cent in Kuwait.


The diversity of migration trends in the Arab region can be further understood through various age groups of migrants living in the region. Working-age (25-64 years old) males represented 49 per cent of all migrants and refugees in the region in 2017 and working-age women represented 19 per cent (figure 9). Children (0-14 years old)⁵ represented 18 per cent of the migrant and refugee population, young people (15-24 years old) constituted 12

Figure 9. Distribution of migrants and refugees in the Arab region by age, age group and sex, 2017




Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Figure 10. Top five countries of origin of migrants and refugees in the Arab region, 2017



Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Figure 11. Number of migrants and refugees in the Arab region by top five countries of origin (millions), 1990-2017



Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

per cent, working-age persons comprised 68 per cent, and older persons (aged 65 and above) represented 2 per cent. Children, young people and older persons' age groups showed a more even sex distribution, with slightly more males.⁶

In 2017, 37 per cent of migrants and refugees in the Arab region, almost 14 million, originated from within the region, a percentage that has remained consistent since 2015. Non-Arab Asian countries were the origin of 56 per cent of migrants in the Arab region in 2017, predominantly migrant workers. Around 8.9 million migrants living in the Arab region were from India, representing 23 per cent of the region's migrants (figure 10). The number of migrants from India started to rise in 2005, increasing by almost 140 per cent (figure 11). Bangladesh and Pakistan were also among the

top five countries of origin in 2017, with roughly 3.1 million migrants each. Although these countries' migrant population in the region also started increasing in 2005, they did so at a slower pace compared with India's migrant population.

Of the total number of IDPs in the Arab region in 2017, 66 per cent were in the Mashreq, predominantly in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic. With increases of around 460,000 IDPs in 2016 to reach a total of 6.8 million in 2017, the Syrian Arab Republic was the country with the highest conflict-induced displacement in the world in 2017. It is also the country with the highest number of IDPs as a percentage of the total population in the Arab region, at 37.1 per cent. There were also over 2.6 million IDPs in Iraq in 2017, a number that has decreased by 20 per cent since 2016. The number of IDPs in the State of

Box 2. Internally displaced persons in Arab countries

According to data from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, the total number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Arab region reached around 15 million in 2017, accounting for 37 per cent of the world's IDPs. Compared with 2016, the number of IDPs decreased by approximately 1.5 million in 2017 (table A), mainly due to returns in Iraq and the Sudan. However, 5.8 million people were newly displaced in the region in 2017, of which 4.9 million were displaced by conflict and almost 1 million by natural disasters, the vast majority in Somalia owing to drought (table B). Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Sudan and Yemen are among the top six countries with the most IDPs in the world.

Table A. Internally displaced persons owing to conflict and violence in Arab countries, 2012-2017

Country	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Syrian Arab Republic	3,000,000	6,500,000	7,600,000	6,600,000	6,325,978	6,784,000
Iraq	3,000,000	2,426,700	3,120,000	3,264,286	3,320,000	2,648,000
Sudan	2,100,000	2,100,000	3,276,000	3,290,310	3,034,614	2,072,000
Yemen	385,000	307,000	334,090	2,509,068	1,973,994	2,014,000
Somalia	1,350,000	1,100,000	1,106,751	1,223,000	1,106,751	825,000
State of Palestine	50,000	59,400	400,000	500,000	303,608	231,000
Libya	144,500	146,000	275,000	221,425	193,277	197,000
Egypt				78,000	78,000	82,000
Lebanon	45,000	20,000	20,000	12,000	12,000	11,000
Total Arab region	10,074,500	12,659,100	16,131,841	17,698,089	16,348,222	14,864,000

Source: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2018c.

Note: Data does not include disaster-induced displacement.



Table B. Internal displacement in Arab countries, 2017

Country	New conflict-caused displacements in 2017	New disaster-induced displacements in 2017	Number of IDPs* as at 31 December 2017	IDPs* as a percentage of the total population
Comoros		94		
Egypt	3,800		82,000	0.1
Iraq	1,379,000	3,900	2,648,000	6.9
Jordan		160		
Lebanon	200		11,000	0.2
Libya	29,000		197,000	3.1
Mauritania		2,900		
Oman		320		
State of Palestine	700	77	231,000	4.7
Saudi Arabia		100		
Somalia	388,000	899,000	825,000	5.6
Sudan	17,000	54,000	2,072,000	5.1
Syrian Arab Republic	2,911,000	2,300	6,784,000	37.1
Tunisia		990		
United Arab Emirates		850		
Yemen	160,000	13	2,014,000	7.1
Total Arab region	4,888,700	964,704	14,864,000	3.6

Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017; and IDMC, 2018a.

*IDPs displaced by conflict and violence.

Source: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2018a.


Palestine decreased by almost 24 per cent from 2016, reaching around 230,000 in 2017.

The Arab LDC were the location of almost all disaster-induced displacements in the Arab region in 2017, owing to a severe drought in Somalia that caused the displacement of close to 900,000 persons. In addition, there were more than 5,000 disaster-induced IDPs in the Sudan. Nonetheless, the total Sudanese IDP population decreased by almost a million from 2016, falling to just over 2 million in 2017.

Since 2014, Yemen has experienced a severe seven-fold increase in displacement owing to

conflict and violence, with an IDP population of 2 million in 2017. The IDP population decreased significantly between 2015 and 2016, but slightly increased again in 2017. However, these numbers should be considered an underestimate, since access to IDPs is severely constrained because of widespread insecurity and instability, among other reasons.

People of concern to UNHCR include refugees and persons in refugee-like situations, asylum-seekers, returned refugees, internally displaced persons, returned IDPs, stateless persons, and others of concern. According to mid-2018 UNHCR data, the total population of

Figure 12. Top five Arab countries of destination for refugees, mid-2018

Source: UNHCR, 2019b.

Note: This figure does not include the approximately 5.4 million Palestine refugees registered with UNRWA in Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip.

concern in the Arab region amounted to over 21.2 million.⁷ Of these, over 15.2 million were internally displaced persons and 3.7 million were refugees under the UNHCR mandate.⁸ As reported by UNHCR, by mid-2018, Lebanon had the largest number of refugees in the region (975,000), followed by the Sudan (908,000) and Jordan (705,000) (figure 12). Jordan and Lebanon continue to have the highest global rates of refugees relative to their national populations. Iraq and Yemen each hosted almost 300,000 refugees in mid-2018. Moreover, in January 2018, UNRWA reported 5.4 million registered Palestine refugees under its mandate, including Palestine refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip.⁹ Furthermore, UNHCR data shows that there were 370,676 stateless persons in the Arab region in 2018.¹⁰


B. Migration and displacement from Arab countries

1. Overall migration and displacement trends

Since the last reporting period, the Arab migrant and refugee population has increased by 1.4 million, or 4.9 per cent. The number of migrants and refugees originating from the Arab region has grown from approximately 11.5 million in 1990 to 29 million in 2017, increasing by 153 per cent in the 27-year span (figure 13). The migrant and refugee

population has been growing at a slower rate since 2015 than it had been in the period 2000-2015.¹¹


Of those 29 million migrants and refugees from Arab countries, 48 per cent – close to 14 million – remained in the region, a proportion that has slightly increased since 1990, when intraregional migrants and refugees from the Arab region represented 42 per cent, and has remained stable since the last reporting period.

Figure 13. Number of migrants and refugees from Arab countries and number and share of intraregional migrants, 1990-2017

Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Around 60 per cent (over 17.3 million) of migrants and refugees from Arab countries originate from the Mashreq (figure 14). The Maghreb is the origin of 5.6 million migrants and

Figure 14. Number and percentage of migrants and refugees from the Arab region, by subregion, 2017



GCC	732,444
Mashreq	17,327,217
Maghreb	5,617,383
Arab LDCs	5,382,998

Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.


refugees, or 19 per cent of the region’s migrants and refugees; while the Arab LDCs account for almost 5.4 million migrants and refugees, also approximately 19 per cent of the Arab migrant and refugee population. The GCC subregion is the origin of around 730,000 migrants and refugees, a share of only 2 per cent of the Arab migrant and refugee population.

This distribution of migrants and refugees from the subregions has remained mostly stable since 1990, except for a slight growth of migrants and refugees from the Mashreq alongside a decrease in the proportion of those originating from the Maghreb (figure 15).

From 1990 until 2010, the top five Arab countries of origin of migrants and refugees were the State of Palestine, Morocco, Iraq, Egypt, and Algeria (figure 16). Since 2015, however, this order has changed with the Syrian Arab Republic, the State of Palestine, Somalia, Morocco and Egypt becoming the top 5 countries of origin.


In 2017, female migrants and refugees represented 44.5 per cent of all migrants and refugees from the Arab region, a proportion

Figure 15. Number of migrants and refugees from the Arab region (millions), by subregion, 1990-2017



Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Figure 16. Number of migrants and refugees from the top five countries of origin in the Arab region (millions), 1990-2017




Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

that has remained relatively stable since 1990. The biggest variation in this proportion came between 2010 and 2015, when migrant women and refugee women represented 42.7 per cent and 44.5 per cent of the total migrant population from the region, respectively. The number of female migrants and refugees from the Arab countries in 2017 was over 12.9 million, 4.9 per cent more than in 2015. The share of female migrants and refugees presents little variation – of 2.2 percentage points – across subregions.

Turkey was the top country of destination for migrants and refugees from the Arab region, counting over 3.3 million in 2017 or 11 per cent of the total Arab migrant and refugee population (figure 17). Jordan and Saudi Arabia were the destinations for over 3.1 million migrants and refugees each, while France was the destination for 2.9 million and Lebanon for 1.9 million. The rest of the Arab countries combined received 20 per cent of migrants and refugees from the Arab region, who mostly went to the United Arab Emirates and the Syrian Arab Republic (predominantly

Figure 17. Top five countries of destination for migrants and refugees from the Arab region, 2017




Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

refugees from Iraq and the State of Palestine). Other countries around the world were the destination for the remaining 8.7 million migrants and refugees, or 30 per cent of migrants from the Arab region, most notably Italy, Spain and the United States of America.

According to mid-2018 data from UNHCR, the Arab region was the origin of a total population of concern to UNHCR of approximately 26.3 million persons – which includes refugees and persons in refugee-like situations, asylum-seekers, returned refugees, internally displaced persons, returned IDPs, stateless persons, and others of concern – representing 37 per cent of the global population of concern. Of the population of concern from the Arab region accounted for by UNHCR, over 8.7 million were refugees, who represented 43 per cent of the global refugee population of over 20 million.

Figure 18. Top five countries of origin of refugees from the Arab region, mid-2018




Iraq	372,304
Somalia	954,701
State of Palestine	101,125
Sudan	719,222
Syrian Arab Republic	6,490,950
Rest of the Arab region	123,294

Source: UNHCR, 2019b.

Note: This figure does not include the approximately 5.4 million Palestine refugees registered with UNRWA in Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip.

Figure 19. Refugees from Arab countries by region of destination, mid-2018




Arab region	2,507,589
Europe	1,262,697
Latin America and the Caribbean	5,793
North America	52,653
Oceania	10,279
Rest of Africa	1,250,240
Rest of Asia	3,671,558

Source: UNHCR, 2019b.

Note: This figure does not include the approximately 5.4 million Palestine refugees registered with UNRWA in Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip.

Figure 20. Top ten countries of destination for refugees from the Arab region, mid-2018



Source: UNHCR, 2019b.

Note: This figure does not include the approximately 5.4 million Palestine refugees registered with UNRWA in Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip.

Table 1. Refugees from the Arab region registered with UNHCR, 2013-2018

Country	Mid-2013	Mid-2014	Mid-2015	Mid-2016	Mid-2017	Mid-2018
Algeria	3,752	3,691	3,541	3,622	3,895	4,236
Bahrain	249	285	373	424	482	529
Comoros	473	528	562	571	584	606
Djibouti	641	809	921	1,113	1,594	2,034
Egypt	9,456	13,050	16,105	18,672	21,088	23,488
Iraq	409,181	426,114	377,747	279,955	349,281	372,304
Jordan	1,588	1,633	1,767	1,903	2,039	2,319
Kuwait	935	990	978	932	1,051	1,122
Lebanon	3,652	4,238	4,329	4,487	5,184	5,598
Libya	3,089	3,353	4,317	6,999	10,059	12,724
Mauritania	34,284	34,340	34,121	36,492	36,390	36,679
Morocco	1,093	1,345	1,559	2,033	2,656	3,607
Oman	24	26	31	41	37	38
State of Palestine	96,801	96,658	97,241	98,767	98,909	101,125
Qatar	15	17	21	21	33	35
Saudi Arabia	439	600	629	752	1,102	1,394
Somalia	1,130,939	1,080,788	1,105,618	1,097,757	989,561	954,701
Sudan	632,014	670,332	640,919	638,986	680,099	719,222
Syrian Arab Republic	1,888,823	3,029,465	4,194,554	5,303,613	5,980,270	6,490,950
Tunisia	1,250	1,368	1,484	1,625	1,781	1,931
United Arab Emirates	74	88	93	106	137	161
Yemen	2,228	2,514	5,832	15,657	21,735	26,793
Total Arab region	4,221,000	5,372,232	6,492,742	7,514,528	8,207,967	8,761,596

Source: UNHCR, 2019a.

Note: The table does not include the approximately 5.4 million Palestine refugees registered with UNRWA in Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip.

Refugees were predominantly from the Syrian Arab Republic, which was the country of origin of 6.5 million refugees, constituting 74 per cent of the Arab region's refugee population and 32 per cent of the global refugee population (table 1, figure 18). The number of Syrian refugees increased by close to 1.2 million between 2016 and 2018. Somalia was the second largest country of origin of refugees in the region, with close to 1 million refugees, and the Sudan was the third largest country of origin with almost 720,000 refugees. In 2018, there were 5.4 million Palestine refugees registered with UNRWA, and over 100,000 refugees from the State of

Palestine registered with UNHCR. There were also over 610,000 asylum seekers from the region in 2018, predominantly from Iraq (260,000) and the Syrian Arab Republic (144,000).

Of the total 8.7 million refugees from the Arab region accounted for by UNHCR in 2018, 29 per cent stayed in the region, while 42 per cent travelled to other Asian countries (figure 19). Non-Arab African countries were the third largest region of destination, receiving 14 per cent of refugees from the Arab region, the same proportion as Europe.

The number of refugees from the Arab region increased between 2016 and 2018 by 17 per cent, counting over 1.2 million new refugees, most of whom were from the Syrian Arab Republic.

In 2018, Turkey was the top country of destination for refugees from the Arab region, counting over 3.6 million. Lebanon and Jordan were the second and third destination countries for Arab refugees, with close to 1 million and over 700,000, respectively (figure 20). Germany is the only European country in the top 10, with over 680,000 Arab refugees.

2. Migration and education

Education is an important driver of migration for young people. In 2017, UNESCO reported over 480,000 tertiary students from Arab countries studying abroad.¹² The top countries of origin of internationally mobile students were Saudi Arabia (89,282), Morocco (48,453) and the Syrian Arab Republic (44,791) (figure 21).


The main destination countries of Arab tertiary students in 2016 were the United States (91,393), France (67,803) and the

United Arab Emirates (44,429) (figure 22). Saudi Arabia received close to 40,000 Arab students, and Jordan close to 35,000.


Regarding the education levels of migrants from the Arab region, available data from the 2010/2011 census of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) show that of a total 7.2 million migrants from the Arab region living in OECD countries,¹³ 45 per cent had basic education, 28 per cent had secondary education, and 24 per cent had tertiary education (figure 23). The data disaggregated by sex shows that men had higher rates of completion of secondary and tertiary education than women.

Education levels also vary according to countries of destination. A comparison between the top five OECD destination countries for migrants from the Arab region shows that Canada and the United States had much higher shares of migrants with tertiary education – 58 per cent and 41 per cent, respectively – than France, Spain and Italy, which had shares of 21 per cent, 11 per cent and 10 per cent of migrants with tertiary education, respectively (figure 24).

Figure 21. Number of tertiary students abroad from the top 10 Arab countries of origin, 2012-2017



Source: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, n.d.

Figure 22. Number of Arab tertiary students abroad by top 10 countries of destination, 2012-2016

Source: UNESCO, n.d.

Note: No information is available for Jordan in 2013 and 2014, for Malaysia in 2013, and for Germany in 2012 and 2016.

Box 3. Education levels of migrant workers in GCC countries

Migrants' level of education is an important determinant of their access to the labour market, and of their wage levels and career prospects, which in turn can influence their access to basic services, protection mechanisms and skills training, and can determine the amount of remittances sent to countries of origin.

The GCC subregion receives most of the migrants in the Arab region, a total of 28.1 million of whom the majority are temporary migrant workers. These countries with a higher labour demand than supply fill the gap with migrant workers, predominantly from Asia.

Most migrants in GCC countries, 57 per cent, have completed primary education (figure A), which includes those with lower-secondary attainment as their highest qualification. Oman has the highest proportion of primary-educated migrants at 72 per cent, and the United Arab Emirates has the lowest share at 44 per cent.

As for migrants with secondary education, which includes secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education, the subregional average stands at 25 per cent, ranging from 12 per cent in Kuwait to 33 per cent in the United Arab Emirates.

The share of migrants with tertiary education in the GCC subregion is 13 per cent. Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have the highest proportion of migrants with tertiary education at around 16 per cent of the migrant population, while Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman have lower proportions of 5-8 per cent.

The proportional distribution of education levels is fairly similar for male and female migrants, with a slightly higher proportion of female migrants with tertiary education than male migrants (figure B). This pattern holds true for all GCC countries, but in Qatar the gender gap is more pronounced: 30 per cent of female migrants have completed tertiary education compared with 13 per cent for male migrants. While the same pattern holds true for other GCC countries, the disparity is less pronounced with a difference of 1-3 percentage points.



Figure A. Migrants' education level in GCC countries





Figure B. Level of education of migrants in GCC countries, by sex



Sources: Gulf Labour Markets and Migration, 2018.


Note: In this figure, basic education corresponds to ISCE level 0, primary education corresponds to ISCE levels 1 and 2, secondary education corresponds to ISCE levels 3 and 4, and tertiary education corresponds to ISCE levels 6 and above.

^a Data for Oman corresponds to employed migrants.

^b The share of persons that are 15 or older with unknown completed education level is on average 2 per cent in the OECD, but varies across countries. Most OECD countries do not collect completed education information for those aged under 15.

Source: Gulf Labour Markets and Migration, 2018.

Figure 23. Education level of migrants from the Arab region in OECD countries, by sex, 2010-2011




Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, n.d.

Note: For this figure, basic education corresponds to completed International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) levels 0/1/2; secondary education corresponds to completed ISCED 3/4; and tertiary education corresponds to completed ISCED 5/6.

* The share of persons that are 15 or older with unknown completed education level is on average 2 per cent in the OECD, but varies across countries. Most OECD countries do not collect completed education information for those aged under 15.

Figure 24. Education level of migrants from the Arab region in top five OECD destination countries by sex, 2010-2011



Source: OECD, n.d.

Note: For this figure, basic education corresponds to completed International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) levels 0, 1 and 2; secondary education corresponds to completed ISCED 3 and 4; and tertiary education corresponds to completed ISCED 5 and above.

* The share of persons that are 15 or older with unknown completed education level is on average 2 per cent in the OECD, but varies across countries. Most OECD countries do not collect completed education information for those aged under 15.

Table 2. Percentage of population aged 25 years and above with tertiary education living in country of origin or living in an OECD country, ca 2010

Country	Origin	OECD
Algeria	8.0%	16.8%
Bahrain	15.2%	48.5%
Jordan	12.0%	45.1%
Kuwait	8.5%	60.4%
Lebanon	15.4%	34.1%
State of Palestine	21.2%	46.3%
Qatar	20.3%	15.5%
Saudi Arabia	16.0%	60.5%
Syrian Arab Republic	5.8%	37.1%
Tunisia	12.4%	13.8%
United Arab Emirates	18.0%	42.6%

Source: Fargues, 2017b, p. 33.

Furthermore, there was a small gender gap in favour of men in the share of migrants with tertiary education. The gap was of 6 percentage points for Canada and the United States, but was less pronounced, with a difference of just 1-2 percentage points, in the rest of the top five countries.

OECD data on the education level of migrants from Arab countries shows that the proportion of nationals with tertiary education living in countries of origin is much lower than the proportion of migrant nationals with tertiary education living in OECD countries (table 2). This means that migrants with tertiary education have higher migration rates to OECD countries than those with lower levels of education.

Qatar is the only country with available data that has a higher proportion of tertiary-educated persons among its non-migrant national population than among its nationals living abroad. For Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Lebanon, the State of Palestine, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the share of persons with tertiary education among their

nationals living abroad is more than twice that of their non-migrant population, and for Kuwait it is seven times more.

C. Migration and displacement by subregion


1. Gulf Cooperation Council countries

(a) Migration and displacement to GCC countries

GCC countries were the destination of 74 per cent of the total migrant and refugee population in the Arab region, 28.1 million in 2017. The subregion has witnessed significant growth since 1990, when its migrant and refugee population stood at 8.2 million (figure 25). Since 2015, the migrant population has increased by 8.8 per cent, with 2.3 more million migrants in 2017 than in 2015. Saudi Arabia received the largest number of migrants in the region and in the subregion, with over 12.1 million migrants living in the country in 2017, an increase of 1.4 million migrants or 13 per cent compared with 2015. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia had the second largest number of migrants globally, surpassed only by the United States. The United Arab Emirates was the second-highest destination country in both the region and the subregion, with over 8.3 million migrants, which constitutes an increase of close to 320,000 or 4 per cent compared with 2015. It was also the country with the sixth largest number of migrants globally. The remaining GCC countries had between 700,000 and over 3 million migrants each in 2017.


UNHCR reports that the GCC subregion was the destination for 2,501 refugees in 2018, predominantly in Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, of which almost three-quarters were from Iraq. There were also 2,684 asylum seekers in the subregion. In addition to those registered with UNHCR as asylum seekers or refugees, large populations from key refugee-producing

Figure 25. Number of migrants and refugees in GCC countries (millions), 1990-2017



Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Figure 26. Migrants and refugees in GCC countries as a percentage of the total population, 2017



Source: DESA, 2017.


countries such as the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen were present in the GCC as migrant workers. UNHCR also reported 163,200 stateless persons in the subregion.

GCC countries have the highest proportion of migrants and refugees as a percentage of the total population. The regional average in 2017 was 50.9 per cent, ranging from a low of 37 per cent in Saudi Arabia to a high of 88.4 per cent

in the United Arab Emirates (figure 26). The United Arab Emirates and Kuwait ranked first and second worldwide, respectively, with the largest proportion of migrants in their population.

The main country of origin of migrants to the GCC subregion is India, with 8.9 million migrants in 2017 – 32 per cent of all migrants in the subregion – increasing from over 8.2 million in 2015 (figure 27). Bangladesh and Pakistan were the countries


Figure 27. Top five countries of origin of migrants and refugees in GCC countries, 2017



Bangladesh	3,103,607
Egypt	2,479,365
India	8,904,781
Indonesia	2,092,809
Pakistan	3,065,435
Rest of the Arab region	3,494,571
Rest of the world	4,998,004


Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Figure 28. Number and proportion of female migrants and refugees among the total migrant and refugee population in GCC countries, 1990-2017



Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Figure 29. Distribution of migrants and refugees in GCC countries by age, age group and sex, 2017




Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.


of origin of around 3.1 million migrants each, and Egypt was the main Arab country of origin, with over 2 million migrants living in the subregion. The proportional distribution among the top countries of origin has remained stable since 2015. In total, 21.2 per cent of migrants in the GCC subregion came from Arab countries, constituting almost 6 million persons.

There were over 7.7 million migrant women in GCC countries in 2017, constituting 27.6 per cent of all migrants in the region (figure 28). Their number has increased by 9 per cent – 665,000 women – since 2015, and their proportion has remained stable since 2015. In 2017, there were over 3.8 million female migrants in Saudi Arabia, 2.1 million in the United Arab Emirates, and 1 million in Kuwait.

In 2017, a total of 56.9 per cent of migrants were working age males, while working age females represented 17.1 per cent of

Figure 30. Number of migrants and refugees from and in GCC countries, 2017

Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Figure 31. Proportion of migrants and refugees from and in GCC countries, 2017

Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

the migrant population. In total, working-age migrants represented 74 per cent of the migrant population, while children represented 14.7 per cent, young people constituted 10.3 per cent, and older persons comprised 1 per cent (figure 29).

The GCC subregion has a high number of migrants, both in net numbers and as a

proportion of the total population (figures 30 and 31), owing to the high influx of migrant workers. The number of migrants going to all GCC countries is also much larger than the number of migrants originating from GCC countries, owing to a smaller number of GCC nationals and their low migration rates. The next section will describe the migration patterns from GCC countries.

(b) Migration and displacement from GCC countries

In 2017, a total of 732,444 migrants and refugees originated from GCC countries, a rise of approximately 30,000, or 4 per cent, from 2015 (figure 32). The number of migrants from the subregion has more than doubled since 1990 and has progressively grown since then, albeit at a slower pace since 2015.

The subregion was the origin of 3,279 refugees as at mid-2018, predominantly from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, which were the origin of 1,122 and 1,394 refugees, respectively. Bahrain was the origin of 529 refugees, and Oman and Qatar had less than 40 each. Their most common destinations were Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States. UNHCR also registered 2,840 asylum seekers from the subregion.


Migrants from GCC countries represented 1.3 per cent of the total population from the subregion in 2017 (figure 33), a percentage that has remained virtually the same since 1990. The proportion of migrants from GCC countries

ranged from 5 per cent in Kuwait to 0.4 per cent in Oman.

In 2017, around 43.1 per cent of migrants from GCC countries stayed in the Arab region, mainly going to the State of Palestine (77,234), the United Arab Emirates (75,128) and Libya (54,310), which are among the top 5 countries of destination (figures 34 and 35). In North America,¹⁴ Canada (53,199) and the United States of America (128,008) were the destination of 25 per cent of migrants and refugees from the subregion. Europe was the third largest region of destination, with the United Kingdom the main European destination and the fourth country of destination overall, receiving 63,356 GCC migrants.


In 2017, a total of 319,471 women migrated from their GCC countries of origin, representing 43.6 per cent of all migrants from the subregion. Their proportion ranged from a high of 49 per cent in Qatar and a low of 38.5 per cent in Kuwait (figure 36). Between 2015 and 2017, the number of female migrants rose for all GCC countries, ranging from an increase of 1.7 per cent in Oman to 5.1 per cent in Kuwait.

Figure 32. Number of migrants and refugees from GCC countries, 1990-2017




Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Figure 33. Migrants and refugees from GCC countries as a percentage of the total population, 2017



Source: DESA, 2017.


Figure 34. Regions of destination for migrants and refugees from GCC countries, 2017



Arab region	315,633
Europe	123,392
Latin America and the Caribbean	3,251
North America	181,207
Oceania	36,063
Non-Arab African countries	2,929
Non-Arab Asian countries	69,969


Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Figure 35. Top five countries of destination for migrants and refugees from GCC countries, 2017




Libya	54,310
State of Palestine	77,234
United Arab Emirates	75,128
United Kingdom	63,356
United States	128,008
Rest of the Arab region	108,961
Rest of the world	225,447

Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Figure 36. Number of female migrants and refugees from GCC countries, 1990-2017

Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Figure 37. Number of tertiary students abroad from GCC countries, 2017

Source: UNESCO, n.d.

Their proportion relative to men slightly decreased for Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, and remained the same for Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia.

UNESCO registered over 150,000 tertiary students abroad from GCC countries in 2017, mostly from Saudi Arabia, which was the origin of almost 90,000 students (figure 37).

The United States was their main destination country, receiving half of all the students from the subregion, followed by the United Kingdom, which received 14 per cent.¹⁵ Other common countries of destination included Australia, Canada, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates. Saudi Arabia was the fourth country of origin with the most international tertiary students in the United States in 2017.¹⁶

2. Maghreb countries

(a) Migration and displacement to the Maghreb


The total migrant and refugee population in the Maghreb stood at almost 1.2 million in 2017, a rise of 2.6 per cent since 2015, which represents close to 31,000 additional migrants and refugees (figure 38). Libya is the country with the largest migrant and refugee population in the subregion: it had 66 per cent (788,419) of migrants and refugees in the subregion in 2017, followed by Algeria at 21 per cent (248,624). While Libya has seen a steady increase in its migrant and refugee population since 1990, Algeria witnessed a decreasing migrant and refugee population from 1990 to 2005, after which the number of migrants and refugees slowly began increasing. Morocco and Tunisia were the destinations of 8 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively, of the migrant and refugee population in the subregion in 2017.

DESA data from 2017 show a total of 150,000 migrants and refugees from sub-Saharan Africa¹⁷ in Maghreb countries, representing

13 per cent of the migrant and refugee population in the subregion. The data show that 71 per cent came from Somalia. There were also 3,412 migrants and refugees from Senegal, 2,027 from Eritrea, 1,360 from Mali, 1,267 from Côte d'Ivoire, and 1,008 from Guinea. In contrast, the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix identified more than 270,000 sub-Saharan migrants in Libya alone in 2017. Over 78,000 came from Niger, 62,000 from Chad, and 31,000 from Ghana. The Matrix also reported approximately 24,000 migrants from Mali, 9,000 from Senegal, 8,000 from Côte d'Ivoire, 4,500 from Guinea, and 2,400 from Eritrea.¹⁸ The differences between the datasets may imply a significant presence of sub-Saharan migrants in the Maghreb who are short-term migrants, in transit, or migrants in an irregular situation who are not reflected in the DESA dataset.


According to UNHCR, a total of 193,192 refugees were living in the Maghreb in mid-2018, mostly in Algeria, which was the destination of 92 per cent (177,881) of the subregion's refugees. In turn, Libya had 9,365 registered refugees, Morocco had 5,069, and Tunisia had 877. Most registered refugees

Figure 38. Number of migrants and refugees in Maghreb countries, 1990-2017



Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Figure 39. Migrants and refugees in Maghreb countries as a percentage of the total population, 2017




Source: DESA, 2017.

in the subregion come from the territory of Western Sahara¹⁹ and reside in Algeria. Furthermore, UNHCR reported 53,860 asylum seekers in Maghreb countries in 2018, around 81 per cent of them in Libya.

In 2017, migrants and refugees represented 12.4 per cent of the population in Libya (figure 39), a proportion that has slightly increased from 10.3 per cent in 1990. In the remaining Maghreb countries, migrants and refugees have continually made up around 1 per cent of the population or less. The subregional average has also been relatively stable, standing at 1.3 per cent in 2017.

While most migrants and refugees in the Maghreb come from the State of Palestine (324,584), Iraq (79,947) is also a predominant Arab country of origin (figure 40). Western Sahara is the second largest territory of origin, with 164,924 migrants and refugees in the subregion, followed by Somalia (118,379) and France (50,602). Arab countries were the origin of 66 per cent of migrants and refugees in the Maghreb in 2017.


Figure 40. Top five countries or territories of origin of migrants and refugees in the Maghreb, 2017



France	50,602
Iraq	79,947
Somalia	118,379
State of Palestine	324,584
Western Sahara	164,924
Rest of the Arab region	262,292
Rest of the world	189,813

Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Figure 41. Number and proportion of female migrants and refugees among the total migrant and refugee population in the Maghreb, 1990-2017




Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

The share of female migrants and refugees in the Maghreb has remained stable at around 35 per cent since 2005, after a dramatic decrease since 1990 when women

represented 46.5 per cent of the migrant population (figure 41). In 2017, there were 419,947 women migrants and refugees in the subregion, 2.8 per cent more than in 2015.

Figure 42. Distribution of migrants and refugees in the Maghreb by age, age group and sex, 2017




Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.


In 2017, children represented 18.5 per cent of the total migrant and refugee population in the subregion, while young people represented 13.9 per cent. The total working age population represented 61.9 per cent, with working-age men comprising 43.2 per cent of the total migrant and refugee population, and working-age women constituting 18.7 per cent. Older persons comprised 5.7 per cent of the total migrant and refugee population (figure 42).

The Maghreb subregion is characterized by migrants and refugees predominantly from other Arab countries and, to a lesser extent, from sub-Saharan Africa. The subregion also has significant patterns of transit migration towards Europe (box 4). In Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, there are significantly more nationals leaving the country than migrants and refugees entering the country, both in terms of absolute numbers and when compared with the total population, while Libya shows the opposite pattern (figures 43 and 44). The next section describes the characteristics of migration patterns from Maghreb countries.

Figure 43. Number of migrants and refugees from and in Maghreb countries, 2017



Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Figure 44. Proportion of migrants and refugees from and in Maghreb countries, 2017

Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Box 4. Mixed movements across the Mediterranean

Movement across the Mediterranean to Europe has three main routes: the Eastern Route from Turkey to Greece; the Central Route from North Africa, mainly Libya, towards Italy and Malta; and the Western Route departing mainly from Morocco to Spain. Migration across the Mediterranean has dramatically decreased since 2015, and has shifted from a predominance of the Eastern route in 2015 towards a preference for the Central route in 2016 and 2017, and to a more recent increase in the use of the Western route in 2018 (figure A).


The number of migrants crossing the Mediterranean dropped from over a million persons at the height of the migration crossings in 2015 to almost a tenth of this figure in 2018. The number of migrants also decreased by almost a third between 2017 and 2018, from over 170,000 to around 117,000, respectively.

Between 2017 and 2018, the patterns of migratory flows shifted: while crossings through the Central route decreased by 80 per cent, crossings through the Eastern route increased by 10 per cent, and crossings through the Western route more than doubled, increasing by 158 per cent.^a

Almost 34,000 migrants and refugees were reported to have died or gone missing between 2000 and mid-2017 while crossing the Mediterranean. Even though the numbers of migrant and refugee crossings have significantly decreased, and the numbers of dead or missing migrants and refugees have dropped (table A), journeys have become more dangerous. Since the most common and shortest routes have been closed off, migrants and refugees are opting for longer and more dangerous journeys.^b In 2017 there was an estimated 1 death for every 77 arrivals through the Western route, but that ratio slightly increased to 1 in every 73 arrivals in 2018. In the Central Mediterranean, known as the deadliest route, the ratio increased significantly from an estimated 1 in 42 arrivals in 2017, to 1 death for every 18 arrivals in 2018. And through the Eastern route, the death to arrivals ratio went from 1 in 318 in 2017 to 1 in 165 in 2018.^c The risks of irregular and dangerous journeys also include violence, abuse, exploitation, human trafficking and slavery.



Figure A. Mixed movements through the Mediterranean, 2015-2018



Source: IOM, 2015, 2016, 2017a, 2018f.

Note: Figures for the Eastern Route comprise arrivals by sea to Cyprus and Greece; for the Central Route to Italy and Malta; and for the Western Route to Spain.

Table A. Total migrants and refugees reported dead or missing in the Mediterranean, 2015-2018

2015	2016	2017	2018
4,054	5,143	3,139	2,299

Source: IOM, 2019a.

Migrants and refugees crossing the Mediterranean in 2018 were predominantly from Arab countries (44 per cent) and from sub-Saharan Africa (42 per cent). The top five countries of origin in 2018 were Guinea, Morocco, Mali, the Syrian Arab Republic and Afghanistan (table B). Among migrants from Arab countries, the most common country of origin was Morocco, followed by the Syrian Arab Republic, Iraq and Tunisia.^d

Of all migrants and refugees crossing the Mediterranean in 2018, 64 per cent were adult males, 14 per cent were adult females, and 21 per cent were children.^e

Table B. Top 10 countries of origin for Mediterranean land and sea arrivals, 2018

Country of origin	Percentage	Country of origin	Percentage
Guinea	12%	Algeria	6%
Morocco	11%	Côte d'Ivoire	5%
Mali	9%	Tunisia	5%
Syrian Arab Republic	9%	Gambia	4%
Afghanistan	7%	Others	25%
Iraq	7%		

Source: UNHCR, 2018c.

^a IOM, 2017a, 2018f

^b Fargues, 2017a.

^c UNHCR, 2018b.

^d UNHCR, 2018c.

^e Ibid.


(b) Migration and displacement from the Maghreb

In 2017, around 19 per cent (over 5.6 million) of all migrants and refugees from the Arab region were from the Maghreb. Morocco was the top country of origin in the subregion, with almost 2.9 million migrants and refugees, followed by Algeria with almost 1.8 million (figure 45). Tunisia was the country of origin of over 750,000 migrants, and Libya of 155,000. Since 2015, migration from the subregion has remained relatively stable, increasing 1.3 per cent in the following two years.

Maghreb countries were the origin of 22,498 refugees as at mid-2018, with 57 per cent coming from Libya (12,724). The number of refugees increased by 58 per cent from mid-2016 to mid-2018, mostly owing to an upsurge of refugees from Libya. There were also 21,351 asylum seekers from the subregion.

Migrants and refugees from the Maghreb made up 5.9 per cent of the total subregional population in 2017, an increase from 4.8 per cent in 1990 (figure 46). Libya was the country with the lowest proportion of


Figure 46. Migrants and refugees from Maghreb countries as a percentage of the total population, 2017



Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.


nationals living abroad relative to the total national population, at 1.7 per cent in 1990 and 2.5 per cent in 2017. Morocco, in contrast, was the country with the largest proportion of nationals living abroad, ranging from 6.4 per cent in 1990 to 8.1 per cent in 2017.

Figure 45. Number of migrants and refugees from Maghreb countries (millions), 1990-2017



Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.


Figure 47. Regions of destination for migrants and refugees from the Maghreb, 2017



Arab region	116,626
Europe	4,838,542
Latin America and the Caribbean	4,327
North America	363,395
Oceania	11,025
Non-Arab African countries	30,430
Non-Arab Asian countries	253,038

Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.


Figure 48. Top five countries of destination for migrants and refugees from the Maghreb, 2017



Arab countries	116,626
France	2,789,853
Italy	602,008
Israel	243,453
Spain	766,823
United States	220,330
Rest of the world	878,290


Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Figure 49. Number of female migrants and refugees from Maghreb countries, 1990-2017



Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Figure 50. Number of tertiary students abroad from Maghreb countries, 2017



Source: UNESCO, n.d.

In 2017, Europe was the predominant region of destination, receiving 86.1 per cent of migrants and refugees from the Maghreb, mostly in France (2,789,853), Spain (766,823), and Italy (602,008) (figures 47 and 48). France alone was the destination for 50 per cent of migrants from the Maghreb.

Women made up 45.8 per cent of the migrant population from the Maghreb in 2017, with over 2.5 million women leaving their countries (figure 49). Morocco was the origin of the largest number of women migrants (1,350,929), followed by Algeria (816,509), Tunisia (330,806), and Libya (73,593).

In 2017, over 102,000 tertiary students left their home countries in the Maghreb, most of them from Morocco (figure 50). Algeria was the origin of over 21,700 students, Tunisia of over 20,000, and Libya of over 12,000. In 2016, France was their main country of destination, receiving over 54,000 students, 57 per cent of the total. Other top countries of destination, such as Canada, Germany, Malaysia and the United States, received around 4 per cent of Maghreb students each.²⁰

3. Mashreq countries


(a) Migration and displacement to the Mashreq

The Mashreq countries had almost 7.3 million migrants and refugees in 2017, around 19 per cent of the Arab region's migrant and refugee population (figure 51). After steady growth in the migrant and refugee population since 1990, which increased at a faster rate from 2005 to 2015, the size of the migrant and refugee population has since stabilized.

Jordan has had the largest number of migrants and refugees in the subregion since 1990, rising steadily from 1.1 million in 1990 to over 3.2 million in 2017. Starting in 2012, Lebanon became the country with the second largest migrant and refugee population in the subregion. Lebanon saw a steep rise in its migrant and refugee population from 2010 to 2015, mainly owing to the influx of Syrian refugees, but this population actually decreased by 1.7 per cent (34,000) from 2015 to 2017. In contrast, the migrant and refugee population in the Syrian Arab Republic, which has slowly increased since 1990, saw a sharp increase between 2005 and 2010 when it doubled in size, and then almost halved in size from 2010 to 2015. The number of migrants and refugees in the Syrian Arab Republic increased by almost 20,000, or 2 per cent, between 2015 and 2017. Migrant and refugee populations in the three remaining countries in the subregion, Egypt, Iraq and the State of Palestine, remained mostly stable between 1990 and 2010, saw an important increase between 2010 and 2015, and then stabilized again in the following two years.

As at mid-2018, 60 per cent of the refugees under the UNHCR mandate in the Arab region lived in the Mashreq. Of the 2.2 million UNHCR reported refugees in the subregion, over 974,000 were in Lebanon, and over 700,000 in Jordan. Iraq had 281,905 refugees, Egypt had 239,741, and the Syrian Arab Republic had

Figure 51. Number of migrants and refugees in Mashreq countries (millions), 1990-2017



Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.


18,490. Moreover, UNRWA reported 5.4 million Palestine refugees in its countries of operation, which are Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip in 2018. Over 550,000 Palestine refugees were still living in the Syrian Arab Republic, close to 470,000 were registered in Lebanon,²¹ and over 2.2 million were in Jordan. There were an additional 1.4 million registered Palestine refugees in Gaza, and 828,000 in the West Bank.²²

Migrants and refugees represented 4.2 per cent of the total population in the Mashreq in 2017, virtually the same proportion as in 2015 (figure 52). However, migrant and refugee shares show considerable variations between countries. While Jordan and Lebanon had high numbers of migrants and refugees relative to their populations (33.3 per cent and 31.9 per cent, respectively), the migrant and refugee population in the remaining Mashreq countries made up less than 6 per cent, with a share as low as 0.5 per cent in Egypt.

In 2017, around 93 per cent of migrants and refugees in the Mashreq came from Arab countries, a significant number of them


refugees. The State of Palestine was the country of origin of over 3.2 million migrant and refugees (46 per cent of the migrant and refugee population in the subregion), followed by the Syrian Arab Republic, which was the origin of over 2.3 million migrants and refugees (32 per cent of the migrant and refugee population in the Mashreq) (figure 53). Iraq was the third country of origin for

Figure 52. Migrants and refugees in Mashreq countries as a percentage of the total population, 2017



Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.


Figure 53. Top five countries of origin of migrants and refugees in the Mashreq, 2017



Egypt	247,601
Iraq	562,856
Jordan	71,277
State of Palestine	3,323,583
Syrian Arab Republic	2,314,676
Rest of the Arab region	245,849
Rest of the world	519,354


Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Figure 54. Number and proportion of female migrants and refugees among the total migrant and refugee population in the Mashreq, 1990-2017



Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Figure 55. Distribution of migrants and refugees in the Mashreq by age, age group and sex, 2017




Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

migrants and refugees in the subregion, comprising 8 per cent (over half a million) of migrants and refugees.

Women make up almost half (49.7 per cent) of the migrant and refugee population in the Mashreq (figure 54), a share that has remained virtually stable since 1990. The number of women migrants and refugees slightly increased by less than 1 per cent from 2015, to reach over 3.6 million in 2017.


Child and youth migrants and refugees are more common in the Mashreq than in the other subregions, comprising 31 per cent and 15.2 per cent, respectively, of the migrant and refugee population, and a conjoint total of 46.2 per cent of the migrant and refugee population in the subregion in 2017 (figure 55). Working-age persons constituted 49.1 per cent of the total migrant and refugee population, while older persons represented 4.7 per cent.

Figure 56. Number of migrants and refugees from and in Mashreq countries, 2017



Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Figure 57. Proportion of migrants and refugees from and in Mashreq countries, 2017



Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Distribution between males and females along all age groups was virtually even.

Large numbers of persons are displaced within the region. When comparing migrants and refugees living in a country to nationals moving from the country (figures 56 and 57), there is a prominent pattern of nationals leaving from countries that have experienced conflict and occupation, like Iraq, the State of Palestine and the Syrian Arab Republic, compared with migrants and refugees in those

countries. In the State of Palestine and the Syrian Arab Republic, significant proportions of the population have migrated or have been displaced compared with the total number of nationals, reaching 77 per cent and 38 per cent, respectively. Egypt also has a much higher number of migrants from the country than migrants present in the country, due to the high rates of labour migration from the country, and low rates of labour migration and refugee movement into the country. In contrast, in Jordan and Lebanon, the main

destination countries of refugees from the subregion, there is a larger net number of migrants and refugees living in the country than of nationals living abroad. The numbers of migrants and refugees hosted by these countries are equivalent in both cases to more than 30 per cent of their nationals. The next section will explore the characteristics of migration and displacement patterns from Mashreq countries.

(b) Migration and displacement from the Mashreq


Migration and displacement from Mashreq countries have almost tripled since 1990 when there were 6 million migrants and refugees, reaching 17.3 million in 2017 (figure 58). The migrant and refugee population from the subregion saw a drastic increase between 2005 and 2015, mostly because of conflict, but the rate of growth has since decelerated.

In 2018, around 80 per cent of the region's refugees originated in the Mashreq, predominantly owing to conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, which was the country of origin of 6,490,950 refugees, representing 74

per cent of refugees from the Arab region in that year. Moreover, there were over 372,000 refugees from Iraq, over 23,000 from Egypt, over 5,000 from Lebanon and over 2,000 from Jordan. Furthermore, over 101,000 refugees from the State of Palestine were registered with UNHCR, and 5.4 million Palestine refugees were registered with UNRWA in 2018.²³ UNHCR also reported 440,828 asylum seekers from the Mashreq, mostly from Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, in 2018.


The State of Palestine had the largest population abroad before 2010, when it was surpassed by the Syrian Arab Republic. The migrant and refugee population from the State of Palestine has been slowly and steadily increasing, from 1.8 million in 1990 to 3.8 million in 2017, as reported by DESA. In contrast, the migrant population from the Syrian Arab Republic was slowly increasing until 2010 (less than doubling in a twenty-year span), and then grew six-fold in just five years between 2010 and 2015 owing to the conflict in the country resulting in large scale refugee movements. Growth rates have slowed since 2015 and there were 6.8 million Syrian migrants

Figure 58. Number of migrants and refugees from Mashreq countries (millions), 1990-2017



Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Figure 59. Migrants and refugees from Mashreq countries as a percentage of the total population, 2017




Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

and refugees in 2017, which is over 625,000 people (10 per cent) more than in 2015.

Iraq is the only country in the subregion that has seen its national migrant and refugee population decrease despite ongoing political instability. From 2005 to 2010, there was a big increase in Iraqi migrants and refugees of almost 80 per cent, or close to 1.2 million persons, reaching a high of 2.6 million in 2010. However, by 2017, the migrant and refugee population decreased to slightly more than its 2005 level, reaching close to 1.7 million migrants and refugees owing to return.

The proportion of nationals living abroad for the Mashreq subregion was 9.9 per cent in 2017 (figure 59). However, those numbers vary extensively between countries. For the State of Palestine, migrants and refugees represented 77.3 per cent of the population. The share was 37.6 per cent for the Syrian


Figure 60. Regions of destination for migrants and refugees from the Mashreq, 2017



Arab region	11,187,932
Europe	1,310,723
Latin America and the Caribbean	60,074
North America	976,422
Oceania	242,846
Non-Arab African countries	23,662
Non-Arab Asian countries	3,525,558


Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Figure 61. Top five countries of destination for migrants and refugees from the Mashreq, 2017



Jordan	3,077,262
Lebanon	1,917,308
Saudi Arabia	1,980,067
Turkey	3,302,223
United Arab Emirates	1,165,133
Rest of the Arab region	3,048,162
Rest of the world	2,837,062

Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.


Figure 62. Number of female migrants and refugees from Mashreq countries, 1990-2017

Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Arab Republic, and less than 14 per cent for the remaining Mashreq countries.

Turkey was the main country of destination for migrants and refugees originating from Mashreq countries in 2017, over 3.2 million of whom were refugees (figure 61). This is a steep rise from the close to 1.4 million migrants and refugees it had in 2015, when it was the fourth country of destination. Jordan was the second country of destination for migrants and refugees from the subregion, and Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates also counted significant numbers. Arab countries received 65 per cent of migrants and refugees from the subregion – mainly in Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – and non-Arab countries, excluding Turkey, received 2.8 million or 16 per cent (figures 60 and 61).

There were 7.7 million female migrants and refugees from the Mashreq in 2017, representing 44.4 per cent of the migrant population from the subregion (figure 62). Their number has grown by 6.2 per cent since 2015, and almost tripled since 1990. Egypt and Jordan had the lowest share of female migrants and refugees among their migrant

Figure 63. Number of tertiary students abroad from Mashreq countries, 2017

Source: UNESCO, n.d.

and refugee population, representing 34.1 per cent and 35.7 per cent, respectively. In contrast, the State of Palestine and the Syrian Arab Republic had the highest proportions, with women making up 48.5 per cent and 47.9 per cent of their migrant and refugee population, respectively.

In 2017, almost 172,000 tertiary students left their Mashreq countries of origin (figure 63). Their top three countries of destination were in the Arab region, namely Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, each receiving between 15 per cent and 17 per cent of students from the Mashreq. Other prominent countries of destination were France, Malaysia, Turkey and the United States.²⁴

4. Arab least developed countries

(a) Migration and displacement to the Arab least developed countries

In contrast to the above subregions, which have witnessed a continuous upward trend in their migrant and refugee population since 1990, the Arab LDCs witnessed a significant drop in the number of migrants and refugees between 1990 and 2005, contracting by 60 per cent from 2.2 million to less than 900,000 (figure 64). This decrease is due to the numbers of migrants and refugees in Somalia and the Sudan. The migrant and refugee population started growing in the Arab LDCs after 2005, reaching almost 1.5 million in


2017. Between 2015 and 2017, the Arab LDCs had 125,000 more migrants and refugees, constituting a 9.4 per cent increase.

Based on mid-2018 UNHCR data, Arab LDCs were the destination of 1,297,052 refugees, the majority of whom resided in the Sudan, which had 908,692 refugees. The number of refugees in the Arab LDCs has increased by 80 per cent since 2016. There were 271,554 registered refugees in Yemen; 84,078 in Mauritania; 17,302 in Djibouti; and 15,426 in Somalia. The majority of refugees in the Arab LDCs came from one of the other Arab LDCs or from neighbouring countries, predominantly from Eritrea, Somalia and South Sudan.

The Sudan had the largest migrant and refugee population among the Arab LDCs in 2017, hosting close to 736,000 migrants and refugees. Though the migrant and refugee population in Yemen has been growing since 2005, it started increasing at a much faster pace after 2005, and slowed down between 2015 and 2017, reaching over 384,000 migrants and refugees in 2017 (box 5).

In 2017, migrants and refugees comprised 1.6 per cent of the population of the Arab LDCs, a significant drop from 5.3 per cent

Figure 64. Number of migrants and refugees in the Arab LDCs, 1990-2017



Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Box 5. Internally displaced persons, migrants and refugees in Yemen

An upsurge in conflict in Yemen since 2015, exacerbated by famine and outbreaks of disease, has had a dire impact on the Yemeni population. In 2018, over 22 million people, 75 per cent of the population, were in need of urgent humanitarian assistance, constituting the largest humanitarian crisis in the world.^a Organizations striving to provide food, medicine, and other essentials have encountered major obstacles in their aid assistance, leaving people (including migrants, refugees, asylum seekers and stateless persons) in the country vulnerable to starvation and disease.

At the end of 2017, there were an estimated 2 million IDPs in Yemen, including 160,000 newly displaced that year.^b Furthermore, there were over 142,000 new displacements between January and June 2018, which is considered a conservative estimate owing to limited comprehensive data.^c Refugees and asylum seekers from Yemen, totalling over 280,000, have sought refuge in other countries, most notably Djibouti and Somalia.^d

Yemen is a prominent transit country between the Horn of Africa and Gulf countries, and a destination country for migrants from neighbouring countries. There are an estimated 279,000 refugees and asylum seekers in the country, almost exclusively from Ethiopia and Somalia.^e One of the main routes of mixed movement towards the Arabian Gulf is from the Horn of Africa – mainly from Djibouti and Somalia – to Yemen and then from Yemen to Saudi Arabia.

DESA reported 384,321 migrants in Yemen in 2017, of which 72.6 per cent were Somali.^f However, owing to the nature of the conflict, restrictions in accessing and counting migrants under these circumstances, and the transit and irregular nature of migration to and through Yemen, the accuracy of this estimate is difficult to ascertain.

The total number of arrivals to Yemen peaked in 2016 at 117,107 persons, and decreased slightly in 2017 by just 0.15 per cent despite the dire humanitarian situation in the country. According to the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix, in 2017, a total of 99,516 migrants arrived in Yemen, of which 11 per cent were children and 89 per cent were adults (77 per cent males and 13 per cent females). In turn, 98 per cent of those assisted at migrant response points had no documents. The vast majority of migrants interviewed by IOM intended to reach Saudi Arabia, while the remaining few were on their way to the Sudan. Ethiopia was the country of origin of around 95 per cent of migrants in Yemen, 5 per cent were Somali and 0.1 per cent came from other countries. Through a flow monitoring point at the border with Saudi Arabia, IOM also recorded a total of 9,563 returned irregular Yemeni migrants in 2017.^g

In 2017, IOM provided assisted voluntary return and reintegration to 1,942 migrants in Yemen, the majority to Somalia and the rest to Ethiopia.^h The UNHCR assisted spontaneous return programme helped 2,591 Somalis return to Somalia in 2018. UNHCR assisted with the resettlement of 114 refugees who were identified as being particularly at risk: 60 Eritreans, 51 Ethiopians and 3 Somalis were resettled.ⁱ

Sources:

^a UNHCR, 2018e.

^b Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, 2018a.

^c Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, 2018b.

^d UNHCR, 2018e.

^e UNHCR, 2018d.


^f DESA, 2017.

^g IOM, 2017c.

^h IOM, 2018a.


ⁱ Data from UNHCR focal point to the Working Group on International Migration in the Arab Region.

Figure 65. Migrants and refugees in the Arab LDCs as a percentage of the total population, 2017




Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Figure 66. Top five countries of origin of migrants and refugees in the Arab LDCs, 2017



Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Figure 67. Number and proportion of female migrants and refugees among the total migrant and refugee population in the Arab LDCs, 1990-2017




Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

in 1990 (figure 65). Countries had diverging proportions of migrants and refugees, representing a wide range between a high of 12.1 per cent in Djibouti and a low of 0.3 per cent in Somalia, although, excluding the former, all had migrant and refugee shares of less than 4 per cent.

In 2017, Somalia was the origin of over 375,000 migrants and refugees, 26 per cent of the migrant and refugee population in the Arab LDCs (figure 66). South Sudan, which in 2015 was the country of origin of over 135,000 migrants and refugees in the Arab LDCs, more than doubled its number of migrants and refugees to over 300,000 by 2017, owing to violence, drought and famine that have displaced millions.²⁵ Overall, migrants and refugees from Arab countries represented 46 per cent of migrants and refugees in the Arab LDCs, mostly from Somalia and the Sudan.

There were over 700,000 migrant and refugee women in 2017 in the Arab LDCs, comprising

Figure 68. Distribution of migrants and refugees in the Arab LDCs by age, age group and sex, 2017



Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Migrants and refugees are evenly distributed between men and women across all age groups, with a slight proportional advantage for males over females below 65 years old (figure 68). In total, counting males and females, children represent 25.9 per cent of the migrant and refugee population, young people represent 17.1 per cent, working age persons constitute 50.7 per cent, and older persons comprise 6.3 per cent.


With the exception of Djibouti and Mauritania, the Arab LDCs have a much larger number of nationals living abroad than of migrants and refugees in their territory (figure 69). Migration from the Comoros and Somalia is especially significant, reaching almost 15 per cent compared to the total population in both countries (figure 70). The following section will describe the patterns of migration and displacement from the Arab least developed countries.

(b) Migration and displacement from the Arab least developed countries

48.3 per cent of the migrant population, a proportion that has remained stable since the last reporting period (figure 67).


Migration and displacement from the Arab LDCs have grown by 160 per cent since 1990, increasing from 2 million migrants and refugees

Figure 69. Number of migrants and refugees from and in the Arab LDCs, 2017




Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Figure 70. Proportion of migrants and refugees from and in the Arab LDCs, 2017



Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Figure 71. Number of migrants and refugees from the Arab LDCs (millions), 1990-2017



Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.


in 1990 to over 5.3 million in 2017 (figure 71). This number increased by over 200,000 migrants and refugees, or 4.8 per cent, between 2015 and 2017. Migrants and refugees from the Arab LDCs represented 19 per cent of all migrants and refugees from the Arab region in 2017.

mostly coming from Somalia (954,701) and the Sudan (719,222). There were also 36,679 refugees from Mauritania; 26,793 from Yemen; 2,034 from Djibouti; and 606 from the Comoros. There were also 146,875 asylum seekers from the Arab LDCs reported by UNHCR in 2018.

Registered refugees with UNHCR from the Arab LDCs amounted to over 1.7 million in 2017,

Somalia and the Sudan are the two top countries of origin among the Arab LDCs, each

Figure 72. Migrants and refugees from the Arab LDCs as a percentage of the total population, 2017




Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

with almost 2 million nationals living abroad in 2017. Yemen was the country of origin of almost 1.2 million migrants and refugees in 2017, and the number of Yemeni migrants and refugees increased by 9.3 per cent between 2015 and 2017, the largest increase among the Arab LDCs. Around 120,000 migrants originated from the Comoros, and 116,000 from Mauritania. Djibouti was the country of origin of the fewest migrants and refugees in the Arab region, with less than 16,000 nationals living abroad.

In 2017, around 8.6 per cent of the population of Arab LDCs were living outside their country of origin (figure 72), an increase from 6.6 per cent in 2015. The Comoros is the country with the largest proportion of its population living abroad among the Arab LDCs at 14.3 per cent, followed closely by Somalia at 13.5 per cent. All other countries have migrant populations of below 5 per cent.


Figure 73. Regions of destination for migrants and refugees from the Arab LDCs, 2017



Arab region	2,368,973
Europe	439,400
Latin America and the Caribbean	153
North America	227,154
Oceania	35,373
Non-Arab African countries	2,276,908
Non-Arab Asian countries	35,037


Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Figure 74. Top five countries of destination for migrants and refugees from the Arab LDCs, 2017




Chad	344,286
Ethiopia	513,305
Kenya	493,437
Saudi Arabia	1,133,106
South Sudan	563,135
Rest of the Arab region	1,235,867
Rest of the world	1,099,862

Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Figure 75. Number of female migrants and refugees from the Arab LDCs, 1990-2017

Source: ESCWA calculations based on DESA, 2017.

Figure 76. Number of tertiary students abroad from the Arab LDCs, 2017

Source: UNESCO, n.d.

In 2017, around 44 per cent of migrants and refugees from the Arab LDCs (over 2.3 million) resided in other Arab countries (figure 73). Saudi Arabia, which was the destination for 21 per cent of the total migrant population from

the Arab LDCs, or 1.1 million persons, was the top country of destination (figure 74). Non-Arab Africa was the second largest destination region, with migrants and refugees going to Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya and South Sudan, all among the top five destination countries.

Women represented 43.6 per cent of migrants and refugees from the Arab LDCs in 2017, accounting for over 2.3 million women and girls (figure 75). This proportion has remained virtually stable since 1990, with the number of women migrants and refugees increasing by 100,00 between 2015 and 2017. In 2017, Yemen was the country with the lowest proportion of female migrants and refugees at 34 per cent, and the Comoros was the country with the highest proportion at 50.7 per cent.

UNESCO reported approximately 55,000 tertiary students from the Arab LDCs studying abroad in 2017 (figure 76). Their top country of destination was Saudi Arabia, which received 26 per cent of students, followed by Malaysia, which received around 18 per cent, and the United Arab Emirates, which received 13 per cent.²⁶

D. Inflows and outflows of remittances in the Arab region


The Arab region is a major source of global remittances, particularly the GCC subregion. Remittances are also a significant source of income for several Arab countries. Remittances can enhance sustainable development by contributing to poverty reduction, financing education and health, providing a capital source for spending and investment, and increasing the flow of foreign currency, among other benefits.

The Arab region received \$54.1 billion in remittances in 2017, constituting 8.7 per cent of global remittance inflows. Although this amount had been in decline since 2014, when it reached a historical high of \$54.2 billion, 2017 figures show a recovery and an estimated increase for 2018 (figure 77). The Mashreq received the largest amount of remittances at \$38.6 billion in 2017, representing 72 per cent of all remittances sent to the region. Egypt is the

top Arab receiving country with \$22.5 billion in 2017, followed by Lebanon at \$7.4 billion (annex IV). The Maghreb received \$10.7 billion, predominantly in Morocco, which received \$6.8 billion. The Arab LDCs received \$3.7 billion, of which Yemen received the majority at \$3.3 billion. The GCC was the subregion with the lowest inflow of remittances in 2017, receiving less than 2 per cent of all remittances to the region, or \$1 billion. Qatar was the main receiving country in the subregion, with over \$666 million.

In 2017, remittances almost doubled (1.9 times) the amount the region received in official development assistance and official aid, totalling \$29.1 billion (table 3).²⁷ Remittances were also 1.8 times the amount the region received in net foreign direct investments, constituting \$30.1 billion.²⁸ Remittances were a significant source of income in some countries: they represented 14.8 per cent of GDP in the State of Palestine, 13.9 per cent in Lebanon, 12.4 per cent in the Comoros, 11.1 per cent

Figure 77. Remittance inflows to the Arab region by subregion (millions USD), 1990-2018*



Source: World Bank, 2018a.

Note: * Data for 2018 are estimates.

Table 3. GDP, official development assistance, foreign direct investment and remittance inflows by country, 2017


	GDP (millions)	Net official development assistance and official aid received (millions)	Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US\$, millions)	Remittance inflows (millions)	Remittances as a percentage of GDP	Remittances as a percentage of official development assistance	Remittances as a percentage of foreign direct investment
Algeria	167,555	189	1,201	2,000	1.2%	1057%	167%
Bahrain	35,307	..	519
Comoros	1,068	67	9	132	12.4%	198%	1,535%
Djibouti	1,845	134	165	58	3.1%	43%	35%
Egypt	235,369	-114	7,392	22,524	9.6%		305%
Iraq	192,061	2,907	-5,032	474	0.2%	16%	..
Jordan	40,068	2,921	2,030	4,432	11.1%	152%	218%
Kuwait	120,126	..	113	23	0.0%	..	20%
Lebanon	53,577	1,306	2,559	7,440	13.9%	570%	291%
Libya	38,108	432
Mauritania	5,025	284	588
Morocco	109,709	1,885	2,680	6,847	6.2%	363%	255%
Oman	72,643	..	2,918	39	0.1%	..	1%
Qatar	166,929	..	986	666	0.4%	..	68%
Saudi Arabia	686,738	..	1,421	291	20%
Somalia	7,052	1,760	384
Sudan	117,488	840	1,065	213	0.2%	25%	20%
State of Palestine	14,498	2,111	203	2,143	14.8%	101%	1,054%
Syrian Arab Republic	..	10,361	..	1,623	..	16%	..
Tunisia	39,952	776	810	1,890	4.7%	244%	233%
United Arab Emirates	382,575	..	10,354
Yemen	31,268	3,234	-270	3,351	10.7%	104%	..
Total Arab region	2,518,960	29,094	30,095	54,145	2.1%	186%	180%

Source: For GDP, ODA and FID see World Bank, 2019; and for remittances see World Bank, 2018a.

in Jordan, and 10.7 per cent in Yemen.²⁹ Remittances also exceeded the amount of foreign direct investment received by the Comoros by 15 times, the State of Palestine by 10 times, and Egypt and Lebanon by three times.


In 2017, approximately \$29 billion in remittances to the Arab region came from other Arab countries, representing 50 per cent of the region’s remittance inflows, predominantly from Saudi Arabia (\$14.1 billion)

Figure 78. Top five remittance-sending countries to the Arab region (millions USD), 2017




Source: World Bank, 2018b.

Figure 80. Top five remittance-sending countries to the Maghreb (millions USD), 2017




Source: World Bank, 2018b.

Figure 79. Top five remittance-sending countries to the GCC (millions USD), 2017



Source: World Bank, 2018b.


Figure 81. Top five remittance-sending countries to the Mashreq (millions USD), 2017



Source: World Bank, 2018b.

(figure 78). In turn, over \$14.8 billion, or 28 per cent, came from Europe, notably from France (\$5.9 billion), Italy (\$2 billion), Spain (\$2 billion), and Germany (\$1.6 billion). An additional \$4.9 billion, 9 per cent of the region's inflow of remittances, came from North America.

Figure 82. Top five remittance-sending countries to the Arab LDCs (millions USD), 2017




Source: World Bank, 2018b.

A subregional breakdown of remittances sent to Arab countries is provided in figures 79-82.

Close to a third (27 per cent) of global remittance outflows in 2017 came from the Arab region, estimated at \$120.6 billion (figure 83), almost all of them (98.9 per cent or \$119.3 billion) from GCC countries. Mashreq countries were the origin of \$962 million in remittances, the Maghreb was the origin of \$206 million, and the Arab LDCs sent out \$139 million. Top remittance-sending countries from the region were the United Arab Emirates at \$44.3 billion; Saudi Arabia at \$36.1 billion; and Kuwait, Oman and Qatar ranging from \$9 billion to over \$14 billion each. Resulting from considerably higher remittance outflows compared with remittance inflows to Arab countries, the net annual outflow of remittances from the region totalled \$66.5 billion in 2017.


India received the largest amount of remittances from the Arab region, estimated at \$38.4 billion in 2017, followed by Egypt at \$16.7 billion, Pakistan at \$13.7 billion, the Philippines at \$10.4 billion, and Bangladesh at \$7.3 billion (figure 84).

Figure 83. Remittance outflows from the Arab region by subregion (millions USD), 1990-2017



Source: World Bank, 2018a.

Note: No data are available for Somalia and the Syrian Arab Republic, and there are gaps in data for Djibouti, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya and Yemen (see annex IV for yearly country data).

Figure 84. Top 10 countries receiving remittances from the Arab region (millions USD), 2017

Source: World Bank, 2018b.

E. Drivers of migration and root causes of displacement in the Arab region

Interconnected factors influence individuals' decisions to leave their country of origin or place of habitual residence. This is certainly seen in the Arab region, as multiple and complex considerations often shape migrants' decision-making. Violence and conflict are among the key determinants of forced population movements. For example, in 2017, the Syrian Arab Republic was the top country of origin of both refugees and internally displaced people in the region. The search for better opportunities and living conditions also plays an important role in the decision to migrate. This is seen in the case of mobile tertiary students who choose to migrate to destinations such as Europe or the United States for higher education, or migrant workers who seek work opportunities in high-income GCC economies.

These macro and individual factors collectively interplay to influence migrants' choices and movements, with an increasing overlap between forced and voluntary migration flows. While conflict and violence may force individuals and families to leave

out of fear for their lives, the search for better economic opportunities and living conditions can often lead to secondary movements. The opposite can also occur, such as in the case of Libya, where many migrants who initially arrived in the country for work have been leaving the country owing to violence and so as to escape inhumane living conditions. The phenomenon of environment-related migration is another example of the multiplicity and intersecting nature of factors explaining migrants' choices and movements, as environmental pressure often acts as a magnifier of existing drivers of migration. The Arab region is considered one of the world's most water-scarce and dry regions. Insufficient access to water affects people's livelihoods, especially in agriculture-dependent rural communities, driving human mobility and shaping migration patterns.

1. Economic and social factors

One of the most notable impacts of the migration-development nexus is how development, or the lack thereof, shapes migration patterns and migrants' motivations. Studies show that poverty, inequality, difficulties in accessing economic opportunities,

and gentrification resulting from non-inclusive urban development significantly influence migrants' decisions to leave low-income countries for high-income countries. In the region, average unemployment rates were estimated at 10 per cent in 2017, with higher rates in countries such as the State of Palestine at 27.4 per cent, Libya at 17.1 per cent, Tunisia at 15.4 per cent and Jordan at 14.9 per cent.³⁰ This particularly affects young people, with over 25 per cent of young people aged 15-24 in the region suffering from unemployment. Youth unemployment is significantly high in some countries, such as the State of Palestine at 43.1 per cent, Libya at 41.2 per cent, Jordan at 34.9 per cent, Tunisia at 34.7 per cent, and Egypt at 33 per cent, according to 2017 estimates. Such high rates contribute to population movements, especially when combined with low wages and poor returns on education, which influence migrants' decisions to leave in search for better living conditions. In Egypt, for example, 54 per cent of young people aged 15-24 with an advanced level of education were unemployed in 2017. In Tunisia, this rate reached 67.5 per cent in 2013.³¹

Research also shows that the poorest groups often do not have the resources and networks required for migration,³² therefore middle-income countries have higher migration rates.³³ In this regard, Egypt and Morocco, both lower-middle income countries, are amongst the top five countries of origin of migrants in the region. Improved economic opportunities and better education and infrastructure in these countries tend to increase people's resources, assets and capabilities to migrate. The persistence of modest economic growth and their proximity to countries with significantly higher development levels, namely the GCC subregion and Europe, influence migrants' motivation and decisions, particularly with regard to their intended final destination country. GCC countries offer better economic prospects to migrants and thus are some of the top countries of destination in the region. Likewise, aspirations for better standards of

living in Europe are among the main factors attracting North African migrants. Improved social and economic conditions can increase the appeal of these regions to migrants from middle- and low-income countries. This dynamic is further reinforced by the labour market structure in both GCC and European countries. The GCC subregion is characterized by a small national workforce, particularly in Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Moreover, Europe is defined by an ageing and shrinking national workforce, resulting in high demand for foreign labour in both regions. In contrast, the labour markets of North Africa and the Mashreq are known for high unemployment rates.³⁴ Consequently, as large numbers of young dependents from these subregions reach working age each year, they are inclined to seek opportunities abroad in countries with a high demand for labour, as an alternative to their saturated labour markets.

2. Conflict induced displacement

Conflicts, occupation and violence are key influences on people's decisions to flee their areas of origin. The political instability and civil unrest that swept across the region in 2011 have resulted in a number of deadly conflicts, causing the destruction of civil and social infrastructure and threatening and claiming the lives of civilians. As a consequence, the region has witnessed the fastest increase of forced displacement, with millions of people fleeing their homes. The number of internally displaced persons in the Syrian Arab Republic in 2017 exceeded 6.8 million people (Box 2). Yemen accounts for over 2 million internally displaced persons. The destruction of housing and infrastructure and disruption to basic services, especially in urban settings, are also major barriers to return and to durable solutions for displaced people.³⁵

While conflict and instability are decisive factors pushing people to flee, the impact of conflict on livelihoods also plays an important

Box 6. Drivers of rural migration in the Near East and North Africa

Migration out of rural areas is a growing global trend, also witnessed in the Near East and North Africa^a region. Young people, an important demographic in the Arab region, have higher average rates of unemployment than any other region worldwide (more than twice the world average of 13 per cent); these rates are even higher in rural areas.^b Rural young people are among the most likely to migrate, either internally or internationally. With lower educational attainment than their urban counterparts and limited access to land and other productive assets, rural young people are increasingly forced to choose between low-wage, seasonal and often informal employment in agriculture and internal or international migration.

The region's rural population, as a percentage of the total population, has been declining steadily over the last 50 years, dropping from just over 60 per cent in 1970 to 38 per cent in 2017.^c As economies undergo structural transformation and the agricultural sector becomes diminished, the movement of people within and across borders is inevitable. This process of transformation – combined with declining agriculture productivity and widening rural-urban disparities in development – is pushing rural populations to migrate in search of higher wages and living standards.

In addition to agriculture sector decline, generally low levels of rural development are further driving regional migration trends. In most countries of the Near East and North Africa region there is a focus on urban development, leaving a widening rural-urban gap in the provision of public services. Across a sample of nine countries, it was found that access to education, health, electricity, sanitation, drinking water and flooring is between 3 and 20 times lower in rural areas.^d

Source: Compiled by FAO.

^a For this box, the Near East and North Africa region is understood to be comprised of: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen.

^b International Labour Organization, 2017b.

^c DESA, 2017.

^d Alkire and Robles (2017).

role. Conflict causes food insecurity, disrupt access to basic services and precipitate households' decision to move. Famine, disease, hostilities and difficulties in accessing basic services are considered the top push factors for displacement in Yemen. In Libya, conflict has not only created significant internal displacement of populations, but has also placed the country at the crossroad of significant irregular flows towards Europe.³⁶ The consequences of the conflict in Libya, notably the liquidity crisis that followed, have affected the situation of many migrants employed in Libya who were initially seeking better economic prospects, with many of them either deciding to continue their journey to another country or returning to their home countries.³⁷

3. Environmental factors and migration

The Arab region has been identified as particularly vulnerable to the impact of climate change. Water security, defined by United Nations Water, as "the capacity of a population to safeguard sustainable access to adequate quantities of acceptable quality water for sustaining livelihoods, human well-being, and socio-economic development, for ensuring protection against water-borne pollution and water-related disasters, and for preserving ecosystems in a climate of peace and political stability",³⁸ is a key concern in the region. In 2019, 18 of 22 Arab countries fall below the renewable water resources annual threshold of 1,000m³ per capita per year, and 13 that fall below the absolute water scarcity threshold of 500m³ per

Box 7. Drivers of urban displacement in the Arab region

Over the last decade, large numbers of people have been moving into cities and urban areas in the Arab region* from within and across borders, voluntarily seeking better living conditions and sustainable livelihood opportunities, or forcibly escaping natural or human-made disasters. This movement of people has been among the main drivers increasing the urban population in Arab countries four-fold, from 39 per cent in 1970 to 58 per cent in 2018, and expected to reach 70 per cent by 2050.

The outbreak of conflict in major cities across Arab countries, and the resulting mass destruction of infrastructure and disruption of basic services, triggered unprecedented levels of internal, interregional and international displacement, segregation and exclusion. Moreover, the protracted character of conflicts, the slow process of post-conflict reconstruction, and a lack of funding for restoring basic services leave large numbers of displaced persons and migrants trapped in a vicious cycle of vulnerability, unable to return to their areas or countries of origin.

Several factors contribute to people migrating from urban areas, including poor urban planning, highly centralized governance frameworks, limited public participation in urban development, poor human and financial resources at the local level, dysfunctional municipalities in crisis contexts, weak enforcement of land use and zoning regulations, and inadequate building standards.

Given that cities are at the forefront of efforts to fulfil the needs and rights of migrants and their host communities, the acknowledgement of cities' role as key partners is instrumental to accelerating the implementation of the Global Compact for Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees, and to the achievement of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Leveraging the positive impact of including migrants and refugees in local life generates additional benefits for economic development and cultural diversity in the Arab region. Arab cities can be catalysts for the inclusion of migrants and displaced persons if they are well-planned, affordable, efficiently governed and sustainable. This requires effective, comprehensive, cross-sectorial and multi-stakeholder actions to address the root causes of conflict, bringing together humanitarian and development actors to develop long-term recovery and development plans that bring stability, peace and resilience to Arab cities.

Source: Compiled by UN-Habitat.

*The Arab region includes the 22 Arab countries belonging to the League of Arab States. Discrepancies in numbers between box 6 and 7 result from the different countries included in the analysis.

capita per year.³⁹ Regional water governance is essential, given that a significant part of water resources in the region stem from transboundary water flows. This is of utmost importance in countries such as Iraq, where only 8 per cent of fresh water comes from within the country, and 71 per cent come from Turkey, 7 per cent from Iran, and 4 per cent from the Syrian Arab Republic. Another example is the case of the transboundary Yarmouk-Jordan River flow from the Syrian Arab Republic, where forecasts suggest that Jordan would receive 51-75 per cent less water compared to historical flow.⁴⁰

Environmental pressure aggravated by the effects of climate events, such as drought, sea level rise, flash floods and desertification, often acts as a threat multiplier exacerbating other drivers of migration.⁴¹ It can also protract displacement, given that people who bear the burden of displacement rarely have the resources to cope with the results of environmental pressures and climate change. It is thus extremely challenging to clearly identify and quantify their direct effects on displacement and migration. Pressure on natural resources, water stress,

land degradation and natural disasters may result in damage to strategic economic sectors, putting additional burdens on populations' livelihoods and thus forcing them to leave their places of origin in search for alternatives. Climate change, for example, has both direct and indirect impacts on agricultural assets and production, and thus on the livelihoods of households involved in agricultural activities. The impacts of climate change can therefore increase the vulnerability of populations, especially rural populations with a high dependency on natural resources, which may be forced to seek alternative income-generating activities and access basic services in other rural areas, urban centres or abroad.

Urban expansion, land degradation and competition over increasingly scarce resources may also exacerbate conflicts and tensions leading, in turn, to more displacement and migration. For example, studies⁴² link the three-year drought in the Syrian Arab Republic from 2007 to 2010, which aggravated existing water and agricultural insecurity and caused massive agricultural failures and livestock mortality,⁴³ with the eruption of civil unrest in the country in 2011. This severe drought that critically impacted agricultural production, and hence the livelihoods of rural populations, caused the displacement of approximately 1.5 million people from farming areas in the Syrian Arab Republic to the peripheries of urban centres.⁴⁴ Similarly, Iraq is suffering from a lack of water, particularly in the southern and central regions, with some of the affected governorates, such as Najaf, receiving families displaced by the water crisis.⁴⁵

4. Facilitating and mediating factors

The presence of diaspora networks and strong connections with individuals abroad are factors that can shape migrants' decisions about their destinations. In the same way, the existence of historic ties and education links influence migration patterns, and partly explain

the presence of some migration corridors in the region. Such is the case of the corridor between Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to France, Italy and Spain, where migratory movements can also be linked to post-colonial connections and to geographic, language and education proximities.

The intensive use of new communication channels allowing the instantaneous flow of information and communication can also improve the experiences, reduce risks and shape the decision-making of people on the move. These social media networks are actively used by migrants to communicate with fellow migrants, and to obtain additional information on the journey and on a country of destination's immigration policies, procedures and access conditions. Consequently, these new tools can increase migrants' awareness about a journey's risks and opportunities.

Changes to migration governance and policies in destination countries also impact migrants' perceptions of the relative dangers or ease of travel, and therefore also influence their decision-making process. Labour agreements, for example, have an important role in facilitating migrants' admission and employment in host societies. Temporary labour migration from South Asia to the GCC subregion is steered by recruitment and placement agencies, which act as intermediaries between prospective workers and their foreign employers. They contribute to organizing migratory movements and shaping the migration experience. Labour agreements and thorough follow-up of their measures also decrease the cost of migration resulting from recruitment malpractices, collusion between recruiters in origin and destination countries, and bureaucracy and poor regulations.⁴⁶ Labour agreements therefore have the potential of unleashing the benefits of migration for development, given that they increase migrants' capacity to adapt and their prospects for inclusion in host countries through easier access to the job market.

In conclusion, the movement of people across borders is often categorized as either ‘voluntary migration’, encompassing migrants who are primarily motivated by improving their economic perspective, or ‘forced displacement’ as the movement of populations escaping wars and persecution. However, this distinction is increasingly blurred, and it is difficult to fit all people on the move with their various situations and motivations into these narrow categories. Each individual has a personal story and specific reasons to move, often stemming from a combination of different considerations. Migration and displacement in the Arab region is characterized by mixed flows and underpinned by multiple drivers, including socioeconomic factors, conflict and political instability, as well as environmental pressures that have various effects on populations’ livelihoods, sometimes rendering crossing borders their only alternative coping strategy.

F. Summary of key findings

- The Arab region hosted over 38 million migrants and refugees in 2017, who make up 14.8 per cent of global migrants and refugees. Half of all migrants and refugees in the region are working-age (25-64) males and one in five are working-age females; almost one in five migrants and refugees are children;
- Displacement continues to be a prominent trend in the region: in 2018, the total population of concern living in the region amounted to over 21.2 million, of which almost 15.2 million were internally displaced persons and 3.7 million were refugees under the UNHCR mandate. Moreover, in 2018, UNRWA reported 5.4 million registered Palestine refugees under its mandate;
- The number of migrants and refugees originating from the Arab region reached 29 million in 2017, of which almost half remained in the region;
- In 2018, the Arab region was the origin of a total population of concern to UNHCR of almost 26.3 million persons. Over 8.7 million of them were refugees, of which 29 per cent remained in the region. Of every five refugees in the world, two come from the Arab region. The number of refugees from the Arab region increased between 2016 and 2018 by 17 per cent (over 1.2 million new refugees), most of whom were from the Syrian Arab Republic;
- The Arab region received \$54.1 billion in remittances in 2017, while remittance outflows from the Arab region were estimated at \$120.6 billion;
- GCC countries are the destination of the largest number of migrants among the Arab subregions. Three of every five migrants and refugees in the Arab region reside in GCC countries, of whom most are migrant workers. Owing to the high influx of migrant workers, GCC countries have the highest proportion of migrants as a percentage of the total population. In 2017, working-age migrants (25-64) represented three quarters of the migrant population, and almost three quarters of migrants in the subregion were male. Migration from GCC countries is less common, both in terms of net number of migrants and as a percentage of the national population;
- Migration to the Maghreb is a less prominent feature than in other subregions, as the subregion is not a destination for a high number of migrant workers nor refugees. However, there is a significant trend of transit migration through the subregion, which is harder to document in terms of numbers of migrants owing to its irregular and varying nature. Libya was the main country of destination in the Maghreb


subregion, where 1 out of 10 residents is a migrant. In contrast, there is a continuing historic pattern of migration from Maghreb countries to Europe, predominantly to France, Italy and Spain;

- Most population movements in the Mashreq subregion are due to forced displacement, although there are high numbers of migrant workers in Jordan and Lebanon. Both countries are also the destination of the largest numbers of refugees, and they have the highest proportions of refugees as a percentage of their population. Nine out of every 10 migrants and refugees in the subregion came from other Arab countries. As at mid-2018, around 60 per cent of refugees living in the Arab region lived in the Mashreq;
- The Sudan and Yemen are both countries of origin and of destination for a significant number of migrants and refugees. Yemen continues to be a transit country for migrants

and refugees on their way to GCC countries, even amid conflict and famine. Somalia is the origin of the largest number of migrants and refugees from the subregion.

The present chapter focused on trends, patterns and drivers of migration and displacement in the Arab region, providing an overview of the main characteristics – country of origin, country of destination, and demographic profiles – of migrants and refugees travelling into, within and from Arab countries. The following chapter provides a description of recent policy developments regarding migration governance in Arab countries at the national, bilateral, regional and global levels.

2. Developments in Migration Governance in the Arab Region





Migration has gained salience in the policy debates of Arab countries, given the significant demographic, economic and social shifts that have resulted from large scale migration in most countries. Most Arab countries have engaged in developing their migration related policy frameworks.

2. Developments in Migration Governance in the Arab Region

National policies and legislation regulate entry, exit and residence of migrants, refugees, stateless persons and nationals in a country, and determine the rights and entitlements of migrants and their families. Furthermore, global, regional and bilateral agreements between countries also shape how migration takes place. The combination of these frameworks, and their interaction with national frameworks, determines migration governance and reflects States' commitments to protecting migrants' rights and entitlements in their territory and those of their nationals abroad. It also reflects countries' efforts to uphold and protect migrants' rights and respond to their needs, both in countries of origin and destination, as well as how they respond to dynamic migration trends and patterns.

The present chapter provides an overview of national policies and international cooperation efforts relating to migration governance carried out by Arab countries between April 2017 and March 2019, complementing previous editions of the Situation Report on International Migration in the Arab Region. Main areas of policy development include: nationality and statelessness, labour migration, irregular migration, human trafficking and migrant smuggling, forced displacement and refugees, and admissions and residency procedures. The chapter also describes developments in subregional, regional and global cooperation relating to migration in which Arab countries have been involved.

Data sources for chapter 2 include official government publications and information, and reports from IOM country offices and other United Nations agencies. Where necessary, the research was complemented with information obtained from news outlets.

The present chapter acknowledges several limitations regarding its scope and methodology. It is a descriptive compendium of policy developments that occurred during the reporting period. The analysis does not offer a normative evaluation of the policies adopted, nor the extent to which they align with migration governance frameworks such as the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. Such an analysis is offered in chapter 3 of the present report. Moreover, while migration governance extends beyond the development of policies, chapter 2 limits research to adopted policies and does not discuss the implementation or the impact of those policies.

A. National policies on international migration and displacement

1. Nationality and statelessness

Nationality laws determine who is a national and who is a non-national, or foreigner, which in turn influences their rights, duties and the services they can access in that country. They can also determine whether a person is left stateless. As per article 1 of the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, when a person is not considered a national by any State under the operation of its law, that person is stateless.¹ Algeria, Libya and Tunisia are the only Arab countries parties to the Convention (annex V to the present report). Persons can be born stateless or become stateless in the course of their lives. Regardless of the reason or circumstances, statelessness leaves them highly vulnerable and marginalized, with no or limited access to education, decent employment, social

Box 8. Non-ID Palestinians in Lebanon

The broad category of non-ID Palestinian comprises two subgroups. The first consists of Palestine refugees, registered with UNRWA in Jordan, the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, currently living in Lebanon and not holding any valid identification document (e.g. travel document, passport or identity card). The second covers Palestinians (non-refugees) in the same situation. Both groups (and their descendants) are neither registered with the Lebanese authorities as refugees or foreign residents, nor with UNRWA in Lebanon although they may be registered with UNRWA in another country field office. Because of their undetermined legal status, non-ID Palestinians have not enjoyed the right to residency and to full access to UNRWA services since their arrival in Lebanon.

There are an estimated 4,000 non-ID Palestinians in Lebanon. Without documentation and legal status in Lebanon, non-ID Palestinians face restrictions of movement, risk detention, and experience severe obstacles in completing civil registration procedures such as those relating to marriage, birth, divorce and death. The situation has acute humanitarian consequences, limiting access to public services including Lebanese education or medical services, and restricting the opening of bank accounts, access to justice and access to formal employment. They are denied the possibility of travelling abroad. As of 2018, no durable regularization of their undocumented status has been achieved, leaving their non-ID descendants at further risks.

Source: Compiled by UNRWA.

protection, health care and civil and political rights. Box 8 details the specific situation of non-ID Palestinians in Lebanon.

In the reporting period covered by the present chapter, some Arab countries passed and amended laws governing who can obtain a nationality and who can be deprived of it. Advancements have been made on enhancing women's rights to nationality and affording more rights to children of women married to foreigners, although there are still wide gaps between men and women regarding nationality rights.

(a) Women's rights regarding passing on their nationality

In September 2018, the Jordanian government issued an instruction to recognize the identification cards of children born to Jordanian women married to foreigners, issued by the Civil Status and Passports Department. Although Jordanian women married to foreigners are not allowed to pass their nationality to their offspring, the official recognition of their identity

cards grants these children access to certain entitlements on an equal footing with nationals,² including employment opportunities, free access to public education, including higher education, access to health care, property ownership and driving licences.³

Somalia drafted a new Citizenship Bill in 2018 that will permit women to pass on their nationality to their children on an equal footing with men.⁴

Moreover, in 2018 in the **Sudan**, the Council of Ministers approved a bill amending the current nationality law, allowing Sudanese women to pass on their nationality to their children, but only if the father is from South Sudan.⁵

(b) Access to citizenship and residency

Egypt made two amendments to its nationality and residency laws in the reporting period. In September 2017, Egypt approved an amendment to article 15 of law No. 26 of 1975 on citizenship. The change grants the Prime Minister the

power to withdraw Egyptian citizenship from individuals who undermine the public order of the State by joining groups, associations, bodies, organizations, gangs or any entity that aims to harm the public order or undermine the social or economic order of the State, or from individuals who have been convicted of crimes that endanger State security.⁶ In August 2018, Egypt ratified law No. 173 of 2018, granting foreigners who deposit a minimum of 7 million Egyptian pounds (approximately \$420 thousand at August 2019 exchange rates)⁷ in local Egyptian banks a five-year residency permit, and the possibility of applying for Egyptian citizenship.⁸ This new law includes the creation of a corresponding category of residency for foreigners called ‘deposit residency’.

The **United Arab Emirates** passed federal decree-law No. 16 of 2017, amending certain provisions of federal law No. 17 of 1972 on nationality and passports.⁹ Following this new amendment, a non-Emirati woman married to an Emirati man may be granted citizenship under specified conditions. Citizenship may be granted seven years after the application if the couple has children, and 10 years after the application if the couple does not have children. Furthermore, a foreign woman who is divorced or widowed from an Emirati national and has Emirati children may be granted citizenship if she maintains residency in the country and either remains single or marries another Emirati national. In addition, under the decree-law, the Head of State has the power to grant nationality to persons who have “provided exceptional services to the country”, independent of any other conditions.¹⁰

2. Labour migration

Labour migration is predominant throughout the Arab region, totalling 23.8 million migrant workers in 2017 who represented 14.5 per cent of all migrant workers globally.¹¹ Furthermore, labour migration towards GCC countries is particularly significant, one of the world’s main destinations for migrant workers. In many Arab

countries, labour migration is regulated through the *kafala* (sponsorship) system, meaning that migrant workers need to have a sponsor to enter, stay, work and/or in some cases exit the country. The *kafeels*, or sponsors, are responsible for the working and residency conditions of migrants, which restricts the mobility of migrants and often leaves them vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. Labour migration is the thematic area with the most developments in governance during the reporting period, the majority enacted in GCC countries.

(a) Work permits

In 2018, the Public Authority of Manpower of **Kuwait** established new conditions for movement of migrant workers from the private to the public sector, which had previously been prohibited. Migrant workers are now required to obtain approval from the Civil Service Commission to change job sectors, after providing justification for their need according to economic activity or contract project in which their employer is involved.¹² Kuwait started issuing temporary work permits of 100 days when employment is transferred from one employer to another, or to cover a trial period when the employee enters the country for the first time.¹³

From September 2018, the issuance or renewal of work permits for migrant workers in **Saudi Arabia** has been linked to the authentication of their housing contracts through the rental services E-network, *Ejar*, which was set up to regulate the relationship between tenants, landlords and real estate brokers.¹⁴

In the **United Arab Emirates**, ministerial decision No. 31 of 2018 established a new system for part-time contracts. An employee with a part-time contract may work for an employer for less than eight hours a day or less than 48 hours a week, but not less than 20 hours per week. The employee may work for more than one employer at the same time without the need to obtain approval from any of the employers. These provisions apply only to employees classified as

skilled workers level 1 and skilled workers level 2. Migrant domestic workers are not eligible.¹⁵

In December 2018, Dubai Internet City, a free economic zone in the United Arab Emirates, began granting certain benefits to companies regarding ownership, taxes and customs, and established a freelance work permit targeting workers in the technology sector. The permit costs 7,500 dirhams (approximately \$2,000 at August 2019 exchange rates) per year, and includes the flexibility to choose and change employers and work on short-term contracts.¹⁶ The same visa scheme was established earlier that year for the media and education sectors within Dubai Media City and Dubai Knowledge Park.¹⁷

(b) Recruitment of migrant workers

In August 2017, the Ministry of Interior of **Kuwait** amended the domestic worker law regarding recruitment agencies, which will now be required to submit financial deposits with a validity of two years ranging from 40,000 Kuwaiti dinars (approximately \$130,000 at August 2019 exchange rates) to 100,000 Kuwaiti dinars (approximately \$330,000 at August 2019 exchange rates), depending on the size of the agency. The amendment should enable the Government to build a reserve of funds to adjudicate cases of labour law violations, and cover unpaid wages and repatriation fees.¹⁸

In 2017, **Qatar** launched a new electronic system aimed at simplifying the residency procedures of foreign workers. Qatar visa centres, which have already opened in five countries, provide integrated services through a unified channel to facilitate and accelerate recruitment procedures and eliminate contract fraud. Services include fingerprinting procedures and biometric data processing, medical testing for migrant workers, and signing employment contracts before departure. All workers, including domestic workers, are expected to be recruited through these centres. The first phase of the centres' implementation was launched in October 2018, which

should facilitate the recruitment of workers through 22 service centres in eight countries (Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Tunisia), whose nationals constitute 80 per cent of the total workforce in Qatar.¹⁹

A new online accreditation platform for foreign engineers who want to work in **Saudi Arabia** was set up in 2018 to facilitate employment procedures. The system also regulates new recruitment practices, such as bans on recruiting foreign engineers with less than five years of work experience and the requirement to pass a professional test and an interview to validate their expertise.²⁰

Migrant workers who wish to work in the **United Arab Emirates** can now be recruited through management centres called *marakez al tadbeer*, which started replacing recruitment centres in March 2018. The centres are managed by the private sector under government supervision, and provide integrated services including assisting in applications processes, providing medical examination services, and issuing residence and identity cards.²¹

(c) Support and protection of migrant workers

In May 2018, **Bahrain** announced the creation of a wage protection system, under which employers are obliged to pay their workers via bank accounts rather than in cash. This system aims to protect workers, especially low-skilled workers in the private sector, from the risk of withheld payments by documenting all wage transfers and aiding dispute settlements.²² The Labour Law was amended in December 2018 to create a placeholder for the wage protection system, and to prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender, origin, language, religion or creed.

The Ministry of Manpower of **Oman** has also introduced new regulations to protect the rights of migrant workers. These include ministerial decision No. 270/2018 regarding procedures, requirements and consequences

for reporting an ‘absconding’ migrant worker. Among other regulations, the employer must provide a bank statement proving that the worker received their salary up to three months before the worker absconded. Workers have the right to object to the report within 60 days, and workers are fined if they are found to have absconded.²³ If an employer files more than five abscondment reports in a month or 10 in a year, the employer will be referred to the labour inspectorate to check if they are complying with the labour law.²⁴

In November 2017, the Government of **Qatar** established a temporary minimum wage for foreign workers of 750 Qatari rials per month (approximately \$200 at August 2019 exchange rates). In addition to their salary, workers are entitled to housing, food and health-care plans covered by employers.²⁵ An ad hoc minimum wage commission was also formed to consider a new minimum wage. All labour contracts now need to be approved by the Ministry of Labour to be rendered valid so as to prevent contract substitution. Law No. 17 of 2018 also established a workers’ support and insurance fund to pay workers’ due wages following a decision by the labour dispute committees, and contribute to humanitarian support for workers in emergency situations and to recreation for workers. The fund will receive for its annual budget 60 per cent of the fees collected for workers’ permits and renewal.²⁶

In 2018, the Qatari Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy mandated its contractors to reimburse recruitment fees charged to migrant workers hired for the construction of the FIFA 2022 World Cup facilities. Contractors engaged on those projects have agreed to reimburse more than 80 million Qatari rials (approximately \$22 million) to thousands of workers who had to pay recruitment fees prior to their journey to Qatar, despite the practice being illegal under the Qatari Labour Law.²⁷

Furthermore, a newly established Strategic Unit within the Labour Inspectorate, made

up of several units within the Qatari Ministry of Administrative Development, Labour and Social Affairs, has been tasked with using data to prioritize and target inspection action to ensure the protection of workers’ rights and the observance of the Labour Code.

The wage protection system of **Saudi Arabia**, which has been implemented gradually since 2013, requires, as of December 2017, that employers of domestic workers issue prepaid payroll or salary cards when workers first arrive in the country to facilitate and ensure timely wage transfers. The system began a new phase in February 2018, when it introduced a new requirement for employers to pay migrant workers by electronic transfers through the national bank so as to allow the Government to track payments. Moreover, a pilot programme has been expanded to provide free phone cards and information material to all workers, including domestic workers, upon arrival in the country.²⁸

In 2018, the **United Arab Emirates** implemented a new insurance plan for foreign workers. Whereas, in the past, employers in the private sector had to make a mandatory deposit of 3,000 dirhams per worker (approximately \$820 at August 2019 exchange rates), the fee is now being replaced by a new insurance scheme that costs 60 dirhams (approximately \$16 at August 2019 exchange rates) annually per worker. The insurance covers work injuries, overtime pay, airplane tickets, vacation allowance, and end of service benefits.²⁹

(d) Labour disputes

In January 2018, **Kuwait** launched the Mobile Labour Disputes Office to enable workers in remote areas of the country to file complaints against employers who are violating the labour law. To enhance the protection of migrant workers, an online service has also been established to request copies of labour documents, allow employers and employees to file and track workplace complaints and

disputes, and alert workers when an employer files an abscondment charge.³⁰

The Government of **Qatar** issued law No. 13 on August 2017, which amends the Labour Law promulgated by law No. 14 of 2004 and the Civil and Commercial Proceedings Law promulgated by law No. 13 of 1990.³¹ Following the adoption of the law, three Labour Dispute Resolution Committees were formed in March 2018 and started receiving complaints. The committees aim to ensure more speedy decisions and guarantee fair treatment. The law also reforms the procedures for dispute settlements between workers and employers. Workers may dispute the penalties imposed upon them by employers, and the outcome of the appeal must be settled within seven days through a newly established office in the Qatari Ministry of Administrative Development, Labour and Social Affairs specialized in receiving dispute cases between employees and employers, including those concerning domestic workers. Furthermore, disputes between employers and workers must first be handled by the Labour Relations Department at the Ministry, and if no agreement is reached between the parties, the case is transferred to the Labour Dispute Resolution Committees for a final decision within a month.³²

Under article 34 of the law of procedures for the Shariah Courts of **Saudi Arabia**, labour disputes relating to employment contracts, wages, rights, injuries, compensation and social insurance claims, among others, will be handled by specialized labour courts established in November 2018. In the first phase of implementation, seven courts were established in seven cities, and an additional 27 circuit courts will cover other provinces and governorates in the future. Six appellate courts will also be established to review judgements.³³ Furthermore, the Justice Ministry has announced that the government will provide free legal aid to plaintiffs who cannot afford a lawyer.³⁴ In December 2018, the rules and procedures for amicable settlement of labour disputes were amended, including

26 articles with definitions of terms, general rules, jurisdictions, requirements to become a mediator, procedures for sessions, and rules for issuing final verdicts.³⁵

The Abu Dhabi Judicial Department of the **United Arab Emirates** has been working on a bilingual litigation system, which began its first phase of implementation in November 2018. The department now demands that plaintiffs translate case documents in civil and commercial lawsuits if the defendant is a foreigner, and has adopted multilingual interactive forms for claim sheets, grievances and requests. In February 2019, the Judicial Department added Hindi as the third official language to be used in the court system, alongside Arabic and English.³⁶

(e) Regulations of domestic work

In February 2018, **Bahrain** released a tripartite domestic contract to be signed between domestic workers, recruitment agencies and employers. The mandatory standardized contract describes the rights and obligations of each party, including details of domestic work and the working environment. It also describes duties, working hours, rest periods and leave days, as agreed between the worker and the employer. Under the contract, the recruitment agency has the obligation to review potential employers to assess their suitability. The implementation of the standardized contract will be carried out in two phases. The first phase regulates the recruitment of domestic workers through licensed recruitment agencies, while the second phase covers the direct employment of domestic workers by the employer.³⁷ The Bahraini Parliament voted in April 2018 to extend free health care to all domestic workers, granting them the same access to medical services as nationals with no charges to themselves or their employers.³⁸ Some of the services provided for free at government-owned medical facilities include: medical check-ups, laboratory tests and X-rays, operations, maternity and child care, hospitalization, dental

care, psychiatric treatment and consultation, physiotherapy, and prescribed medications.³⁹

The Government of **Kuwait** established a centralised recruitment agency for domestic workers under law No. 68 of 2015, which became fully operational in September 2017. The agency, which operates alongside private recruitment agencies, is responsible for reducing recruitment costs, stopping illegal recruitment fees, and securing labour agreements for female workers.⁴⁰

In addition, under Council of Ministers' decision No. 614 of April 2018, the competencies regarding domestic workers, outlined in law No. 68 of 2015, were transferred from the Ministry of Interior to the Public Authority of Manpower.

Qatar introduced law No. 15 of 2017 on domestic workers, aimed at enhancing the protection of their rights. The new law stipulates that domestic workers are entitled to government-verified contracts, paid annual leave, an end-of-service payment, and termination of their contract in case of abuse or breach of contract, among other provisions.⁴¹ Furthermore, decision No. 39 of 2018 of the Minister of Administrative Development, Labour and Social Affairs established a three-month probation period for domestic workers.⁴²

Domestic workers in **Saudi Arabia** are now permitted to transfer to other employers under 13 conditions, including if their wages are proven not to have been paid for three consecutive or isolated months (without good reason), if the worker has been abused, if the employer does not obtain or renew the worker's residency permit within 30 days of expiry, if the worker is assigned by their employer to perform work for persons who are not relatives of the employer, or if the worker is required to do dangerous tasks.⁴³

The **Syrian Arab Republic** passed law No. 40 of 2017 regarding the recruitment of foreign domestic workers, which establishes

recruitment fees, procedures to obtain licenses, and fines for violations.⁴⁴

The **United Arab Emirates** approved federal law No. 10 in September 2017, regulating domestic work and enhancing protection for domestic workers. The law specifies regulations for recruitment agencies and employers regarding hiring practices, and sets employer and employee obligations, working conditions, and contracts. It also asserts the right of employees to keep their personal documents, the standardization of contracts that include descriptions of working conditions, the creation of specialized tribunals for settling workplace grievances, and the establishment of mandatory time off.⁴⁵ In addition, the law includes provisions on inspections, penalties, end of service compensation, and termination of contracts. The law identifies 19 types of domestic service workers that fall under its mandate.⁴⁶ The United Arab Emirates also established a new fee system for domestic workers, which includes different forms of recruitment based on country of origin and type and length of contract, including hourly, weekly, monthly or yearly contracts, to allow more flexibility in hiring schemes.⁴⁷

(f) Other policies regarding migrant workers

In March 2018, **Djibouti** ratified the 2014 Protocol to the ILO Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29). Under the Protocol, signatory States commit to taking effective measures to prevent and eliminate the use of forced or compulsory labour, defined as "all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily". By ratifying the Protocol, countries also commit to developing a national policy and plan of action that provides victims protection and access to remedies, and sanctions the perpetrators.⁴⁸

In July 2017, **Jordan** implemented new requirements for its migrant workers, requiring them to present a criminal record check from

their country of origin before arrival, and to obtain a medical certificate issued by official medical authorities in Jordan.⁴⁹

In 2017, **Oman** lifted the time limit for paid sick leave for migrants working for the Government by amending some provisions of the executive regulations of the Civil Service Law.⁵⁰

The Government of **Qatar** issued law No. 13 of September 2018, which amends some of the provisions of law No. 21 of 2015 regulating the entry and exit of expatriates and their residence. The new provisions allow all migrant workers employed in the private sector to leave the country without requiring exit permits from employers. However, the law and its regulation specify that employers may require 5 per cent of its total workforce to have pre-approval before travelling owing to the nature of their work.⁵¹ Positions for which exit permits may still be required are high-skilled workers in three categories: chief executive and financial officers, directors in charge of supervising the daily operations of businesses, and directors of information and communication technology. The law does not apply to domestic workers and other categories of workers not covered by the Labour Law.

In 2018, **Saudi Arabia** made amendments to its Labour Law on fines for violations. Employers violating the provision regarding the prescribed holidays of their employees; allowing non-Saudi employees to work in a profession other than that specified in the work permit; omitting to open a file in the Labour Office; or not submitting or updating their employees' data are now subject to a fine of 10,000 Saudi riyals (approximately \$2,700 at August 2019 exchange rates). Employers will also be fined 2,000 Saudi riyals (approximately \$530 at August 2019 exchange rates) for retaining passports, residency permits or medical insurance cards without employees' consent. Furthermore, employers who do not uphold occupational health and safety regulations for their workers will be fined 15,000 Saudi riyals (approximately

\$4,000 at August 2019 exchange rates).⁵² The amendments also clarify situations where workers may be fired without payment of end-of-service benefits, such as if they have been absent from work for 15 consecutive days or 30 days intermittently during a contractual year, or if they have verbally attacked employers.⁵³

(g) Labour force nationalization

GCC countries, where migrants (most of whom are migrant workers) represent between 37 per cent and 88 per cent of the population and constitute a high proportion of the workforce, have engaged in efforts to increase employment of nationals in both the private and the public sectors. New laws on labour force nationalization have mainly focused on banning or reducing employment of foreign workers in selected sectors.

In **Bahrain**, new restrictions on employing foreigners in selected sectors include administrative decree No. 1280 of 2017, prohibiting the issuance of work permits in the civil and oil sectors for foreign high-skilled workers aged under 30. The decree became effective in January 2018.⁵⁴ Furthermore, the Council of Representatives unanimously endorsed a draft law to create a list of professions that will be reserved for Bahraini citizens only.⁵⁵

Kuwait issued decree No. 11 of 2017 on the rules and procedures for the appointment of government representatives in August 2017, under which 15 occupations have been chosen to undergo a five-year process of labour force nationalization. The process aims to reduce the number of foreign employees in the public sector by set percentages each year and replace them with Kuwaitis.⁵⁶ The occupations have been granted percentage quotas of national workers ranging from 70 per cent to 100 per cent. The fields of information technology, development, management and statistics, administrative support, literature, media, arts, public relations and the maritime sector

are targeted at 100 per cent nationalization. Forensics, preventive and rescue groups, engineering, educational and sports services, finance, economic and trade functions and science functions are targeted at between 95 per cent and 98 per cent nationalization; and the service sector, livestock, agricultural and aquaculture functions, teaching, education and training have a target of between 70 per cent and 85 per cent nationalization.⁵⁷

In line with **Omani** efforts to nationalize the labour market, the Ministry of Manpower has issued a series of decisions banning the recruitment of foreign workers in the private sector for a period of six months in selected fields and activities, including information systems, finance and accounting, sales and marketing, management and human resources management, insurance, media and engineering, in addition to the medical, aviation and technical fields. Certain exceptions and amendments to the characteristics of jobs included in the ban have been established, and the time period of the ban has been extended for several sectors.⁵⁸ Pursuant to decision No. 487/2018 of the Ministry, Oman banned issuing employment visas to foreign workers in 87 selected professions, including purchase and sales representatives; workers in the construction, cleaning and workshop sectors; media, engineering, accounting and finance, information technology, insurance, administration and human resources, starting in January 2018 and for an initial six-month period, which was then extended twice by six months.⁵⁹ An additional ban was put in place in February 2019 for selected professions under article 1 of decree No. 73/2019.⁶⁰

Qatar is also in the process of nationalizing its labour force in selected sectors. The Ministry of Education and Higher Education is enforcing the nationalization of nearly 80 per cent of senior and middle positions in public schools,⁶¹ and the Ministry of Administrative Development, Labour and Social Affairs is including the legal field and the fields of information technology, finance and accounting, translation, public relations and

media among its target sectors for labour force nationalization.

The National Transformation Plan of **Saudi Arabia**, which is part of its Vision 2030, includes labour force nationalization as one of its main objectives.⁶² The Ministry of Labour and Social Development is amending the existing *Nitaqat* system, first introduced in 2011 to encourage employment of Saudi nationals in the private sector. Reforms include incentives and restrictions on organizations' hiring practices to increase the mandatory employment ratio of Saudi nationals to expatriate employees in organizations' local workforce. The *Nitaqat* system, which classifies Saudi organizations into six categories depending on their size and rate of Saudi nationals to expatriate employees, was amended in September 2017 and in February 2019 by changing the classification methods to encourage higher employment rates of nationals.⁶³ To achieve a lower national unemployment rate, taxes have been imposed on Saudi companies that hire foreign workers beginning in early 2017. A Saudi company has to pay 300 riyals (approximately \$80 at August 2019 exchange rates) per foreign worker per month, and companies that employ more migrants than nationals pay a higher fee of 400 riyals (approximately \$100 at August 2019 exchange rates) per foreign employee. These fees are set to increase in 2019 and 2020.⁶⁴

Under the same objective, the Ministry of Labour and Social Development issued a ministerial decree restricting the employment of foreign workers in 12 sectors, the majority in the retail and sales services. The plan was implemented over three phases, the first beginning in September 2018,⁶⁵ and the second and third phases beginning in November 2018 and January 2019, respectively. Each phase aims to gradually expand the sectors that fall under the nationalization scheme.⁶⁶

The Human Resource Development Fund of Saudi Arabia is also supporting labour force nationalization by paying 20 per cent and 15

per cent of the monthly salary of female and male Saudi employees, respectively, covering Saudi nationals employed after 31 July 2017 for a two-year period in the public and private sectors.⁶⁷

3. Irregular migration

The combination of precarious situations in countries of origin and a lack of access to regular migration pathways often leads to migrants being in an irregular situation when they enter, stay or work in a country without required documents or authorization. This situation makes migrants more vulnerable to marginalization, exploitation and rights violations. Furthermore, migrants sometimes fall into situations of irregularity through no fault of their own, often owing to administrative errors, the action (or inaction) of their sponsors, or because they left their work without permission or escaped an abusive situation.⁶⁸

Several countries in the Arab region have granted migrants in an irregular situation the opportunity to either regularize their status, or to leave the country without incurring fines or penalties, so as to decrease the number of such migrants within their borders.

Regularization

In July 2017, the Labour Market Regulatory Authority of **Bahrain** launched a flexible work permit system that allows undocumented workers to regularize their status and obtain a work permit without a sponsor. Migrants in the country with terminated work permits, or whose permits have expired and have not been renewed by their employers, are eligible for a flexi permit. Skilled, domestic and agricultural workers are not eligible under the current flexi scheme. The flexible work permit is valid for two years subject to renewal, and grants holders the right to reside in the country and work part or full time, have more than one employer in a number of sectors, and leave and re-enter the country. The cost of the permit for two years

is 749 Bahraini dinars (approximately \$2,000 at August 2019 exchange rates), which may be paid in monthly instalments by the migrant. There are two types of permit: a flexi permit that enables the holder to work in any non-specialized job but bars them from working in restaurants and hotels; and a flexi hospitality permit that enables the holder to work in any non-specialized job, including in the hospitality industry.⁶⁹

In January 2018, **Kuwait** issued ministerial decision No. 64 of 2018, granting migrants in an irregular situation with expired or rejected permits a three-month amnesty period to regularize their situation or leave the country.⁷⁰ Government reports estimate that 45,000 expatriates benefited from the amnesty by legalizing their status or leaving the country without penalties.⁷¹

From December 2016 until December 2017, **Morocco** implemented the second phase of its regularization campaign, building on the results of the first phase that was implemented in 2014. The Government gave priority in this new phase to spouses of Moroccan nationals and of foreign legal residents and their children; migrants with valid work contracts; migrants with at least five years of continuous residency in the country, and migrants with chronic illnesses. Furthermore, the second phase allowed rejected applicants to reapply.⁷² In March 2018, the criteria for eligibility were expanded to allow more migrants to regularize their status, including women and their children, unaccompanied minors, migrant workers without an employment contract, and migrants who have resided in the country for less than five years but have a higher education degree.⁷³

In March 2017, **Saudi Arabia** launched a campaign entitled “A nation without violators” to give migrants who entered the country without authorization, who overstayed their visa, or who violated the conditions of their work permits the opportunity to leave the country without paying a penalty.⁷⁴ However, migrants whose sponsors never issued or failed

to renew their residency IDs were allowed to leave the country only if their sponsor applied for and paid their exit visa fees. Only migrants in an irregular situation with abscondment charges were allowed to exit without sponsor approval. The amnesty was followed by government raids and labour inspections to detect residency and labour violators. As of February 2019, the number of violators of the Residency Law or Labour Law since the campaign was launched in 2017 reached 2,666,916. Around 2,000,000 had violated the Residency Law, 408,000 had violated the Labour Law, and over 180,000 had violated the border security system.⁷⁵

Under decree No. 2017-1061 of September 2017, **Tunisia** waived the fine for overstaying visas for vulnerable migrants, including victims of trafficking and vulnerable migrant students wishing to leave the country. Before the decree was passed, migrants in an irregular situation had to pay a fine of 20 Tunisian dinars (approximately \$7 at August 2019 exchange rates) for every week of irregular overstay in the country, with no capping of fees, which often became unpayable for migrants and forced them to go into debt, continue their irregular stay, or migrate irregularly to another country.

As part of the campaign entitled “Protect yourself via rectifying your status”, launched in August 2018 and extended until December that year, the **United Arab Emirates** gave migrants who violated the Entry and Residency Law the option to correct their legal status by paying a fee, applying for a new six-month visa without a sponsor if they wanted to remain in the country for work purposes, or voluntarily exiting the country without legal consequences or fines. The United Arab Emirates also allowed migrants who entered the country without authorization to leave voluntarily with a temporary ban of two years to re-enter the country.⁷⁶ After the amnesty ended on 31 October 2018, violators faced tougher legal action, including arrest, deportation, and greater punishments and fines. A sponsor employing an undocumented worker

is now fined 50,000 dinars (approximately \$13,600 at August 2019 exchange rates) for each worker in an irregular situation and 100,000 dinars (approximately \$27,000 at August 2019 exchange rates) for each repeat offence.⁷⁷

4. Human trafficking and migrant smuggling

Migrant smuggling is defined in the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air as “the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident”.⁷⁸

Trafficking in persons is defined in the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation”.^{79,80}

During the reporting period, several Arab countries established national commissions and national strategies to address trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling, and to provide assistance to trafficking victims and smuggled migrants. Several countries have also established entities mandated to implement anti-trafficking strategies.

(a) National strategies and commissions to combat human trafficking

As part of **Jordanian** efforts to combat trafficking in persons, the Anti-Trafficking Technical Committee revised the current anti-trafficking law, which has been in force since 2009. The amendment to the law, which aims to deter human trafficking by imposing harsher punishments, was approved by the

Government in March 2019, and is awaiting approval by parliament.

In February 2018, **Kuwait** approved a National Strategy to Combat Trafficking in Persons. The Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are responsible for its implementation, and the country has already engaged in public awareness campaigns to combat human trafficking and migrant smuggling.⁸¹

Morocco passed a decree in November 2017 to establish a national inter-ministerial anti-trafficking commission, with decree No. 2-17-70 of July 2018 providing details on its composition and prerogatives.⁸² The commission is responsible for coordinating anti-trafficking measures, elaborating a national strategy and action plan, and providing suggestions on capacity-building to relevant stakeholders. It is also tasked with suggesting modalities to develop and implement procedures for officials to identify and refer trafficking victims, ensuring that victims are not punished for crimes committed as a direct result of being subjected to human trafficking, providing adequate protection services for trafficking victims and witnesses, and producing disaggregated data that distinguish between human trafficking and migrant smuggling crimes.⁸³ In addition to the relevant ministries, the commission also comprises representatives of two civil society organizations working on protection and assistance to victims. In December 2018, Morocco published a report entitled “Morocco’s Migration Policies and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration” where it reiterated its commitment to combat trafficking in persons, including establishing a national referral mechanism for the assistance and protection of victims.⁸⁴

In early 2017, **Qatar** passed Ministerial Decision No. 15 of 2017 Regarding the Establishment of a National Committee for Combatting Human Trafficking. The decision defines the composition, term in office, objective, method of

procedure and reporting lines of the Committee, stipulating that it will be established in the Ministry of Administrative Development, Labour and Social Affairs.⁸⁵ The National Committee revised the national strategy to combat trafficking 2017-2022, prioritizing prevention, protection, judicial pursuits, and regional and international cooperation.⁸⁶

Saudi Arabia is addressing human trafficking by allocating a budget of 36 million riyals (approximately \$9.6 million at August 2019 exchange rates) for its interagency Anti-trafficking Secretariat. This includes implementation of the 2017-2020 National Action Plan to Combat Trafficking, which focuses on monitoring, prevention, building government capacity, inter-ministerial coordination, effective law enforcement, and victim protection.⁸⁷

In 2017, the Ministry of Interior of the **Sudan** funded and launched a Trafficking Unit under the Organized Crime Directorate, and the National Committee to Combat Trafficking of the Sudan drafted and finalized a National Action Plan.⁸⁸ Furthermore, in October 2018, the Sudan acceded to the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime of 2000.⁸⁹

Tunisia also officially launched its 2015-2017 national anti-trafficking action plan,⁹⁰ which included developing manuals and training guides for judges and security personnel, and it continued to develop its 2018-2023 national strategy to combat trafficking.

(b) Protection and assistance to victims of trafficking in persons

In April 2018, **Bahrain** established an assistance fund granting protection and assistance to victims of human trafficking. The fund provides monthly allowances for victims whose cases are in the process of determination, and a grant that victims can use for reintegration in their home country or for employment in Bahrain.⁹¹

In May 2018, Bahrain also launched a National Referral System for Victims of Trafficking in Persons in an effort to identify the role of the various entities involved in combating human trafficking, and to establish the procedures for managing cases.⁹²

The **Iraqi** Council of Ministers' decision No. 385 of 2017 mandates the creation of care houses for victims of human trafficking to accommodate and rehabilitate victims by providing them social, psychological and physical support, and assist in their reintegration by encouraging social participation, offering education opportunities, including vocational training, and providing employment opportunities. The decision also stipulates that non-Iraqi victims will be provided with accommodation, and their return to their countries of origin will be facilitated in coordination with relevant country authorities.⁹³

(c) Awareness and prevention campaigns

In July 2018, **Egypt** and **Tunisia** joined the Global Blue Heart Campaign, set up by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to combat trafficking in persons, which aims to raise awareness of the sufferings of victims of human trafficking and to build political support to fight criminals behind trafficking and to engage all stakeholders, including Governments, civil society and the private sector, in the fight against human trafficking. The Governments of both countries, represented by their respective national committees mandated to combat trafficking in persons, launched national campaigns against trafficking in persons that included national, regional and international development partners, civil society organizations and the private sector.⁹⁴

(d) Other relevant measures and developments

In **Somalia** in November 2017, the federal member state of Puntland ratified a human trafficking legislative framework, which includes new penal and criminal procedure codes and a law that specifically prohibits trafficking.⁹⁵

The **Tunisian** Ministry of Justice created an office to monitor and maintain statistics on human trafficking. The Government conducted training programmes for security personnel and other government officials on the anti-trafficking law, victim identification techniques, and protection services. It also continued international cooperation with INTERPOL to strengthen cooperation and information exchanges on potential trafficking cases. Furthermore, in January 2018, the Government launched a multilingual hotline to report potential trafficking cases.⁹⁶ In the same month, the national committee to combat trafficking in persons launched its first annual report on national efforts to fight this crime in Tunisia.

5. Forced displacement and refugee protection

Given the high numbers of refugees from and to the Arab region, governance on this area is crucial to support this vulnerable population. Although only 9 of the 22 Arab countries have ratified the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (annex V to the present report), many countries provide special rights and services for persons fleeing conflict and persecution. In the reporting period, several Arab countries enhanced the rights and protection mechanisms for refugees through national laws, policies, and/or programmes.

(a) Access to asylum, refugee status and residency

Djibouti passed a new set of refugee laws in December 2017: decree 2017-409/PR/MI streamlines procedures to determine refugee status,⁹⁷ and decree 2017-410/PR/MI determines the fundamental rights of refugees and asylum seekers.⁹⁸ The new laws facilitate refugees' access to health care, education and employment, giving them more opportunities for integration.⁹⁹

Since July 2017, unlimited free renewal of residency documents has been available for six months for Palestinian refugees from the

Syrian Arab Republic in **Lebanon** who had entered Lebanon before September 2016, with no penalty charge for delays. However, the July 2017 memorandum excludes persons who entered Lebanon after September 2016, as well as those who entered irregularly and those with an exit order.¹⁰⁰

As the first GCC country to have an asylum law, **Qatar** passed law No. 11 of 2018 regulating political asylum, which enables individuals to apply for political asylum, except those who committed war crimes, human rights violations or non-political crimes. The law establishes that the Minister of Interior can grant asylum seekers three months of temporary residency until a final decision on their claim is reached. The Qatari Interior Ministry is responsible for forming a committee of agencies to evaluate political asylum requests. Those who are granted asylum are obliged to stop pursuing any political activities in Qatar, are granted the right to apply for travel documents, and are allowed to be joined by family members.¹⁰¹ Approved asylum seekers are granted the right to work and the right to access government health care, education and housing.¹⁰²

(b) Refugee return

In August 2018, the **Lebanese** General Security Agency established 17 centres across the country to manage applications of Syrians who wish to return. The centres facilitate registration and regularization of the status of Syrians in case of legal or security problems, so they can more easily go back to their country. Syrians who entered the country via regular channels before January 2015 and who pay the fines for overstaying their residency permits will be allowed to leave Lebanon without a re-entry ban. Syrians who entered Lebanon via regular channels after January 2015 and overstayed their visas may leave with a one-year re-entry ban. Syrians who entered irregularly may leave the country if they pay a \$400 fine. In all cases, those who do not pay the fines or follow required process may leave the country but will be

permanently banned from returning to Lebanon. All refugees registered with UNHCR are allowed to leave without paying a fine and without a re-entry ban.¹⁰³

In August 2018, the **Syrian** Cabinet approved the creation of a Coordination Body for the Return of Displaced Persons Abroad, which will coordinate and facilitate the return of refugees to the Syrian Arab Republic.¹⁰⁴

(c) Access to economic and social rights

In December 2017, **Djibouti, Somalia** and the **Sudan**, as members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, adopted the Djibouti Declaration on Refugee Education in which signatories commit to ensuring that every refugee and returnee has access to quality education by integrating refugees into national education policies, strategies, programmes and plans of action.¹⁰⁵

In October 2017, the **Iraqi** parliament approved law No. 76 of 2017 regulating entry, exit and residency of foreigners in the country. The law annuls article 202 of the previous law issued in 2001, which stipulated equal rights of Palestinians and Iraqis to public and private employment, education, free health care, retirement rights, free housing, tax exemption, and travel documents.¹⁰⁶

In November 2017, **Jordan** issued circular No. 351/2017, which regulates participation of Syrian refugees in the labour market. The new regulation grants Syrian refugees permission to change work sectors to any other sector if their permits expire, and to work in the agricultural, support services and bakery sectors. It further allows Syrians to transfer from one employer to another if their permit has expired without the need to obtain clearance, and it allows them to work in the construction sector without the requirement of recognition of prior learning.¹⁰⁷

In February 2018, the Jordanian Government endorsed the Jordan Response Plan for the

Syria Crisis, led by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation and prepared by government agencies and international donor agencies. The Response Plan seeks to address the needs of Syrian refugees and Jordanian host communities affected by the crisis, by adopting a resilience-based approach that bridges the divide between short-term humanitarian and longer-term development responses. The Jordan Response Plan 2018-2020 sets out budget needs and fund-raising goals for the Government to effectively continue offering support to Syrian refugees, including by providing education, health care, shelter and cash assistance.¹⁰⁸

Furthermore, between March 2018 and March 2019, Jordan carried out a campaign to formalize the status of Syrian refugees living informally in urban areas, either because they were registered in camps and left without official authorization or they never registered with UNHCR and the Government.^{109,110} Regularizing their status gives refugees protection from arrest and increases their access to formal jobs – albeit with some limitations – and to aid and education. On the other hand, on 24 January 2018, the Jordanian Government revoked the right for refugees living outside camps to receive subsidies on health care: they will now have to pay 80 per cent of health-care costs up front to get treatment.

In July 2017, the Unified Lebanese Vision for the Palestinian refugees Affairs in Lebanon was officially launched by the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee, the inter-ministerial body dealing with Palestinian refugees' affairs in **Lebanon**. The document was signed by the main Lebanese political forces in November 2016, providing a framework of action to deal with the social and economic situation of Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon. The document – yet to be translated into policy – includes recommendations for the Government to shift unnecessary restrictions on granting Palestinian refugees their economic and social rights, including by facilitating the issuance

of work permits and amending the Lebanese Social Security Law.

(d) Other measures and developments

From October 2017, **Lebanon** established new procedures for birth registrations of Syrians born in Lebanon, which include the abolishment of the requirement for parents to have legal residency in the country to register the birth. Under the October 2017 Circular of the Ministry of Interior, other civil registration procedures concerning marriage, death or divorce are also possible without proof of legal residency. Furthermore, based on a March 2018 circular, Syrian parents with children born in Lebanon between 1 January 2011 and 8 February 2018 can register their children without the need to go to court.¹¹¹ Palestinians from the Syrian Arab Republic living in Lebanon can equally benefit from the two circulars issued for Syrian refugees in Lebanon;¹¹² however, difficulties persist in completing full birth registration for Palestine refugee parents without legal residency in Lebanon.

The Sudan created the Syrian Refugee Support Committee to review citizenship applications from refugees and make the final call on a case-by-case basis, after the Government passed a new presidential decree in 2017 to only grant citizenship to Syrians after they pass a security clearance.¹¹³

6. Admissions, visas and residency permits

A key factor in migration governance involves regulations on admission into, residence and exit of foreigners from a country, as well as enforcement of these regulations. The conditions for admission and residence in a country, and the rights of migrants once in a country, have profound effects on who migrates, how they migrate, how they integrate into the country of destination, and the length of their stay, among many other consequences.

During the reporting period, April 2017 to March 2019, several Arab countries modified the length

of residency permits, regulated issuance of travel permits for migrants' families, and passed laws granting temporary or permanent residency to retired migrants, among other regulations.

(a) Family reunification

In January 2018, **Bahrain** issued a decision to amend decree No. 121 of 2007 to increase the minimum monthly salary required for foreigners to request entry visas and resident permits for family members from 250 Bahraini dinars (approximately \$660 at August 2019 exchange rates) to 400 Bahraini dinars (approximately \$1,000 at August 2019 exchange rates).¹¹⁴ Under resolution 1 of 2017, Bahrain also imposed new fees for applications submitted to the Labour Market Regulatory Authority to issue, renew or cancel work permits, register notifications of absence from work, increase the number of work permits, and apply for residence and entry permits for family members.¹¹⁵

Kuwait lifted age restrictions for granting visit visas for parents of foreign residents, which used to be issued only for parents aged 60 or below. The visas are now issued for one month and are subject to renewal.¹¹⁶

In October 2017, **Oman** decreased its minimum wage requirement to issue family visas for members of migrant workers' families from 600 Omani riyals (approximately \$1,500 at August 2019 exchange rates) to 300 Omani Riyals (approximately \$800 at August 2019 exchange rates).¹¹⁷

Qatar launched a new online service for foreigners to apply for family visit visas for parents, children and first and second grade relatives, to enhance the efficiency of the procedure through innovative technologies.¹¹⁸

New regulations implemented in July 2017 required migrant workers living in **Saudi Arabia** to pay a monthly fee of 100 riyals (approximately \$27 at August 2019 exchange rates) for each dependant living with them, a

sum that doubled in July 2018 and is scheduled to double again in 2020.¹¹⁹

(b) Residency permits

Bahrain extended the validity of residence permits under personal sponsorship from two to five years or up to 10 years, costing 400 Bahraini dinars (approximately \$1,000 at August 2019 exchange rates) and 600 Bahraini dinars (approximately \$1,600 at August 2019 exchange rates), respectively.¹²⁰ The requirements for obtaining personal sponsorship residency are: having worked in the private or government sector in any GCC country for at least 15 years; owning real estate in Bahrain worth at least 50,000 Bahraini dinars (approximately \$130,000 at August 2019 exchange rates); or investing at least 100,000 Bahraini dinars (approximately \$270,000 at August 2019 exchange rates) in a business in an approved sector in the country.¹²¹

Iraq issued act No. 76 of 2017, the Foreigners Residency Act, which replaces the Expats Residence Law No. 36 of 1961 and regulates all types of visas, entry, exit and residency of foreign nationals. The law introduces the sponsorship system for employment, a mandatory exit visa for workers, and stipulates the conditions for extension and deportation, among other matters.¹²²

Beginning in March 2018, **Kuwait** no longer grants residency permits to foreigners who suffer from 22 listed non-infectious diseases, including cancer, diabetes or high blood pressure. People with infectious diseases such as AIDS, herpes or hepatitis B were already barred from entering the country under an earlier ban.¹²³

Oman also issued decree No. 129/2018 to amend some the Executive Regulations of the Aliens Residence Law. The decree allows foreigners who own property under specified conditions to obtain a visa without a sponsor, and to have their spouses and first-degree family members join them. The decree further allows foreigners who work for a government agency to be sponsors of foreign domestic workers.¹²⁴

In September 2018, **Qatar** issued law No. 10 of 2018 that, for the first time for any GCC country, makes it possible for foreign residents to obtain a permanent residency permit. Permanent residency may be granted if applicants have completed 20 years of legal consecutive residency in the country if they were born outside Qatar, or 10 years if they were born in Qatar. It is also dependent on the applicant having enough income to support him or herself and his or her family,¹²⁵ not having previous convictions or dishonourable offences, and having sufficient knowledge of Arabic.¹²⁶ The law will give priority to children of Qatari mothers, and to those who have recognized desired skills. Law No. 10 of 2018 states that 100 permanent residency permits may be issued per year. Permanent residents are granted the same social security benefits as Qatari citizens, including health care and education, they are given priority for government jobs, are allowed to own real estate, and do not need permission from their employers to exit and enter the country. The law also allows foreigners who serve in the Qatari armed forces to apply for permanent residency.¹²⁷

In July 2017, the duration of residency permits for migrant workers – except domestic workers – in the private sector in **Saudi Arabia** was reduced from two years to one year.¹²⁸

Beginning in 2019, the **United Arab Emirates** implemented a new system for long-term residence visas. The new system enables foreigners to live, work and study in the country without a national sponsor, and allows them to have 100 per cent ownership of their business on the country's mainland. These visas are issued for 5 or 10 years, include family members, and are renewed automatically. Investors with investment in real estate worth at least 5 million dirhams (approximately \$1,361,000 at August 2019 exchange rates), entrepreneurs who meet specific requirements, and students who are performing exceptionally well may be granted a five-year residency permit. Investors with investment in real estate worth at least 10 million dirhams (approximately \$2,722,000 at

August 2019 exchange rates) and specialists in the medical, scientific, technical, research and creative sectors are eligible for 10-year residence visas.¹²⁹ Students sponsored by their parents in the UAE may receive a one-year visa extension upon graduation.¹³⁰

The cabinet of the United Arab Emirates also adopted a decree, starting in October 2018, to extend residency permits of widows and divorced women and their children for one year from the death of the spouse or the divorce, without needing a sponsor.¹³¹

In September 2018, the Emirati Government announced that retired foreign workers in the country, aged over 55 years, could apply for a new residency permit if they owned a minimum real estate investment of 2 million dirhams (approximately \$540 thousand at August 2019 exchange rates), have financial savings of at least 1 million dirhams (approximately \$270 thousand at August 2019 exchange rates), or have proof of income of over 20,000 dirhams (approximately \$5,400 at August 2019 exchange rates) per month.¹³²

7. Other laws and policies

There are other areas of migration governance that have not been included under specific headers in the present report owing to the small number of developments in the reporting period, but which are nevertheless impacting the situation and rights of migrants and should therefore be mentioned.

Arab countries have passed laws and policies pertaining to migrants' access to health care, engaging expatriates, investment for development, remittance transfers, and property ownership by foreigners, among others.

(a) Access to health care

In May 2018, **Bahrain** adopted a new health insurance scheme through decision No. 23 of 2018, which includes coverage on an equal

footing with citizens for non-Bahraini men and women married to Bahraini citizens and children of Bahraini women married to foreigners.¹³³

In August 2017, **Kuwait** passed a ministerial decree increasing the costs of public health for migrants who pay annual health insurance. Examples of the fee changes include an increase from 2 Kuwaiti dinars (approximately \$6.5 at August 2019 exchange rates) to 5 dinars (approximately \$16.5 at August 2019 exchange rates) for medical treatment at a public hospital; from 2 dinars (approximately \$6.5 at August 2019 exchange rates) to 10 dinars (approximately \$33 at August 2019 exchange rates) for outpatient clinics; and a fee of 10 dinars (approximately \$33 at August 2019 exchange rates) per day for staying in public wards, a service that used to be free.¹³⁴

(b) Education

The **Algerian** executive decree No. 18-95 of March 2018 established the conditions and modalities for recognizing foreign higher education diplomas.¹³⁵

Through ministerial decision No. 34/2018, starting in February 2018, foreigners in **Oman** have to pay 50 Omani riyals (approximately \$130 at August 2019 exchange rates) to register their children in government schools; and 100 riyals (approximately \$260 at August 2019 exchange rates) for selected services in public schools, a service that was previously provided for free.¹³⁶

(c) Diaspora engagement and remittances

In July 2017, the **Egyptian** Ministry of Emigration and Expatriate Affairs and the Ministry of Investment and International Cooperation agreed to establish an Investor Service Centre under the Ministry of Investment. One of the Centre's goals is to support investments by Egyptian expatriates.¹³⁷

In October 2018, the Prime Minister of Egypt initiated the formation of a national committee to create an integrated database of Egyptian

expatriates, which will be chaired by the Minister of Emigration and Expatriate Affairs and representatives from several other ministries.¹³⁸

In an effort to engage its diaspora, Egypt launched an initiative entitled "Your vacation at your home country" to foster tourism to Egypt among its nationals abroad, and to attract their investments in development. The initiative is framed as an effort to create closer links with the expatriate population, and to collaborate with them on their problems and proposed solutions.¹³⁹

Egyptian initiatives also include launching a mobile-based money transfer service under the Egypt Post Authority to facilitate remittance sending from Egyptians abroad via mobile phones. The service simplifies money transfers, especially for those in small villages and remote areas with limited banking services.¹⁴⁰

(d) Other measures and developments

The **Egyptian** investment law No. 72 of 2017 aims to create new incentives for foreign investment in the country, facilitate the procedures for establishing and operating a business in Egypt, ease cross-border trade and profit repatriation, and guarantee investor protection. Guarantees incorporated in this law for international investors include that foreign investors – founders, shareholders or partners of a company or owners of an establishment – shall receive the same treatment under the law as Egyptian nationals, are guaranteed residence in Egypt for a minimum of one year renewable throughout the duration of the project, have the right to transfer their profits abroad, and their projects may include 10 per cent foreign employees and up to 20 per cent for specific cases with appropriate approval.¹⁴¹

Under law No. 5 of 2018, Egypt reformed its Penal Code in January 2018 to criminalize corruption by foreign public employees working in the country. The new provisions establish that any foreign public employee or employee of a public international organization found to be committing bribery will be imprisoned for

life and fined between 500 and 1,000 Egyptian pounds (approximately \$30-60 at August 2019 exchange rates), and provides definitions of who is considered a foreign public employee and an employee of a public international organization.¹⁴²

In 2018, **Oman** banned foreigners and nationals who have been deprived of their citizenship from owning agricultural land and real estate in certain areas of the country, along with land on islands and historic houses, in a royal decree that also includes regulations on fines and imprisonment for those who breach the law.¹⁴³

As of January 2018, migrants in **Saudi Arabia** could receive home-based marriage contracts, facilitating marriage procedures. The preliminary stage of the service is available in personal status courts in Riyadh and Madinah, and is planned to be extended to 14 other personal status courts in other areas. It will initially be available only for non-Saudis who speak Arabic.¹⁴⁴

In February 2018, the **Syrian Arab Republic** issued law No. 2 of 2018, which sets consular fees outside the country for transit passes, civil status documents (such as registry records, marriage certificates, birth certificates, divorce certificates, death certificates), fines for losing or damaging passports, residency certificates, and fines for delays in registering births or deaths, among other services.¹⁴⁵

Tunisia has developed a national migration strategy that aims to enhance migration governance in a comprehensive manner.¹⁴⁶ Following a national multi-stakeholder consultation, the strategy will be implemented by the Ministry for Social Affairs, in collaboration with the International Centre for Migration Policy Development.

In October 2018, Tunisia approved the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination Act, which criminalizes racism against Tunisians and migrants, and imposes one- to three-month jail sentences and fines of up to 1,000 Tunisian dinars (approximately \$350 at August 2019 exchange

rates) for racist language, and one- to three-year jail sentences and up to 3,000 Tunisian dinars (approximately \$1,040 at August 2019 exchange rates) for inciting or supporting racial hatred and discrimination. The law also includes a provision to raise awareness and conduct trainings to combat racial discrimination.¹⁴⁷

B. International cooperation on migration

Given the international nature of migration, to ensure safe, orderly and regular migration, it is imperative that States also engage in international cooperation at the global, interregional, regional and bilateral levels. Arab countries are involved in multiple international processes to advance collaboration on several key issues.

1. Global processes

In December 2018, at the General Assembly of the United Nations, Arab countries – with the exception of Algeria and Libya which abstained, and Somalia which was absent – endorsed the **Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM)**, the first intergovernmental non-legally binding global framework to cover all dimensions of international migration in a holistic and comprehensive manner (see chapter 3 and annex V to the present report). GCM sets a common understanding, shared responsibilities, and unity of purpose to mitigate the challenges and harness the benefits of migration. It also establishes 23 non-legally binding objectives to better manage migration at the local, national, regional and global levels, and includes a multi-stakeholder approach at the global and regional levels to review its implementation and guide further work.

All Arab countries – with the exception of Libya which abstained – voted in favour of adopting the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) in December 2018, which, in parallel with GCM, is an intergovernmentally negotiated global agreement dealing specifically with refugees.

GCR has four main objectives: easing pressure on refugee-receiving countries; enhancing refugee self-reliance; expanding access to third-country solutions; and supporting conditions of safe return in countries of origin. It also outlines a comprehensive refugee response framework and programme of action; sets out concrete measures to help meet its objectives; and establishes arrangements for follow-up and review.¹⁴⁸

The majority of Arab countries¹⁴⁹ participated in the tenth and eleventh sessions of the **Global Forum on Migration and Development**, held in 2017 and 2018 in Berlin and Marrakesh, respectively, which were geared towards contributing to the negotiations and outcomes of GCM by providing substantive inputs and political support to the process.¹⁵⁰

Furthermore, in November 2017, a **Global Conference on Cities and Migration** took place in Mechelen, Belgium, aimed at combining current thinking around international migration and sustainable urban development so as to contribute to implementing the urban dimensions of the 2030 Agenda, including, SDG 11 designed to make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable. Representatives of Arab cities from Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania and Morocco participated in the event. The outcome of the Conference was the Mechelen Declaration on Cities and Migration, which builds on the 2030 Agenda, the New Urban Agenda and the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, and provides actionable commitments, means of implementation, and a monitoring and evaluation mechanism to enhance cities and local communities' links to migration and development.

2. Interregional, regional and subregional processes

(a) Lead-up to the adoption of the Global Compact for Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees

The Arab Regional Consultative Process on Migration and Refugees Affairs, chaired by the League of Arab States, held an extraordinary

meeting in July 2017 to prepare for consultations on GCM and GCR. The meeting aimed to raise awareness among members of the League of Arab States on ongoing processes, so as to agree on key messages that the Arab region would put forth in the two global compacts. The outcome of the Consultative Process highlighted key priority areas for the Arab region: human rights for all migrants; addressing the drivers of migration; international cooperation on migration; contributions of migrants and diasporas to sustainable development; smuggling of migrants, trafficking in persons and contemporary forms of slavery; and irregular migration and regular pathways.¹⁵¹

ESCWA, in partnership with IOM and the League of Arab States, and in collaboration with the Working Group on International Migration in the Arab Region, organized a multi-stakeholder regional consultation in preparation for GCM in September 2017. The Regional Consultation aimed to enhance member States' and other stakeholders' awareness of the global process leading to the adoption of GCM; identify key migration issues, priorities and challenges in the Arab region; and build a common understanding of GCM as an important framework for addressing the region's migration priorities. Key issues discussed included decent work and labour mobility in the Arab context; protecting migrants in vulnerable situations; and the links between migration and development. The key messages emanating from the Regional Consultation were presented at the GCM stocktaking meeting held in Mexico in December 2017, and informed the subsequent negotiation phase leading up to the adoption of GCM in December 2018.¹⁵²

The Regional Review Conference of the 2013 Cairo Declaration on Population and Development took place in Beirut in October 2018, bringing together representatives of government institutions, including ministers and high-level officials from relevant ministries and national population councils, in addition to parliamentarians, representatives of civil society

organizations, regional organizations, United Nations agencies, academics, experts and other stakeholders. Migration was one of the key areas of discussion, including the interconnectedness of mobility and environmental sustainability, emerging issues related to patterns and trends of population migration, crisis and climate change as drivers of migration, and the impact of migration on urban sustainability.¹⁵³

(b) Cooperation on labour migration

In July 2017, the Abu Dhabi Dialogue (ADD)¹⁵⁴ held a special workshop on operationalizing the following four collaborative programmes approved by ADD ministers in the previous year: ensuring certification and mutual skill recognition; developing comprehensive information and orientation programmes; strengthening joint government oversight and monitoring of recruitment practices; and conducting research on the future of domestic work in GCC countries. The workshop's goal was to lay the groundwork for implementation and follow-up of the four collaborative tracks. In May 2018, a senior officials meeting was held for member State representatives to further discuss achievements and the way forward regarding the four collaborative tracks.¹⁵⁵

ILO organized an interregional consultation on labour migration and labour mobility from Asia and Africa to the Middle East, held in Beirut in October 2017, which brought together multiple stakeholders from the three regions to discuss common issues of concern relating to migrant workers, such as addressing abusive and fraudulent recruitment practices; innovative models for effective jobs/skills matching; mechanisms for ensuring decent working conditions, including labour inspection; access to justice and dispute resolution, facilitating regular migration pathways and addressing irregular migration; preventing migrant workers from falling into irregularity through no fault of their own; and bilateral, regional and interregional cooperation on labour migration. A summary report of the meeting was shared with the Office

of the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General for International Migration as input to the sixth thematic consultation on GCM, which included discussions of decent work and labour mobility.¹⁵⁶

On the sidelines of the forty-fifth session of the Arab Labour Conference, held in April 2018, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates agreed to create a subregional system to regulate domestic work, which includes standard regulations on contracts, domestic workers' ability to transfer to another employer, and establishing minimum wages. The five GCC countries also agreed to form a technical team to propose a common vision for domestic workers in the Gulf.¹⁵⁷

(c) Europe-Africa cooperation on migration

As part of the Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development (also known as the Rabat Process),¹⁵⁸ the fifth annual Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development was held in Marrakech in May 2018. Ministers and high-level representatives from the European Union and Africa met to integrate the Rabat Process in the global framework for migration; to reinforce its role in monitoring the Joint Valletta Action Plan¹⁵⁹ and fulfil the political commitments made during the Valletta Summit on migration in November 2015; and to adopt its new multi-year cooperation programme.¹⁶⁰ The outcome of the Conference was the adoption of the Marrakesh Political Declaration and a targeted Action Plan 2018-2020 with the following five priorities aligned with the priority domains of the Joint Valletta Action Plan: the benefits of migration for development and combatting the root causes of irregular migration and displacement; legal migration and mobility; protection and asylum; prevention and eradication of irregular migration, smuggling of migrants and human trafficking; and return, readmission and reintegration.¹⁶¹ A senior officials meeting was convened in Ouagadougou in February 2019 to launch the implementation of the Marrakesh Action Plan 2018-2020. Attendants

discussed how to integrate and reflect the cross-cutting priorities set out in the Marrakesh Political Declaration in the activities of the Rabat Process and the programmed activities and methodology for the implementation of the Marrakesh Action Plan over the next two years.¹⁶²

In June 2018, Algiers hosted the fourteenth Conference of Foreign Affairs Ministers in the cadre of the Western Mediterranean Forum, also known as the 5+5 Dialogue, comprising Algeria, France, Italy, Libya, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, Portugal, Spain and Tunisia. Issues linked to migration, employment, young people and sustainable development were the main areas of cooperation addressed at the meeting.¹⁶³

In November 2018, a total of 280 representatives from European and African countries came together at a senior officials meeting held in Addis Ababa, to discuss progress and the way forward in implementing the Joint Valletta Action Plan.¹⁶⁴

(d) African initiatives on migration

At the thirtieth **African Union** Summit held in January 2018, Morocco presented the African Agenda on Migration, an inclusive and participatory approach that included dialogues with Heads of State and consultations at the following two meetings: the Regional Meeting held in Skhirat, Morocco, in November 2017 that convened around 120 decision makers, representatives of international organizations, researchers and members of civil society; and the Ministerial Conference, held in Rabat in January 2018, attended by ministers representing the continent's five subregions, the African Union Commission and the eight regional economic communities.¹⁶⁵ The African Agenda on Migration follows the blueprint for a common vision of migration in Africa, which was presented at the twenty-eighth African Union Summit held in July 2017.¹⁶⁶ Furthermore, at its thirty-first Summit held in July 2018, the African Union agreed to establish the African Observatory for Migration and Development in Rabat tasked with coordinating information exchange

between African countries regarding migration, promoting harmonization of national strategies, and enhancing cooperation with other partners, under the guiding principles to "understand, anticipate and act".¹⁶⁷

The African Union also updated its Migration Policy Framework, originally established in 2006, to adapt to current migration patterns and priorities, resulting in the Migration Policy Framework for Africa and Plan of Action (2018-2030) which integrates Agenda 2063, the 2030 Agenda and international migration management policies and standards, centring around the following eight pillars: migration governance, labour migration and education, diaspora engagement, border governance, irregular migration, forced displacement, internal migration, and migration and trade.¹⁶⁸

The **Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)**, which brings together Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan and Uganda to achieve peace, prosperity and regional integration, held the eleventh session of its Regional Consultative Process on Migration (RCPM) in November 2018 on the theme "Enhancing labour migration in the IGAD region". The meeting commemorated the 10-year anniversary of the IGAD RCPM, and included discussions on the achievements made over the last 10 years, such as creating a cohesive regional strategy for migration, opening up labour markets, and strengthening strategies to address irregular migration and to enhance free movement of persons. There were additional discussions on follow-up and review of progress in the implementation of the recommendations of the 2015 RCPM on labour migration.¹⁶⁹

The Government of **Djibouti** hosted the fourth Pan-African Forum on Migration in November 2018, in collaboration with the African Union Commission, IGAD and IOM. The meeting aimed to engage relevant stakeholders, including regional economic commissions, African Union member States, the private sector, academia, parliamentarians, the African diaspora and

civil society organizations, among others, to assess progress regarding the Protocol on Free Movement in Africa; identify concerns of countries of origin and destination of migrants; provide a platform for the regional economic communities and regional consultative processes to inform participants about their migration initiatives; and update participants on the African Union's migration agenda and processes.¹⁷⁰

In April 2018, **Egypt** launched a tripartite collaboration project with Cyprus and Greece entitled *Roots Revival*, which aims to enhance relations between the three countries, revive historic migration and tourism between them, and acknowledge the cultural contributions of diasporas.¹⁷¹

In line with the European Union-Egypt partnership priorities for 2017-2020,¹⁷² Egypt also signed two agreements with the European Union in October 2018 to create jobs in the country, with a view to also reducing irregular migration. The first agreement entails a fund for inclusive growth focusing on job creation through investment in small and medium enterprises; and the other includes an European Union investment of \$6.88 million to reduce irregular migration and combat migrant smuggling and human trafficking.¹⁷³

The African Union-European Union-United Nations Task Force on Stranded Migrants was established in November 2017 to support African migrants stranded in **Libya** by improving the conditions of government-controlled detention centres and by supporting migrants' repatriation to their home country or to third countries, and to dismantle organized criminal networks for human trafficking and migrant smuggling.¹⁷⁴

In 2017, the **Sudan** launched the Regional Operational Centre on Trafficking, in collaboration with the African Union, to facilitate investigations regarding international trafficking in persons between countries of origin, transit and destination.¹⁷⁵ In 2018, Chad, Libya, Niger and the Sudan signed a quadripartite agreement to address

transnational crime, trafficking in persons and irregular migration.¹⁷⁶

Chad, the Sudan and UNHCR signed a tripartite agreement in May 2017 on the voluntary repatriation of Sudanese refugees living in Chad and of Chadian refugees living in the Sudan. In January 2018, the three parties signed an operational plan for the repatriation of 20,000 Sudanese refugees from Chad in 2018.¹⁷⁷

3. Bilateral cooperation

Arab States have engaged in bilateral cooperation, through legally binding bilateral agreements and non-binding memorandums of understanding, to strengthen ties and regulations on specific areas of concern. During the reporting period, April 2017 to March 2019, a number of bilateral agreements were put in place, predominantly with countries in Africa, Southeast Asia and Europe, regarding diverse areas such as labour migration, repatriation of migrants in an irregular situation, addressing irregular migration, combatting migrant smuggling and human trafficking, enhancing and facilitating migrant remittances, and providing migrants with access to health care.

Algeria ratified a memorandum of understanding with Mali through presidential decree No. 18-49 in January 2018 on labour, employment and social security, including provisions for the protection of migrant workers and the dissemination of information about their rights.¹⁷⁸ Algeria also signed a 'young professionals' agreement with France, which came into force in early 2018, enabling young Algerian professionals to work in France and French young people to engage in international corporate volunteer programmes. Furthermore, the two countries established a health-care protocol securing the treatment of Algerians in French hospitals.¹⁷⁹ In September 2018, Algeria and Germany engaged in bilateral talks focused on repatriation, which resulted in an agreement on repatriation procedures of Algerian nationals living irregularly in Germany, under which Algeria accepted to readmit its citizens.¹⁸⁰

In April 2017, **Bahrain** and Thailand agreed to promote collaboration on public health and strengthen an existing memorandum of understanding between the two countries on health cooperation by enhancing the exchange of specialists and health professionals, and visits by public and private sector representatives. They also discussed joint efforts to combat trafficking in persons.¹⁸¹

In August 2017, **Egypt** and Germany reached a deal to mitigate irregular migration from Egypt to Europe, under which Germany pledged to provide political and economic support to refugees living in Egypt, including establishing job centres and reintegration centres.¹⁸²

Egypt also signed a protocol on cooperation and partnership with the Sudan on money transfers through Sudan Post and the Egyptian National Post Authority. The agreement allows the two national postal services to send and receive remittances and to use the logistics centre at Cairo airport to facilitate electronic commerce.¹⁸³ A similar agreement was signed between Egypt and Jordan to facilitate remittance transfers between the Bank of Alexandria and Egypt Post with the Jordan Post Company. The agreement aims to facilitate remittance services to Egyptians in Jordan by expanding banking services through the Jordan Post network, to provide new payment systems and technologies, and to introduce new products designed to encourage those sending and receiving remittances to invest them in saving schemes.¹⁸⁴ Egypt Post has signed similar agreements with Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Libya and Nigeria.¹⁸⁵

Iraq signed a memorandum of cooperation with Germany in April 2018 on the repatriation of Iraqi refugees no longer allowed to stay in Germany. The agreement entails the readmission by Iraq of 10,000 Iraqi refugees, and support from Germany for their reintegration by providing jobs and training opportunities in Iraq.¹⁸⁶

Iraq and the **Syrian Arab Republic** also signed a memorandum of understanding on a

mutual exemption of entry visas for holders of diplomatic, service, private and official passports. It was ratified by the Syrian Arab Republic through law No. 30 of 2017.¹⁸⁷

In September 2018, **Jordan** and the Philippines agreed on a cooperation framework for employment of domestic workers, and signed a memorandum of agreement on labour cooperation to ensure better and safer working conditions for Filipino migrant workers in Jordan and the enforcement of established procedures for recruiting Filipino domestic workers.¹⁸⁸

Jordan also signed an agreement of cooperation with Nepal in September 2017 to increase the employment of Nepalese workers in Jordan. The agreement centred on the responsibilities of both countries in regulating employment and recruitment costs, and upholding the rights of workers, employers and agencies.¹⁸⁹

In March 2018, **Kuwait** and the Philippines signed a memorandum of understanding to regulate the working conditions of migrant domestic workers in Kuwait, following multiple allegations of abusive working conditions. The agreement guaranteed the right of domestic workers to retain their passports and to refuse to be transferred to another employer. It also committed Kuwait to setting up a 24-hour hotline and a special police unit to respond to complaints, and to ensuring domestic workers' access to telephones.¹⁹⁰ Moreover, Kuwait signed a memorandum of understanding with India in October 2018, creating a framework for cooperation on recruitment of domestic workers.¹⁹¹ Kuwait also signed a memorandum of understanding with the Sudan, agreeing to enhance labour exchange in various fields of the public and private sectors.¹⁹²

In December 2017, **Libya** and Italy agreed to set up a joint operations centre to identify migrant smugglers and human traffickers. The centre would facilitate cooperation between the coastguards, the Department of Combatting Illegal Migration, the Libyan

Attorney General, and intelligence services from both countries.¹⁹³

In August 2018, in response to an upsurge in irregular migration through Ceuta, **Morocco** and Spain reactivated a 1992 agreement on the readmission of nationals from third countries who enter Spain through Morocco irregularly.¹⁹⁴

In December 2017, **Saudi Arabia** signed a general labour recruitment bilateral agreement with Uganda to allow Ugandan workers, especially professionals such as doctors, engineers, welders and carpenters, and less-skilled workers, to apply for work in Saudi Arabia. The agreement also included amending a 2015 bilateral labour agreement on domestic workers following a ban imposed in 2016 by Uganda preventing its nationals from working as domestic workers in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, which was lifted in April 2017. The amendments include provisions to combat trafficking in persons and protect workers' rights.¹⁹⁵

Throughout 2017, Saudi Arabia also signed agreements and memorandums of understanding on recruitment of workers with Viet Nam (as reflected in royal decree M/124), India (M/119), Mexico (M/98), Egypt (M/76), and Morocco (M/68).¹⁹⁶ In October 2018, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia concluded an agreement to resume the recruitment of Indonesian domestic workers.¹⁹⁷

Furthermore, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have been negotiating draft bilateral labour agreements with Uganda to ensure the rights of migrant workers in **GCC countries**.¹⁹⁸ Qatar also signed a memorandum of understanding with Ghana in November 2018 on avoiding double taxation and regulating the employment of workers, among other matters.¹⁹⁹

In November 2017, Kenya agreed to lift its three-year ban on its nationals working as domestic workers in GCC countries. The Government signed a bilateral labour agreement with Qatar and another with Saudi Arabia.²⁰⁰ Kenya also agreed to send 100,000 workers of different skill levels to Saudi Arabia following collaboration

on protecting workers' rights. Reforms also include pre-departure training, closer vetting and monitoring of recruitment agencies, and securing a \$15,000 bond and a yearly \$5,000 registration fee from approved recruitment agencies.²⁰¹

In December 2017, the **Sudan** signed a number of bilateral agreements and cooperation programmes with Turkey, including a memorandum of understanding on migration and expatriate affairs.²⁰²

Tunisia signed a memorandum of understanding with Belgium on cooperation in the field of migration, solidarity development and security, which aims to strengthen cooperation on diverse areas of migration, including aiding the return and reintegration of Tunisians living in Belgium; facilitating travel between the two countries for students, business persons, senior officials, journalists, artists and athletes; addressing irregular migration; and protecting migrants.

The **United Arab Emirates** signed a memorandum of understanding with the Philippines on labour migration, recruitment and employment of domestic workers, which aims to regulate agencies' recruitment practices to prevent human trafficking and protect migrants' rights by utilizing a model employment contract signed by migrant workers in their country of origin, and by holding pre-departure training for employers and employees so that both parties understand their rights and obligations, among other measures.²⁰³

The United Arab Emirates also signed a memorandum of understanding with Bangladesh on assisted employment, under which only registered and licensed recruitment agencies in the United Arab Emirates are allowed to hire Bangladeshi workers through registered and licensed recruitment agencies in Bangladesh.²⁰⁴ Moreover, the Gulf country signed a memorandum of understanding with Tajikistan on best practices for promoting labour recruitment,²⁰⁵ and another with Thailand to promote cooperation on combatting human trafficking.²⁰⁶ Furthermore, in January 2018 the

United Arab Emirates signed a memorandum of understanding with Thailand to combat trafficking in persons.²⁰⁷

In 2018, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates concluded bilateral labour agreements with Ethiopia to ensure the protection of the rights of Ethiopian migrant workers. These agreements partially ended the ban instituted by Ethiopia in 2013 preventing its citizens from working in several Middle Eastern countries.²⁰⁸

C. Conclusion

Arab countries have taken major steps to enhance the protection of migrant workers; develop strategies addressing irregular migration, trafficking in persons; open pathways for longer residencies, permanent residency and citizenship; and protect refugees, among many other new developments in migration governance. Some developments, however, have also restricted migrants' access to rights and services, which have exacerbated their vulnerabilities.²⁰⁹

Table 4 maps the policy developments set out in the present chapter by country and thematic area. GCC countries, host to almost three quarters of all the migrants and refugees in the region, have been involved in diverse new developments in migration governance at the national level, while other subregions, most notably the Arab LDCs, have shown more limited enactment of new laws and policies. Human trafficking and migrant smuggling have received heightened attention, with several Arab countries actively engaged in establishing national strategies and entities to address these issues. Labour migration, forced displacement and refugee movements are also areas where many countries have passed new legislation, showing Arab Governments' commitment to engaging in policy responses that address the most common drivers of

migration in the region, namely the search for employment and forced displacement.

Nationality and statelessness: Some Arab countries have put in place important new laws to give women less restricted access to nationality, and to allow them to pass their nationality on to their children. Further steps should be taken to ensure all countries confer equal nationality rights to men and women, including equal pathways for foreign spouses and children to obtain citizenship, as gender gaps still remain in the region. More attention should also be given to combatting statelessness by making sure all newborns have proper access to birth registration and to nationality, and that people are not arbitrarily deprived of their nationality if it renders them stateless.

Labour migration: GCC countries were the most active in the reporting period in continuing efforts to regulate labour migration, and passing legislation to enhance protection of migrant workers' rights, while striving to reduce unemployment among their nationals by reserving jobs in selected sectors and occupations for nationals only. Advances include creating tighter regulations for recruitment agencies, establishing standardized contracts, setting up mechanisms to support the resolution of labour disputes, and setting forth new regulations for the issuance and renewal of work permits. While steps have been taken in several countries to make the *kafala* system more flexible and less restrictive so as to provide more guarantees and protections to migrant workers, the system still puts migrant workers in particularly vulnerable situations that expose them to abuse and exploitation and highly restricts their rights. More reforms are needed to adequately uphold migrant workers' rights, ensure they have decent working conditions, including decent pay, and grant them improved protection. In addition, labour force nationalization schemes have in some instances impeded migrants' access to rights and services, especially when that access has been conditioned on increased service costs or

Table 4. Policy developments by country and thematic area, April 2017 – March 2019

Country	Nationality and statelessness	Labour migration	Irregular migration	Human trafficking and migrant smuggling	Forced displacement and refugee protection	Admission, visas and residency permits	Other laws and policies
Algeria							X
Bahrain		X	X	X		X	X
Comoros							
Djibouti		X			X		
Egypt	X			X			X
Iraq				X	X	X	
Jordan	X	X		X	X		
Kuwait		X	X	X		X	X
Lebanon					X		
Libya							
Mauritania							
Morocco			X	X			
Oman		X				X	X
Qatar		X	X	X	X	X	
Saudi Arabia		X	X	X		X	X
Somalia	X			X	X		
State of Palestine							
Sudan	X			X	X		
Syrian Arab Republic		X			X		X
Tunisia			X	X			X
United Arab Emirates	X	X	X		X	X	
Yemen							

a minimum income, which may be restrictive for lower-income migrants thus fostering inequality.

Irregular migration: Developments regarding irregular migration in the region have focused on regularization campaigns granting migrants in irregular situations the possibility of regulating their status or leaving the country without

penalties, depending on the amnesty conditions. Most developments, however, have focused on fine and penalty exemptions to facilitate the exit of migrants in an irregular situation, with limited focus on integrating migrants by regularizing their status. In addition, more progress is needed to increase the availability of regular channels of migration. Arab countries could focus on

addressing irregular migration by examining situations where migrant workers fall into irregular status through no fault of their own (for example, because of employers' failure to renew visas, work and residence permits), and by ensuring that migrants in an irregular situation are not returned to conflict countries and are not forcibly or collectively returned without due process and consideration of their individual circumstances, and without giving them the right to seek asylum. Other measures could include allowing migrant workers to renew their own visas, work and residency permits, issuing residency permits with a validity of at least two months longer than the employment contract, and ensuring that workers do not lose their immigration status if they lose their employment.

Human trafficking and migrant smuggling:

Many Arab countries have developed national and international strategies and frameworks to combat human trafficking, and to grant protection and assistance to victims of trafficking. Plans include establishing identification and referral systems, providing protection and assistance to victims, training relevant authorities, and launching penal and criminal procedures and public awareness campaigns. Ensuring that these strategies are effectively implemented is an important step in prevention and protection. All the measures implemented by Arab countries in the reporting period have focused on human trafficking, while little has been done at the policy level to address migrant smuggling, which is interlinked with irregular migration and could be addressed by enhancing regular migration pathways. While human trafficking and migrant smuggling have many commonalities, focusing legislative efforts solely on human trafficking may enhance the vulnerability of smuggled migrants who have been subject to exploitation and abuse in the course of their journey. It may also leave gaps in the prevention, identification and prosecution of migrant smuggling. Given that the lines between migrant smuggling and human trafficking are sometimes blurred, and smuggling may often turn into trafficking, more efforts could be put in place to address both phenomena and

make sure victims and migrants' human rights are protected.

Forced displacement and refugee protection:

Some Arab countries have passed important new laws to grant asylum, refugee status or protection to forcibly displaced persons, and to expand services available for them. However, war, conflict and instability have resulted in the displacement of large numbers of people and increased their vulnerability. The protracted nature of displacement is putting significant pressure on host countries and communities, triggering policy responses that restrict the rights of refugees and persons in refugee-like situations and limit their access to services, thus exacerbating their already vulnerable circumstances. Furthermore, while all refugees have a right to return to their country of origin, countries of origin and destination should make sure that their return is safe, voluntary and sustainable, and in line with the international principle of non-refoulement as stipulated by international law and humanitarian law.

Visas and residency permits: Arab countries have also passed new regulations for granting residency to migrants, reflecting different strategies for governing entry and residence of foreigners. While some countries have extended the length of residency permits and opened pathways for permanent residency – albeit under certain terms and conditions that are often highly restrictive for lower-income migrants – others have shortened the length of residence permits and imposed new or increased fees for residence of dependents. Almost all developments are in GCC countries, which are promoting the permanence and investment of high-skilled and high-earning migrants, while at the same time levying fees on dependents that migrants have to pay.

Other migration-related policies: Arab countries have also developed policies to enhance expatriate engagement and foster investment for development, stipulated fees and regulations targeted specifically at migrants, and worked to

fight racial discrimination that disproportionately affects migrants. In line with objectives to nationalize the labour force, some GCC countries have established or raised fees that are specific to migrants, and that create economic barriers for low-income workers.

International cooperation: All Arab countries have been actively engaged in international cooperation towards enhancing migration governance that ensures migration is carried out in a safe, orderly and regular manner.

To further promote good migration governance in the Arab region, countries are encouraged to undertake the following:

1. Ratify international legal instruments to protect the rights of migrants, refugees and stateless persons including the following:
 - a. 1949 Migration for Employment Convention (Revised) (No. 97);
 - b. 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol;
 - c. 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons;
 - d. 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness;
 - e. 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa;
 - f. 1975 Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention (No. 143);
 - g. 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women;
 - h. 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families;
 - i. 1997 Private Employment Agencies Convention (No. 181);
 - j. 2000 Convention against Transnational Organized Crime;
 - k. 2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime;
 - l. 2000 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime;
- m. 2011 Domestic Workers Convention (No. 189);
- n. 2014 Protocol to the Forced Labour Convention (No. 29).
2. Respect, protect and fulfil migrants' human rights, regardless of their migration status, sex, age, race, religion or nationality;
3. Grant men and women equal rights to pass their nationality to their children and spouses;
4. Ensure that migration policies are sensitive to the rights of children: guarantee sufficient protection for migrant children under the age of 18, and due consideration of the impact of parental migration on the rights and wellbeing of children left behind;
5. Prevent and reduce statelessness and improve the situation of stateless communities and their access to social services, including by granting nationality to stateless persons and by registering all births;
6. Reform the *kafala* system to allow freedom of movement and greater internal labour market mobility; ensure fair recruitment processes, protect migrant workers' rights, including the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining; provide migrants with decent working and living conditions, including decent pay and occupational safety and health; and prevent any risk or exposure to exploitation and/or abuse in the recruitment process, including forced labour;
7. Guarantee protection and equal rights for all migrant workers, including by incorporating domestic workers and other excluded categories of workers into labour laws or by ensuring that standards in domestic work legislation are no lower than those in the labour law, and ensure that these laws are fully implemented;
8. Provide migrants with access to social security schemes in destination countries, and establish mechanisms for the portability of social security entitlements and benefits;
9. Monitor irregular migration routes and work to dismantle organized criminal

networks that endanger the lives of migrants through smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons in the context of international migration;

10. Ensure that addressing irregular migration does not violate migrants' rights, including their right to seek asylum and the principle of non-refoulement, and address the root causes of irregular migration;
11. Ensure migrants and refugees have access to basic services, such as adequate food, housing, water, health care, education and social protection, and access to justice;
12. Ensure national regulations respect the right to work of migrants and refugees living in the country – particularly in cases of protracted displacement – including by removing administrative and legislative barriers to refugees' access to the labour market;
13. Translate political commitments to grant refugees economic and social rights into concrete actions, through changes in law and administrative procedures;
14. Adopt development-based responses and long-term strategies for protracted displacement;
15. Use immigration detention only as a measure of last resort, work towards ending the practice of child detention in the context of international migration, and ensure that return takes place in a safe, voluntary and dignified manner;
16. Recognize the positive contributions of migrants and refugees to the sustainable development of countries of origin and destination, and ensure an evidence-based dialogue on migration;

17. Adopt a human-centred and rights-based development approach to migration governance, which considers how migration is related to sustainable development and is directly linked to achieving the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals;²¹⁰


18. Strengthen international cooperation on migration governance through whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches, and include workers' and employers' organizations, the private sector, civil society, academia and migrant organizations in dialogues and decision-making processes.

The present chapter discussed developments in migration governance at the national, bilateral, regional and interregional levels, which show Arab countries' commitment to addressing labour migration, displacement, human trafficking and migrant smuggling, among other priority areas. It also identified gaps and challenges, as well as areas of improvement and policy reform. Implementing the above recommendations could help address some of the persisting challenges migrants face in the Arab region.

Chapter 3 of the present report considers some of these policy developments and newly promulgated legislation in the light of the recently adopted Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, highlighting priorities and gaps in the region and providing recommendations for countries to fully align their policies with GCM objectives.



3. Global Compact for Migration: Policy Implications for the Arab Region



“In adopting the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, Governments committed to a global migration framework based on facts not myths, a framework that protects their national interests and in fact advances them through better cooperation.”

Louise Arbour, Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for International Migration

3. Global Compact for Migration: Policy Implications for the Arab Region

A. Introduction

The adoption of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) in 2018 marked a historic turning point in migration governance. Anchored in human rights, GCM presents a global framework for protecting migrants and maximizing their contribution to development while maintaining countries' sovereignty.

The present chapter builds on the findings in chapters 1 and 2, and provides detailed analysis of GCM policy implications for the Arab region. It begins by providing a brief overview of the developments that led to the adoption of GCM. It then unpacks the various GCM objectives, highlighting their relevance to the region, and focuses on three selected priority areas. The present chapter also presents policy

recommendations that address priority areas for intervention.

Extensive desk research was conducted to draft the present chapter, relying on primary and secondary data sources covering the majority of Arab countries. Three countries are not included in the analysis, namely the Comoros, Djibouti and Mauritania, owing to difficulties in accessing data.

B. Developing a global migration governance framework

In the light of rapidly increasing numbers of international migrants over the last few decades (box 9), the need for an international governance framework for international

Box 9. International migration: a global snapshot

In 2017, the United Nations estimated the international migrant stock at 258 million, representing 3.4 per cent of the 7.6 billion people worldwide. Two thirds of them were migrant workers, estimated at 164 million globally by ILO.

Migration has significantly increased in the last two decades. In 2000, 173 million migrants represented only 2.8 per cent of the then 6.1 billion people worldwide, a proportion that had remained largely unchanged since at least 1990 when 153 billion migrants represented 2.9 per cent of the 5.3 billion people globally. In the same period, numbers of refugees grew spectacularly, reaching the highest peak since the Second World War.

According to UNHCR, the number of refugees worldwide increased from 11.7 million in 2000 to 19.9 million in 2017. In addition to UNHCR data, Palestine refugees under the UNRWA mandate totalled an estimated 3.9 million in 2000 and 5.4 million in 2017. Thus, the total global refugee population increased from 15.6 million (representing 9 per cent of all migrants) to 25.4 million (representing almost 10 per cent of all migrants) between 2000 and 2017.

Source: DESA, 2017; UNHCR, 2018f.

migration became apparent. The earliest element of this framework dates back to the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (the Migrant Workers Convention). While this Convention focuses on the specific situation of migrant workers, including those in an irregular situation, it underscores that most human rights enshrined in other instruments are also applicable to them. However, 28 years later, only 54 mostly migrant-origin countries (including Algeria, the Comoros, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and the Syrian Arab Republic) have ratified the Migrant Workers Convention, but none of the large migrant-destination countries in North America, Europe, Oceania and the Gulf have done so. Since many states are reluctant to subject themselves to legally binding instruments relating to migration, States have not reached a consensus on the Migrant Workers Convention.

The adoption of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development, held in Cairo in 1994, was an important milestone for international migration governance. It established the nexus between international migration and development by stating that orderly international migration could have a positive impact on both the communities of origin and the communities of destination, providing the former with remittances and the latter with needed human resources. It also highlighted the potential of international migration in facilitating skills transfer and cultural enrichment. Moreover, it stressed some of the intrinsic challenges associated with international migration, and underlined the need for international migration policies to address the impact of migration on countries of origin and destination, including host societies.

The two decades following the Migrant Workers Convention and the 1994 Cairo Declaration saw limited progress in international governance of international migration. The United Nations Millennium Declaration mentioned only once

the topic of migration, by committing to take measures to ensure respect for and protection of the human rights of migrants, migrant workers and their families, to eliminate the increasing acts of racism and xenophobia in many societies, and to promote greater harmony and tolerance in all societies. However, none of the Millennium Development Goals contained any reference to migration.

Fifteen years later, migration had become a major issue under the 2030 Agenda and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The 2030 Agenda recognizes migration as a core development consideration, and explicitly incorporates it in the global development agenda. A key reference to migration is present in target 10.7 on facilitating orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies; and target 10.C on reducing to less than 3 per cent the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminating remittance corridors with costs higher than 5 per cent. Target 8.8 also commits to protecting labour rights and promoting safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants. Nonetheless, these targets overlook many core aspects of migration issues. Other SDG targets indirectly apply to migration, such as target 16.3 on promoting the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensuring equal access to justice for all; and target 16.9 on providing legal identity for all, including birth registration.

The period 2015-2018 constituted a turning point for recognition that international migration was a major global issue and it was time to produce a framework of universal principles to guide policymaking on this matter. In the wake of major tragedies unfolding mostly, though not only, in the Arab region (such as unprecedented refugee movements from Iraq, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen; transit migration across North Africa; and tens of thousands dying at sea while crossing the Mediterranean¹ or the Gulf

of Aden), that a worldwide coalition of political leaders, international organizations, civil society organizations, influential thinkers and academics began developing key guidelines for the governance of international migration, reflected

initially in the 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants then in the 2018 the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) and in the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR).

Table 5. Arab states' commitment to international tools on migrants and refugees and their actual experience of migration and displacement

Country	International tool				Migration and displacement experience (% of total population)	
	Refugee Convention 1951	Migrant Workers Convention 1990	GCM 2018	GCR 2018	Migrants and refugees in	Migrants and refugees out
GCC countries						
Bahrain			F	F	48,4	3,9
Kuwait			F	F	75,5	5,0
Oman			F	F	44,7	0,4
Qatar			F	F	65,2	0,9
Saudi Arabia			F	F	37,0	0,8
United Arab Emirates			F	F	88,4	1,5
Mashreq						
Egypt	Y	Y	F	F	0,5	3,5
Iraq			F	F	1,0	4,4
Jordan			F	F	33,3	7,7
Lebanon			F	F	31,9	13,5
State of Palestine			F	F	5,2	77,3
Syrian Arab Republic		Y	F	F	5,5	37,6
Maghreb						
Algeria	Y	Y	A	F	0,6	4,3
Libya		Y	A	A	12,4	2,5
Morocco	Y	Y	F	F	0,3	8,1
Tunisia	Y		F	F	0,5	6,7
Arab LDCs						
Comoros		Y	F	F	1,5	14,3
Djibouti	Y		F	F	12,1	1,7
Mauritania	Y	Y	F	F	3,8	0,8
Somalia	Y		N	F	0,3	4,9
Sudan	Y		F	F	1,8	44,2
Yemen	Y		F	F	1,4	4,2

A significant step was made with the adoption of GCM, a non-legally binding instrument. GCM obtained large consensus in the Arab region, and was adopted by most States when compared with other international tools such as the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) and the 1990 Migrant Workers Convention that were ratified by fewer States, as illustrated in table 5.

In the Arab region, mostly countries with a low proportion of refugees have ratified the Refugee Convention, while countries hosting large migrant populations have not. In the same vein, countries with a low proportion of migrants living on their territory but with a large proportion of citizens abroad have ratified the Migrant Workers Convention.

C. Global Compact for Migration

The Global Compact for Migration is a non-binding intergovernmental agreement that aims to facilitate safe, orderly and regular migration. Its preamble stipulates that GCM rests on international law, including the core international human rights instruments and ILO conventions. GCM aims to mitigate the negative causes and consequences of migration, while fostering its positive impact. The goal of GCM is to create conducive conditions that enable all migrants to enrich our societies through their human, economic and social capacities; and to mitigate the adverse drivers and structural factors that hinder people from building and maintaining sustainable livelihoods in their countries of origin, and so compel them to seek a future elsewhere.

For the first time, the international community spelled out a number of universal principles to guide policies in the field of international migration. Primarily, GCM promotes the wellbeing of migrants: it ensures effective respect, protection and fulfilment of the human rights of all migrants, regardless of their migration

status, across all stages of the migration cycle. It also reaffirms the commitment to eliminate all forms of discrimination, including racism, xenophobia and intolerance against migrants and their families, and mainstreams a gender perspective and promotes gender equality. Moreover, GCM advocates international cooperation (no State can address migration on its own owing to the inherently transnational nature of the phenomenon), while reaffirming State sovereignty (the sovereign right of States to determine their national migration policy within their jurisdiction, in conformity with international law). ‘Whole-of-government’ and ‘whole-of-society’ approaches to migration are also identified as guiding principles.

Striking a balance between potentially conflicting perspectives, GCM proved to be a widely consensual agreement as it obtained 152 votes in favour to 5 against and 12 abstentions (not counting 24 absent States) at the General Assembly of the United Nations on 19 December 2018. Most Arab States voted in favour, and only two abstained.

During the General Assembly debates, several arguments put forward by countries were key to GCM adoption. Firstly, the GCM is non-binding in international law. As recalled by the representative of Denmark, “the agreement creates no new legal obligations for States”.² GCM is a blueprint on how countries can best manage migration, and cooperate more effectively with one another and with other stakeholders, while taking into account their migration realities and capacities.

Secondly, GCM is about the rights of migrants rather than recognizing the right to migrate. Most of its principles are already enshrined in international human rights law. By reaffirming that these principles must apply to migrants as well as to all other persons – migrants, as well as refugees and all other persons are entitled to the same universal human rights and fundamental freedoms, which must be respected, protected and fulfilled at all times

– GCM does not add a new layer to existing principles. Instead, it intends to reduce the risks and vulnerabilities migrants face at different stages of migration by respecting, protecting and fulfilling their human rights. Since human rights are universal, GCM can naturally claim its universality. In the words of the representative of Morocco, GCM must seek to be universal, fostering State ownership and making migration a positive, driving force for global solidarity. The representative of Egypt expressed regret that some States did not sign the text, despite its respect for national policies.³

Thirdly, GCM recognizes State sovereignty in migration policy. The President of the General Assembly stressed that GCM did not undermine, but rather strengthened, the sovereignty of States. It fosters international cooperation by acknowledging that no State can address migration alone, and upholds the sovereignty of States and their obligations under international law. The representative of Bahrain said that GCM was not about who passes through borders, but rather about how to address their needs once they arrive. Giving his own country as an example, he said that in 2017, Bahrain had allowed migrants to live and work in the country without a sponsor, an employer or a job, making holders of the new ‘flexi-permit’ masters of their own fate. At the same time, he reaffirmed that this was not a permanent immigration scheme and migration to Bahrain remained temporary in essence. The representative of the Syrian Arab Republic said that GCM was in line with the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs, noting that external interference had caused many Syrians to leave the country.⁴

GCM sets its people-centred approach as a guiding principle, promoting the wellbeing of both migrants and of communities in countries of origin, transit and destination. Discussions, however, also focused on the need to consider the principles of national sovereignty and the potential socioeconomic and political impact on receiving countries. In answer to those concerns,

GCM advocates argued that it reaffirmed the sovereign right of States to determine their national migration policies, and was committed to facilitating safe, orderly and regular migration to reduce the incidence and negative impact of irregular migration. Another issue of concern was dealing with refugees in the same way as migrants; however, the special status of refugees was clearly reaffirmed by the Member States of the United Nations in the Global Compact on Refugees on 17 December 2018.⁵

D. Relevance of the Global Compact for Migration objectives to the Arab region

GCM comprises 23 objectives for better migration governance at the local, national, regional and global levels. All objectives are universal; however, the present section focuses on their relevance to Arab countries.

The 23 GCM objectives cover a spectrum of topics related to numerous facets of migration and its governance. Where possible, experiences from some Arab countries are included as examples of means to operationalize those objectives.

Objective 1: Collect and utilize accurate and disaggregated data as a basis for evidence-based policies

Knowledge on international migration is limited by significant deficits in empirical data. Owing to a lack of reliable, accurate and up-to-date statistics on migration flows and stocks and on migrants’ characteristics, international migration is a domain affected by many misjudgements that could mislead policymakers and public opinion.

Statistics are needed in all policymaking steps to identify opportunities and benefits as well as challenges and risks, shape policy responses, and evaluate policies and measure their impact on the ground. Statistics must be time- and

space-sensitive and provide all the details necessary to characterize policy target groups.

Action 1 (d) is particularly relevant to Arab countries with a deficit of reliable migration statistics, including on migrant stocks and flows and more detailed statistics for analysing the effects and benefits of migration and on the contributions of migrants and diasporas to sustainable development. Policymakers have little information on the demographic, social and economic dynamics of migration in the Arab region. Arab countries therefore require support to include migration data in national surveys and administrative routines, and to ensure that data are processed and transformed into statistics.

A promising development under GCM is the African Union's support for Morocco to establish an African Observatory for Migration and Development in Rabat.⁶ This could be further explored as a resource for the region at large.

Objective 2: Minimize the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their country of origin

People can migrate by choice, but also out of necessity in cases of conflict, environmental threats, poverty or unemployment. GCM commits to creating conducive political, economic, social and environmental conditions for people to lead peaceful, productive and sustainable lives in their own country, while ensuring that desperation and deteriorating environments do not compel them to seek livelihoods elsewhere through irregular migration. Forced displacement is particularly prevalent in the Arab region, both as the origin and destination of such movements, resulting in large numbers of migrants in irregular situations.

Action 2 (b) intends to eliminate the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their country of origin, including through disaster risk reduction, climate change mitigation and adaptation. Environmental hazards, such as fresh water shortages (in Jordan, Syrian Arab Republic or Yemen), desert

encroachment (in Maghreb countries), and sea level elevation (in the lowlands of Egypt and Iraq) will almost certainly become factors causing population movements in the near future. Building local populations' resilience to such hazards must become an urgent priority.

Objective 3: Provide accurate and timely information at all stages of migration

Not all migrants are informed before departure of what duties and rights, and what challenges and opportunities, they will face in the destination country. It is only upon arrival that many migrants discover a destination country's laws on entry and stay, as well as its realities in terms of working and living conditions or access to services. Migrants' lack of information can cause negative outcomes, from finding themselves in an irregular situation and subject to sanctions, to being exposed to abuse, exploitation and violence. Several countries of origin organize pre-departure orientation programmes, or safe migration information campaigns, intended to provide their citizens who are moving abroad with basic knowledge of their destination. For example, the Philippines and Sri Lanka hold training sessions for migrant workers heading to Arab countries, notably women in the domestic and care sectors.⁷

Action 3 (d) recommends providing newly arrived migrants with targeted, gender-responsive, child-sensitive, accessible and comprehensive information and legal guidance on their rights and obligations. The pilot post-arrival programme launched by the United Arab Emirates in 2017, with a focus on legal and cultural orientation as a strategy to promote coexistence between migrants and host communities, serves as an example of how such action could be implemented.⁸

Objective 4: Ensure that all migrants have proof of legal identity and adequate documentation

Action 4 (d) recommends facilitating access to personal documentation, such

as passports and visas, and ensuring that relevant regulations and criteria to obtain such documentation are non-discriminatory, by undertaking a gender-responsive and age-sensitive review to prevent increased risk of vulnerabilities throughout the migration cycle.

In several Arab countries, women face significant challenges in obtaining travel documents without the authorization of male guardians. Moreover, the unlawful confiscation by employers of employees' passports remains a problem that countries should engage with international and national partners to address.

Action 4 (e) recommends strengthening measures to reduce statelessness, including by registering migrants' births, ensuring that women and men can equally confer their nationality to their children, and providing nationality to children born in another State's territory, especially in situations where a child would otherwise be stateless. In the Arab region, statelessness includes, among others, the following:

- Children born of a national mother and a foreign father when the marriage ends before the child is born, or of a father who is unable or unwilling to attest to paternity. Several Arab countries, such as Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, Tunisia and Yemen, have adopted legislation whereby mothers can give their nationality to their children to tackle this issue;
- Unregistered children of migrants and refugees may be at risk of statelessness;
- Palestinians who have not been granted citizenship of their country of residence.

Objective 5: Enhance availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration

This objective advocates efforts to facilitate labour mobility and decent work, particularly for migrants compelled to leave their countries of

origin owing to sudden-onset natural disasters. It also highlights the need to facilitate family reunification for migrants at all skills levels, and expand available options for academic mobility.

Objective 5 is of particular relevance to Arab destination countries of migrant workers, notably GCC countries, many of which are in the process of reviewing, revising, creating alternatives to, or eliminating the *kafala* system, which creates legal obstacles to labour mobility within the destination country and may impede family reunification.

Objective 6: Facilitate fair and ethical recruitment and safeguard conditions that ensure decent work

This objective calls for several actions to appropriately tackle the decent work deficit in the Arab region. The first action is to promote signature, ratification, accession and implementation of relevant international instruments related to international labour migration, labour rights, decent work and forced labour (Action 6 (a)). All Arab countries, except the State of Palestine which is not an ILO member, have ratified at least four of the eight ILO fundamental conventions, but it is still necessary to better understand the obstacles to ratification of those conventions to which GCC countries, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Somalia and the Sudan are not parties (table 6; see annex V to the present report for more information on Arab States' ratification status of international legal instruments related to international migration). Moreover, it would be valuable to have more information on the degree to which the protections enshrined in the conventions are already reflected in national legislation, regardless of the formal ratification of the conventions.⁹

In addition, objective 6 urges action to prevent debt bondage by prohibiting recruiters and employers from charging or shifting recruitment fees or related costs to migrant workers (Action 6 (c)). Positive developments include the adoption by several Arab countries, including all GCC

Table 6. Ratification of the eight ILO fundamental conventions by the Arab Countries

Country	Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29)	Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No.87)	Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No.98)	Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No.100)	Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No.105)	Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No.111)	Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No.138)	Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No.182)
GCC countries								
Bahrain	1981				1998	2000	2012	2001
Kuwait	1968	1961	2007		1961	1965	1999	2000
Oman	1998				2005		2005	2001
Qatar	1998				2007	1976	2006	2000
Saudi Arabia	1978			1978	1978	1978	2014	2001
United Arab Emirates	1982			1997	1997	2001	1998	2001
Mashreq								
Egypt	1955	1957	1954	1960	1958	1960	1999	2002
Iraq	1962	2018	1962	1963	1959	1959	1985	2001
Jordan	1966		1968	1966	1958	1963	1998	2000
Lebanon	1977		1977	1977	1977	1977	2003	2001
State of Palestine								
Syrian Arab Republic	1960	1960	1957	1957	1958	1960	2001	2003
Maghreb								
Algeria	1962	1962	1962	1962	1969	1969	1984	2001
Libya	1961	2000	1962	1962	1961	1961	1975	2000
Morocco	1957		1957	1979	1966	1963	2000	2001
Tunisia	1962	1957	1957	1968	1959	1959	1995	2000
Arab LDCs								
Comoros	1978	1978	1978	1978	1978	2004	2004	2004
Djibouti	1978	1978	1978	1978	1978	2005	2005	2005
Mauritania	1961	1961	2001	2001	1997	1963	2001	2001
Somalia	1960	2014	2014		1961	1961		2014
Sudan	1957		1957	1970	1970	1970	2003	2003
Yemen	1969	1976	1969	1976	1969	1969	2000	2000

Source: ILO, n.d.

Table 7. Recruitment costs incurred by migrants and earnings of migrant workers in selected corridors, 2015 or 2016

Migration corridor	Total recruitment cost in 2016 (USD)	Current monthly earnings in 2016 (USD)	Recruitment cost in monthly earnings*
Pakistan-Saudi Arabia 2015	4460	491	10,5
India-Saudi Arabia 2016	1386	377	4,5
Nepal-Saudi Arabia 2016	769	286	3,8
Philippines-Saudi Arabia 2016	309	471	0,7
Ethiopia-Saudi Arabia 2015	1015	348	3,7
Nepal-Qatar 2016	742	292	2,9
India-Qatar 2015	1156	604	1,9
Philippines-Qatar 2015	519	508	1,1

Source: Abella, 2018.

*Averages calculated from sample distribution of ratios of recruitment cost to earnings.

countries, of legislation to stop recruitment fees from being charged to migrant workers entering destination countries. However, the fees charged by agencies operating in origin countries remain a problematic practice that affects the wellbeing of workers in the region. Tools such as the IOM International Recruitment Integrity System and the ILO General Principles and Operational Guidelines for Fair Recruitment can assist Arab countries in addressing these extra-jurisdictional issues through the engagement of private sector stakeholders (table 7).

Other actions highly relevant for Arab countries under objective 6 include the following:

- Provide migrants with written contracts and ensure their awareness of the provisions included in the contract (Action 6 (d)): many migrants across the Arab region are employed in the informal sector, where they work without a written contract. Moreover, non-Arabic speaking low-income migrant workers employed in the formal sector who have a written contract, may not have the language skills necessary to understand what it contains. Overcoming language barriers can be addressed in different ways; for example, translating the contracts and producing multilingual administrative documents;

- Prohibit the confiscation or non-consensual retention of work contracts, and travel or identity documents from migrants (Action 6 (h)): passport withholding is a widespread though unlawful practice among employers of low-income workers, notably women domestic workers. This issue can be tackled by ensuring that all workers are protected by relevant labour laws and policies, including the most vulnerable such as migrant domestic workers.

Objective 7: Address and reduce vulnerabilities in migration

To reduce vulnerabilities in migration, Action 7 (c) advocates action to address the particular needs and vulnerabilities of migrant women, girls and boys. These actions are highly relevant to the Arab region, where an estimated 1.7 million migrant women are employed in the domestic sector in GCC and Mashreq countries alone. Countries are taking steps to amend their legislation to protect vulnerable migrants; however, more action is needed to ensure that all migrants are protected from gender-based violence, abuse and exploitation.

Moreover, in some Arab countries, migrant women's reproductive rights are denied. For instance, women who get pregnant or contract

a sexually transmitted infection could be subject to detention and deportation. In addition, in some countries, marriage is prohibited for migrant women, they are subjected to regular pregnancy and HIV testing, and their access to contraceptives is restricted.¹⁰

Several categories of migrant women are particularly exposed to gender-based violence and abuse:

- Low-income migrants: research shows that health problems, for example, are rampant among low-income female migrants and significantly aggravated by illiteracy, frequent change of workplace, overtime work, mistreatment at the workplace, unpaid salaries, and when the family left behind has problems;¹¹
- Smuggled migrants: there are many reports on the severe abuses that women are exposed to along irregular migration routes, with sexual violence and rape generating extended physical and mental health problems.

Action 7 (h) aims to prevent migrants from falling into an irregular status in the country of destination, by developing accessible and expedient procedures that facilitate transition from one status to another, and by informing migrants of their rights and obligations. Irregular migrant status causes harm to migrants and to their hosts. In the Arab region, where 5-10 million migrants could be in an irregular situation (unauthorised entry, overstayed visas, unauthorised employment), reducing the challenges faced by these vulnerable categories of migrants calls for a wide range of policy changes to ease their access to basic services and rights, such as civil registry, education and formal employment.

Objective 8: Save lives and establish coordinated international efforts on missing migrants

This objective addresses a major concern of Arab Governments and other migration

stakeholders in the region. Some of the world's deadliest migration routes cross, originate from or end in Arab countries, in particular the Central, Western and Eastern Mediterranean routes to Europe, the trans-Saharan route from sub-Saharan Africa to the Mediterranean shore across Libya and other Maghreb countries, and the Gulf of Aden route from the Horn of Africa to the Arabian Peninsula. Every year, thousands of migrants die at sea or in the desert trying to reach a better life for themselves and their families. Multi-pronged action is urgently needed to save lives (Action 8 (a)), eliminate the causes of high-risk journeys (Action 8 (b)), and attenuate their consequences (Action 8 (c)).

Objective 9: Strengthen the transnational response to smuggling of migrants

Smuggling is intrinsically transnational as it spans territories belonging to countries of origin, transit and destination. International cooperation between States along smuggling routes is therefore vital to developing an appropriate response. In theory, tackling the phenomenon in the Arab region could be best done through joint efforts by all concerned countries; for example, from the Horn of Africa to Libya and Europe along the central Mediterranean route, from the Syrian Arab Republic to Turkey and Europe along the eastern Mediterranean route, and from the Horn of Africa to Yemen and GCC countries along the Gulf of Aden route. A key action to eliminate smuggling is for countries of destination to widen their pathways for regular migration.

Objective 10: Prevent, combat and eradicate trafficking in persons in the context of international migration

Undocumented migrants in irregular situations are easy prey for traffickers. Given that they are unprotected and are often stuck in limbo, they are at high risk of falling in the hands of criminal networks and being subjected to violence and exploitation. In such migrant populations, women and children are in an especially

vulnerable situation. Action 10 (e) urges States to apply measures that address the particular vulnerabilities of women, men, girls and boys, regardless of their migration status. In this regard, initiatives such as the establishment by the Government of Bahrain of an assistance fund for victims of human trafficking are a step forward, which could be replicated elsewhere in the region. The fund aims to provide victims with financial protection for court proceedings, and a grant for either reintegration in their country of origin or employment in Bahrain.¹²

Although most Arab States are parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention) and its first two protocols,¹³ many reports by human rights activists and international organizations indicate evidence of trafficking in persons along routes of mixed movement, which remains a significant challenge. Action 10 (c) calls for monitoring irregular migration routes that may be exploited by human trafficking networks to recruit and victimize smuggled or irregular migrants, which is especially pertinent along the land and sea routes from Africa to Europe or the Arabian Peninsula.

Moreover, there is evidence that trafficked migrants, who are successful in freeing themselves from the criminal networks exploiting them, risk detention and deportation by the authorities for breaching laws on entry and stay. In this context, Action 10 (h) calls for providing migrants who are victims of trafficking in persons with protection and assistance, including physical, psychological and social recovery, counselling, assisted voluntary return, or a permit to remain in the country of destination temporarily or permanently.

Objective 11: Manage borders in an integrated, secure and coordinated manner

This objective is of great importance to Arab countries given the ongoing displacement within the region, and mixed flows crossing through the region. Integrated borders do not

only ensure the security of the populations within a given territory, but also guarantee the smooth movement of goods and persons required for trade, commerce and economic growth. With many Arab countries suffering from slow economic growth, such intraregional and international trade is fundamental to economic stability and prosperity in the region.¹⁴

Objective 12: Strengthen certainty and predictability in migration procedures for appropriate screening, assessment and referral

To avoid unnecessary delays and expenses for countries and migrants alike, Action 12 (a) calls for increasing the transparency and accessibility of migration procedures by clearly communicating requirements for entry, admission, stay, work, study or other activities, and by introducing technology to simplify application procedures. This action also reflects the need to address the *kafala* system's negative externalities, such as the development of illegal visa businesses and unlawful recruitment fees charged to migrants before departure. The Bahraini Expatriate Management System and the Saudi *Musaned* recruitment platform are excellent examples of technological solutions facilitating transparency, efficiency and regulation of the labour migration process, which can inform similar initiatives in the region.

Actions 12 (b), (c) and (d) address the needs of migrants in situations of vulnerability, including women, children or victims of trafficking in persons and other forms of exploitation, by highlighting the importance of providing appropriate assistance and counselling in a culturally sensitive way, and of establishing specialized, child sensitive identification and referral mechanisms.

Objective 13: Use migration detention only as a measure of last resort and work towards alternatives

This objective aims to limit the use of migration detention by encouraging the dissemination

of best practices on human rights-based alternatives to detention in the context of international migration, including by facilitating regular exchanges and the development of initiatives based on successful practices among States, and between countries and relevant stakeholders. With unprecedented flows of international migrants arriving in and transiting through many Arab countries, the reception capacity of many States has been strained to the limit. Many migrants are consequently left to face substandard conditions in detention centres in the absence of effective alternatives. Support can be provided to align best practices on alternatives to detention with regional specificities, and to develop context specific approaches that can assist countries in receiving and hosting migrants in a safe and secure environment that respects their human rights.

Objective 14: Enhance consular protection, assistance and cooperation throughout the migration cycle

Objective 14 is one of the rare sections of GCM dealing with a State's nationals abroad rather than migrants within its territory. Arab countries with sizeable numbers of citizens abroad are generally represented at the embassy and consular level in the main destination countries of their nationals. Protecting its citizens abroad is also commonly seen as a State's duty, although not all countries have developed specific tools for this purpose.

The Egyptian constitution of 2014 provides that "the State shall protect the interests of Egyptians living abroad, protect them, guarantee their rights and freedoms, enable them to perform their public duties towards the State and society, and engage them in the nation's development" (article 88: Egyptians living abroad).¹⁵ Moreover, the Egyptian Government is preparing a law to establish a fund for caring for Egyptians abroad, to assist those in need of legal and judicial assistance and to provide information on employment opportunities in Egypt.¹⁶

The Moroccan constitution of 2011 contains a similar provision, stating that "the Kingdom of Morocco works for the protection of the rights and legitimate interests of the Moroccan citizens [feminine] and citizens [masculine] resident abroad, within respect for international law and for the laws in force in the host countries. It is committed to the maintenance and to the development of their human ties, notably cultural, with the Kingdom, and the preservation of their national identity (article 16).¹⁷ Established by royal decree in 2007, the Council of the Moroccan Community Living Abroad is entrusted with defending the interests of Moroccans overseas. Moreover, on 1 November 2018, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation set up a hotline for Moroccans living abroad, directly accessible from their main countries of residence.¹⁸

The Tunisian constitution of 2014 does not mention the rights and protection of the country's expatriates, but the General Direction of Consular Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for dealing with the rights and interests of Tunisian citizens living abroad,¹⁹ and the Ministry of Social Affairs has created a portal for Tunisians abroad.²⁰

Objective 15: Provide access to basic services for migrants

The basic services explicitly mentioned in GCM are health and education.²¹ Actions 15 (e) and (f) recommend the provision of migrant-inclusive service delivery systems, making health care and quality education available to all migrants regardless of their migration status, on a non-discriminatory basis. Signatory States have committed to incorporating the health needs of migrants into national and local health-care policies, which is particularly important for Arab countries that are facing pressure on their medical systems from large population movements into or through their territories. These situations may lead to immediate reactions to restrict access to strained services to nationals only. However, such actions

can lead to public health crises in addition to exacerbating the suffering of displaced populations. Since the quality and quantity of health and education services provided to citizens varies with a country's level of income and other economic and political circumstances, it is challenging to establish universal standards for services provided to migrants. Action 15 (d) calls for mandating independent institutions to receive, investigate and monitor complaints about situations where migrants' access to basic services is systematically denied or hindered, to facilitate access to redress, and to work towards a change in practice.

Objective 16: Empower migrants and societies to realize full inclusion and social cohesion

GCM does not make explicit what 'full inclusion' precisely means, leaving room for stakeholder interpretation. In general, migrants' inclusion refers to a complex multifaceted process that extends over a long period and spans economic (e.g. access to labour and income-generating activity), cultural (e.g. recognition of others' beliefs, values and practices, including religious freedoms), social (e.g. interpersonal relationships between migrants and the host community, a common language), political (e.g. participation in public decisions, access to citizenship), and other dimensions. The GCM commitment to empower migrants to become active members of society, and to promote the reciprocal engagement of receiving communities and migrants in the exercise of their rights and obligations towards each other, must be placed in the context of a wide range of situations across the Arab region.

Firstly, Governments' visions greatly vary between countries, from those with official policies to reduce the number of foreign residents to those promoting pathways for foreign residents' full membership in the host society. For this reason, GCM support for short-, medium- and long-term policy goals regarding family reunification (Action 16 (c)) is likely to be regarded differently according to the specific context of each country.

Secondly, economic realities on the ground are highly disparate. The GCM commitment to working towards inclusive labour markets and ensuring the full participation of migrant workers in the formal economy (Action 16 (d)) has different implications according to the nature of a destination country's labour market. Arab labour markets cover the whole spectrum, from a dominant formal sector (most GCC countries) to a dominant informal sector (most Mashreq and Maghreb countries). In the first case, having a formal work contract is a prerequisite for migration; while in the second case, migration often comes first and then the migrant finds a job after arrival.

Thirdly, social norms and perceptions regarding gender roles must be factored. GCM commitments to empower migrant women by eliminating gender-based discriminatory restrictions on formal employment (Action 16 (e)) can be applied to situations where a tradition of women staying at home and providing care translates into low rates of female economic participation. When such social norms apply to national women but not to foreigners, female-dominated occupations are more easily accessible to migrant women than to nationals. For example, the proportion of employed women in the population aged 20-65 in Saudi Arabia ranges from 11.7 per cent among Saudis to 35.4 per cent among foreign nationals.²²

Objective 17: Eliminate all forms of discrimination and promote evidence-based public discourse to shape perceptions of migration

All Arab countries are among the 177 States parties to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.²³ However, assessing the Convention's implementation and measuring the prevalence of acts of racism, discrimination and xenophobia are hampered by information gaps. Reports of migrants being discriminated against exist in most Arab countries, but they are based on qualitative analysis. Statistics that would evidence the phenomenon and demonstrate its extent are

not available. Collecting data disaggregated by origin, gender and socioeconomic characteristics is needed to identify and quantify groups that are victims of discrimination and to take measures to protect them. Moreover, establishing comprehensive data requires that all acts of discrimination be recorded. For this to be possible, countries must also empower migrants and communities to denounce any acts of incitement to violence directed towards migrants by informing them of available mechanisms for redress, as set out in Action 17 (b). Surveys have shown that because of a lack of proper redress mechanisms or out of fear of being penalized and deported, migrants often do not report discrimination they have suffered.

Objective 18: Invest in skills development and facilitate mutual recognition of skills, qualifications and competences

Education is a driver of international migration. Therefore, international migrants are on average more educated than their population of origin.²⁴ This applies to migrants living in OECD countries and originating from Arab countries for which recent data on educational levels of the resident population are available (table 2).

Moreover, migration can contribute to human capital building if migrants employed at the level of their skills are exposed to a new experience, including formal education and vocational training in their country of destination. To make the most of their migration, international migrants need their skills and qualifications to be recognized. Unless migrants are recruited on the basis of their actual skills, such recognition is not straightforward (it may meet resistance from the host state and population), and migration risks resulting in a waste of skills. Action 18 (c) recommends concluding bilateral, regional or multilateral mutual recognition agreements, or including recognition provisions in other agreements. This is what several Arab countries have tried to achieve by signing mobility partnerships (non-binding agreements) with the European Union, including the following:

- The European Union-Morocco partnership (2013) aims for closer cooperation to facilitate mutual recognition of vocational and academic qualifications;
- The European Union-Tunisia partnership (2013) includes improving information available to qualified Tunisian citizens on employment, education and training opportunities in the European Union, and making mutual recognition of professional and university qualifications easier;
- The European Union-Jordan partnership (2014) covers close cooperation to facilitate mutual recognition of vocational and academic qualifications, and developing curriculums in a manner that enhances recognition of Jordanian qualifications within the European Unions and other destination countries.²⁵

Such models can be considered for intraregional mobility between Arab countries of origin and countries of destination.

Objective 19: Create conditions for migrants and diasporas to fully contribute to sustainable development in all countries

In the words of the former Special Representative of the Secretary-General for International Migration, Peter Sutherland, “migration *is* development”.²⁶ Migrants contribute to the economies of both the destination countries where they work and the origin countries to which they send remittances and ideas, and which they help connect to the world. Action 19 (a) calls for fostering and facilitating the positive effects of migration for the realization of all Sustainable Development Goals, and requires action from migrants’ countries of origin and of destination. Arab migrant-sending countries have established institutions and designed policies to connect with their expatriate nationals. The first objective is to attract migrants’ remittances and investments. Directly channelled by families, remittances are often countercyclical, can reach

remote communities, and have a proven impact on poverty reduction.

Another objective of diaspora policies is to strengthen migrants' cultural links with their country of origin. For example, Arab consulates in non-Arabic speaking countries (e.g. Western Europe) have designed special linguistic programmes for second-generation migrants. In France as of 1977, the consulates of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, in collaboration with the French Ministry of Education, co-organize Arabic language courses for the children of migrants within the framework of French public schools.²⁷ The Association of Tunisians in France endorses the initiative with the slogan "Teaching the origin language and culture, an effective tool for building citizens". Moreover, in 2015, the Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Residing Abroad launched an online platform to teach Arabic to second-generation migrants.²⁸

Creating political links with the diaspora can also be achieved by enabling voting from abroad and, in certain cases, providing specific parliamentary representation for citizens abroad. Action 19 (g) also calls for enabling political participation and engagement of migrants in their countries of origin by establishing voting registries for citizens abroad, and through parliamentary representation. Tunisia,²⁹ Algeria³⁰ and Morocco³¹ have enforced such mechanisms, although only proxy voting was made available to Moroccans living abroad in the parliamentary election of 2017.

Objective 20: Promote faster, safer and cheaper transfer of remittances and foster financial inclusion of migrants

This objective addresses the overall goal of making migration work for the development of migrants' origin countries and communities. Remittances are one of the most effective sources of external funding in developing countries. Since remittances are channelled within the families of migrants, they directly

reach remote communities, with a proven impact on poverty reduction. This is of significant importance to the Arab region. As demonstrated in chapter 1 of the present report, the Arab region as a migrant destination is a major source of remittances, with remittance outflows estimated at \$120.6 billion in 2017. As a migration origin region, the remittance inflows stood at \$54.1 billion for the same year.

Action 20 (a) aligns with SDG target 10.c by calling for a road map to reduce the transaction costs of migrant remittances to less than 3 per cent, and to eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5 per cent by 2030. Achieving this objective requires the involvement of all Arab States, both as countries of origin and of destination. Banks and other intermediaries often apply charges to money transfers at both ends. Moreover, there is an ongoing debate in several GCC countries on whether States should tax migrant workers' remittances, which would certainly increase overall transfer costs above the target 3 per cent.³²

Collaboration between countries of origin and of destination is also required to implement GCM Action 20 (h), which focuses on addressing gender inequalities and fostering women's economic participation through several means, such as providing financial literacy training, accessing formal remittance transfer systems, opening bank accounts, and owning and managing financial assets and investments. Similar measures allow women to have full economic agency and responsibility in managing money in destination countries if they are autonomous migrants and remittance-senders, as well as in the origin country if they are remittance-receivers heading a household.

Objective 21: Cooperate in facilitating safe and dignified return and readmission, as well as sustainable reintegration

This objective is relevant for Arab countries, as both origin and destination countries. As origin countries, several Arab States have signed a

number of bilateral readmission agreements with European countries. Moreover, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia have also signed mobility partnerships with the European Union, which include commitments on readmission. For example, the 2013 European Union-Morocco mobility partnership provides for continuing cooperation on readmission to the mutual benefit of both parties and in compliance with the existing reciprocal obligations between Morocco and European Union countries, and for resuming negotiations between the European Union and Morocco to conclude a balanced readmission agreement.³³

Six years later, however, Morocco has not yet signed any readmission agreement with the European Union as a whole. The same applies to readmission provisions included in the European Union-Tunisia and the European Union-Jordan mobility partnerships. Readmission is part of a broader negotiation under which Arab partner States request visa facilitation for businesspeople, students and other persons in exchange for a commitment to readmit nationals or third-country nationals in irregular situations in Europe. Arab Governments, however, prefer bilateral negotiations with individual European Union countries rather than with the European Union as a whole, because this may place them in a better bargaining position.^{34,35}

As destination or transit countries, Arab States do not have specific readmission and reintegration agreements with origin countries. However, they support a number of ad hoc initiatives. For example, in 2017, Qatar launched a project on 'Return Assistance to Stranded Nepali Migrants'. Nepali migrants in situations of exploitation in Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Arab Emirates have been provided with assistance for voluntary return and reintegration to Nepal by IOM.³⁶ Similarly, IOM has assisted the voluntary return and reintegration from Maghreb countries of thousands of migrants originating from sub-Saharan Africa.³⁷

Objective 22: Establish mechanisms for the portability of social security entitlements and earned benefits

Social security refers to public policy measures protecting individuals against certain life risks and social needs, particularly in the event of illness, unemployment, employment injury, maternity, family responsibilities, disability, loss of the family breadwinner, as well as during retirement and old age. The portability of social security entitlements is the ability of migrant workers to preserve, maintain and transfer benefits of a social security programme from one country to another.³⁸ In 2013, only 23 per cent of the world's migrant workers were working under conditions that would allow them in the future to benefit from the full portability of pension and other earned benefits. The vast majority (80.5 per cent) of them were migrants from high-income countries living in other high-income countries.³⁹ The portability of social security entitlements is rarely enshrined in a country's labour law and more often included in bilateral agreements between migrant origin and destination countries. An analysis of trends at the global level revealed a doubling of the share of migrants with no access to portability, with the situation being particularly acute in GCC countries.⁴⁰ This trend may drive migrant workers to overstay their work visas and turn to irregular employment out of fear of returning home empty handed.

In the Arab region, Bahrain was the first to adopt a full legal provision on this matter. Decree No. 24 of 1976 states that a foreigner leaving the country permanently who has subscribed to the social insurance for more than three years shall be paid his dues that were paid to the General Authority to participate in the social insurance, his indemnity, and an annual interest rate of 5 per cent (article 138 a). In addition, he shall be paid the sum of the total amounts paid for old age or death insurance that were paid on his behalf by the employer, the amounts

deducted from his salary, and an additional 3 per cent of that amount (article 138 b). Such provisions can provide a model for other destination countries in the region seeking to address this GCM objective.

Bilateral agreements on labour migration to Arab destination countries do not include specific provisions on the portability of social benefits. For example, the 2008 Qatar-Sri Lanka agreement does not cover the matter. Similarly, the 2013 Agreement on Domestic Worker Recruitment between Saudi Arabia and the Philippines contains no provision on social security, and the two countries have not signed a bilateral social security agreement.⁴¹ Support can be provided to Arab countries during negotiations to assist in integrating these considerations in future agreements, and when revising existing agreements.

As migrant origin countries, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia have signed bilateral social security agreements with several European destination countries. Moreover, France, Spain and the United Kingdom have agreements on the portability of social benefits for seasonal migrants originating from Maghreb countries.

Objective 23: Strengthen international cooperation and global partnerships for safe, orderly and regular migration

This objective is forward-looking and sets out action to implement GCM. Migration is a transnational phenomenon, so migration policies need to be produced and implemented in a spirit of partnership between countries. In addition to traditional collaboration between sovereign States, providing a comprehensive response to migrants' and host communities' needs and reducing their vulnerabilities also require integrating all relevant governmental institutions and other relevant non-governmental stakeholders.

E. Implementing the Global Compact for Migration: priority areas for the Arab region

In view of the discussion above on possible GCM policy implications for Arab countries, the present section delves into selected priority areas for the region, namely migrants' full inclusion and their right to access basic services with an emphasis on access to health; addressing and reducing vulnerabilities of migrants; and preventing and combatting smuggling and trafficking of migrants. The present section examines the realities of Arab countries, current policies, and possible barriers facing GCM implementation. Where possible, migrants' perspectives and experiences are emphasized. In case of issues of particular relevance for refugees, their situation and experience are touched upon as well, although their situation is covered under the Global Compact on Refugees. This section concludes with a set of policy recommendations that address the challenges identified in each of those priority areas.

For Arab countries to design relevant policy measures to address the priority areas, there is an urgent need to collect accurate, reliable and comparable data, disaggregated by sex, age, migration status and other relevant characteristics. It is important to understand who migrants are, their migration patterns, and their specific needs so as to design policies and interventions that empower them, capitalize on their potential for sustainable development, dispel negative narratives and stereotypes, and limit possible migration challenges. While objective 1 of GCM, which focuses on data, is not discussed in detail in the present report, it is an enabler to achieve the remaining GCM objectives and ensure safe, orderly and regular migration.

These priority areas were selected in a broad consultation process, drawing on key messages emanating from a regional consultation on

international migration in the Arab region in preparation for GCM, held in Beirut in September 2017; a 2018 mapping report on migration-related programmes, projects and activities in the Arab region; and discussions with experts and members of the Working Group on International Migration in the Arab Region. These areas have been selected as a priority for policy intervention in the Arab region; however, this selection does not preclude the relevance of other areas and GCM objectives that merit future research.

1. Migrants' rights to access basic services and the concept of full inclusion

Building a cohesive society comprising migrants and their hosts can be best achieved with targeted policies and actions. Objective 16 of GCM aims to realize full inclusion of migrants and to strengthen social cohesion by empowering migrants and societies. Full inclusion, which GCM does not define, is usually understood as a situation where migrants have rights and duties, and opportunities and responsibilities, similar to those of their host country's citizens. In other terms, a situation in which newcomers have gained full membership of the receiving society. However, it is also important to note that some regions, such as the GCC subregion, where labour migration is prevalent and national populations are composed of significant numbers of temporary migrant workers, a more nuanced understanding of full integration should be considered. Nevertheless, social cohesion generally refers to a society that works towards the wellbeing of all its members, fights exclusion and marginalization, creates a sense of belonging, promotes trust, and offers its members the opportunity of upward social mobility.⁴² The present section briefly discusses paths to acquiring citizenship as a means of ensuring full inclusion.

Access to basic services, elaborated in objective 15 of GCM, is an important precondition for the full inclusion of migrants

and for improved social cohesion. GCM makes the case for developing migrant-inclusive service delivery systems based on the principle of non-discrimination, and entailing crucial public services such as health and education.⁴³ The present chapter considers in detail migrants' access to health services. Annex VI to the present report sets out legislation on migrants' rights to access basic services, and the portability of benefits from across the region.

(a) Acquisition of citizenship

Full inclusion is a lengthy multi-dimensional process encompassing a variety of economic and social aspects, including labour integration and access to formal employment, equal access to services, and living in the same neighbourhoods as natives and taking part in their social or recreational circles, not to mention cultural, civil and political inclusion.

Acquiring citizenship is the most accomplished form of migrants' inclusion in destination countries. The acquisition by migrants' children of the citizenship of the destination country is by virtue of *jus soli*, which is the right of those born on the territory of a country to the nationality of that country.

Nationality laws and legislation on migrant naturalization in Arab countries are not necessarily conducive to full citizenship integration of migrants and their descendants. This is especially the case in countries where inward migration flows reflect temporary labour demands with a clear understanding that there are little to no prospects of residency beyond contractual obligations, and in the case of large waves of forced displacement such as those witnessed in Mashreq countries.

In all Arab countries, an almost exclusive principle of paternal *jus sanguinis* (*haqq ad-dam*) underpins nationality laws: individuals' nationality of origin, or nationality at birth, is the State to which their father belongs.⁴⁴ Nationality

is transmitted by patrilineal descent (*jinsiyat an-nasab*). For example, in Egypt, a continuous residence in the territory from 1 January 1900 is required to establish Egyptian nationality, which is later passed on by filiation (Nationality Law of 1926 amended by law No. 391 of 1952). In Iraq (1924), Jordan (1949), Lebanon (1925), Saudi Arabia (1926), Morocco (1956), Tunisia (1956), the Sudan (1957), Kuwait (1959), Bahrain (1963), Algeria (1963), Qatar (1963), Oman (1972) and Yemen (1990), the same combination of paternal descent and presence of lineage since a specific date considered as founding the nation is what determines the nationality of origin. In all countries except the Syrian Arab Republic, there is a binary distinction between nationals and foreign-nationals. However, in the Syrian Arab Republic, a 1969 law inspired by Pan-Arabism established three categories of nationality: Syrians, Arabs, and foreigners.

In the case of a child born from a national mother and a foreign father, some countries apply a complementary principle of maternal *jus sanguinis* when the foreign father is dead or non-resident (Tunisia 1993, Egypt 2004, Algeria 2005, Morocco 2007). In Lebanon, Libya and the Syrian Arab Republic, the dominant principle of *jus sanguinis* is mitigated by *jus soli* (*haqq al-iqlīm*), so that children to whom it is not possible to attribute any other nationality (e.g. unknown parents) eventually receive the nationality of their country of birth.

Arab countries' nationality laws also rely on, in theory, the possibility of foreigners acquiring nationality by naturalization (*al-tajannus*). However, naturalization is subject to strict conditions. Some general conditions include the migrants' continuous and prolonged residency (20 years in certain countries); their integration in the political community (in Libya the law defines 'Arab nationality' and facilitates the acquisition of Libyan citizenship for Arab citizens);⁴⁵ and several other criteria, such as being in good health and employable. In general, the long-term benefits of naturalization are often delayed, as a result of a probation

period (5-10 years in general). It is only after this probation period that equality of rights with citizens becomes effective. Moreover, in some countries, an extended exclusion generally applies to political rights. From this perspective, Morocco is a forerunner in the Arab region with regard to recognition of citizenship-like rights to migrants in its territory. Article 30 of its 2011 constitution provides that "foreigners under [Moroccan] jurisdiction enjoy the fundamental freedoms recognized to Moroccan citizens [feminine] and citizens [masculine], in accordance with the law. Those among them who reside in Morocco can participate in local elections by virtue of the law, of the application of international conventions or of practices of reciprocity".⁴⁶

While nationality laws in the region can be interpreted as restrictive, many Arab societies have displayed, for more than a century, an unwavering openness to refugees and those forced to migrate as a result of conflict and adverse circumstances in neighbouring countries. The special openness of the Sudan to Syrian refugees must be mentioned. Since 2014, the Sudan exempts Syrians from an entry visa and permit of stay, grants them the right to work and full access to public education, and offers them a citizenship track after six months of residence.⁴⁷

(b) Migrants' access to health

Health is a right enshrined in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,⁴⁸ and a core dimension of human development.⁴⁹ It is also contained in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which affirms the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health (article 12). The present section explores access to health services that non-citizens or temporary migrants have in the countries where they reside, how this access compares to citizens' access, and its impact on the specific socioeconomic conditions of non-citizens and migrants.

Two opposite forces come into play in differentiating between migrants' and non-migrants' health status. Firstly, there are reasons why a typical migrant may enjoy a higher than average level of health. Migrants, including irregular migrants, are usually people whose individual characteristics are not fully representative of those of their population of origin. On the supply side, the 'best and fittest' are more prone to moving from a country of origin and to running all the risks expatriation implies, including irregular migration (self-selection). On the demand side, recruiters often set good health as a term of employment, and in some countries the State administration requests immunity from certain diseases, and often a certificate of good health, to deliver a permit of stay and residency (selection by others). Such requests are problematic from a human rights standpoint. For example, the HIV and AIDS Recommendation, 2010 (No. 200) prohibits mandatory HIV testing of workers, including migrant workers.⁵⁰

A number of studies, all of them conducted in Western contexts of immigration, have revealed a 'migrant mortality advantage'. In particular, research on mortality levels among migrants originating from Morocco and Turkey in France and Germany highlights a 'Mediterranean paradox' by which migrants belonging to economically underprivileged segments of society have a higher life expectancy than the host population.⁵¹ Other studies found that migrants of Turkish and Moroccan origin in Belgium, as well as Moroccan and Surinamese migrants in the Netherlands, have higher life expectancies than native Belgians or Dutch nationals although they have poorer living conditions.⁵² Several factors, from the above-mentioned selection process to the virtues of a so-called 'Mediterranean diet', have been presented to understand this phenomenon.

The migrant mortality advantage, however, must be relativized as it often combines a real phenomenon (those who migrate are the

healthier members of an origin population) and a statistical artefact (migrants who fall seriously ill and risk dying tend to return to their country of origin, where the disease or death will be counted). Temporary migrants typically stay at destination for the duration of a work contract, which is conditioned on their good health. Should migrant workers fall seriously ill, it is likely that they return to their country of origin. For statistical purposes, this would not be noted in the country of destination, but rather included in morbidity (and mortality in case of death) data in the origin country. Some authors have coined this error the 'salmon effect'.⁵³

In addition to the above-mentioned health advantage, a second force plays in the opposite direction to the disadvantage of migrants. Their exposure to disease and work-related injury in a destination country is often higher than average. This is the case when migrants are employed in '3Ds' (dirty, dangerous, and demeaning jobs). Moreover, many migrants endure adverse living and working conditions, such as overcrowded housing and poor nutrition, which have a potentially negative impact on health. Consequently, with the passing of time, migrants' initial health advantage can gradually subside or even reverse.

The present section tries to answer the core question of who pays for migrants' health: the State, the employer, or the migrant. In cases where nobody is responsible but the migrants, the present section enquires whether they can benefit from the support of solidarity networks, civil society associations or systems of mutual aid. A key related question is what options are available to migrants who get sick, and whether they prefer to return to their country of origin.

Access to health is a complex issue that goes beyond the question of who pays for migrants' health, to which migrants are covered and how inclusive is their coverage. Access to health has a number of critical dimensions, including the following:

- Gender: several aspects should be considered, such as whether women enjoy the same access as men, whether they are autonomous or dependent migrants; and if their specific sexual and reproductive health needs are adequately addressed;
- Age: health needs, and the cost of addressing them, vary enormously according to age. To provide a comprehensive overview, analysis should take into consideration the needs and coverage of different age groups;
- Economic status: the level of income and the sector of employment (formal, informal, household) have an impact on health outcomes and on access to health care, and thus should be considered when analysing access to health;
- Migration status: irregular migrant status may bar access to health-care facilities that are available to migrants in a regular situation.

Taking into account the above dimensions, a complex typology emerges of who has adequate access to health services. Given the lack of comprehensive data on most of the aforementioned issues, only the question of 'who pays' is considered in the present section.

A review of the legislation governing migrants' access to health services divides Arab countries into the following categories: countries where the State is the main provider of health care to migrants; countries where the employer is in charge of migrants' health; and countries where migrants are predominantly left to fend for themselves. In several Arab countries, there is no clear legislation that defines migrants' access to health, and no stipulations in the labour law. These countries are grouped under category 4: countries where regulation on who is in charge is unclear or incomprehensive. Further research is needed on these countries, as sectoral policies or

other laws and decrees may have stipulations regarding migrants' access to health.

Category 1: The State is responsible

In a number of Arab countries, the law provides that foreign residents must be covered by health insurance; however, it is not always clear who covers the insurance. Only Moroccan law unambiguously specifies that the State is in charge. Syrian law indicates that migrant workers have the same health insurance as Syrian citizens.

The **Moroccan** Social Security National Fund covers all migrants living in the country who are employed in formal activities on an equal footing with citizens for their medical expenses. Moreover, all low-income migrants, whether they are employed in formal or informal activities, benefit from a free medical assistance scheme (RAMED), provided that they have regular residency status. Only migrants in an irregular situation, who are believed to be in small numbers after the regularization campaigns of 2014 and 2018, remain uncovered (box 10).

The 2003 law on the entry and stay of foreigners stipulates that foreign residents with authorized employment have the same access to public services as Moroccan citizens.⁵⁴ In 2015, addressing concerns about the health situation of sub-Saharan migrants in the country, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry for Moroccan Residents Abroad and Migration Affairs, the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Economy and Finance signed a partnership agreement providing refugees and migrant women access to social housing and to basic medical coverage.⁵⁵

Syrian Labour Law No. 91 of 1959 stipulates that all foreign workers with a work permit are provided the same health insurance as Syrian workers, who enjoy free medical care in all government clinics and health centres.⁵⁶ Article 94 of the Social Insurance Act No. 92 of 1959,

as amended,⁵⁷ also provides for the portability of social benefits, stating that pensioners or the beneficiaries of pensioners or insured persons who leave the Syrian Arab Republic can ask for the pension to be remitted to the country in which they live, provided that they pay the transaction costs and, if they are not Syrians, subject to the condition of reciprocity. However, the law is not clear regarding its coverage of irregular migrant workers. It is also unclear on coverage for dependents of migrant worker.

Category 2: The employer is responsible

All GCC countries, except Oman, belong to this category. Migrants represent at least half of the total population in these countries, and the majority of the active population. Moreover, migrants are over-represented among low-income workers who have a high prevalence

of work-related diseases and accidents, but typically more limited access to quality health care – a detrimental combination with consequences for health, including mental health.⁵⁸

While countries regard free or highly subsidized medical care as part of the welfare package they owe their citizens, they all want to reduce public expenditure on non-nationals' health care. To this end, they can impose on employers an obligation to provide their employees with health insurance, or to directly cover their health expenses.

Bahrain is a leading example of an Arab country with non-discriminatory legislation on migrants' access to services. As early as 1976, participation in social insurance schemes was made available to all employees, irrespective

Box 10. Promoting migrants' rights in Morocco

Morocco provides an interesting example of gradual integration of low- or no-income migrants in the health system. The country hosts large numbers of migrants who arrived in the last two decades from sub-Saharan Africa with an intention to reach Europe, but who eventually became stuck in the country for lack of a visa to a European country.^a While most of them were staying irregularly in Morocco, the Government launched in 2014 and reiterated in 2017-2018 a large-scale regularization campaign. The Moroccan administration regularized the situation of most cross-Saharan undocumented migrants (around 50,000 between 2014 and 2018, representing 85 per cent of all applicants).^b Most, if not all, regularized migrants are low- or no-income people, which raises the question of what kind of access to health they have. A 2016 survey shows that a combination of public subsidies and private solidarity makes it possible for them to find some support in case of illness or injury.^c

In 2008, Morocco established a medical assistance scheme (RAMED), providing low-income people with access to free health care and to free medicine in public hospitals.^d In 2012, RAMED was extended to migrants in regular situations and to refugees in 2015, regardless of their employment status. By doing so, Morocco recognizes that migrants have the same rights to health as citizens. A survey of health behaviours among migrants in an irregular situation in Rabat found that 40 per cent had actually received health care at some point in the country. Non-governmental organizations play a greater role (62 per cent) than public hospitals (23 per cent) in providing health care, except for pregnant women who mostly give birth in public hospitals.^e In 68 per cent of cases, migrants in irregular situations had to spend some personal money on health care, potentially tapping into savings kept for continuing their journey to Europe.

^a Mourji and others, 2016.

^b Morocco World News, 2018.

^c Mourji and others, 2016.

^d <https://www.ramed.ma/ServicesEnligne/home.html>.

^e Alami, 2014.

of gender, nationality or age (article 2, decree No. 24 of 1976). The same decree provides for portability of social benefits, stating that foreigners leaving the country permanently who have subscribed to the social insurance for more than three years shall receive their dues that were paid to the General Authority to participate in the social insurance, their indemnity, and an annual interest rate of 5 per cent (article 138a).⁵⁹

Decision No. 23 of 2018 resulting in Health Insurance Law requires employers to pay fees for health insurance subscription on behalf of their non-Bahraini workers to cover the benefits listed under the compulsory health package for residents (article 28a-2). It also requires sponsors to pay subscription fees for persons they sponsor who do not have an employer (article 28a-6), a measure that protects migrants whose sponsor is not their employer.

Kuwaiti law No. 1 of 1999 on alien health insurance grants foreigners access to medical services under the general health insurance and medical security schemes (article 1). A foreign worker's employer is required to obtain and pay for the worker's health insurance policy before a residence permit is issued (article 2). Ministerial decree No. 68 of 2015 extends to domestic workers the compulsory coverage of medical expenses (together with food, clothes and accommodation) by the employer.

Qatari decree No. 16 of 2005 of the Ministry of Civil Service Affairs and Housing stipulates employers' obligation to cover their foreign employees' health insurance. Article 1 lists medical care to be provided for monitoring workers' health status and early detection of occupational diseases (check-ups for all workers, laboratory tests and x-rays, medicines, maternity care, vaccinations). Article 10 requires the employer to facilitate periodical medical check-ups while paying the employee for the time spent doing the check-ups.

Law No. 7 of 2013 established a social health insurance system to cover basic health services for all Qatari citizens, GCC citizens, residents and visitors (article 2). Employers must pay the insurance policy of their non-Qatari employees and members of their families, and sponsors must pay the insurance policy of their sponsored individuals (article 13). Any migrant worker with a residence permit receives a Hamad Medical Corporation health card, which they need to access public health centres. All services at the Hamad Medical Corporation are free or nearly free for all residents and visitors in Qatar. 'Long-term' accommodation is available for patients who do not have other options during their treatment. The only limitation is for migrants without a health card, either because of their irregular status or if their employer failed to complete the necessary paperwork.

The **Saudi Arabian** Cooperative Health Insurance Law of 1999 ensures the provision of health services to all non-Saudi residents and their dependents. Sponsors must subscribe their sponsored individuals to a health insurance scheme, which must cover the duration of their residence (article 3). For a fee, employers can expand the scope of basic services covered by the insurance. Moreover, the Compulsory Employment-based Health Insurance of 2016 requires that patients contribute a fixed co-payment for their medical expenses;⁶⁰ however, whether a migrant worker can afford the co-payment remains questionable. A 2014 study estimated that migrant workers should spend 10-30 per cent of their monthly wages (the average expatriate salary in the private sector was less than \$270 per month at the time of the survey) as co-payment for a medical consultation.⁶¹

The law of the **United Arab Emirates** requires every employer or sponsor to provide health insurance for their employees or persons under their sponsorship, and for their family members up to three children under 18 (law No. 23 of 2005). The law specifies that "an employer shall bear the cost of basic health insurance policies for his/her employees and their dependents and

shall not pass on this cost, or any part of it, to his employees” (article 11 (5)).⁶²

Category 3: The migrant is responsible

Oman is the only GCC country where the law does not stipulate that employers must cover their foreign employees’ health insurance. Sultan’s decree No. 72/1991 resulting in the Social Insurance Law and its amendments applies to citizens employed in private companies in Oman or another GCC country, but not to foreign workers, household workers, self-employed persons and artisans. In 2006, the law was amended to include the right of foreigners who become naturalized citizens to retroactively benefit from social insurance for the period before the law came into effect. The Omani public health scheme covers Omani and other GCC citizens, but excludes non-GCC foreigners living in the country unless they are employed in government jobs. Only in case of emergency are public hospitals obliged to admit all foreigners.⁶³

Category 4: Regulations on who is in charge are unclear or incomprehensive

Egyptian legislation is not explicit on foreign residents’ access to health (law No. 64/2010). IOM and several non-governmental organizations provide health and psychosocial services to vulnerable migrants. Syrian refugees, who have been admitted to public hospitals since the arrival of the first refugees in 2012, also benefit from the Regional Refugee Resilience Plan launched in April 2017.⁶⁴

In **Iraq**, successive conflicts in the 1990s and 2000s have transformed the country, once a key destination for migrant workers, into one of the world’s largest origin countries of refugees and internally displaced persons. In the 2010s, increased security in parts of Iraq and the start of the Syrian civil war triggered a movement of return of former Iraqi refugees and massive arrivals from the embattled Syrian Arab Republic. It is therefore difficult to assess

policies and the level of access to health services that people on the move have in Iraq.

Jordanian legislation is unclear on whether an overall health protection scheme is available to migrants. The 1996 Labour Law stipulates that all workers have a right to annual and sick leave (articles 64 and 65) and to personal protection from work hazards (article 78). Employers must provide medical care to domestic workers under regulation 90/2009. An Office of the Prime Minister’s decision of 2010 provides all victims of violence, regardless of nationality, with free access to public hospitals.⁶⁵ Integrated medical clinics open to refugees provide services to people in need from all nationalities.

Lebanon was emerging from a devastating civil war (1975-1989) when it started receiving massive inflows of refugees, first from Iraq (2006-2008) then from the Syrian Arab Republic (since 2011), in addition to a large refugee population from the State of Palestine (descendants of refugees who arrived in 1948-1949). The country’s health system found itself under extreme strain. A ‘Lebanon crisis response plan’ was designed with the help of UNHCR and other international agencies.⁶⁶ In 2016, access to public health centres was extended to the most vulnerable among displaced persons and host communities, irrespective of nationality. Except for basic preventive medicine and immunization care services that are free, minimal fees are requested from out-patients but hospitalization is not covered, which can pose challenges for most low-income migrants and displaced persons.

Libya, which was a major destination country and migration hub before 2011, is still host to a large number of international migrants (at least 670,920 according to IOM, or between 700,000 and 1 million according to other United Nations sources)⁶⁷ employed in the country or stranded on their way to Europe. Little is known about their health conditions. In 2017, a health service availability and readiness

assessment (SARA) by the Libyan Ministry of Health and WHO found that the country faced considerable health challenges owing to the conflict.⁶⁸ Reports from detention centres where several thousand migrants are being held describe their high exposure to communicable diseases, violence, abuse, exploitation and ultimately death.⁶⁹ A 2018 IOM survey found that water and sanitation, shelter and health are priority needs, with health coming first for more than three quarters of the migrant communities deprived of any accessible health facilities.⁷⁰

Social Security Law No. 19 of 2016 of the **State of Palestine**, which came into effect in November 2018, covers all workers, including female and male domestic workers. The law lists eight social insurance areas, three of which came into force upon the law taking effect. These include work injury insurance.⁷¹

Mauritanian decree of 16 April 2008 on the employment of foreign workers stipulates that they enjoy the same access as citizens to public services. However, the nature of this access and its coverage is not specified.

The Employment of Non-Sudanese Act of 2000 provides preferential treatment for Arab and African nationals over other nationalities in the **Sudan**, as is the case in employment-related matters. However, the insurance coverage and access to health services is not clearly defined for different migrant groups.

The **Tunisian** constitution of 2014 reaffirms that “health is a right for every human being” and “the state shall guarantee preventive health care and treatment for every citizen [...] and shall ensure free health care for those without means and those with limited income” (article 38).⁷² However, it does not specify the availability of health care for non-citizens. A study on migrants’ status regarding human rights in post-revolution Tunisia shows that the High Commissioner for Human Rights recommends that migrants, whatever their

legal status, be granted equal access to health as citizens.⁷³ Free Medical Assistance for the Poor (Assistance Médicale Gratuite – AMG) is provided to close to one third of the country’s citizens, but it is not known whether and in what proportion it reaches non-citizens, although the eligibility criterion for AMG is income not nationality.⁷⁴

A desk review of accessible **Yemeni** laws and policies did not reveal any policies related to migrants’ access to health care. On the ground, United Nations agencies are providing health services to the large refugee populations arriving from the Horn of Africa.

2. Addressing and reducing vulnerabilities of migrants

Objective 7 of GCM calls for increased efforts to respond to the needs of migrants who face situations of vulnerability, in particular women at risk, children, especially those unaccompanied or separated from their families, members of ethnic and religious minorities, victims of violence, including sexual and gender-based violence, older persons, persons with disabilities, persons who are discriminated against on any basis, indigenous peoples, workers facing exploitation and abuse, domestic workers, victims of trafficking in persons, and migrants subject to exploitation and abuse in the context of migrant smuggling.

Action 7 (d) singles out domestic workers as a vulnerable group by calling for a review of relevant existing labour laws and work conditions to identify and effectively address workplace-related vulnerabilities and abuses of migrant workers at all skills levels, including domestic workers and those working in the informal economy (box 11). Furthermore, objective 6 underlines the importance of fair and ethical recruitment and decent work conditions, which are of particular relevance to low-income migrant workers employed under the *kafala* system.

Migrant domestic workers have been selected as a case study for the purpose of the present section. It also explores two areas that require attention in an attempt to reduce the vulnerabilities of migrants: the *kafala* system, and the wage protection system.

The distinct circumstances and concerns of all vulnerable groups merit individual attention owing to the specificities of the region, and is an area for future research. Annex VII to the present report sets out legislation from across the region relevant to addressing and reducing vulnerabilities of migrants.

(a) *Kafala* system

In several Arab countries where the sponsorship system (*kafala*) is in force, every migrant is considered a temporary resident by law (or a ‘visitor’), so sponsorship is primarily aimed at making sure that migrants are only temporarily present and leave at the end of their contract. Every migrant has a local sponsor who serves as a guarantor for their actions.

An ILO white paper defines *kafala* as a system by which migrant workers are tied to the employer for: entry to country of destination; renewal of residence and work permits; termination of employment; transfer to a

different employer; and/or exit from country of destination.⁷⁵

The sponsor in most countries must be a local citizen. However, self-sponsorship is possible in some countries in the case of foreign investors, in addition to dependent sponsorship in cases of family reunion where a migrant’s spouse, sons under 18 and unmarried daughters whatever their age can be sponsored by the migrant. Transfer of sponsorship at the initiative of the migrant is mostly forbidden unless the original sponsor formally agrees.

Countries are increasingly aware of the shortcomings of the *kafala* system, such as the difficulty to implement monitoring mechanisms to ensure the fulfilment of a sponsor’s responsibilities, including covering costs pertaining to work and residence permits, health insurance, and the timely payment of wages including the final payment. Transgressions in some cases have pushed migrants towards an unbearable situation of debt bondage. Another shortfall is the restrictions it imposes in many cases on migrants’ freedom of mobility, which both infringes their rights and hinders the economic performance of the country.

Recognizing these shortcomings, several Governments have taken steps towards

Box 11. Case study: Migrant domestic workers

In 2015, there were 67.1 million domestic workers worldwide. Around 11.5 million of them, representing 17.2 per cent of the total, were international migrants. Domestic work is a highly gendered occupation. Globally, women are estimated to represent 73 per cent of all migrant domestic workers. In the Arab countries, however, domestic work is also a male occupation. ILO estimates that over 50 per cent of all male migrant domestic workers are employed in Gulf countries and the Mashreq.^a

There is insufficient public data on the number of domestic workers (both national and migrant) in the Arab region. In several countries, domestic workers typically belong to the local community or are internal, short-distance migrants. However, this does not apply to the GCC and Mashreq, where most domestic workers are international migrants, according to ILO estimates.

Two situations converge to explain the predominance of migrants among domestic workers in these subregions: a large proportion of mid- to high-income households generating a context in which



nationals are reluctant to work as domestic workers; and large refugee or migrant populations in irregular situations for whom informal employment is the only option. In the first case, migrant domestic workers enter the country with a regular visa delivered to them upon recruitment in their country of origin, on the basis of a work contract as domestic worker. In the second case, migrant domestic workers stay irregularly in the country and find employment at a later stage, typically without a formal written contract.

Migrant domestic workers are more prone to vulnerabilities, as the nature of their work presents a legal conundrum. Domestic work covers a variety of tasks that family members would otherwise complete but that domestic workers fulfil instead, typically while living with their employers. They are part of the 'economic family' but they are not members of the legal family. The law that governs the family does not govern conditions of a work contract.^b On the other hand, migrant domestic workers are waged workers, but labour law does not necessarily apply to them either. It is important to note that legislation varies between countries. In States where labour law does not include domestic workers, it is suggested that this is due to considerations of the private nature of their employment. Unlike trades, companies, factories, workshops or offices, households are not registered as productive units and a family house is not a place where labour inspectors are normally allowed owing to the privacy of the home.

As a result, migrant domestic workers in many Arab countries are exposed to more vulnerability, as they are not yet fully covered by national labour laws. Countries where domestic worker laws do exist must be acknowledged as making progress in seeking to increase protection for domestic workers. However, efforts must continue to address existing gaps and challenges (for example, compliance with the ILO Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189)), and strengthen the enforcement of the law. This would contribute to reducing vulnerabilities and risks that migrant domestic workers face as a result of working and living in the private space of homes, with many reported cases of physical, emotional and sexual abuse, as well as unpaid overtime, absence of weekly rest and passport confiscation. Women domestic workers face a number of gender-specific barriers, including a lack of information, knowledge and access to resources, in addition to being at higher risk of violence. Furthermore, even with cases where violations of rights are evident, only a few are actually reported in practice. Migrant domestic workers are hesitant to prosecute their employers for myriad reasons, including the fear of losing their job and therefore their residency in the country of destination. Moreover, if a worker is employed irregularly, a conflict with the employer would immediately expose the complainant to detention for unauthorized employment.

Along the labour migration process, risks of exploitation are plentiful, both in countries of origin and destination. Within the context of the sponsorship system, which governs foreigners' employment and residency, migrant domestic workers face a wide range of challenges and risks. In the country of origin, these can include brokers charging illegal recruitment fees, which could potentially produce a situation of debt bondage before the paid job has even started. Another common form of treacherous recruitment is when migrant workers are offered employment before leaving their home country, without a written contract in a language they can understand. Later, they find that the job in practice differs substantially from what they had earlier understood. In the country of destination, several forms of exploitation by the employer have been noted, typically withholding salaries and confiscating passports, further contributing to debt and restricting freedom of movement. Enhancing protection for absconding migrant domestic workers would be highly beneficial, both with the support of countries of origin (embassies) and that of countries of destination. In some countries, if the employer reports a absconding migrant domestic worker, this leads to automatic or pending detention and deportation. In other cases, the workers are given time to present themselves before the relevant authorities to make their case.

In countries where employment is not governed by the *kafala* system, migrant domestic workers are also vulnerable to many risks. For example, in Egypt where the 2003 labour code stipulates that domestic work is an exception to the labour law, a typical migrant domestic worker originates from Eritrea,



Ethiopia, Somalia or the Sudan.^c Many of them are in a semi-clandestine situation and fear detention and deportation if the police apprehend them, so they refrain from denouncing and prosecuting an abusive or exploitative employer.

Measures taken to improve the situation of migrant domestic workers in the Arab region

In 2018, Kuwait made a significant step by transferring the competencies of the Interior Minister regarding the employment of domestic workers to the Minister of Economic Affairs and the Public Authority for Manpower (Council of Ministers decision No. 614 of 2018).^d The legislative framework could further be developed to ensure their eligibility for the wage protection system.^e Qatari Domestic Workers Law No.15 of 2017^f provides a legal framework for the employment and protection of domestic workers that is close to the labour law, although less protective standards remain in relation to normal hours of work, overtime compensation, periods of daily and weekly rest, and paid annual leave. An adequate and appropriate system of monitoring and enforcing compliance is also absent. In the United Arab Emirates, Federal Law No. 10 of 2017 introduces measures for the protection of domestic workers (role of recruitment agencies, standards for labour contracts, employer and employee obligations, inspections, penalties, time off, end of service indemnity, termination of contracts, and dispute settlement).^g In Saudi Arabia, laws enacted in 2017 have mandated the employers of migrant domestic workers to issue prepaid payroll or salary cards, and made it possible for domestic workers to change their employer under certain defined circumstances.

^a ILO, 2015.

^b Thomas, 2010.

^c Jureidini, 2009.

^d 2015، الكويت.

^e Migrant-Rights, 2017.

^f قطر، 2017 ب.

^g الإمارات العربية المتحدة، 2017.

reforming the system. A significant move was Qatari law No. 13 of 2018,⁷⁶ which largely ended the obligation of exit permits for foreign workers covered by the Labour Law.⁷⁷ In 2017, Bahrain introduced a flexible work permit that allows certain categories of workers in an irregular situation to obtain work permits.

(b) Wage protection system: paying wages in full and on time

Not paying wages in full and on time is a common though unlawful practice among employers of migrant workers. To protect workers, Governments in the GCC region have adopted laws requiring all employees to open accounts in accredited banks, and employers to pay their employees through bank transfers to ensure that the payment of salaries fulfils contractual obligations and

can be tracked. This obligation, called the wage protection system (WPS), has been adopted by all GCC countries, although it is not yet operational in Bahrain.

WPS implementation is a significant achievement for strengthening the protection of waged workers, and providing an array of benefits to other stakeholders. For example, through the WPS, employers can obtain proof of their compliance with the labour law in case of dispute. Moreover, WPS can be a critical resource for national authorities in regulating firms and employers.

Despite these developments, several areas remain in need of reform to reduce vulnerabilities of migrants. Firstly, the system makes it possible to monitor how much was paid to the worker, but not whether the payment corresponds

Box 12. Migrant workers in trade unions

Enabling all migrants, including those in an irregular situation, to speak for themselves and listening to them is a key means of reducing their vulnerability.

In 2012, Morocco became the first Arab country to allow migrant workers to form their own trade union (ODT-TI) as part of a large national union, the Democratic Labour Organization. ODT-TI is committed to defending the rights of all migrant workers with or without legal status in Morocco. It calls for equality of wages and treatment at the workplace for all. Its experience may serve as an example for other countries in the region. In 2018, the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT) opened four migrant workers' information desks (in Tunis, Sfax, Sousse and Medenine), and trained a dozen focal points with support from international organizations. UGTT also developed a guide to inform and raise awareness among migrant workers in Tunisia.

Source: Morocco, Conseil de la Communauté Marocaine à l'Étranger, 2012; see also Organisation démocratique des travailleurs immigrés. Available at <http://odtmaroc.com/ar/2461>.

to what was due. There is sometimes a gap between the net salary transferred through the bank and the basic salary written in the signed contract. Other challenges include an absence of payslips meaning that workers do not know how their wages have been calculated (overtime and deductions); gaps in penalties for non-compliance with WPS; or employers withdrawing cash for their workers under the pretext of saving them time and charging them for the service or not paying them in full.⁷⁸ Consequently, WPS makes it possible to verify if and when a payment has been made, but not if its amount was correct or if the right person withdrew the cash.

3. Preventing and combatting the smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons

The present section highlights the importance of preventing and combatting the smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons as a priority area for the region, which serves as an origin, transit and destination for several major smuggling and trafficking routes. It introduces the concepts of trafficking and smuggling, clarifying the distinction between them, provides a detailed analysis of the different smuggling and trafficking routes, and gives an overview of relevant global frameworks.

(a) Migrant trafficking and smuggling: definitions and distinctions

The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, defines trafficking in persons as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs”.⁷⁹

The Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, defines migrant smuggling as “the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State

Box 13. Role of recruitment fees and abusive and fraudulent practices of recruitment agencies in trafficking in persons

Migrant workers are likely to rely on recruitment agencies to handle their recruitment, owing to complex visa procedures or migrants' lack of familiarity and connection with the destination country. Unscrupulous recruiters and recruitment agencies often take advantage of migrant workers' lack of education, language skills, and information to deceive them and prevent them from leaving their employment. In some cases, they provide false information about the law or workers' migration status, or take advantage of relationships with authorities to prevent workers from approaching authorities themselves. A recent report by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants states: migrants are at heightened risk of exploitation and abuse in the workplace owing to deceptive recruitment practices, both by employers and intermediaries; frequent lack of social support systems; unfamiliarity with the local culture, language, their rights at work and national labour and migration laws in the country of employment; limited or denied access to legal and administrative systems; dependence on the job and employer owing to migration-related debt, legal status, or employers restricting their freedom to leave the workplace; and reliance by family members on remittances sent back home by migrants. These factors are amplified by the discrimination and xenophobia that migrants increasingly face.

Sources: UNODC, 2015; A/HRC/26/35, para. 18.

Box 14. Reasons for low levels of trafficking convictions for recruiters and recruitment agencies

Experts consulted by UNODC flagged the following factors that potentially contribute to low levels of trafficking convictions for recruiters and recruitment agencies:

- Some victims do not see themselves as victims, and are often reluctant to come forward and testify;
- Authorities, including law enforcement, labour inspectors, judges and immigration officials, lack the capacity to identify victims of trafficking in persons;
- Lack of evidence to prove that recruiters or recruitment agencies were involved in trafficking in persons. For example, there is often a "word against word" situation, or it may be difficult to prove that the recruitment fees charged were unreasonable;
- Trafficking in persons is a complex crime, often involving organized crime structures that operate across international borders.

Source: UNODC, 2015.

Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident".⁸⁰

While the two notions are distinct, they are linked for smuggled migrants because of the irregular nature of their presence in countries: they are particularly at risk

of becoming trafficked persons and face challenges to get access to protection mechanisms. Subsequently, the challenge for all countries, rich and poor, is to target criminals who exploit desperate people and to protect and assist smuggled migrants and victims of trafficking.⁸¹

Table 8. Signatories to the Palermo Convention and its protocols as at 20 March 2019

Country	Ratified		
	Convention	Protocol 1	Protocol 2
GCC			
Bahrain	2004 a	2004 a	2004 a
Kuwait	2006	2006 a	2006 a
Oman	2005 a	2005 a	2005 a
Qatar	2008 a	2009 a	-
Saudi Arabia	2005	2007	2007
United Arab Emirates	2007	2009 a	-
Mashreq			
Egypt	2004	2004	2005 a
Iraq	2008 a	2009 a	2009 a
Jordan	2009	2009 a	-
Lebanon	2005	2005	2005
State of Palestine	2015 a	2017 a	-
Syrian Arab Republic	2009	2009	2009
Maghreb			
Algeria	2002	2004	2004
Libya	2004	2004	2004
Morocco	2002	2011 a	-
Tunisia	2003	2003	2003
Arab LDCs			
Comoros	2003	-	-
Djibouti	2005	2005	2005
Mauritania	2005 a	2005 a	2005 a
Somalia	-	-	-
Sudan	2004	2014 a	2018 a
Yemen	2010	-	-

Source: United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, "Signatories to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Crime and its Protocols".

Note: a: accession

Protocol 1: Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children.

Protocol 2: Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air.

The following conceptual remarks must be made from the outset:

- Smuggling always concerns migrants, as it implies the illegal crossing of international borders. Trafficking, on the other hand, involves vulnerable individuals in general, including migrants but also vulnerable non-migrant populations;
- Smuggling is by nature transnational while trafficking can be local, national or international. Smuggling is not only about organizing illegal border crossing, it also includes transportation across large swathes of national territories spanning several countries, during which migrants are exposed to all kinds of risks. For example, in the long journey from Western Africa to Europe, migrants are left at the mercy of transnational smugglers operating not only at international boundaries but also across the desert in the national territories of Libya and Niger;
- Smuggling entails facilitating border-crossing in direct contravention of the law. In a period when major migrant destination countries are developing policies for containing international migration, and commercial carriers have a mandate to refuse boarding to individuals who would be denied entry at a destination for lack of proper authorization, smuggling has become a service in high demand. The tougher the constraints to regular migration, the higher the demand for and the price of smuggling services. Incidentally, the dangers faced by smuggled people also increase;
- Trafficking is closely related to the abusive practices of some recruitment agencies (see box 13).

GCM objectives include several commitments to prevent and combat trafficking and smuggling of migrants. Some of the actions stipulated call for intensifying joint efforts in that regard

by strengthening capacity and international cooperation to prevent, investigate, prosecute and penalize the smuggling of migrants, and fight smuggling networks. Annex VIII to the present report sets out legislation adopted by Arab countries on preventing and combatting trafficking and smuggling.

In contrast to most cases of trafficking, smuggling involves consent by the smuggled person. Nonetheless, smugglers are the criminals, not the smuggled persons. GCM commits to ensuring that migrants shall not become liable to criminal prosecution for the fact of having been the object of smuggling. Moreover, smuggled migrants are exposed to all sorts of violation of their human rights. They must therefore be protected and the special needs of women and children considered.

GCM also includes a commitment to prevent, combat and eradicate trafficking in persons in the context of international migration, and to enhance the identification and protection of, and assistance to, migrants who have become victims of trafficking, paying particular attention to women and children.

The vast majority of Arab States have signed and ratified the Palermo Convention and its first two protocols, the most recent being the Sudan that ratified Protocol 2 on 9 October 2018 (table 9).⁸² However, the way the Convention

and its protocols are implemented varies greatly between Arab countries.

(b) Trafficking and smuggling routes

The below routes have been selected because they illustrate the variety of situations and of policy responses across the region. These corridors draw a picture of the present complexity of a phenomenon that requires joint action between all countries involved: origin, transit and destination.

i. Syrians smuggled to Europe

What became known as the ‘Mediterranean migration crisis’ was triggered by large numbers of Syrian refugees leaving Turkey and other countries of first asylum, where they could no longer live decent lives. Between April 2011 and March 2016, over 640,000 Syrian citizens arrived in Greece and Italy by sea on small boats. Arrivals to Greece almost stopped after a joint statement by the European Union and Turkey in March 2016 on keeping in Turkey Syrians with no visas for Europe.⁸³

In the first years of the conflict, Syrians were in Turkey as ‘guests’ not refugees. Turkey, while a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, maintains a geographical limitation only to people originating from Europe, excluding citizens from non-European States, from the status of refugee. In 2014, Turkey

Table 9. Syrian nationals smuggled by sea and granted asylum once in Europe, April 2011 – March 2016

(1) Syrians smuggled by sea to Greece and Italy		641,502
(2) First-time asylum applicants from the Syrian Arab Republic in the European Union		827,500
(3) Proportion of Syrian asylum seekers entering the European Union through Greece and Italy		77.5%
(4) Decisions on asylum applications lodged by Syrians	All decisions	564,875
	Positive decisions	545,470
	Percentage of positive decisions	96.6%
(5) Expected number of Syrians smuggled by sea who would have obtained a humanitarian visa before travelling to the European Union*		619,465

* Calculated as the number of Syrians smuggled by sea to Greece and Italy (1) times the percentage of positive decisions on asylum applications lodged by Syrians (4).

Source: Fargues, 2017a.

Table 10. Foreign nationals in Libya at the end of October 2018

Country	Number	Percentage
Niger	135,781	20
Egypt	95,293	14
Chad	89,488	13
Sudan	78,183	12
Nigeria	62,447	9
Other	209,728	31
Total	670,920	100

Source: IOM, 2018e.

adopted a law creating an intermediate status of ‘conditional refugees’ for non-Europeans, eligible for a number of guarantees close to those of the Convention. Conditional refugees are allowed to reside in Turkey temporarily until they are resettled in a third country.⁸⁴

Seeking asylum in Europe from Turkey requires that European countries have a resettlement policy. Refugee resettlement exists in European States’ asylum laws, and it is theoretically possible for their embassies or UNHCR to conduct refugee status determination so that an accepted refugee can travel regularly and safely. However, in reality, European States practice very little or no resettlement. They grant refugee protection only once a claim lodged by an asylum seeker at arrival on their territory has been accepted. According to European law, it is possible to apply for a humanitarian or asylum visa directly from a third country and then travel safely to Europe to lodge an asylum claim.⁸⁵ However, European countries do not deliver such visas. Migrants are therefore faced with two options: obtaining a visa for a reason unrelated to asylum, such as work, study or family reunion, but such visas are possible for only a small number of migrants; or try reaching Europe with no visa using the services of smugglers. Of the 827,500 first-time asylum applicants from the Syrian Arab Republic recorded in the European Union between 2011 and 2016, a total of 641,502 (77.5 per cent) had been smuggled by sea (table 10). Almost all of them (96.6 per cent) were granted refugee

status or temporary protection by either Greece or another country of destination in Europe. The hazards of smuggling and dying at sea, and the chaos created by thousands of disorderly landings on unequipped islands, could have been mitigated had there been more European Union humanitarian or asylum visas issued to Syrians in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey.

ii. Gulf of Aden corridor

Despite the tragic situation in Yemen, with more than 2 million of its citizens internally displaced by conflict since 2015, the war-torn country has remained a destination or place of transit for migrants and refugees fleeing life-threatening conditions in Eritrea, Somalia and other countries. An estimated monthly average of 7,000 migrants smuggled by sea from Africa reached Yemen in 2017.⁸⁶ According to UNHCR, over 270,000 refugees, mostly from Somalia, were in Yemen in 2018. OCHA provides a higher estimate of 435,000 in 2017. Most migrants from the Horn of Africa reaching Yemen are on their way to other countries in the Arabian Peninsula, in particular Oman and Saudi Arabia.

While Yemen still attracts transit migrants and asylum seekers, an estimated 100,000 of its citizens have fled the country, half of them to Oman (50,000 Yemeni refugees in 2017) and the rest to Djibouti, Saudi Arabia and Somalia (which also sends refugees to Yemen).⁸⁷ Saudi Arabia has barred the entry of new refugees from Yemen and is sending back some of them (17,000 in the first quarter of 2018).⁸⁸

Several countries on this route have adopted legislation and policies relevant to combatting smuggling and trafficking and to protecting victims, as follows:

- Article 248 of the Yemeni penal code criminalizes slavery and prescribes penalties of up to 10 years of imprisonment for sex trafficking; and article 279 criminalizing child sex trafficking prescribes penalties of up to seven years imprisonment, which could be

increased to 15 years imprisonment under aggravating circumstances;⁸⁹

- Omani royal decree No. 126/2008 defines acts of trafficking and penalties for convicted offenders;⁹⁰
- The Saudi Arabian 2009 Anti-Trafficking Law prohibits all forms of human trafficking, and prescribes heavy punishments of up to 15 years imprisonment and 1,000,000 Saudi Riyals fines (articles 3 and 4).⁹¹

Despite those policies and legislation, migrants smuggled or trafficked along this route face heightened vulnerabilities. They are exposed to abuse, kidnapping, forced labour and death. There is a high number of cases of enforced disappearance of women trafficked for sex.⁹²

iii. Migrants' extreme vulnerability in Libya

Libya is Northern Africa's largest migration hub. In 2018, between 700,000 to 1 million international migrants, representing 11-16 per cent of the country's 6.3 million inhabitants, were in Libya.⁹³ Migrants are attracted by work opportunities in the country, and by the prospect of passage to Europe. Libya has been a hotspot for people smuggling for decades, with many smuggled migrants exposed to high risks of exploitation, abuse, violence and even death.

Some migrants to Libya originate from war-torn countries like Somalia or the Sudan, and would have been eligible for refugee status if such a status existed. However, Libya is not party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and, in spite of having ratified the 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, it has no legislation on asylum. As a result, Libya does not recognize any refugee on its territory. UNHCR, however, can register individuals from a limited list of nationalities, including Palestinians.⁹⁴

No official statistics on migration flows to or through Libya exist, but IOM records suggest that Libya still attracts large numbers

of migrants. In October 2018, IOM counted 670,920 foreign nationals in the country, but the real number could be anything between 700,000 and 1 million according to IOM (table 11). Two thirds of them arrived from sub-Saharan Africa, 28 per cent from Northern Africa, and 6 per cent from other Middle-Eastern and Asian countries. Four of the six countries sharing a land border with Libya are top of the list of origin countries (Chad, Egypt, Niger and the Sudan). Particularly vulnerable groups are minors (comprising 10 per cent of total migrants, of whom 35 per cent are unaccompanied) and women (12 per cent).⁹⁵

Migrants in Libya belong to four categories, according to their origin and motivations for migration: nationals of neighbouring countries employed in Libya, who frequently travel back and forth to their home country; nationals of a western or central African country who seek employment in Libya, and are at high risk of ill-treatment or who try to reach Europe; nationals of an eastern African country, fleeing persecution and trying to reach Europe to lodge an asylum claim; and nationals from a distant Arab country (mostly Iraq, State of Palestine and the Syrian Arab Republic), who are often travelling with their families.⁹⁶

The political disorder and economic downturn witnessed in Libya since 2011 have set the stage for the proliferation of a multitude of militias engaging in all types of criminal activities, including smuggling. Migrants are susceptible to arrest by armed groups at any checkpoint. In the absence of rule of law, migrants are exposed in any part of Libya to the worst forms of human rights violations, such as deprivation of food, water and minimal health care, physical violence, sexual abuse, robbery, arbitrary detention for extorting money, forced labour, slavery, torture and murder.⁹⁷

A smuggling economy has emerged. Migrants have become a commodity in the hands of armed groups and organized criminal groups

operating transnationally within and beyond the region. The scale of revenues is huge, estimated at \$978 million in 2016 (3.4 per cent of the country's GDP), distributed between \$726 million in charges for overland travel and \$252 million for Mediterranean crossings.⁹⁸ Not only do criminal networks control migration routes in Libya, but some of them have also developed beyond the country's borders into 'pan-African smuggling consortia' capable of handling migrants' full travel from origin to destination and collecting payment upon departure.⁹⁹

The number of undocumented migrants and refugees arriving by sea from Libya to Italy has significantly declined in the last two years, from 181,436 in 2016 to 23,370 in 2018.¹⁰⁰ The sharp drop in arrivals by sea to Italy since 2016 is the result of fewer migrants embarking from Libya, and of changes to the 'search and rescue at sea' policy adopted by the European Union.

(c) Containing the flow upstream: the Khartoum process

There is a common notion that preventing would-be migrants from leaving a country unless they have the proper documents to reach their final destination is the most straightforward way to end the migrant smuggling business. However, the accuracy of this notion is unfounded. In 2014, when movements of migrants smuggled across the Sahara started to raise concerns, the European Union and the African Union launched a platform for political cooperation between countries along the route from the Horn of Africa to Europe, which became known as the Khartoum Process. Five Arab countries were involved in the Process: Djibouti, Egypt, Somalia, the Sudan and Tunisia.¹⁰¹ Libya was not part of it, because it could not be considered a safe country for containing or returning migrants.

The Khartoum process focused on tackling human trafficking and prosecuting criminal networks of smugglers and traffickers. It claimed a 'victim-centred approach', supporting

the victims of trafficking and protecting the human rights of smuggled migrants, while developing a regional framework for returning migrants and the establishment of reception centres.¹⁰² The Khartoum Process held a summit in Valetta in November 2015 and several subsequent meetings, but it has not produced any significant solutions to curbing migrant smuggling across the Sahara. Similar to other frameworks, it also seeks to address the root causes of irregular migration by promoting sustainable development in countries of origin and transit.

4. Achieving the Global Compact for Migration: entry points for policy reform in the priority areas

The following are some policy recommendations that can guide policymakers and relevant stakeholders in addressing the migration governance priority areas set out in the present chapter, and assist in operationalizing and implementing the relevant GCM objectives.

(a) Filling the knowledge gap

Objective 1 of GCM focuses on collecting and utilizing accurate and disaggregated data as a basis for evidence-based policies.¹⁰³ While this objective was not selected as a standalone priority area, it is cross-cutting across the various regional priority areas selected. Ensuring access to services, reducing vulnerabilities, and combatting trafficking and smuggling all require data to inform policies and devise appropriate responses. Identifying migration-related issues, designing policy responses, monitoring policies, and evaluating their impact require quality statistics. Current statistical deficits in the region are an obstacle to sound policymaking on migration. To address this challenge, there is a need to build the capacity of public administrations to produce the data necessary for statistical observation of migration, while protecting individual privacy. Below are some recommendations on filling the knowledge gap:

1) Applying the definitions of international migration established under the aegis of the United Nations Statistical Commission.

The United Nations uses two distinct and complementary definitions. The first applies to the individual migrant, who is defined “as any person who changes his or her country of usual residence. A person’s country of usual residence is that in which the person lives, [...] where he or she normally spends the daily period of rest”.¹⁰⁴ The second applies collectively to the migrant population and defines the international migrant stock as “the number of people living in a country or area other than that in which they were born”.¹⁰⁵

Because public policies dealing with international migrants are by nature multisectoral, information routinely collected by a variety of public administrations on individuals using their services must identify and count international migrants, and systematically include a person’s country of birth and country of citizenship. Other individual characteristics, including sex, age, migration status and other variables (education, economic activity, occupation), must be collected to disaggregate data and identify migrant subgroups for targeted and inclusive policymaking. This is in line with SDG target 17.18, which calls on countries to increase significantly the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts.

This applies to administrative sources of data, such as forms filled in by hospitals, schools, labour offices, housing offices and tribunals. They represent matchless sources of data to assess and monitor migrants’ inclusion, use of services, and access to justice. Moreover, they make it possible to observe differential outcomes between migrants and non-migrants, and track discrimination against migrants.

2) Collecting harmonized and disaggregated data

Under GCM objective 1, States commit to elaborating and implementing a comprehensive strategy for improving migration data at the local, national, regional and global levels, with the participation of all relevant stakeholders, under the guidance of the United Nations Statistical Commission, by harmonizing methodologies for data collection, and strengthening analysis and dissemination of migration-related data and indicators. Harmonizing data entails the two following conditions:

- Nationally, central statistical bureaus must safeguard that all public administrations use the same definitions, to guarantee consistency between data produced by different sectors and ensure that migrants can be compared with non-migrants in the host country. For example, the impact of migrants’ occupation on their health presupposes that occupation is defined using the same classification by administrations collecting health events (numerator of a prevalence or morbidity rate) and by those counting migrants (denominator);
- Internationally, States must use the same classifications to make it possible to compare migrants with the population in their countries of origin. Measuring the impact of migration on health presupposes that all countries apply the WHO International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems.

The research community must design universal time-sensitive indicators to measure and monitor migrants’ access to a variety of services, including housing, health, education and access to justice. Each type of service requires specific methodologies to measure migrants’ access and outcomes, and compare them with non-migrants in the same population.

In addition to country of birth and country of citizenship, other individual characteristics that public administrations in Arab countries could collect to better understand migration include the following:

- Sex and age to identify gendered and age-specific issues, and to monitor policies targeting or impacting women, children, young people and older persons;
- Duration of stay, which allows differentiating long-term from short-term migrants and travellers, and is a factor of migrants' integration in the host society and their access to rights and duties;
- Reason for migrating, which allows differentiating between forced and voluntary migrants, and between workers, family members, students and other groups of migrants;
- A self-reporting indicator, where individuals are asked if they consider themselves of migrant origin/heritage, which allows the identification of second-generation migrants and diaspora members.

Many migrants in Arab countries are employed in informal occupations. The sector of employment is a critical determinant of access to health for citizens and foreign-citizens. Workers in the formal sector are likely to enjoy better health coverage than those in the informal sector. It is therefore recommended to include the employment sector in data collected on migrants by public administrations. It is also recommended that the 2020 round of population censuses should include all the above questions, and routine household surveys should also collect such data within the limits of their sample size.

The distinction between migrants and refugees must be flexible, to include individuals who seek at the same time protection and employment. The concept of 'mixed movements' used by

international organizations to refer to the cross-border movement of people seeking international protection or better lives and opportunities, often by resorting to smugglers and travelling together without valid visas,¹⁰⁶ may indeed correspond to the mixed motivations of genuine refugees who also need to make a living.

Countries must properly address irregular migration by collecting data on apprehended migrants that make it possible to distinguish between irregular entry, irregular stay, and irregular employment. While the three situations are not mutually exclusive, they are susceptible to specific policy interventions by the State, actions by non-governmental and civil society organizations, and public perceptions.

Countries with significant migrant populations in transit should commission ad hoc statistical surveys of transit migrants both in regular and irregular situations, to better understand related policy challenges. This is a service currently provided by the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix in many Arab countries.

Lastly, it is recommended that academia should strengthen research on migrant smuggling and trafficking as business models, on their modus operandi, on the way migrants are regarded by communities, and on the differing impacts on men and women migrants. Greater knowledge is vital for efficiently combating this billion-dollar industry.

(b) Facilitating migrant inclusion and access to services

1) Reconsidering nationality laws

Arab countries may consider reforming their nationality laws to adjust to realities created by migration. Depending on their specificities, countries should consider the following:

- Introduce *jus soli* by conditionally and selectively providing citizenship to individuals born and living in their territory;

- Include maternal descent as a way to transmit citizenship to children born from mixed marriages, as is already the case in some countries of the region;
- Consider the naturalization of selected long-term residents on the basis of individual criteria, linked to the potential for economic, social and cultural integration.

2) Ensuring migrants' access to basic services

In line with GCM objective 15 on providing access to basic services for migrants, Arab countries can consider granting long-term migrants all the rights guaranteed to citizens. Such rights should include those defined in article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stating that "everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care".

All Arab countries, notwithstanding their signatory status to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, should consider complying with its General Comment n.20 stating that "the ground of nationality should not bar access to Covenant rights [...]. The Covenant rights apply to everyone including non-nationals, such as refugees, asylum-seekers, stateless persons, migrant workers and victims of international trafficking, regardless of legal status and documentation".¹⁰⁷

Unequal access to health is not only a violation of a fundamental right, it is also counter-effective in terms of a country's public health as it can produce uncontrolled negative effects, such as the spread of transmissible diseases. According to WHO, prevention can be the most cost-effective way to maintain the health of the population in a sustainable manner, and to create healthy populations for everyone's benefit.¹⁰⁸ Consequently, a fully efficient health system must grant all migrants, regardless of their status, free access to a number of basic preventive and curative medical services. Universal access to

basic health care is both a factor of increased efficiency of the whole health system and a critical component of human capital, and therefore the sustainable development of a country.

Some GCM actions commit States to incorporate the health needs of migrants in national and local health care policies and plans, such as by strengthening capacities for service provision, facilitating affordable and non-discriminatory access, and reducing communication barriers. In Arab countries where migration brings in sizeable populations with a variety of languages and cultural practices, States must provide interpretation in health-care facilities so that migrants face no linguistic obstacles to their right to health.

In compliance with these objectives, States are encouraged to ensure that migrants are granted universal health coverage in the same way as non-migrants. This applies in particular to workers employed in the formal sector. Whether paid by the employer or by the State, health insurance should cover all migrant workers' and their families' preventive and curative medical expenses, and not only work-related incidents in hazardous occupations, such as construction sites. This should apply in particular to low-income migrants who cannot afford out-of-pocket expensive medical care.

In a context of conflict- or poverty-driven migration, people on the move are exposed to exceptionally high risks to their physical and mental health and often to their lives. Health care and protection must be available to migrants at all stages of their journey from origin to destination through one or several countries of transit. The cross-border continuity of health services that migrants need requires a level of medical bilateral or regional cooperation, which is not easily attained in most parts of the Arab region. In crisis contexts, countries must therefore facilitate interventions by mobile emergency units working under international control to ensure migrants and refugees' access to medical support.

(c) Addressing and reducing vulnerabilities of migrants

1) Protecting human rights of migrants and creating enabling environments

GCM objective 6 is closely linked to objective 16, as it aims to provide migrant workers engaged in remunerated and contractual labour with the same labour rights and protections extended to all workers in their respective sectors, including through wage protection mechanisms.

Whether their status is regular or irregular, all migrants have the same human rights. Countries must therefore create an enabling environment and specific instruments allowing migrants, regardless of their status, to report violations of their human rights and to have access to justice.

Accordingly, States must ensure that authorities do not arbitrarily arrest, detain or deport migrants when they file complaints. This applies to all migrants, in particular to those who are victims of abuse or exploitation, or those who fall into an irregular situation because of their employer or sponsor.

2) Protecting the most vulnerable

Migrant domestic workers are an especially unprotected category, notably in countries where the labour law does not apply to them. Countries must consider extending labour law protections to all domestic workers employed by private households, including migrants.

In countries where the *kafala* system is in force, migrants' high dependence on their sponsor could generate various kinds of abuse that may prove difficult to control by the authorities. Governments must not wait for the reform or abolition of the *kafala* system to put in place monitoring mechanisms and to sanction employers and sponsors for unlawful actions. In particular, monitors are recommended to have a mandate to ensure that private sponsors do not risk sponsored persons falling into irregular

situations, thus exposing them to arbitrary detention and deportation.

The unlawful but common practice of sponsors and employers retaining their employees' passports amounts to denying them freedom of movement. Countries must enforce the prevention of passport confiscation, forced confinement at the employer's home, and other illegal practices violating employees' rights.

Countries should also strengthen existing measures and put in place monitoring instruments for identifying and penalizing cases of abuse, exploitation, violence and other illegal practices against domestic workers. They must ensure that an employee can safely file a complaint against an employer without risking detention and deportation when the employment contract is broken. States can build on existing practices to enforce wage protection systems, and penalize employers for delayed or non-payment of wages.

(d) Combatting smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons

All Arab States but one have signed or acceded to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), and most have also signed the first two Palermo protocols. Nonetheless, large-scale unpunished human trafficking and migrant smuggling has been observed across the entire region.

To successfully achieve the GCM objectives related to smuggling and trafficking, Arab States may consider the following recommendations:

- Take significant steps to incorporate UNTOC and its protocols in national legislation;
- Enhance international and regional cooperation, including through intelligence and information sharing, to allow for strengthened investigation and

prosecution of trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants;

- Mobilize and deploy all the necessary human and administrative resources to efficiently combat criminal networks operating on their territory and transnationally;
- Take action to eliminate unauthorized border-crossing and irregular migration, including prosecuting smugglers and traffickers, sanctioning employers of undocumented migrants, and opening regular channels for migrants and persons in need of international protection. A variety of actors, including States, civil society organizations and the media, must work jointly to raise awareness of the dangers of resorting to smugglers for crossing land borders and territories or the sea;
- Consider regularizing migrants in an irregular situation, particularly when they are already working informally and there is a recognized demand for their employment;
- Amend laws criminalizing irregular entry, stay and exit from their territory, and deal with such infractions as administrative offenses not crimes;¹⁰⁹
- Replace detention with other sanctions to penalize the administrative offenses of irregular entry, stay and exit, with respect for migrants' human rights. In the meantime, ensure that detained migrants are held in conditions respectful of their human rights, and provide humanitarian inspectors access to detention sites and to detained persons;
- Ensure that detained migrants who are deported are not returned to unsafe countries, in compliance with the International Refugee Law and human rights principle of non-refoulement.

In the crisis context of several Arab countries, protecting migrants and refugees requires a

specific approach that coordinates local and international actors to accomplish the following:

- Establish mobile teams to reach mobile vulnerable migrants;
- Regularly assess operational locations to adapt to a volatile security context;
- Reach migrants stranded in desert or mountain areas to provide them with support;
- Cooperate with local civil society to reach migrants and refugees hiding in remote places and support them;
- Coordinate humanitarian interventions in the various countries crossed by migrants and refugees from their origin to their destination;
- Increase efforts to counter-trafficking and enforce the law against criminal networks of trafficking in persons;¹¹⁰
- Use the framework of mobility partnerships with the European Union and its member States to encourage regular migration of persons in need of international protection;
- Work with the European Union and its member States to step up search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean, and reach an agreement to disembark them in European ports.¹¹¹

Moreover, the international community should set up monitoring instruments to ensure that European financial and technical support provided to Arab countries for preventing irregular migration is not used against the human rights of migrants.

Arab transit countries and the European Union need to help origin countries of returned migrants in establishing reintegration programmes under European Union-sponsored policies.

Combating migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons must include dismantling the wider smuggling economy.

More coordination between governmental and non-governmental actors, and international and local actors engaged in tackling migrant smuggling and trafficking in various parts of the Arab countries, is also necessary.

Enabling all migrants, including those in an irregular situation, to speak for themselves and listening to them is a recommendation for all stakeholders.

F. Conclusion

In 2018, for the first time, the world's nations agreed on fundamental principles to govern international migration. The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration adopted in Marrakech, Morocco, on 11 December 2018 bears a resolutely people-centred approach for migration to benefit all, migrant persons as well as origin and destination populations. It spells out the rights and freedoms that apply to all migrants as human beings: women, men and children, whether they have a regular or irregular migration status. However, for 2018 to go down in history as a critical turning point in the governance of international migration, States must implement GCM, and the actions it recommends must result in the expected outcomes. Great challenges still lie ahead.

The Arab region has its own set of challenges. Firstly, the proportion of nationals abroad and migrants living in Arab countries compared with the total population is two and three times, respectively, higher than the world's average. Refugee populations, notably those in protracted refugee situations, are the largest globally in certain parts of the Arab region. Moreover, owing to their geographical position between the least developed regions of the world and its richest parts, several Arab

countries are crossed by routes of mixed movement originating in Africa and Asia destined for Europe and the Arabian Peninsula.

Secondly, gaps in the governance of migration in Arab countries have accentuated a number of migration-related issues. Nationality laws often hinder full inclusion of migrants and their descendants in the citizenry, so entire subpopulations of non-citizens with limited or no access to all fundamental rights have gradually emerged over the years and generations. On the other side, the *kafala* sponsorship system that prevails in the largest migrant destination countries of the Arab region limits the protection, defence and exercise of migrants' rights. Exclusion of migrant domestic workers from labour laws has created additional vulnerabilities. Gendered legislation on migration-related issues and personal status place particular strain on migrant women in the exercise of their reproductive rights. Moreover, owing to a lack of well-defined alternatives, detention and deportation are a frequent though exaggerated response to the administrative offence of irregular entry or stay.

Thirdly, challenges in the implementation of the law gives room to a variety of unlawful practices, which worsen the situation of migrants in the Arab region. Numerous migrants with an irregular status fall victim to organized crime perpetrated by migrant smugglers and human traffickers along the routes of mixed movement across the entire Arab region. They risk all forms of abuse, from extortion and forced labour to being trapped in sex work and sometimes killed. Low-income migrant workers can also be subject to illegal exploitative working conditions imposed by employers, without access to justice and redress.

Good practices already applied in several Arab countries should facilitate the implementation of parts of GCM. The following are a few examples of recent progress towards a better management of migration: providing extended economic and social rights to non-citizens, including migrants in

irregular situations; amending nationality laws to include maternal descent; applying health coverage to a large spectrum of migrants; complementing the fight against smugglers and traffickers by legislation to defend and protect their victims; including domestic workers in the general framework of labour laws; and signing bilateral and multilateral partnerships to establish cooperation between origin and destination countries.

Nevertheless, significant obstacles remain to full GCM implementation in the Arab region. Filling the knowledge gap is an absolute priority. Countries cannot conduct informed policymaking on migration with a severe data deficit, which prevails across the entire Arab region. Only when public administrations include the necessary information in their routines, and statistical offices transform raw administrative data into meaningful indicators, migration stakeholders will have the tools for identifying issues, designing policies and monitoring their outcomes.

Guaranteeing migrants full inclusion for building social cohesion is another priority. To achieve this, amending policies on employment, health and education is necessary. The aim is to treat non-citizens in the same way as citizens regarding access to the labour market and to basic services, and to eliminate discriminatory practices. An additional priority is to address and reduce vulnerabilities, including through action to address the specific needs of autonomous migrant women and children, and to ensure that migrants in an irregular situation are not criminalized for their status and that their human rights are fully respected. Combatting criminal networks engaged in migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons is an utmost priority. It requires both local action on the ground where networks operate, and external cooperation with origin and destination countries to tackle the causes of irregular migration.

Annexes



Annex I

Glossary of terms

Amnesty	A general pardon, “regularization” or “legalization” that is extended to people who can show residence in a country for which the amnesty is granted, despite the fact that such residence was unauthorized.
Asylum	The grant, by a State, of protection on its territory to persons from another State who are fleeing persecution or serious danger. Asylum encompasses a variety of elements, including non-refoulement, permission to remain on the territory of the asylum country and humane standards of treatment.
Asylum-seeker	An individual who is seeking international protection. In countries with individualized procedures, an asylum-seeker is someone whose claim has not yet been finally decided on by the country in which the claim is submitted. Not every asylum-seeker will ultimately be recognized as a refugee, but every refugee was initially an asylum-seeker.
Bonded labour	Service rendered by a worker under condition of bondage arising from economic considerations, notably indebtedness through a loan or an advance. Where debt is the root cause of bondage, the implication is that the worker (or dependents or heirs) is tied to a particular creditor for a specified or unspecified period until the loan is repaid.
Child	An individual being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier (Article 1, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989).
Debt bondage	The status or condition arising from a pledge by a debtor of his or her personal service or those of a person under his or her control as security for a debt, if the value of those services as reasonably assessed is not applied toward the liquidation of the debt or the length and nature of those services are not respectively limited and defined (Article 1(a), Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Abolition of Practices Similar to Slavery, 1956).
Deportation	The act of a State in the exercise of its sovereignty in removing a non-national from its territory to his or her country of origin or third state after refusal of admission or termination of permission to remain.
Detention	Restriction on freedom of movement through confinement that is ordered by an administrative or judicial authority. There are two types of detention: criminal detention, having as a purpose punishment for the committed crime; and administrative detention, guaranteeing that another administrative measure (such as deportation or expulsion) can be implemented. In the majority of countries, irregular migrants are subject to administrative detention, as they have violated immigration laws and regulations that are not considered to be crimes. In many States, a non-national may also be administratively detained pending a decision on refugee status or on admission to or removal from the State.
Diasporas	Diasporas are broadly defined as individuals and members or networks, associations and communities, who have left their country of origin, but maintain links with their homelands. This concept covers more settled expatriate communities, migrant workers based abroad temporarily, expatriates with the nationality of the host country, dual nationals, and second-/third-generation migrants.

Displaced persons	Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, either across an international border or within a State, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters.
Displacement	The movement of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, either across an international border or within a State, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters.
Facilitated migration	Fostering or encouraging of regular migration by making travel easier and more convenient. This may take the form of a streamlined visa application process, or efficient and well-staffed passenger inspection procedures.
Family migration	A general concept covering family reunification and the migration of a family unit as a whole.
Family reunification/reunion	Process whereby family members separated through forced or voluntary migration regroup in a country other than the one of their origin.
Forced/compulsory labour	All work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself/herself voluntarily (Article 2(1), ILO Convention No. 29 on Forced Labour, 1930).
Forced return	The compulsory return of an individual to the country of origin, transit or third country, on the basis of an administrative or judicial act.
Governance of migration	System of institutions, legal frameworks, mechanisms and practices aimed at regulating migration and protecting migrants. Used almost synonymously with the term “migration management”, although migration management is also sometimes used to refer to the narrow act of regulating cross-border movement at the state level.
Highly skilled/qualified migrant	While there is no internationally agreed definition, two overlapping meanings are often intended. In very general terms a highly skilled migrant is considered to be a person with tertiary education, typically an adult who has completed at least two years of postsecondary education. In a more specific sense, a highly skilled migrant is a person who has earned, either by tertiary level education or occupational experience, the level of qualifications typically needed to practice a profession.
Integration	While the term is used and understood differently in different countries and contexts, “integration” can be defined as the process by which migrants become accepted into society, both as individuals and as groups. It generally refers to a two-way process of adaptation by migrants and host societies, while the particular requirements for acceptance by a host society vary from country to country. Integration does not necessarily imply permanent settlement. It does, however, imply consideration of the rights and obligations of migrants and host societies, of access to different kinds of services and the labour market, and of identification and respect for a core set of values that bind migrants and host communities in a common purpose. Local integration is one of the three durable solutions to address the plight of refugees. It may also be applied to victims of trafficking and unaccompanied children.
Internal migration	A movement of people from one area of a country to another area of the same country for the purpose or with the effect of establishing a new residence. This migration may be temporary or permanent. Internal migrants move but remain within their country of origin (e.g. rural to urban migration).
Internally displaced persons (IDPs)	Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border (Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2).

International migration	Movement of persons who leave their country of origin, or the country of habitual residence, to establish themselves either permanently or temporarily in another country. An international frontier is therefore crossed.
International migration law	International norms and principles relating to migration deriving from State sovereignty – such as the right to admit, detain and expel migrants, to combat trafficking and smuggling, to protect borders, to confer nationality – and from human rights instruments. These two elements constitute the main pillars of international migration law. Instruments of international migration law are spread across various branches of law, such as human rights law, humanitarian law, labour law, refugee law, consular law, trade law and maritime law.
Internationally mobile students	Students who have crossed a national or territorial border for the purpose of education and are now enrolled outside their country of origin.
Irregular migrant	A person who, owing to unauthorized entry, breach of a condition of entry, or the expiry of his or her visa, lacks legal status in a transit or host country. The definition covers inter alia those persons who have entered a transit or host country lawfully but have stayed for a longer period than authorized or subsequently taken up unauthorized employment (also called clandestine/undocumented migrant or migrant in an irregular situation). The term “irregular” is preferable to “illegal” because the latter carries a criminal connotation and is seen as denying migrants’ humanity.
Irregular migration	Movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries. There is no clear or universally accepted definition of irregular migration. From the perspective of destination countries, it is entry, stay or work in a country without the necessary authorization or documents required under immigration regulations. From the perspective of the sending country, the irregularity is for example seen in cases in which a person crosses an international boundary without a valid passport or travel document or does not fulfil the administrative requirements for leaving the country. There is, however, a tendency to restrict the use of the term “illegal migration” to cases of smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons.
Labour migration	Movement of persons from one State to another, or within their own country of residence, for the purpose of employment. Labour migration is addressed by most States in their migration laws. In addition, some States take an active role in regulating outward labour migration and seeking opportunities for their nationals abroad.
Less/low skilled and semi-skilled migrant worker	There is no internationally agreed definition of a less or low skilled and semi-skilled migrant worker. In broad terms, a semi-skilled worker is considered to be a person who requires a degree of training or familiarization with the job before being able to operate at maximum/optimal efficiency, although this training is not of the length or intensity required for designation as a skilled (or craft) worker, being measured in weeks or days rather than years, nor is it normally at the tertiary level. Many so-called “manual workers” (e.g. production, construction workers) should therefore be classified as semi-skilled. A less or low-skilled worker, on the other hand, is considered to be a person who has received less training than a semi-skilled worker or, having not received any training, has still acquired his or her competence on the job.
Migrant	Any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person’s legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is.
Migrant flow	The number of migrants counted as moving or being authorized to move, to or from a given location in a defined period of time.
Migrant stock	The number of migrants living in a country at a particular point in time.

Migrant worker	“A person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national” (Article 2(1), International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 1990).
Migration	The movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification.
Migration management	A term used to encompass numerous governmental functions within a national system for the orderly and humane management of cross-border migration, particularly managing the entry and presence of foreigners within the borders of the State and the protection of refugees and others in need of protection. It refers to a planned approach to the development of policy, legislative and administrative responses to key migration issues.
Mixed movements (mixed flows)	A movement in which a number of people are travelling together, generally in an irregular manner, using the same routes and means of transport, but for different reasons. People travelling as part of mixed movements have varying needs and profiles and may include asylum-seekers, refugees, trafficked persons, unaccompanied/separated children, and migrants in an irregular situation. Source: UNHCR, 10 Point Action plan on Mixed Migration, 2012, p. 291.
Naturalization	Granting by a State of its nationality to a non-national through a formal act on the application of the individual concerned. International law does not provide detailed rules for naturalization, but it recognizes the competence of every State to naturalize those who are not its nationals and who apply to become its nationals.
Non-refoulement	The principle of non-refoulement prohibits States from expelling or returning (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. The duty of non-refoulement is a part of customary international law and is therefore binding on all States, whether or not they are parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.
Push-pull factors	Migration is often analysed in terms of the “push-pull model”, which looks at the push factors, which drive people to leave their country (such as economic, social, or political problems) and the pull factors attracting them to the country of destination.
Readmission	Act by a State accepting the re-entry of an individual (own national, third-country national or stateless person).
Refugee	A person who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country. (Article 1A(2), Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951 as modified by the 1967 Protocol). In addition to the refugee definition in the 1951 Refugee Convention, Article 1(2), 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention defines a refugee as any person compelled to leave his or her country “owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country or origin or nationality.” Similarly, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration states that refugees also include persons who flee their country “because their lives, security or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, gross violations of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.”

Refugee status determination	Legal and administrative procedures undertaken by States and/or UNHCR to determine whether an individual should be recognized as a refugee in accordance with national and international law.
Regular migration	Migration that occurs through recognized, authorized channels.
Regularisation	Any process or programme by which the authorities in a State allow non-nationals in an irregular or undocumented situation to stay lawfully in the country. Typical practices include the granting of an amnesty (also known as 'legalization') to non-nationals who have resided in the country in an irregular situation for a given length of time and are not otherwise found inadmissible.
Reintegration	Re-inclusion or re-incorporation of a person into a group or a process, e.g. of a migrant into the society of his or her country of origin or habitual residence.
Remittances	Multi-directional, voluntary, and private international monetary transfers that migrants make, individually or collectively, to people with whom they maintain close links.
Repatriation	The personal right of a refugee, prisoner of war or a civil detainee to return to his or her country of nationality under specific conditions laid down in various international instruments (Geneva Conventions, 1949 and Protocols, 1977, the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention, 1907, human rights instruments as well as customary international law). The option of repatriation is bestowed upon the individual personally and not upon the detaining power. In the law of international armed conflict, repatriation also entails the obligation of the detaining power to release eligible persons (soldiers and civilians) and the duty of the country of origin to receive its own nationals at the end of hostilities. Even if treaty law does not contain a general rule on this point, it is today readily accepted that the repatriation of prisoners of war and civil detainees has been consented to implicitly by the interested parties. Repatriation as a term also applies to diplomatic envoys and international officials in time of international crisis as well as expatriates and migrants.
Resettlement	The transfer of refugees from the country in which they have sought asylum to another State that has agreed to admit them. The refugees will usually be granted asylum or some other form of long-term resident rights and, in many cases, will have the opportunity to become naturalized citizens. For this reason, resettlement is a durable solution as well as a tool for the protection of refugees. It is also a practical example of international burden- and responsibility-sharing.
Return migration	The movement of a person returning to his or her country of origin or habitual residence usually after spending at least one year in another country. This return may or may not be voluntary. Return migration includes voluntary repatriation.
Seasonal migrant worker/migration	A migrant worker whose work, or migration for employment, is by its character dependent on seasonal conditions and is performed only during part of the year (Article 2(2)(b), International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 1990).
Skilled migrant	A migrant worker who, because of his or her skills or acquired professional experience, is usually granted preferential treatment regarding admission to a host country (and is therefore subject to fewer restrictions regarding length of stay, change of employment and family reunification).
Smuggling of migrants	"The procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident" (Article 3(a), Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000). Smuggling, contrary to trafficking, does not require an element of exploitation, coercion, or violation of human rights.
Statelessness	The condition of an individual who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law. Statelessness may result from a number of causes including conflict of laws, gaps in nationality laws, gender inequality in nationality laws, discrimination, state succession, arbitrary deprivation of nationality, lack of birth registration and documentation.
Temporary (labour) migration	Migration of workers who enter a foreign country for a specified limited period of time before returning to the country of origin.

Temporary migrant workers	Skilled, semi-skilled or untrained workers who remain in the destination country for definite periods as determined in a work contract with an individual worker or a service contract concluded with an enterprise. Also called contract migrant workers.
Trafficking in persons	“The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation” (Article 3(a), Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000). Trafficking in persons can take place within the borders of one State or may have a transnational character.
Transit	A stopover of passage of varying length while travelling between two or more countries.
Undocumented migrant workers/migrant workers in an irregular situation	Migrant workers or members of their families, who are not authorized to enter, to stay or to engage in employment in a State.
Victim of human trafficking	Any natural person who is subject to trafficking in human beings.
Voluntary return	The assisted or independent return to the country of origin, transit or another third country based on the free will of the returnee.
Vulnerable group	Depending on the context, any group or sector of society (such as children, the elderly, persons with disabilities, ethnic or religious minorities, migrants, particularly those who are in an irregular situation, or persons of diverse sex, sexual orientation and gender identity (SSOGI)) that is at higher risk of being subjected to discriminatory practices, violence, social disadvantage, or economic hardship than other groups within the State. These groups are also at higher risk in periods of conflict, crisis or disasters.

Annex II

Migration and displacement to the Arab region

Table AII.1 Migration and displacement to GCC countries, 1990-2017				
Year	International migrant and refugee population at mid-year			
	International migrant and refugee population, both sexes	Migrant and refugee population as a percentage of the total population	Percentage of female migrant and refugee population	Top countries of origin, both sexes
Bahrain				
1990	173,212	34.9	29.1	India (60,505), Egypt (21,908), Pakistan (20,949), Bangladesh (20,442), Philippines (7,934)
1995	205,979	36.5	30.0	India (74,599), Pakistan (25,280), Bangladesh (24,630), Egypt (23,628), Philippines (10,206)
2000	239,361	36.0	30.9	India (88,904), Pakistan (29,683), Bangladesh (28,889), Egypt (25,417), Philippines (12,508)
2005	404,018	45.4	28.6	India (157,081), Bangladesh (49,900), Pakistan (46,931), Egypt (41,784), Philippines (24,672)
2010	657,856	53.0	27.7	India (259,915), Bangladesh (81,920), Pakistan (74,535), Egypt (67,374), Philippines (42,281)
2015	704,137	51.3	27.7	India (302,635), Bangladesh (78,396), Pakistan (74,710), Egypt (80,889), Philippines (48,059)
2017	722,649	48.4	27.7	India (310,591), Egypt (83,015), Bangladesh (80,457), Pakistan (76,674), Philippines (49,322)
Kuwait				
1990	1,074,391	51.2	39.0	India (375,183), Egypt (135,880), Pakistan (129,928), Bangladesh (126,783), Philippines (49,207)
1995	921,954	57.2	35.8	India (332,377), Bangladesh (110,044), Pakistan (112,925), Egypt (107,006), Philippines (45,266)
2000	1,127,640	55.0	32.5	India (418,664), Pakistan (139,783), Bangladesh (136,047), Egypt (119,693), Philippines (58,906)
2005	1,333,327	58.6	31.1	India (485,847), Bangladesh (175,015), Pakistan (162,363), Egypt (128,020), (Philippines (76,327)
2010	1,871,537	62.4	30.0	India (674,184), Bangladesh (257,626), Pakistan (225,431), Egypt (168,272), Philippines (112,782)
2015	2,866,136	72.8	34.1	India (1,061,758), Egypt (387,993), Bangladesh (350,229), Pakistan (312,434), Philippines (181,462)
2017	3,123,431	75.5	32.0	India (1,157,072), Egypt (422,823), Bangladesh (276,518), Pakistan (135,876), Philippines (197,751)

Oman				
1990	304,000	16.8	20.2	India (152,554), Bangladesh (50,041), Pakistan (35,675), Egypt (18,811), Sri Lanka (13,996)
1995	539,643	24.5	22.6	India (282,987), Bangladesh (82,653), Pakistan (59,439), Egypt (27,544), Sri Lanka (14,591)
2000	623,608	27.5	21.7	India (333,881), Bangladesh (92,034), Pakistan (66,498), Egypt (28,536), Indonesia (17,274)
2005	666,160	26.5	20.8	India (373,411), Bangladesh (92,947), Pakistan (70,569), Egypt (27,249), Indonesia (19,887)
2010	816,221	26.8	19.3	India (473,206), Bangladesh (108,861), Pakistan (86,029), Egypt (30,361), Indonesia (25,710)
2015	1,814,591	43.2	17.3	India (1,052,013), Bangladesh (242,015), Pakistan (191,256), Egypt (67,497), Indonesia (57,157)
2017	2,073,292	44.7	16.0	India (1,201,995), Bangladesh (276,518), Pakistan (218,522), Egypt (77,119), Indonesia (65,305)
Qatar				
1990	309,753	65.0	27.1	Indonesia (108,178), United Arab Emirates (39,178), Bangladesh (36,556), Philippines (37,462), Saudi Arabia (14,187)
1995	361,673	70.4	25.4	Indonesia (130,606), Philippines (44,332), Bangladesh (43,199), United Arab Emirates (41,796), Saudi Arabia (17,817)
2000	359,697	60.7	23.8	Indonesia (133,562), Philippines (44,593), Bangladesh (43,402), United Arab Emirates (38,184), Saudi Arabia (18,792)
2005	646,026	74.7	22.8	India (193,404), Bangladesh (75,689), Indonesia (64,612), Philippines (54,268), Pakistan (51,773)
2010	1,456,413	81.8	17.2	India (540,914), Bangladesh (169,370), Pakistan (145,204), Egypt (136,060), Philippines (107,963)
2015	1,687,640	68.0	16.1	India (645,577), Egypt (163,569), Bangladesh (160,183), Nepal (151,314), Philippines (148,496)
2017	1,721,392	65.2	16.1	India (658,488), Egypt (166,840), Bangladesh (163,386), Nepal (154,340), Philippines (151,465)
Saudi Arabia				
1990	4,998,445	30.6	33.5	India (906,468), Indonesia (635,007), Pakistan (556,715), Bangladesh (479,380), Egypt (357,540)
1995	5,122,702	27.3	33.3	India (929,709), Indonesia (650,783), Pakistan (570,555), Bangladesh (491,297), Egypt (366,429)
2000	5,263,387	25.3	33.2	India (978,992), Indonesia (668,666), Pakistan (586,225), Bangladesh (504,790), Egypt (376,493)
2005	6,501,819	27.2	31.3	India (1,216,549), Indonesia (825,998), Pakistan (724,160), Bangladesh (623,564), Egypt (465,079)
2010	8,429,956	30.7	29.6	India (1,579,235), Indonesia (1,070,951), Pakistan (938,913), Bangladesh (808,485), Egypt (603,000)
2015	10,771,366	34.1	30.7	India (2,003,256), Indonesia (1,368,407), Pakistan (1,187,817), Bangladesh (1,022,812), Egypt (770,483)

2017	12,185,284	37.0	31.5	India (2,266,216), Indonesia (1,548,032), Pakistan (135,876), Indonesia (43,909), Egypt (871,621)
United Arab Emirates				
1990	1,306,574	70.2	28.7	India (458,294), Egypt (165,980), Pakistan (158,710), Bangladesh (154,869), Philippines (60,107)
1995	1,824,118	74.5	28.2	India (225,750), Pakistan (225,750), Bangladesh (219,911), Egypt (207,924), Philippines (91,840)
2000	2,446,675	77.6	28.2	India (915,848), Pakistan (305,782), Bangladesh (297,610), Egypt (261,834), Philippines (128,860)
2005	3,281,036	71.6	27.2	India (1,286,993), Bangladesh (408,976), Pakistan (383,811), Egypt (341,770), Philippines (202,618)
2010	7,316,611	88.5	25.3	India (2,913,802), Pakistan (836,310), Bangladesh (919,365), Egypt (755,158), Philippines (474,063)
2015	7,995,126	87.3	25.3	India (3,184,017), Bangladesh (1,004,623), Pakistan (913,866), Egypt (825,188), Philippines (518,025)
2017	8,312,524	88.4	25.3	India (3,310,419), Bangladesh (1,044,505), Pakistan (950,145), Egypt (857,947), Philippines (538,590)

Source: DESA, 2017.

Table AII.2 Migration and displacement to the Maghreb, 1990-2017				
Year	International migrant and refugee population at mid-year			
	International migrant and refugee population, both sexes	Migrant and refugee population as a percentage of the total population	Percentage of female migrant and refugee population	Top countries of origin, both sexes
Algeria				
1990	273,954	1.1	45.2	Western Sahara (167,905), State of Palestine (36,004), Sudan (9,127), Germany (6,544), Russian Federation (6,287)
1995	262,032	0.9	45.2	Western Sahara (166,903), State of Palestine (33,836), Somalia (6,248), Sudan (5,362), Iraq (4,249)
2000	250,110	0.8	45.2	Western Sahara (165,911), State of Palestine (31,667), Somalia (11,570), Iraq (7,579), Saudi Arabia (3,926)
2005	197,422	0.6	45.2	Western Sahara (130,960), State of Palestine (24,996), Somalia (9,132), Iraq (5,982), Saudi Arabia (3,098)
2010	216,964	0.6	47.1	Western Sahara (143,923), State of Palestine (27,470), Somalia (10,035), Iraq (6,574), Saudi Arabia (3,404)
2015	239,473	0.6	47.2	Western Sahara (158,854), State of Palestine (30,319), Somalia (11,076), Iraq (7,256), Saudi Arabia (3,757)
2017	248,624	0.6	47.2	Western Sahara (164,924), State of Palestine (31,477), Somalia (11,499), Iraq (7,533), Saudi Arabia (3,900)
Libya				
1990	457,075	10.3	46.9	State of Palestine (152,266), Sudan (38,599), Germany (27,674), Russian Federation (26,586), United States of America (19,067)

1995	508,041	10.3	40.8	State of Palestine (179,924), Somalia (40,088), Iraq (26,910), Sudan (24,407), Saudi Arabia (19,370)
2000	567,436	10.6	35.0	State of Palestine (210,540), Somalia (76,918), Iraq (50,436), Saudi Arabia (26,101), Syrian Arab Republic (20,428)
2005	625,212	10.8	28.7	State of Palestine (231,509), Somalia (84,755), Iraq (55,518), Saudi Arabia (28,761), Syrian Arab Republic (22,509)
2010	683,998	11.1	28.4	State of Palestine (253,786), Somalia (92,720), Iraq (60,735), Saudi Arabia (31,464), Syrian Arab Republic (24,624)
2015	771,146	12.4	28.8	State of Palestine (286,136), Somalia (104,539), Iraq (68,477), Saudi Arabia (35,474)
2017	788,419	12.4	28.8	State of Palestine (292,545), Somalia (106,880), Iraq (70,010), Saudi Arabia (36,268), Syrian Arab Republic (28,383)
Morocco				
1990	54,895	0.2	47.1	France (15,056), Algeria (9,188), Syrian Arab Republic (1,399), Spain (2,802), Tunisia (1,763)
1995	50,360	0.2	47.8	France (13,813), Algeria (8,429), Spain (2,571), Tunisia (1,618), Syrian Arab Republic (1,284)
2000	53,034	0.2	48.6	France (14,547), Algeria (8,877), Spain (2,708), Tunisia (1,704), Syrian Arab Republic (1,353)
2005	54,379	0.2	49.3	France (14,916), Algeria (9,103), Spain (2,777), Tunisia (1,748), Syrian Arab Republic (1,388)
2010	70,909	0.2	49.6	France (26,733), Algeria (10,190), Spain (3,108), Tunisia (1,956), Syrian Arab Republic (1,553)
2015	92,424	0.3	49.8	France (34,844), Algeria (13,281), Spain (4,051), Tunisia (2,549), Syrian Arab Republic (2,024)
2017	95,835	0.3	49.8	France (36,129), Algeria (13,771), Spain (4,200), Tunisia (2,643), (Syrian Arab Republic (2,098)
Tunisia				
1990	37,984	0.5	50.2	Algeria (13,757), Morocco (7,275), France (3,870), Italy (1,622), Libya (1,224)
1995	37,867	0.4	49.7	Algeria (13,669), Morocco (7,220), France (3,841), Italy (1,610), Libya (1,215)
2000	36,446	0.4	49.2	Algeria (9,967), Morocco (6,558), France (4,754), Libya (1,791), Italy (1,608)
2005	35,040	0.3	48.6	Algeria (9,577), Morocco (6,315), France (4,577), Libya (1,725), Italy (1,548)
2010	43,172	0.4	48.5	Algeria (8,068), Libya (7,062), Morocco (4,480), France (6,669), Italy (1,705)

2015	56,701	0.5	48.2	Algeria (10,443), Libya (9,147), Morocco (5,803), France (8,638), Italy (2,209)
2017	57,663	0.5	48.2	Algeria (10,620), Libya (9,302), France (8,784), Morocco (5,901), Italy (2,246)

Source: DESA, 2017.

Table All.3 Migration and displacement to the Mashreq, 1990-2017				
Year	International migrant and refugee population at mid-year			Top countries of origin, both sexes
	International migrant and refugee population, both sexes	Migrant and refugee population as a percentage of the total population	Percentage of female migrant and refugee population	
Egypt				
1990	173,708	0.3	47.1	State of Palestine (53,328), Sudan (15,184), Germany (9,692), Russian Federation (9,311), United States of America (6,679)
1995	166,955	0.3	47.0	State of Palestine (52,935), Sudan (11,817), Germany (7,378), Russian Federation (7,112), Somalia (6,209)
2000	173,452	0.2	46.8	State of Palestine (56,745), Somalia (11,540), Sudan (9,388), Iraq (7,793), Saudi Arabia (5,987)
2005	274,001	0.4	42.2	State of Palestine (117,556), Sudan (24,677), Somalia (17,739), Iraq (9,278), Saudi Arabia (7,128)
2010	295,714	0.4	43.8	State of Palestine (126,871), Sudan (26,632), Somalia (19,145), Iraq (10,013), Saudi Arabia (7,693)
2015	565,931	0.6	43.8	State of Palestine (150,486), Syrian Arab Republic (206,837), Sudan (39,589), Somalia (22,709), Iraq (11,877)
2017	478,310	0.5	46.1	Syrian Arab Republic (174,813), State of Palestine (127,186), Sudan (33,459), Somalia (19,193), Iraq (10,038)
Iraq				
1990	83,638	0.5	33.3	Iran (14,976), State of Palestine (14,347), Egypt (11,075), Jordan (7,970), Syrian Arab Republic (4,778)
1995	199,460	1.0	42.4	State of Palestine (73,847), Iran (44,953), Turkey (17,439), Egypt (13,058), Jordan (9,397)
2000	210,525	0.9	42.8	State of Palestine (94,124), Iran (42,602), Turkey (13,885), Egypt (12,375), Jordan (8,905)
2005	132,915	0.5	39.1	State of Palestine (29,507), Iran (17,393), Turkey (17,331), Egypt (14,186), Jordan (10,208)
2010	117,389	0.4	37.8	Iran (17,568), Turkey (17,502), Egypt (14,326), State of Palestine (12,956), Jordan (10,309)
2015	359,381	1.0	41.8	Syrian Arab Republic (252,056), Turkey (17,515), Iran (14,406), Egypt (14,364), State of Palestine (12,051)
2017	366,568	1.0	41.8	Syrian Arab Republic (257,096), Turkey (17,865), Iran (14,694), Egypt (14,951), State of Palestine (12,291)

Jordan				
1990	1,146,349	32.2	48.8	State of Palestine (851,880), Egypt (171,413), Syrian Arab Republic (51,557), Iraq (25,773), Sri Lanka (11,062)
1995	1,537,097	33.6	48.9	State of Palestine (1,140,038), Egypt (229,396), Syrian Arab Republic (54,585), Iraq (40,831), Sri Lanka (13,104)
2000	1,927,845	37.8	49.0	State of Palestine (1,428,251), Egypt (287,377) Syrian Arab Republic (57,624), Iraq (55,884), Sri Lanka (15,147)
2005	2,325,414	40.7	49.1	State of Palestine (1,611,803), Iraq (268,747), Egypt (188,554), Syrian Arab Republic (104,791), Sri Lanka (21,878)
2010	2,722,983	37.9	49.2	State of Palestine (1,760,396), Iraq (475,782), Syrian Arabic Republic (149,685), Egypt (135,994), Sri Lanka (28,134)
2015	3,112,026	34.0	49.6	State of Palestine (1,969,731), Syrian Arab Republic (643,705), Iraq (218,676), Egypt (127,716), Yemen (28,645)
2017	3,233,553	33.3	49.6	State of Palestine (2,046,650), Syrian Arab Republic (668,842), Iraq (227,215), Egypt (132,703), Yemen (29,763)
Lebanon				
1990	523,693	19.4	39.0	State of Palestine (389,171), Egypt (78,308), Syrian Arab Republic (23,553), Iraq (11,774), Sri Lanka (5,054)
1995	608,303	20.1	35.8	State of Palestine (428,088), Egypt (104,377), Syrian Arab Republic (24,856), Iraq (18,572), Sri Lanka (5,965)
2000	692,913	21.4	32.5	State of Palestine (467,005), Egypt (130,459), Syrian Arab Republic (26,159), Iraq (25,369), Sri Lanka (6,876)
2005	756,784	19.0	31.1	State of Palestine (498,778), Egypt (114,723), Iraq (84,380), Syrian Arab Republic (23,419), Sri Lanka (5,382)
2010	820,655	18.9	30.0	State of Palestine (530,550), Iraq (143,391), Egypt (99,001), Syrian Arab Republic (20,679), Sri Lanka (3,887)
2015	1,973,204	33.7	34.1	Syrian Arab Republic (1,230,484), State of Palestine (515,853), Iraq (120,739), Egypt (83,361), Sri Lanka (3,272)
2017	1,939,212	31.9	32.0	Syrian Arab Republic (1,209,286), State of Palestine (506,966), Iraq (118,659), Egypt (81,924), Sri Lanka (3,215)
State of Palestine				
1990	288,332	13.7	33.5	Israel (98,290), Jordan (55,317), Saudi Arabia (21,258), Egypt (17,920), Kuwait (16,702)
1995	281,767	10.8	33.3	Israel (96,052), Jordan (54,057), Saudi Arabia (20,773), Egypt (17,515), Kuwait (16,322)
2000	275,202	8.5	33.2	Israel (93,814), Jordan (52,798), Saudi Arabia (20,289), Egypt (17,104), Kuwait (15,942)
2005	266,617	7.5	31.3	Israel (78,664), Jordan (54,528), Saudi Arabia (21,144), Egypt (17,871), Kuwait (16,611)
2010	258,032	6.3	29.6	Israel (63,515), Jordan (56,259), Saudi Arabia (21,993), Egypt (18,633), Kuwait (17,280)

2015	255,507	5.5	30.7	Israel (62,895), Jordan (55,709), Saudi Arabia (21,778), Egypt (18,451), Kuwait (17,111)
2017	253,735	5.2	31.5	Israel (62,458), Jordan (55,322), Saudi Arabia (21,626), Egypt (18,323) Kuwait (16,992)
Syrian Arab Republic				
1990	714,140	5.7	49.0	State of Palestine (244,707), Iraq (3,825), Somalia (200)
1995	830,610	5.8	49.1	State of Palestine (289,464), Iraq (3,036), Somalia (345), Afghanistan (92), Sudan (48)
2000	832,273	5.1	48.7	State of Palestine (383,199), Iraq (1,829), Somalia (443), Afghanistan (172), Sudan (91)
2005	876,410	4.8	48.7	State of Palestine (440,091), Iraq (336,344), Somalia (1,126), Afghanistan (626), Sudan (221)
2010	1,785,115	8.5	48.9	Iraq (1,112,300), State of Palestine (496,983), Somalia (2,762), Afghanistan (1,611), Sudan (539)
2015	993,940	5.3	48.9	State of Palestine (618,128), Iraq (253,609), Somalia (2,538), Afghanistan (1,791), Sudan (562)
2017	1,013,818	5.5	48.9	State of Palestine (630,490), Iraq (206,944), Somalia (2,588), Afghanistan (1,826), Sudan (573)

Source: DESA, 2017.

Table AII.4 Migration and displacement to the Arab LDCs 1990-2017

Year	International migrant and refugee population at mid-year			Top countries of origin, both sexes
	International migrant and refugee population, both sexes	Migrant and refugee population as a percentage of the total population	Percentage of female migrant and refugee population	
Comoros				
1990	14,079	3.4	52.3	Madagascar (10,810), Réunion (957), France (543), United Republic of Tanzania (163), Kenya (87)
1995	13,939	2.9	52.6	Madagascar (10,701), Réunion (948), United Republic of Tanzania (162), Kenya (86)
2000	13,799	2.5	52.8	Madagascar (10,595), Réunion (938), France (532), United Republic of Tanzania (160), Kenya (85)
2005	13,209	2.2	52.4	Madagascar (10,142), Réunion (898), France (509), United Republic of Tanzania (153), Kenya (81)
2010	12,618	1.8	52.0	Madagascar (9,689), Réunion (857), France (486), United Republic of Tanzania (146), Kenya (77)
2015	12,555	1.6	51.6	Madagascar (9,651), Réunion (850), France (482), United Arab Emirates (145), Kenya (76)
2017	12,555	1.5	51.6	Madagascar (9,651), Réunion (850), France (482), United Republic of Tanzania (145), Kenya (76)
Djibouti				
1990	122,221	20.7	47.4	Somalia (101,216), Ethiopia (13,405), Yemen (289)
1995	99,774	15.8	47.4	Somalia (82,625), Ethiopia (10,943), Yemen (236)
2000	100,507	14.0	47.3	Somalia (83,230), Ethiopia (11,023), Yemen (238)
2005	92,091	11.8	44.3	Somalia (76,262), Ethiopia (10,100), Yemen (218)
2010	101,575	11.9	47.5	Somalia (84,118), Ethiopia (11,141), Yemen (240)
2015	112,351	12.1	47.4	Somalia (93,042), Ethiopia (12,323), Yemen (265)
2017	116,089	12.1	47.4	Somalia (96,137), Ethiopia (13,732), Yemen (273)
Mauritania				
1990	111,650	5.5	48.4	Senegal (94,138), Mali (6,776), Guinea (2,748), Algeria (1,450), Guinea-Bissau (1,067)
1995	89,562	3.8	47.5	Mali (41,626), Senegal (36,493), Guinea (2,936), Algeria (1,549), Guinea-Bissau (1,140)
2000	57,366	2.1	45.7	Senegal (37,730), Mali (7,483), Guinea (3,042), Algeria (1,601), Guinea-Bissau (1,178)

2005	58,119	1.9	43.9	Senegal (38,053), Mali (7,547), Guinea (3,068), Algeria (1,614), Guinea Bissau (1,188)
2010	84,679	2.3	42.6	Senegal (38,381), Mali (7,612), Guinea (3,100), Algeria (1,627), Guinea-Bissau (1,198)
2015	166,552	4.0	43.5	Mali (104,491), Western Sahara (28,007), Senegal (17,630), Guinea (3,105), Algeria (1,634),
2017	168,438	3.8	43.5	Mali (105,674), Western Sahara (28,324), Senegal (17,829), Guinea (3,140), Algeria (1,652)
Somalia				
1990	478,294	6.5	48.9	Ethiopia (460,000)
1995	19,527	0.3	47.3	Ethiopia (18,044)
2000	20,087	0.2	47.1	Ethiopia (555)
2005	20,670	0.2	46.6	Ethiopia (1,142), Eritrea (17)
2010	23,995	0.2	46.2	Ethiopia (1,882), Eritrea (37)
2015	41,578	0.3	47.3	Ethiopia (13,079), Yemen (5,883), Eritrea (34)
2017	44,868	0.3	47.5	Ethiopia (13,732), Yemen (8,141), Eritrea (35)
Sudan				
1990	1,402,896	7.0	50.4	Ethiopia (942,295), Chad (196,164), Uganda (74,433), Eritrea (64,790), Nigeria (23,208)
1995	1,053,396	4.4	50.1	Ethiopia (502,740), Eritrea (237,519), Chad (129,807), Uganda (57,771), Nigeria (23,677)
2000	801,883	2.9	49.7	Eritrea (435,158), Ethiopia (123,478), Chad (72,615), Uganda (44,409), Nigeria (24,143)
2005	541,994	1.8	49.1	Eritrea (192,139), Ethiopia (107,732), Chad (80,942), Uganda (26,103), Nigeria (25,762)
2010	578,363	1.7	49.0	South Sudan (202,948), Eritrea (132,187), Chad (71,202), Ethiopia (70,677), Democratic Republic of Congo (20,549)
2015	623,878	1.6	49.7	South Sudan (255,959), Eritrea (159,748), Chad (74,514), Ethiopia (60,734), Nigeria (14,828)
2017	735,821	1.8	49.9	South Sudan (301,885), Eritrea (188,411), Chad (87,884), Ethiopia (71,631), Nigeria (17,488)
Yemen				
1990	118,863	1.0	43.6	Somalia (36,771), Sudan (18,648), Ethiopia (15,804), Egypt (8,579), Iraq (4,943)
1995	136,515	0.9	43.0	Somalia (61,684), Sudan (19,777), Egypt (8,886), (Iraq (5,140), State of Palestine (3,353)
2000	143,495	0.8	44.5	Somalia (69,012), Sudan (20,102), Egypt (9,206), Iraq (5,389), State of Palestine (2,794)

2005	171,073	0.8	42.5	Somalia (92,122), Sudan (21,494), Egypt (9,888), Iraq (6,742), State of Palestine (3,392)
2010	285,837	1.2	45.9	Somalia (194,393), Sudan (23,170), Egypt (10,621), Iraq (10,441), Ethiopia (4,181)
2015	379,899	1.4	47.5	Somalia (245,683), Sudan (27,082), Egypt (11,096), Iraq (9,801), Ethiopia (5,740)
2017	384,321	1.4	47.5	Somalia (278,891), Sudan (27,397), Egypt (11,225), Iraq (9,915), Ethiopia (5,806)

Source: DESA, 2017.

Migration and displacement from the Arab region

Table All.5 Migration and displacement from GCC countries, 1990-2017				
Year	International migrant and refugee population at mid-year			Top countries of destination, both sexes
	International migrant and refugee population, both sexes	Migrant and refugee population as a percentage of the total population	Percentage of female migrant and refugee population	
Bahrain				
1990	12,767	2.6%	52.5%	State of Palestine (8,351), Libya (1,091), United Kingdom (583), Australia (493), Egypt (382)
1995	25,964	4.6%	49.2%	Bangladesh (10,375), State of Palestine (8,161), United Kingdom (2,295), Libya (894), Canada (802)
2000	47,711	7.2%	48.5%	Bangladesh (20,661), Philippines (8,381), State of Palestine (7,791), United Kingdom (4,047), Canada (1,327)
2005	52,484	5.9%	47.9%	Bangladesh (24,592), State of Palestine (8,305), Philippines (6,783), United Kingdom (4,621), Canada (1,681)
2010	53,756	4.3%	47.2%	Bangladesh (28,471), State of Palestine (8,640), United Kingdom (5,573), Canada (1,995), United Arab Emirates (1,679)
2015	56,304	4.1%	47.8%	Bangladesh (30,160), State of Palestine (8,555), United Kingdom (4,883), Canada (2,231), United Arab Emirates (1,834)
2017	57,749	3.9%	47.6%	Bangladesh (30,877), State of Palestine (8,495), United Kingdom (5,133), Canada (2,319)
Kuwait				
1990	81,482	3.9%	44.6%	India (16,860), State of Palestine (16,702), United Arab Emirates (13,095), United States of America (8,889), Qatar (6,155)
1995	96,910	6.0%	42.8%	United Arab Emirates (16,904), State of Palestine (16,322), United States of America (14,823), India (12,149), Qatar (7,067)
2000	113,305	5.5%	41.5%	United Arab Emirates (21,687), United States of America (20,884), State of Palestine (15,942), Canada (9,513), Libya (7,947)

2005	126,263	5.5%	41.1%	United Arab Emirates (26,337), United States of America (22,048), State of Palestine (16,611), Canada (10,982), Libya (8,756)
2010	181,048	6.0%	37.8%	United Arab Emirates (56,684), United States of America (23,921), State of Palestine (17,280), Canada (12,860), United Kingdom (12,511)
2015	197,827	5.0%	38.5%	United Arab Emirates (61,940), United States of America (28,403), State of Palestine (17,111), Canada (14,381), Slovenia (11,873)
2017	207,920	5.0%	38.5%	United Arab Emirates (64,398), United States of America (29,345), State of Palestine (16,992), Slovenia (16,295)
Oman				
1990	12,534	0.7%	48.5%	State of Palestine (9,110), Libya (1,246), Jordan (540), Egypt (436), United Kingdom (281),
1995	13,861	0.6%	47.8%	State of Palestine (8,902), Libya (1,236), United Kingdom (1,108), Jordan (657), Egypt (401)
2000	15,606	0.7%	47.2%	State of Palestine (8,695), United Kingdom (1,954), Libya (1,247), Jordan (772), Canada (555)
2005	18,058	0.7%	46.6%	State of Palestine (9,060), United Kingdom (2,406), Libya (1,373), Jordan (1,116), Canada (1,031)
2010	20,623	0.7%	46.5%	State of Palestine (9,426), United Kingdom (3,055), Canada (1,385), Libya (1,502), Jordan (1,435)
2015	20,359	0.5%	47.0%	State of Palestine (9,334), United Kingdom (2,676), Libya (1,693), Canada (1,548), Australia (1,540)
2017	20,688	0.4%	47.0%	State of Palestine (9,269), United Kingdom (2,813), Australia (1,614), Libya (1,730), Canada (1,609)
Qatar				
1990	12,204	2.6%	50.6%	State of Palestine (9,870), Libya (819), Egypt (287), Canada (259), France (151)
1995	13,330	2.6%	49.7%	State of Palestine (9,645), Libya (921), Canada (666), United Kingdom (582), Egypt (278)
2000	14,716	2.5%	49.0%	State of Palestine (9,420), Canada (1,089), Libya (1,040), United Kingdom (1,026), Egypt (292)
2005	17,760	2.1%	48.1%	State of Palestine (9,815), United Kingdom (1,650), Canada (1,361), Libya (1,146), United Arab Emirates (824)
2010	22,327	1.3%	48.0%	State of Palestine (10,211), United Kingdom (2,409), United Arab Emirates (2,244), Canada (1,650), Libya (1,255)
2015	23,506	0.9%	49.2%	State of Palestine (10,111), United Arab Emirates (2,452), United Kingdom (2,110), Canada (1,845), Libya (1,414)
2017	24,025	0.9%	49.0%	State of Palestine (10,040), United Arab Emirates (2,549), United Kingdom (2,218), Canada (1,918)
Saudi Arabia				
1990	107,037	0.7%	46.1%	State of Palestine (21,258), Qatar (14,187), Libya (12,976), United States of America (12,632), India (6,058)
1995	130,886	0.7%	43.3%	State of Palestine (20,773), Libya (19,379), Qatar (17,817), United States of America (17,082), United Kingdom (6,294)
2000	153,572	0.7%	41.5%	Libya (26,101), United States of America (21,618), State of Palestine (20,289), Qatar (18,792), Canada (9,840)

2005	177,109	0.7%	41.3%	Libya (28,761), United States of America (27,673), State of Palestine (21,144), United Kingdom (19,541), Canada (15,696)
2010	213,553	0.8%	40.9%	United States of America (34,736), United Kingdom (32,177), Libya (31,464), State of Palestine (21,993), Canada (13,736)
2015	269,645	0.9%	44.5%	United States of America (83,669), United Kingdom (30,036), Libya (35,474), Canada (15,114), State of Palestine (21,778)
2017	278,912	0.8%	44.5%	United States of America (86,444), Libya (36,268), United Kingdom (31,574), State of Palestine (21,626), Australia (15,838)
United Arab Emirates				
1990	79,540	4.3%	43.8%	Qatar (39,178), State of Palestine (10,629), India (9,940), Kuwait (4,778), Turkey (3,344)
1995	97,968	4.0%	41.4%	Qatar (41,796), India (12,301), State of Palestine (10,387), Oman (7,470), Kuwait (5,852)
2000	111,116	3.5%	40.4%	Qatar (38,184), India (14,662), State of Palestine (10,145), Oman (10,139), Kuwait (9,199)
2005	105,041	2.3%	45.6%	Qatar (18,041), Kuwait (13,635), India (13,547), State of Palestine (10,570), Canada (10,402)
2010	122,872	1.5%	45.9%	Kuwait (21,472), Canada (14,355), Qatar (12,533), India (12,432), State of Palestine (10,996)
2015	135,577	1.5%	47.2%	Kuwait (24,662), Canada (16,053), Oman (14,515), India (11,986), United States of America (11,827)
2017	143,150	1.5%	46.2%	Kuwait (26,875), Canada (16,689), Oman (16,584), United States of America (12,219), India (11,866)

Source: DESA, 2017.

Table All.6 Migration and displacement from Maghreb countries, 1990-2017

Year	International migrant and refugee population at mid-year			
	International migrant and refugee population, both sexes	Migrant and refugee population as a percentage of the total population	Percentage of female migrant and refugee population	Top countries of destination, both sexes
Algeria				
1990	906,030	3.5%	43.5%	France (788,914), Israel (19,544), Tunisia (13,757), Spain (11,518), Belgium (10,413)
1995	965,162	3.3%	43.8%	France (814,417), Israel (25,514), Tunisia (13,669), Spain (12,706), Germany (12,366)
2000	1,025,039	3.3%	44.1%	France (839,920), Israel (30,056), Canada (20,571), Spain (19,360), Germany (16,238)
2005	1,588,723	4.8%	47.8%	France (1,337,210), Spain (48,283), Israel (36,950), Canada (34,754), Italy (19,139)
2010	1,630,181	4.5%	44.7%	France (1,322,603), Spain (60,246), Canada (51,080), Israel (44,292), United Kingdom (23,879)
2015	1,785,555	4.5%	45.5%	France (1,455,276), Canada (57,123), Spain (56,038), Israel (45,680), Italy (22,471)
2017	1,792,712	4.3%	45.5%	France (1,452,409), Canada (59,389), Spain (56,569), Israel (44,553), Germany (23,349)

Libya				
1990	76,071	1.7%	47.4%	Israel (19,180), Indonesia (13,860) United Kingdom (6,468), Italy (5,450), Côte d'Ivoire (5,379)
1995	77,236	1.6%	47.3%	Israel (19,857), Indonesia (9,170), United Kingdom (7,588), Côte d'Ivoire (5,397), United States of America (4,763)
2000	78,811	1.5%	46.8%	Israel (19,423), United Kingdom (8,836), United States of America (5,500), Côte d'Ivoire (4,526), Indonesia (4,480)
2005	98,964	1.7%	47.0%	Italy (19,794), Israel (17,977), United Kingdom (11,808), United States of America (6,250), Egypt (4,368)
2010	127,168	2.1%	47.4%	Italy (36,216), Israel (16,748), United Kingdom (15,742), United States of America (7,213), Tunisia (7,062)
2015	154,432	2.5%	46.4%	Italy (36,222), Jordan (20,866), Israel (17,273), United Kingdom (13,793), United States of America (9,215)
2017	158,795	2.5%	46.3%	Italy (36,859), Jordan (21,680), Israel (16,847), United Kingdom (14,499), United States of America (9,520)
Morocco				
1990	1,588,218	6.4%	43.2%	France (713,987), Italy (169,285), Israel (157,029), Belgium (135,422), Spain (133,341)
1995	1,737,570	6.4%	44.5%	France (737,068), Italy (227,427), Israel (166,657), Spain (165,214), Netherlands (130,895)
2000	1,948,424	6.8%	45.2%	France (760,148), Italy (285,569), Spain (266,706), Israel (166,953), Netherlands (151,473)
2005	2,376,184	7.8%	44.5%	France (832,641), Spain (521,940), Italy (355,367), Netherlands (168,387), Israel (161,576)
2010	2,766,342	8.5%	44.8%	France (856,493), Spain (763,734), Italy (425,165), Netherlands (167,858), Israel (158,158)
2015	2,852,573	8.2%	46.5%	France (942,409), Spain (699,880), Italy (425,238), Netherlands (172,291), Israel (163,113)
2017	2,898,721	8.1%	46.6%	France (940,552), Spain (706,520), Italy (432,718), Netherlands (180,226), Israel (159,091)
Tunisia				
1990	453,933	5.5%	39.7%	France (276,216), Italy (70,813), Israel (40,293), Germany (27,234), Belgium (6,112)
1995	467,644	5.1%	41.0%	France (285,233), Italy (73,188), Israel (39,320), Germany (25,283), Switzerland (6,249)
2000	480,276	5.0%	42.1%	France (294,250), Italy (75,563), Israel (36,146), Germany (23,332), Switzerland (7,454)
2005	572,919	5.7%	43.2%	France (362,087), Italy (91,608), Israel (29,309), Germany (28,888), Switzerland (8,391)
2010	599,051	5.6%	41.5%	France (359,248), Italy (107,653), Germany (33,439), Israel (22,828), Canada (10,985)
2015	752,714	6.7%	43.2%	France (395,285), United States of America (115,113) Italy (107,671), Germany (34,842), Israel (23,543)
2017	767,155	6.7%	43.1%	France (394,506), United States of America (118,931), Italy (109,565), Germany (41,471), Israel (22,962)

Source: DESA, 2017.

Table AII.7 Migration and displacement from Mashreq countries, 1990-2017

Year	International migrant and refugee population at mid-year			
	International migrant and refugee population, both sexes	Migrant and refugee population as a percentage of the total population	Percentage of female migrant and refugee population	Top countries of destination, both sexes
Egypt				
1990	1,321,128	2.3%	37.8%	Qatar (357,540), Jordan (171,413), United Arab Emirates (165,980), Kuwait (135,880), Lebanon (78,308)
1995	1,491,202	2.3%	36.3%	Saudi Arabia (366,429), Jordan (229,396), United Arab Emirates (207,924), Kuwait (107,006), Lebanon (104,377)
2000	1,707,426	2.4%	35.3%	Qatar (376,493), Jordan (287,377), United Arab Emirates (261,834), Lebanon (130,459), Kuwait (119,693)
2005	1,900,048	2.5%	34.5%	Saudi Arabia (465,079), United Arab Emirates (341,770), Jordan (188,554), Kuwait (128,020), United States of America (124,709)
2010	2,611,995	3.1%	32.4%	Turkey (755,158), Saudi Arabia (603,000), Kuwait (168,272), Qatar (136,060), United States of America (137,193)
2015	3,200,613	3.4%	34.3%	United Arab Emirates (825,188), Saudi Arabia (770,483), Kuwait (387,993), United States of America (179,188), Qatar (163,569)
2017	3,412,957	3.5%	34.1%	Saudi Arabia (871,621), United Arab Emirates (857,947), Kuwait (422,823), United States of America (185,131), Qatar (166,840)
Iraq				
1990	1,506,679	8.6%	43.3%	Iran (1,153,969), Israel (74,502), United States of America (44,916), Saudi Arabia (42,857), Sweden (38,795)
1995	1,328,704	6.6%	42.9%	Iran (833,700), Israel (77,265), United States of America (68,305), Sweden (46,038), Jordan (40,831)
2000	1,163,980	4.9%	42.5%	Iran (540,400), United States of America (89,892), Israel (75,702), Germany (58,884), Jordan (55,884)
2005	1,445,446	5.4%	45.2%	Syrian Arab Republic (336,344), Jordan (268,747), United States of America (105,551), Iran (98,094), Lebanon (84,380)
2010	2,639,101	8.6%	46.7%	Syrian Arab Republic (1,112,300), Jordan (475,782), Lebanon (143,391), United States of America (122,517), Sweden (118,361)
2015	1,668,072	4.6%	46.2%	Syrian Arab Republic (253,609), Jordan (218,676), United States of America (203,230), Sweden (130,995), Lebanon (120,739)
2017	1,679,040	4.4%	46.0%	Jordan (227,215), United States of America (209,971), Syrian Arab Republic (206,944), Sweden (133,414), Lebanon (118,659)
Jordan				
1990	313,737	8.8%	40.3%	Saudi Arabia (90,278), State of Palestine (55,317), United States of America (31,871), United Arab Emirates (26,078), Kuwait (21,348)

1995	339,193	7.4%	39.4%	Saudi Arabia (92,523), State of Palestine (54,057), United States of America (39,858), United Arab Emirates (35,757), Kuwait (18,028)
2000	368,463	7.2%	38.6%	Saudi Arabia (95,064), State of Palestine (52,798), United Arab Emirates (47,494), United States of America (47,982), Kuwait (21,710)
2005	433,828	7.6%	37.1%	Saudi Arabia (117,432), United Arab Emirates (63,626), United States of America (55,381), State of Palestine (54,528), Kuwait (24,519)
2010	597,512	8.3%	35.6%	Saudi Arabia (152,257), United Arab Emirates (141,838), United States of America (64,674), State of Palestine (56,259), Kuwait (33,444)
2015	698,934	7.6%	35.9%	Saudi Arabia (192,620), United Arab Emirates (154,991), United States of America (71,758), State of Palestine (55,709), Kuwait (50,399)
2017	744,582	7.7%	35.7%	Saudi Arabia (217,904), United Arab Emirates (161,143), United States of America (74,138), State of Palestine (55,322), Kuwait (54,923)
Lebanon				
1990	506,600	18.7%	42.6%	United States of America (86,369), Australia (81,858), Saudi Arabia (57,203), Canada (52,394), Germany (45,648)
1995	531,071	17.5%	43.1%	United States of America (97,425), Australia (79,925), Canada (59,419), Saudi Arabia (58,626), Germany (47,656)
2000	559,130	17.3%	43.5%	United States of America (108,599), Australia (79,050), Canada (67,856), Saudi Arabia (60,237), Germany (49,663)
2005	612,261	15.4%	42.2%	United States of America (114,895), Australia (84,910), Saudi Arabia (74,411), Canada (72,255), Germany (57,764)
2010	703,015	16.2%	41.0%	United States of America (124,883), Saudi Arabia (96,479), Australia (89,680), Canada (81,105), Germany (64,346)
2015	773,357	13.2%	41.0%	United States of America (124,865), Saudi Arabia (123,277), Australia (96,306), Canada (90,701), Germany (67,045)
2017	822,300	13.5%	40.9%	Saudi Arabia (139,459), United States of America (129,006), Australia (100,970), Canada (94,299), Germany (79,801)
State of Palestine				
1990	1,813,068	86.3%	51.0%	Jordan (851,880), Lebanon (389,171), Syrian Arab Republic (244,707), Libya (152,266), Egypt (53,328)
1995	2,275,134	86.9%	50.4%	Jordan (1,140,038), Lebanon (428,088), Syrian Arab Republic (289,464), Libya (179,924), Iraq (73,847)
2000	2,756,033	85.5%	49.4%	Jordan (1,428,251), Lebanon (467,005), Syrian Arab Republic (467,005), Libya (210,540), Iraq (94,124)
2005	3,047,671	85.2%	48.6%	Jordan (1,611,803), Lebanon (498,778), Syrian Arab Republic (440,091), Libya (231,990), Egypt (117,556)

2010	3,342,282	82.2%	48.7%	Jordan (1,760,396), Lebanon (530,550), Syrian Arab Republic (496,983), Libya (253,786), Egypt (126,871)
2015	3,732,417	80.0%	47.8%	Jordan (1,969,731), Syrian Arab Republic (618,128), Lebanon (515,853), Libya (286,136), Egypt (150,486)
2017	3,803,893	77.3%	47.9%	Jordan (2,046,650), Syrian Arab Republic (630,490), Lebanon (506,966), Libya (292,545), Egypt (127,186)
Syrian Arab Republic				
1990	620,868	5.0%	42.8%	Saudi Arabia (305,838), Jordan (51,557), United States of America (36,728), Lebanon (23,553), Germany (15,330)
1995	661,469	4.6%	42.6%	Saudi Arabia (313,441), Jordan (54,585), United States of America (46,282), Lebanon (24,856), Germany (20,223)
2000	706,499	4.3%	42.4%	Saudi Arabia (322,050), Jordan (57,624), United States of America (55,946), Lebanon (26,159), Germany (25,116)
2005	861,759	4.7%	40.7%	Saudi Arabia (397,826), Jordan (104,791), United States of America (57,569), Germany (34,895), Lebanon (23,419)
2010	1,079,749	5.1%	38.9%	Saudi Arabia (515,803), Jordan (149,685), United States of America (61,003), Germany (42,959), United Arab Emirates (44,418)
2015	6,238,472	33.3%	48.4%	Turkey (2,768,494), Lebanon (1,230,484), Saudi Arabia (659,067), Jordan (643,705), Iraq (252,056)
2017	6,864,445	37.6%	48.5%	Turkey (3,271,533), Lebanon (1,209,286), Saudi Arabia (745,580), Jordan (668,842), Iraq (257,096)

Source: DESA, 2017.

Table All.8 Migration and displacement from the Arab LDCs, 1990-2017

Year	International migrant and refugee population at mid-year			
	International migrant and refugee population, both sexes	Migrant and refugee population as a percentage of the total population	Percentage of female migrant and refugee population	Top countries of destination, both sexes
Comoros				
1990	40,076	9.7%	45.0%	France (18,859), Mayotte (10,288), Madagascar (8,179), Libya (1,203), Réunion (411)
1995	51,284	10.8%	45.7%	Mayotte (20,154), France (19,469), Madagascar (7,242), Libya (2,178), Réunion (952)
2000	70,493	13.0%	47.6%	Mayotte (36,203), France (20,078), Madagascar (8,050), Libya (3,162), Réunion (1,509)

2005	96,141	15.7%	48.2%	Mayotte (49,545), France (30,384), Madagascar (8,910), Libya (3,483), Réunion (1,878)
2010	108,558	15.7%	50.3%	Mayotte (56,520), France (33,867), Madagascar (9,876), Libya (3,810), Réunion (2,143)
2015	115,633	14.9%	50.7%	Mayotte (57,479), France (37,264), Madagascar (10,953), Libya (4,295), Réunion (2,215)
2017	116,574	14.3%	50.7%	Mayotte (57,795), France (37,190), Madagascar (11,557), Libya (4,391), Réunion (2,248)
Djibouti				
1990	5,281	0.9%	45.5%	France (3,050), Ethiopia (904), Libya (694), Egypt (234), Canada (111)
1995	6,937	1.1%	43.9%	France (3,149), Ethiopia (1,901), Libya (863), Canada (300), Egypt (247)
2000	9,039	1.3%	42.6%	Ethiopia (3,258), France (3,247), Libya (1,047), Canada (496), Egypt (271)
2005	12,207	1.6%	47.2%	France (6,015), Ethiopia (2,740), Libya (1,154), Canada (943), Egypt (323)
2010	13,531	1.6%	47.9%	France (6,075), Ethiopia (3,025), Canada (1,330), Libya (1,264), Belgium (439)
2015	15,518	1.7%	48.5%	France (6,684), Ethiopia (3,705), Canada (1,487), Libya (1,425), Belgium (491)
2017	15,823	1.7%	48.7%	France (6,670), Ethiopia (3,910), Canada (1,545), Libya (1,456), Belgium (497)
Mauritania				
1990	134,129	1.8%	44.2%	Senegal (89,862), Mali (14,942), France (11,287), Côte d'Ivoire (9,873), Gambia (2,005)
1995	151,363	2.0%	43.9%	Senegal (98,848), Mali (20,955), France (11,652), Côte d'Ivoire (10,316), Gambia (2,474)
2000	105,587	1.2%	39.2%	Senegal (59,956), Mali (12,423), France (12,017), Côte d'Ivoire (9,058), Gambia (3,100)
2005	99,141	1.0%	38.5%	Senegal (53,740), France (12,537), Spain (8,638), Côte d'Ivoire (8,241), Mali (5,499)
2010	113,363	0.9%	37.3%	Senegal (50,090), France (16,426), Mali (14,446), Spain (11,138), Côte d'Ivoire (7,702)
2015	118,570	0.9%	38.3%	Senegal (51,490), France (18,073), Mali (17,189), Spain (8,532), Côte d'Ivoire (7,997)
2017	120,433	0.8%	38.3%	Senegal (51,951), Mali (18,063), France (18,037), Spain (8,612), Côte d'Ivoire (8,076)
Somalia				
1990	846,967	4.2%	47.1%	Ethiopia (616,940), Djibouti (101,216), Yemen (36,771), Canada (19,517), Italy (11,363)
1995	899,478	3.7%	47.7%	Ethiopia (459,615), Kenya (103,743), Djibouti (82,625), Yemen (61,684), Libya (40,088)

2000	1,004,443	3.7%	48.6%	Ethiopia (389,419), Kenya (159,197), Djibouti (83,230), Libya (76,918), Yemen (69,012)
2005	1,150,483	3.7%	46.2%	Ethiopia (327,545), Kenya (259,706), Yemen (92,122), Libya (84,755), United States of America (76,917)
2010	1,578,233	4.6%	47.0%	Kenya (398,753), Ethiopia (361,609), Yemen (194,393), United States of America (120,575), United Kingdom (98,604)
2015	1,924,902	5.0%	47.8%	Kenya (488,470), Ethiopia (442,910), Yemen (275,683), United Kingdom (114,110), Libya (104,539)
2017	1,988,458	4.9%	47.9%	Kenya (485,864), Ethiopia (467,508), Yemen (278,891), United Kingdom (119,953), Libya (106,880)
Sudan				
1990	587,063	28.9%	42.6%	Saudi Arabia (178,769), Uganda (126,304), Ethiopia (53,857), Libya (38,599), United Arab Emirates (32,088)
1995	745,992	32.1%	43.2%	Uganda (273,062), Saudi Arabia (183,214), United Arab Emirates (42,130), Ethiopia (33,008), Central African Republic (27,015)
2000	859,690	31.7%	43.1%	Uganda (360,660), Saudi Arabia (188,246), United Arab Emirates (54,597), Central African Republic (29,587), Chad (28,613)
2005	1,175,018	37.5%	44.7%	Uganda (360,477), Chad (247,525), Saudi Arabia (232,539), United Arab Emirates (55,931), Kuwait (30,751)
2010	1,197,225	33.2%	42.5%	Saudi Arabia (301,500), Chad (293,127), Uganda (166,124), United Arab Emirates (111,835), Kuwait (41,140)
2015	1,876,275	44.9%	45.1%	South Sudan (562,391), Saudi Arabia (385,241), Chad (363,465), United Arab Emirates (122,206), Uganda (64,136)
2017	1,951,705	44.2%	44.9%	South Sudan (563,135), Saudi Arabia (435,810), Chad (344,286), United Arab Emirates (127,057), Uganda (90,652)
Yemen				
1990	455,442	3.8%	36.3%	Saudi Arabia (286,032), United Arab Emirates (44,514), Kuwait (36,441), Israel (36,222), Libya (10,956)
1995	486,199	3.2%	35.7%	Saudi Arabia (293,143), United Arab Emirates (57,044), Israel (37,172), Kuwait (29,202), Libya (13,236)
2000	529,341	3.0%	35.1%	Saudi Arabia (301,194), United Arab Emirates (72,861), Israel (36,041), Kuwait (33,307), United States of America (19,697)
2005	630,975	3.1%	34.5%	Saudi Arabia (372,063), United Arab Emirates (82,490), Kuwait (35,975), Israel (32,787), United States of America (27,207)
2010	879,636	3.7%	32.6%	Saudi Arabia (482,400), United Arab Emirates (172,602), Kuwait (47,616), United States of America (35,748), Qatar (33,584)
2015	1,089,146	4.0%	33.7%	Saudi Arabia (616,386), United Arab Emirates (188,608), Kuwait (65,129), United States of America (43,464), Qatar (34,877)
2017	1,190,005	4.2%	34.0%	Saudi Arabia (697,296), United Arab Emirates (196,095), Kuwait (70,975), United States of America (44,905), Qatar (35,574)

Source: DESA, 2017.

Annex III

Migrants and refugees by age

Table AIII.1 Number of migrants and refugees by age, 2017									
Country	0-4	5-9	10-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44
Algeria	15,638	14,309	12,234	11,145	12,662	16,783	20,943	22,428	22,046
Bahrain	28,657	30,042	31,658	30,307	36,990	79,773	121,888	114,726	87,304
Comoros	435	440	519	732	1,042	1,298	1,369	1,324	1,238
Djibouti	5,216	5,861	7,551	10,107	12,960	14,231	13,484	11,610	9,457
Egypt	20,902	19,953	19,367	26,267	43,119	57,252	61,329	54,077	45,271
Iraq	6,894	10,965	14,576	22,478	38,718	51,734	51,682	43,413	34,514
Jordan	515,880	435,186	348,020	271,625	222,205	220,468	218,034	194,854	173,169
Kuwait	184,354	179,075	134,308	104,737	227,162	311,241	426,342	435,558	379,903
Lebanon	270,030	229,501	197,221	156,434	151,485	153,414	141,388	131,531	121,160
Libya	59,726	46,391	47,025	54,773	67,382	80,090	86,801	84,250	73,712
Mauritania	21,970	17,706	13,833	13,703	17,153	18,513	16,235	12,809	9,938
Morocco	6,666	5,510	4,550	5,099	7,360	9,417	9,780	8,886	7,858
Oman	33,656	32,637	27,078	19,277	157,810	504,912	459,049	310,569	210,464
Qatar	75,108	69,238	66,610	72,455	142,482	260,830	315,859	242,226	174,072
Saudi Arabia	810,133	754,955	626,234	538,184	685,912	1,493,848	2,069,563	1,983,815	1,343,390
Somalia	5,320	4,477	3,726	3,257	3,366	3,713	3,952	3,852	3,502
State of Palestine	4,074	6,053	12,105	22,961	32,375	35,063	30,986	23,871	16,950
Sudan	67,551	60,532	61,425	66,717	73,900	73,035	63,372	51,853	42,780
Syrian Arab Republic	56,227	49,253	43,491	44,594	75,981	118,630	145,251	138,961	115,123
Tunisia	3,108	2,593	2,406	2,899	3,875	4,913	5,458	5,555	5,452
United Arab Emirates	391,949	374,539	273,667	268,568	625,086	1,150,859	1,404,381	1,198,496	1,070,874
Yemen	45,350	33,577	22,761	20,548	26,961	34,023	36,288	35,067	31,590
Arab region	2,628,844	2,382,793	1,970,365	1,766,867	2,665,986	4,694,040	5,703,434	5,109,731	3,979,767

Source: DESA, International Migration Database. Trends in International Migrant Stock, the 2017 Revision.

45-49	50-54	55-59	60-64	65-69	70-74	75+	Total
20,737	19,041	17,832	15,925	12,104	8,466	6,331	248,624
63,079	41,830	26,386	14,865	8,145	3,066	3,933	722,649
1,112	921	716	530	377	256	246	12,555
7,457	5,647	4,383	3,397	2,197	1,167	1,364	116,089
38,083	29,471	21,787	15,642	10,692	7,334	7,764	478,310
27,760	21,018	15,321	11,120	7,653	4,731	3,991	366,568
151,270	123,962	97,755	82,096	68,407	50,638	59,984	3,233,553
306,906	191,461	126,340	66,113	28,306	12,363	9,262	3,123,431
106,313	86,668	70,738	50,997	29,850	18,456	24,026	1,939,212
59,023	44,471	32,871	24,334	14,151	6,724	6,695	788,419
7,811	5,612	4,285	3,027	2,137	1,583	2,123	168,438
7,085	6,006	4,948	3,971	3,085	2,282	3,332	95,835
145,223	86,567	55,522	21,984	5,629	1,667	1,248	2,073,292
125,078	81,327	50,355	24,602	11,567	4,871	4,712	1,721,392
863,944	519,733	258,426	110,045	50,904	37,099	39,099	12,185,284
3,032	2,392	1,752	1,197	658	322	350	44,868
12,051	9,014	7,883	7,719	7,857	9,411	15,362	253,735
36,914	30,212	25,438	22,319	20,820	19,317	19,636	735,821
88,907	61,039	38,326	20,414	9,472	4,807	3,342	1,013,818
5,181	4,614	3,913	3,099	2,082	1,233	1,282	57,663
746,622	442,625	228,121	82,036	34,140	10,888	9,673	8,312,524
26,902	21,750	17,041	12,524	8,760	5,780	5,399	384,321
2,850,490	1,835,381	1,110,139	597,956	338,993	212,461	229,154	38,076,401

Migrants and refugees by broad age group

Table AIII.2. Number of migrants and refugees by broad age group, 2017					
Country	Children (0-14)	Youth (15-24)	Active working age (25-60)	Older persons (60+)	Total
Algeria	42,181	23,807	139,810	42,826	248,624
Bahrain	90,357	67,297	534,986	30,009	722,649
Comoros	1,394	1,774	7,978	1,409	12,555
Djibouti	18,628	23,067	66,269	8,125	116,089
Egypt	60,222	69,386	307,270	41,432	478,310
Iraq	32,435	61,196	245,442	27,495	366,568
Jordan	1,299,086	493,830	1,179,512	261,125	3,233,553
Kuwait	497,737	331,899	2,177,751	116,044	3,123,431
Lebanon	696,752	307,919	811,212	123,329	1,939,212
Libya	153,142	122,155	461,218	51,904	788,419
Mauritania	53,509	30,856	75,203	8,870	168,438
Morocco	16,726	12,459	53,980	12,670	95,835
Oman	93,371	177,087	1,772,306	30,528	2,073,292
Qatar	210,956	214,937	1,249,747	45,752	1,721,392
Saudi Arabia	2,191,322	1,224,096	8,532,719	237,147	12,185,284
Somalia	13,523	6,623	22,195	2,527	44,868
State of Palestine	22,232	55,336	135,818	40,349	253,735
Sudan	189,508	140,617	323,604	82,092	735,821
Syrian Arab Republic	148,971	120,575	706,237	38,035	1,013,818
Tunisia	8,107	6,774	35,086	7,696	57,663
United Arab Emirates	1,040,155	893,654	6,241,978	136,737	8,312,524
Yemen	101,688	47,509	202,661	32,463	384,321
Arab region	6,982,002	4,432,853	25,282,982	1,378,564	38,076,401

Source: DESA, International Migration Database. Trends in International Migrant Stock, the 2017 Revision.

Table AIII.3. Percentage of migrants and refugees by broad age group, 2017

Country	Children (0-14)	Youth (15-24)	Active working age (25-60)	Older persons (60+)
Algeria	17.0%	9.6%	56.2%	17.2%
Bahrain	12.5%	9.3%	74.0%	4.2%
Comoros	11.1%	14.1%	63.5%	11.2%
Djibouti	16.0%	19.9%	57.1%	7.0%
Egypt	12.6%	14.5%	64.2%	8.7%
Iraq	8.8%	16.7%	67.0%	7.5%
Jordan	40.2%	15.3%	36.5%	8.1%
Kuwait	15.9%	10.6%	69.7%	3.7%
Lebanon	35.9%	15.9%	41.8%	6.4%
Libya	19.4%	15.5%	58.5%	6.6%
Mauritania	31.8%	18.3%	44.6%	5.3%
Morocco	17.5%	13.0%	56.3%	13.2%
Oman	4.5%	8.5%	85.5%	1.5%
Qatar	12.3%	12.5%	72.6%	2.7%
Saudi Arabia	18.0%	10.0%	70.0%	1.9%
Somalia	30.1%	14.8%	49.5%	5.6%
State of Palestine	8.8%	21.8%	53.5%	15.9%
Sudan	25.8%	19.1%	44.0%	11.2%
Syrian Arab Republic	14.7%	11.9%	69.7%	3.8%
Tunisia	14.1%	11.7%	60.8%	13.3%
United Arab Emirates	12.5%	10.8%	75.1%	1.6%
Yemen	26.5%	12.4%	52.7%	8.4%
Arab region	18.3%	11.6%	66.4%	3.6%

Source: DESA, International Migration Database. Trends in International Migrant Stock, the 2017 Revision.

Note: Due to rounding, the sum of the percentages of may not add to 100%.

Annex IV

Remittances

Table AIV.1 Remittance inflows to Arab countries, 2006-2018e								
Country	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2017	2018e
GCC countries								
Bahrain								
Kuwait			5	3	4	4	23	24
Oman	39	39	39	39	39	39	39	41
Qatar				803	499	379	666	688
Saudi Arabia	106	216	236	246	273	308	291	304
United Arab Emirates								
Mashreq								
Egypt	5,330	8,694	12,453	19,236	19,570	18,699	22,524	25,677
Iraq	389	71	177	271	729	986	474	497
Jordan	2,794	3,510	3,623	3,848	6,370	4,375	4,432	4,388
Lebanon	5,202	7,181	6,914	6,671	7,191	7,606	7,440	7,771
State of Palestine	464	741	927	1,737	1,805	2,095	2,143	2,704
Syrian Arab Republic	795	1,325	1,623	1,623	1,623	1,623	1,623	1,623
Maghreb								
Algeria	1,610	2,202	2,044	1,942	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,157
Libya	16							
Morocco	5,451	6,894	6,423	6,508	7,736	7,088	6,847	7,401
Tunisia	1,510	1,977	2,063	2,266	2,347	1,821	1,890	2,027
Arab LDCs								
Comoros	63	101	87	110	126	131	132	143
Djibouti	28	30	33	33	36	58	58	62
Mauritania								
Somalia								
Sudan	801	1,591	1,456	596	507	153	213	271
Yemen	1,283	1,411	1,526	3,351	3,351	3,351	3,351	3,351
Total Arab region	25,881	35,982	39,628	49,283	54,203	50,715	54,145	59,128

Source: World Bank, 2018a.

Table AIV.2 Remittance outflows from Arab countries, 2006-2017

Country	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2017
GCC countries							
Bahrain	1,531	1,774	1,642	2,074	2,364	2,391	2,466
Kuwait	3,183	10,323	11,864	15,459	18,128	15,288	13,760
Oman	2,788	5,181	5,704	8,087	10,301	10,312	9,815
Qatar	3,690	5,380	8,141	10,413	11,230	11,982	12,759
Saudi Arabia	15,943	21,696	27,069	29,493	36,924	37,843	36,119
United Arab Emirates	6,072	9,995	10,566	14,398	19,280	43,420	44,367
Mashreq							
Egypt	135	241	305	293	351	352	271
Iraq	781	31	48	548	599	350	
Jordan	402	472	605	685	675	570	673
Lebanon	3,445	4,366	4,390	4,698	4,289	4,171	
State of Palestine	7	8	18	48	36	32	19
Syrian Arab Republic	235	210	530				
Maghreb							
Algeria	35	27	28	44	296	77	69
Libya	945	964	1,609	1,971	1,120	756	
Morocco	38	54	62	64	86	120	108
Tunisia	16	16	13	18	28	27	29
Arab LDCs							
Comoros	0.4	1	1	1			
Djibouti	5	5	12	12	14	18	
Mauritania				240	189		36
Somalia							
Sudan	2	2	1	8	36	104	103
Yemen	120	337	338	338	335		
Total Arab region	39,374	61,083	72,946	88,893	106,283	127,813	120,594

Source: World Bank, 2018a.

Annex V

Arab States' ratification status of international legal instruments related to international migration and displacement

	International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (1990)	Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951)	Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967)	Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (2000), supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Crime	Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (2000), supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Crime	Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954)
Algeria	2005 (a)*	1963 (d)	1967 (a)	2001 (s); 2004 (r)*	2001 (s); 2004 (r)*	1964 (a)
Bahrain	-	-	-	2004 (a)*	2004 (a)*	-
Comoros	2000 (s)	-	-	-	-	-
Djibouti	-	1977 (d)	1977 (d)	2005 (a)	2005 (a)	-
Egypt	1993 (a)*	1981 (a)*	1981 (a)	2002 (s); 2004 (r)	2005 (a)	-
Iraq	-	-	-	2009 (a)	2009 (a)	-
Jordan	-	-	-	2009 (a)	-	-
Kuwait	-	-	-	2006 (a)	2006 (a)	-
Lebanon	-	-	-	2002 (s); 2005 (r)	2002 (s); 2005 (r)	-
Libya	2004 (a)	-	-	2001 (s); 2004 (r)	2001 (s); 2004 (r)	1989 (a)
Mauritania	2007 (a)	1987 (a)	1987 (a)	2005 (a)	2005 (a)	-
Morocco	1991 (s); 1993 (r)*	1956 (d)	1971 (a)	2011 (a)	-	-
Oman	-	-	-	2005 (a)	2005 (a)	-
Qatar	-	-	-	2009 (a)*	-	-
Saudi Arabia	-	-	-	2002 (s); 2007(r)*	2002 (s); 2007(r)	-
Somalia	-	1978 (a)	1978 (a)	-	-	-
State of Palestine	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sudan	-	1974 (a)*	1974 (a)	2014 (a)	2018 (a)*	-
Syrian Arab Republic	2005 (a)	-	-	2000 (s); 2009 (r)*	2000 (s); 2009 (r)*	-
Tunisia	-	1957 (d)	1968 (a)	2000 (s); 2003 (r)*	2000 (s); 2003 (r)*	1969 (a)
United Arab Emirates	-	-	-	2009 (a)*	-	-
Yemen	-	1980 (a)	1980 (a)	-	-	-

Source: United Nations Treaty Collection, "Multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary-General, status of treaties". Available at https://treaties.un.org/pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx?clang=_en (accessed on 16 January 2019); ILO, "Ratification by convention", NORMLEX database. Available at [www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12001:0::NO:::~: accessed on 16 January 2019\).](http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12001:0::NO:::)

* With reservations; (s) signature; (a) accession; (d) succession; (r) ratification

Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961)	ILO Convention 29 on Forced Labour (1930)	ILO Protocol 29 to the Forced Labour Convention (2014)	ILO Convention 97 on Migration for Employment (1949)	ILO Convention 105 on the Abolition of Forced Labour (1957)	ILO Convention 143 on Migrant Workers (1975)	ILO Convention 181 on Private Employment Agencies (1997)	ILO Convention 189 on Domestic Workers (2011)	Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (2018)	Global Compact on Refugees (2018)
-	1962	-	1962*	1969	-	2006	-	-	2018
-	1981	-	-	1998	-	-	-	2018	2018
-	1978	-	-	1978	-	-	-	2018	2018
-	1978	2018	-	1978	-	-	-	2018	2018
-	1955	-	-	1958	-	-	-	2018	2018
-	1962	-	-	1959	-	-	-	2018	2018
-	1966	-	-	1958	-	-	-	2018	2018
-	1968	-	-	1961	-	-	-	2018	2018
-	1977	-	-	1977	-	-	-	2018	2018
1989 (a)	1961	-	-	1961	-	-	-	-	-
-	1961	2016	-	1997	-	-	-	2018	2018
-	1957	-	-	1966	-	1999	-	2018	2018
-	1998	-	-	2005	-	-	-	2018	2018
-	1998	-	-	2007	-	-	-	2018	2018
-	1978	-	-	1978	-	-	-	2018	2018
-	1960	-	-	1961	-	-	-	-	2018
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2018	2018
-	1957	-	-	1970	-	-	-	2018	2018
-	1960	-	-	1958	-	-	-	2018	2018
2000 (a)*	1962	-	-	1959	-	-	-	2018	2018
-	1982	-	-	1997	-	-	-	2018	2018
-	1969	-	-	1969	-	-	-	2018	2018

Annex VI

Legislation on selected areas of migrants' rights to access basic services

The table below documents migrants' rights to access basic services (GCM objective 15), including public services such as health and education, irrespective of migrant status, and portability of benefits, such as social security entitlements (GCM objective 22).

GCC countries
Bahrain
<p>Art. 2, Decree No. 24 of 1976 Participation in Social Insurance Schemes is available to all employees without discrimination based on gender, nationality or age.</p>
<p>Art. 138, Decree No. 24 of 1976, a foreigner leaving the country permanently who has subscribed to the social insurance for more than three years shall be paid his dues that were paid to the General Authority to participate in the Social Insurance, his indemnity, as well as an interest rate of 5% per year (138 a). In addition, he shall be paid the sum of the total amounts paid for old age or death insurance which were paid on his behalf by the employer, the amounts deducted from his salary as well as an additional 3% of that amount (138 b).</p> <p>If the foreigner has participated in the insurance scheme for three years or less at the time of his departure and is not entitled to a pension from the General Authority then he shall be paid his dues as stipulated in part (a) of the previous article (Art. 139 (a)).</p> <p>In addition, he shall be paid the total amounts for subscriptions paid for old age, disability and death insurance, which were deducted from his salary as well as an additional 3% of that amount. The additional 3% are only paid if he has participated in the insurance scheme for a total of at least 12 months whether continuously or intermittently.</p> <p>If the insured is entitled to a pension or a disability or death salary in accordance with articles 34, 37, 41, 42, 56, 57, 58,59, 60, 61, 62, then his dues shall all be paid in the form of a one-time payment in accordance with table No. 6 annexed to this law (Art. 139(b)).</p>
<p>Law No. 24 of 1976, Article 65 The employer is required to display in a prominent location at the workplace, in both English and Arabic, an announcement about the entity responsible for treating his workers and the procedures that must be followed by the latter in cases of injury at work or outside it.</p>
<p>Decree No. 12 of 1977 Suspending Certain Provisions of the Social Insurance Law for Non-Bahrainis: The application of provisions of the Social Insurance Law issued by Decree No. 24 of 1976 and amended by Law No. 27 of 1976 relating to insurance against old age, disability and death shall be suspended for non-Bahrainis until a decision of re-implementation is issued by the Council of Ministers (Art. 1).</p>
<p>Decision No. 23 of 2018 Issuing the Health Insurance Law – Art. 2 defines the scope of application of this law as all citizens, residents, and visitors. – Art. 28 (a)(2) requires the employer to pay the fees for health insurance subscription on behalf of his non-Bahraini workers in order to cover the benefits listed under the compulsory health package for residents. – Art 28(a)(6) requires a sponsor to pay the subscription fees for persons he sponsors who do not have an employer in order to cover the benefits listed under the relevant compulsory health insurance package.</p>

Kuwait

Ministerial Decree No. 68 of 2015 Regarding Domestic Workers: Art. 9 requires the employer to bear the following expenses of the domestic worker: food, clothes, medical treatment and accommodation.

Law No. 1 of 1999 on Alien Health Insurance and the Imposition of Fees Against Medical Services: Art. 1 grants foreigners access to medical service under the health insurance and medical security systems.

Art. 2 requires the employer to obtain and pay for the foreign worker's health insurance policy. This condition must be met before the worker can be granted a residence permit.

Art. 4 lists the main health and medical services that must be covered by health insurance.

Art. 12 lists the categories of individuals which shall not be subject to the health insurance provided for in this law.

Oman

Sultan's Decree No. 72/1991 issuing the Social Insurance Law and its Amendments: This law is applicable to citizens of Oman employed in the private sector under a permanent work contract or working in one of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. It does not cover foreign workers, household workers, self-employed persons, and artisans. In 2006, the law was amended to include Article 22 (Bis) A, B & C. These relate to the right of foreigners working in the private sector who become naturalised citizens to benefit from Social Insurance for the period of time prior to the law coming into effect if certain conditions are met and procedures are followed.

Qatar

Law No. 7 of 2013 on the Social Health Insurance System: This law was enacted to ensure the implementation of a mandatory health insurance system of basic health services to all Qatari citizens, GCC citizens, residents and visitors (Art. 2).

The employer shall be responsible for payment of health insurance premiums for non-Qatari employees and members of their families and the sponsor shall be responsible for payment of those premiums for sponsored individuals (Art. 13).

Law No. 17 of 2018 Establishing the Workers' Support and Insurance Fund: The fund aims to support, ensure and provide care for workers, guarantee their rights and provide a healthy and safe working environment for them. In particular it is tasked with (Art. 5):

1. Providing the needed and sustainable financial resources for the support and insurance of workers.
2. Paying the workers' benefits, which are settled by the labour dispute settlement committees, and subsequently reclaiming those amounts from the employer.
3. Contributing to the provision and establishment of playgrounds, entertainment venues, or workers' accommodation, in coordination with the relevant authorities. The fund shall receive for its annual budget 60% of the fees collected for workers' permits and their renewal (Art. 4).

Ministry of Civil Service Affairs and Housing Decree No. 18 of 2005 regarding Work Injuries and Occupation Disease Statistics Templates and Reporting Procedures: Art. 2 requires the employer to notify the Labour Administration of: Incidents of fire, collapse or explosion which lead to the cessation of work at the organization/ establishment or one of its productive branches for one work day or more. The notification must be made within twenty-four hours of the occurrence of the incident. Every occupational disease, which befalls one of the workers in the establishment or one of its branches and is subsequently diagnosed by a medical professional. The notification must be made within three days of receiving the test results using the form in template number one (attached). The employer is required to notify the Labour Administration of the final conclusions of the parties involved in the investigation on the reasons for the occurrence of fatal incidents and the possibility of their recurrence as well as the final estimates on loss of life and material losses as soon as they are available (Art. 4).

The employer is further required to notify the Labour Administration of statistics on injuries, fatalities and occupational diseases using templates number three, four, five and six (attached), every six months (Art. 5).

Art. 6 defines the formulas to be used for calculating the rate of injury occurrence and injury severity.

Ministerial Decision No. 19 of 2005 regarding periodical medical exams for workers susceptible to occupational disease: This law defines the occupational diseases that workers in different sectors must be periodically tested for and the steps that must be taken to ensure the safety of workers who contract an occupational disease.

Art. 10 requires the employer to facilitate the process of conducting the periodical medical exam including providing the necessary data and to pay the worker for the time it takes him to submit to those exams.

Ministry of Civil Service Affairs and Housing Decree No. 16 of 2005 regarding the Regulation of Medical Care for Workers in Facilities: Art. 1 of this decree lists the medical care that must be provided by the employer for each worker in his organization:

Medical check-ups for all workers.

Laboratory tests and x-rays.

Medicines needed for treatment outside the hospital.

Maternity care for female workers during pregnancy.

Vaccinations against diseases as advised by the National Health Authority.

Setting up special programs aiming to protect workers against occupational diseases through early detection, follow-up on progression and treatment.

Supervision over food served to workers and health facilities as well as promotion of health awareness amongst workers.

Conducting a study on working conditions with the aim of improving them and using this study as guidance when carrying out medical exams for workers.

Creating a medical file for each worker which lists the results of the initial check-up, any health conditions s/he may have (regular – professional – injuries), periods of missed work and treatment.

The employer shall prepare a first aid primary medical kit equipped with medicines, tools and equipment in the quantities specified in the table annexed to this resolution. Each location run by the employer must be provided with a kit. In addition, one worker must be trained to perform first aid procedures in every location where the number of workers ranges between five and twenty-five. One first aid kit must be allocated for each group of twenty-five workers (Art. 2).

The employer shall in organizations, which have more than one hundred employees, appoint a full-time nurse at the organization, in addition to providing first aid kits. If the number of workers exceeds five hundred, then the employer shall open a clinic staffed by a doctor and a nurse at least and equipped with a first aid room (Art. 3).

An appropriate number of workers at the organization must be trained to provide first aid care pending the arrival of the primary paramedic or doctor (Art. 4).

The workers' clinic shall be properly ventilated and well lit. It shall meet health and safety conditions and shall be equipped with the proper instruments and equipment (Art. 5).

The National Health Authority and Labour Department Medical clinics shall inspect medical clinics at the workplace to ensure that they meet the proper standards (Art. 6).

Law No. 13 of 2018 amending certain provisions of Law No. 21 of 2015 in relation to organizing the entry and exit of expatriates and their residence. According to this amendment an expatriate worker shall have the right to leave the country temporarily, or to depart definitely from the country during the validity of the labour contract.

Saudi Arabia

Cooperative Health Insurance Law 1999

Art. 1 defines the purpose of this law, which is to ensure the provision and regulation of health care to all non-Saudi residents of the Kingdom. The law may also be applied to citizens and other individuals by issuing a Ministerial Decision on the matter.

Art. 2 determines that the coverage of the cooperative health insurance shall include all non-Saudi residents and their dependents in accordance with article 5b.

Art. 3 taking into account article 5b and the provisions of articles 12 and 13 of this law, each sponsor responsible for a resident must ensure to subscribe to the cooperative health insurance on his behalf. A residence permit may not be granted or renewed until after the Cooperative Health Insurance document has been provided and it must cover the whole duration of residence (Art. 3).

Art. 7 lists the main health services covered by the cooperative health insurance document.

Art. 8 allows the employer to expand the scope of the services covered by the cooperative health insurance at an additional fee.

Art. 10 requires the employer to bear the costs of his employee's treatment until the subscription to the cooperative health insurance on his behalf takes effect.

Ministerial Decision No. 2833 of 2006/1427H on Work Injuries: This decision is in implementation of Art. 141 of the Labour Law (Royal Decree M/51).

The employer must notify the Labour Office of any worker's injury within one week of finding out about it (Art. 1).

If the police conducts the investigation into the injury, then they must notify the Labour Office within one week of finishing the investigation (Art. 2).

The Labour Office shall determine whether the injury is work related or not in accordance with the police report or the statements of witnesses (Art. 3).

If the medical report does not specify the level of incapacitation resulting from the injury or if one of the parties question the veracity of the medical report then the Labour Office shall refer the injured worker to one of the governmental hospitals to obtain a new report (Art. 4).

The Labour Office shall determine the amount of compensation the injured worker is entitled to based on the medical report (Art. 5).

If one of the parties objects to the decision of the Labour Office then the matter shall be referred to the competent primary authority (Art. 6).

Ministerial Decision No. 399 of 2007/1428H on Housing Conditions for Workers: Art. 2 sets out the health conditions that must be taken into consideration when choosing adequate locations for constructing workers' housing. These include being located in an environment that is pollutant free and that is well connected to transportation routes and public service facilities.

Art. 3 lists the specifications of each housing unit including room sizes, facilities, and ventilation.

Art. 4 lists the specifications for shared accommodation units.

In accordance with Art. 5, the employer is required to ensure that each housing unit is permanently equipped with fresh water, a sewage system and a garbage disposal system.

Employers are required to equip workers' housing with the basic equipment needed for adequate living and proportionate to the needs of the number of persons inhabiting the unit (Art. 6).

Art. 7 deals with hygiene requirements and pest and rodent control.

Art. 8 sets the requirement for making fire prevention arrangements.

Employers are required to ensure that workers' housing units are not used as temporary or permanent storage for hazardous, flammable or explosive materials (Art. 9).

Art. 10 requires the employer to equip housing facilities located far from public service facilities with first aid and emergency materials and equipment as well as provide transportation modes to the nearest health care facility to be available round the clock.

Art. 13 prohibits employers from charging workers for housing and related services.

Art. 16 sets the conditions and requirements for meals served to workers.

The Health Law 2002: Art. 13 – "Health care shall be provided to non-Saudis according to the Cooperative Health Insurance Law and its Implementing Regulations."

The Implementing Regulations of the Cooperative Health Insurance Law 2009: Art. 2 enumerates the beneficiaries of the Cooperative Health Insurance:

All non-Saudi persons employed in a sector other than the governmental sector.

All non-Saudi persons not employed in a sector other than the governmental sector, who are residents of the Kingdom. The dependents of persons defined in paragraphs 1 and 2 who hold a residence permit in the Kingdom. Art. 3 (1) excludes non-Saudis employed by governmental bodies and institutions from the beneficiaries listed in article 2. Those of them whose employment contract does not cover health insurance must obtain their own insurance coverage.

The Social Insurance Law issued by Royal Decree M/33/2000: Art. 1 states that this law shall include a) the Occupational Hazards Branch which provides benefits in cases of employment injuries.

Art. 4, Para. (1): The Occupational Hazards Branch shall be compulsorily applied to all workers without discrimination as to sex, nationality or age.

Para. (3): For the purposes of application of the provisions of the law in accordance with Para. (1) [...], the worker shall have been employed by virtue of an employment contract for the benefit of one or more employers regardless of the duration, nature or form of the contract or the amount of the wage paid, provided that his employment is mainly performed within the Kingdom [...].

Art. 5 lists the individuals excluded from the provisions of this law. This includes among others foreign employees of foreign diplomatic, or political, or military missions, domestic servants, and foreign workers who come to the Kingdom to engage in jobs that usually take no more than three months to complete.

United Arab Emirates

Law No. 23 of 2005, Articles 4 and 5

Every employer is required to provide health insurance coverage for all his employees/workers and their family members covering the employee's/worker's wife and three children under 18 years of age. Every sponsor must subscribe to the scheme for any person under his sponsorship from the date of his arrival to the State unless such a person is entitled to health insurance coverage through his employer (Zahra, 2017).

Law No. 23 of 2005 Regarding the Health Insurance Scheme for the Emirate of Abu Dhabi

A Sponsor shall be responsible for ensuring that all Resident Expatriates under his sponsorship are covered by valid Health insurance policies at all times. (Zahra, 2017) – In accordance with Art. 4 (6), sponsors shall subscribe to the Health Insurance Scheme, under the appropriate insurance policy, for persons entering the State on a visit visa under the sponsor's sponsorship if their stay exceeds two months.

Schedule 1 sets out the Basic Healthcare Services that shall be made available to every Resident Expatriate in the Emirate (Art. 8). Pursuant to Art. 9 (2), the sponsor or employer shall cover the actual cost of health care in medical emergencies in the event that the injured person is not insured. An employer shall bear the cost of Basic Health Insurance Policies for his employees and their dependents and shall not pass on the cost of providing such policies, or any part thereof, to his employees (Art. 11 (5)).

Law No. 11 of 2013 Regarding the Health Insurance Scheme for the Emirate of Dubai

requires that all Residents must have a level of health insurance that meets or exceeds minimum benefits stipulated by Dubai Health Authority (DHA). In Dubai employers are legally obligated to provide medical cover for their employees. (Medical Insurance, n.d.) – The scope of applicability of this law is defined in Art. 4 and includes nationals, residents, visitors, employers, sponsors and others.

Art. 8 lists the categories of beneficiaries according to the health benefits they are entitled to. The second category is Health Benefits for Residents consisting of the health services provided by the employer or sponsor, which include the basic insurance coverage at a minimum and may be extended to include additional coverage for the beneficiary and his family members. In accordance with Art. 9, the employer is responsible for providing basic health insurance coverage for his employees and a sponsor is responsible for providing the same for persons he sponsors who have no employer. Art. 10 lists the responsibilities of the employer which include bearing the complete cost of the health insurance coverage, ensuring its validity, bearing costs of emergency treatment for workers who are not covered by an insurance policy, and providing a health insurance card to each of his employees.

Ministerial Resolution No. (591) of 2016 Concerning the Commitment of Establishments to Provide Accommodation to their Workers: In accordance with Article 1 of this decision, establishments employing 50 or more employees are required to provide accommodation to employees whose salary, under the Wages Protection System, is less than AED 2000. The quality of accommodation must be in line with regulatory standards, applying Ministerial Resolution 212 of 2014 for less than 500 workers, and Cabinet Decision No. 13 of 2009 for more than 500 workers.

Ministerial Decision No. (2/37) of 1982 Regarding the Level of Medical Care an Employer Shall Provide to Workers: In accordance with Art. 2, an employer who has 50 workers or less is required to have means of first aid at his establishment. An employer who has between 50 and 200 workers shall provide means of first aid, hire a certified nurse to administer it, and appoint a doctor to treat workers at no cost. If treatment requires a specialist then the establishment doctor shall refer him one and the costs of treatment shall be equally borne by the employer and the worker (Art. 3). An employer who has 200 workers or more shall provide the services mentioned in articles 2 and 3 as well as bear the cost of all other treatments including seeing a specialist, surgery, hospital stays and medication (Art. 4).

Mashreq

Egypt

Ministry of Social Solidarity as per Law 64/2010

Vulnerable migrants have access to health and psychosocial services provided by agencies such as IOM. There is one shelter available for trafficking victims.

Egyptian Minister of Education issued Ministerial Decree No. 24 in 1992, allowing the children of recognized refugees from Sudan and the children of Sudanese, Libyan, and Jordanian political asylum seekers to attend public schools.

Law No. 82 On Combating Illegal Migration & Smuggling of Migrants

The law criminalizes smugglers (while considering irregular migrants as victims) and includes a provision for the creation of a fund to assist victims.

Iraq

Act No. 51 of 1971, The Political Refugee Act

The law is mainly related to the allegiance to the Iraqi previous regime. The law binds the political refugee to the acceptance of the Interior Minister to leave the country, The Minister also can allow the political refugee to access housing and social security (Article 14). The law is still in use.

Law on Foreigners Residence No. 118 of 1978 Article 2 [As amended by Law No. (208) of 1980]

(1) Arab citizens shall be excluded from the provisions of this Law with observance of the provisions of para (a) of Article 8 thereof.

Ministerial Resolution 202-2001 provides Palestinian refugees with all the benefits to which Iraqi nationals are entitled. Following the Syrian Crisis in 2011, authorities in the Kurdish region of Iraq granted Syrian refugees the right to enrol in public schools and work in the region.

Jordan

Labour Law (8) of 1996

The Law sets out comprehensive protections of worker's rights, including the following: (a) right to annual and sick leave (articles 64 and 65); (b) timely provision of wages including penalties for employers who fail to pay within seven days of the due date (article 46); (c) a weekly day off (article 60); and (d) right to personal protection from the hazards of work (article 78).

In 2010, the Office of the Prime Minister issued a decision to allow all victims of violence regardless of nationality to be treated free of charge in general hospitals of Jordan. The Ministry of Health, together with the Family Protection Unit, has been referring cases of violence and recently cases of trafficking to hospitals and medical centres.

Lebanon

Palestinian refugees, Presidential Decree 42-1959 was issued to create the Department of Palestinian Refugee Affairs to contact the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East with respect to shelter, education, health, and social services.

State of Palestine

Social Security Law No. 19 of 2016, which came into effect in November 2018, covers all workers, including female and male domestic workers. The law lists eight social insurance areas, three of which came into force upon the law taking effect. These include work injury insurance.

Syrian Arab Republic

Law No. 91 of 1959

Defining foreigners as non-Syrians and non-Arabs dictates that foreigners need a work permit from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour and a residency permit in order to work in Syria. This definition of work explicitly includes domestic workers. With this permit, foreign workers are provided with the same protections, such as insurance, vacations and workers compensations, as Syrian workers.

Agricultural Relations Act of 2004, which states: "Arab workers shall be afforded the same treatment as Syrian workers for the purposes of the application of this Act, provided that they have a work permit from the Ministry."

Law no. 24 amended the labour law

Regulate some minimum wage and other employment issues for casual or temporary workers, including domestic workers.

Article 94 of the Social Insurance Act No. 92 of 1959 (as amended), pensioners or the beneficiaries of pensioners or insured persons who leave the Syrian Arab Republic can ask for the pension to be remitted to the country in which they live, provided that they pay the transaction costs and, if they are not Syrians, subject to the condition of reciprocity and in accordance with the regulations in force.

Maghreb

Algeria

Law No. 81-10 of July 11, 1981 related to foreign nationals' employment conditions.

Access to Employment: Temporary labour authorisation of 3 months renewable once a year, or work permit linked to a 2 year renewable labour contract. National Preference. Qualification Requirement (Superior to technician level, principle of non competition with local workforce). Moroccan, Tunisian and Libyan citizens are supposed to be exempted from the work-permit requirement.

Law No. 08-11 of 25 June 2008 governing foreign nationals' conditions of entry, stay and circulation

Residence permits for foreigners are granted for two years, student permits are linked to the length of studies, work permits are linked to the length of the labour authorization. A 10 year-permit can be delivered to persons living in Algeria for 7 years and their adult children, or on the basis of bilateral agreements (e.g. France, Tunisia).

Libya

Law No. 18 for the year 1980

Defines an 'Arab nationality' and facilitates Arab citizens acquiring Libyan citizenship, facilitations already introduced by the 1954 law on Libyan citizenship.

Decision No. 1 2004 related to the conditions of employing foreign manpower

Introducing a new distinction between nationals from countries with which Libya has concluded bilateral agreements and nationals from other countries. The former were given priority over the latter. Libya gave up a (pro)regional approach for a bilateral and case-by-case policy.

Morocco

Law No. 02-03

Equal access to public services

Law No. 02-03

Family reunification with residence permit

Law No. 02-03

Access to Employment: labour contract submitted for work authorization. No access to the liberal professions, except through bilateral agreements.

Framework partnership agreement

Was signed on 26 October 2015 between the Ministry of Health, the Ministry in charge of Moroccan Residents Abroad and Migration Affairs, the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Economy and Finance. This partnership agreement refers to a basic medical coverage scheme for refugee and migrant women.

Tunisia

Decree-Law No. 63-6 of 28 February 1963

Jus sanguinis by descent of father or mother. Distinction: children born abroad to a Tunisian mother and a foreign father are Tunisian if they opt to be when coming of age or if their parents request nationality during their minority. Foreign nationals can also obtain the Tunisian nationality after marrying a Tunisian national under certain conditions.

Law No. 66-27 of 30 April 1966, last amendment by Law n°96-62 of 15 July 1996

Access to Employment if previous delivery of a contract approved by the Labour Minister, and a residence permit with authorisation to work (double ministerial visa). National preference. One-year contract, renewable once. Employment contract renewed perhaps more than once when is in the use of foreign companies operating in Tunisia as part of the implementation of development projects approved by the competent authorities

Article 47 of the constitution

Concerning children's rights is the constitutional basis for the right to education of all child migrants. It outlines the obligation of the State to guarantee the right of children to education and instruction: the State provides every kind of protection to all children without discrimination and in keeping with the best interest of the child.

2012 Draft Constitution of 14 December 2012

Access to public services.

2012 Draft Constitution of 14 December 2012

Access to estate ownership: forbidden in agricultural zone, subject to authorisation in urban zones unless a bilateral agreement exists (e.g, Morocco, Algeria, Libya), and reciprocity is respected, free in tourist zone (+ tax advantages).

Arab LDCs
Mauritania
<p>Decree of April 16, 2008 Access to employment related to the employment conditions of foreign manpower sets out 3 categories of work permit with variable terms (temporary or indeterminate) and access rights (to trade or to the liberal professions, for example). Equal access to employment, except for those linked to sovereignty (public, judicial security service, etc). The low implementation of penalties against irregular employment; a high proportion of informal work.</p>
<p>Decree of 16 April 2008 (employment of foreign nationals) Government strategy to develop action plans for attracting economic immigrants in certain job sectors (services, fishery, and education) and for ensuring that employment contributes to local economic development. Government collaboration with international organisations (IOM) so as to craft labour migration policies. Three categories of work permit with variable terms (temporary or indeterminate). Equal access to employment, except for those linked to sovereignty (public, judicial security service, etc).</p>
<p>Article 21 Equal access to public services and access to estate ownership.</p>
Sudan
<p>Asylum Law, 1974 and its 1976 Decree Refugees shall stay in places put aside for their residency. The right to work depends on a work permit.</p>
<p>The Sudanese National Investment Encouragement Act 2013 No discrimination between Sudanese and foreign investors. Article 22 of the Act covers the allocation of land to investors.</p>
<p>The 2000 Act on the Employment of Non-Sudanese Chapter II of the act provides preferential treatment for Arab and African nationals over other nationalities as far as work permit and employment is concerned.</p>
Yemen
<p>Law No. 5 of 1995, Article 24(2) A non-Yemeni worker shall not be required to pay the fee for his work permit in cases covered by a reciprocal arrangement.</p>

Annex VII

Legislation on selected areas for reducing vulnerabilities of migrants

The table below sets out legislation relevant to reducing vulnerabilities of migrants, such as children-responsive and child-sensitive policies, protection of domestic workers, and migrants' access to legal assistance.

GCC countries
Bahrain
Law No. 36 of 2012 Issuing the Labour Law for the Private Sector. Workers to better annual and sick leave conditions, protects against discriminatory practices in the payment of wages, and imposes higher penalties on violations of provisions of the law.
Art. 2 (amendment), Bahraini Decision No. 40 of 2002 Transfer without the approval of the current employer if the contract is still valid was permitted if a number of conditions were fulfilled.
Art. 1, Bahraini Decision No. 15 of 2011 Amending Paragraph A of Article 25 of Law No. 19 of 2006 Regulating the Labour Market Foreign worker may transfer without the approval of his current employer only after spending at least one year in his current job.
Articles 2,3 and 5, Bahraini Decision No. 121 of 2007 In Bahrain, a residence permit may be granted to the spouse and minor children of a foreign worker or a business owner.
Art. 389 of the Bahraini Penal Code 1976 Prohibiting employers from confiscating the passports of workers.
Kuwait
Art. 2, 5 and 6, Kuwaiti Ministerial Decree No. 166 of 2007 Decree prohibiting employers in the private sector from retaining the travel documents of their workers.
Kuwaiti Labour Law No. 6/2010 In 2010, Kuwait adopted a labor law for the private sector, which added new protection measures to the existing law set to protect migrant workers, such as increasing the minimum wage, setting additional wage levels, and increasing the holiday credit for annual leaves and official national holidays.
WPS provides an official record that can be monitored with penalties for non-compliance. As a measure for protection against non-payment of wages, WPS was formally presented and well received at the third meeting of the Abu Dhabi Dialogue (2014). The first to implement a WPS was the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2009 (upgraded in 2016), followed by Saudi Arabia (2013), Oman (2014), Qatar (2015) and Kuwait (2015).
Ministerial Decree No. 68 of 2015 Regarding Domestic Workers: The employer shall commit to paying the domestic worker the agreed upon wages at the end of the month. One form of proving receipt of wages shall be the transfer receipt (Art. 7). The employer is prohibited from keeping any of the worker's documents including personal identification documents such as the passport or ID card without the worker's approval (Art. 12).
The working hours are set at a maximum of 12 hours daily with resting periods as well as weekly day off and a paid annual leave (Art. 22).

Oman

Circular No. 2 in 2006 of the Omani Ministry of Manpower
Prohibiting employers from withholding the passports of foreign workers.

Labour Law Decision No. 113 of 2011

Inclusion of all allowances into the calculation of the gross salary and the reduction of working hours from 48 to 45 hours per week. Annual leave was also increased from 15 days in the first year to 30 days and payable on the basis of gross salary.

WPS

Article 53 in the Labour Law (Decree 35, 2003) was amended to make it compulsory for salaries to be paid into a locally approved bank account.

Ministerial Decision No. 270/2018 Issuing the Regulations for Reporting Absconding Non-Omani Workers – In accordance with Art. 4, if an establishment reports 5 or more cases of absconding workers in one month or 10 or more cases in a year then it will be referred to inspection to determine its level of commitment to the provisions of the Labour Law and the Code for Occupational Safety and Health Regulations. If it is found to be incompliant with either, services provided to the establishment shall be halted for a period of one year. Art. 11 grants the worker the right to object to the employer's report within sixty days from the date of the report's approval.

Art. 15 lists the consequences resulting from approving the report:

Change of worker's status from "active worker" to "worker who left his workplace."

Worker's right to the end of service indemnity due to him for his work period shall be forfeited based on his leaving work.

The worker is deprived of the right to practice any other work or to transfer his services to any other employer.

The worker is prohibited from entering the country.

Ministerial Decision No. 189 of 2004 Regarding the Rules and Work Conditions for Domestic Workers: In accordance with Art. 3 of this decision, permits for the recruitment of employees, their labour cards, their medical examinations, and transfer of their sponsorship shall be subject to the same terms as non-Omani workers provided it does not contravene the provisions of this decision.

With respect to employment contracts, they must be written in Arabic. If the contract is in a language other than Arabic, a copy must be appended in Arabic, signed by both parties, to have the same probative force. The contract must include all the rights and obligations of the two parties and the conditions of work (Art. 4).

Art. 5 lists the recruiter's obligations, which must be included in the employment contract.

Art. 6 relates to the right of the employee to have his travel costs covered by the recruiter in the case of repatriation or annual leave that is agreed upon in the work contract.

Art. 10 describes the procedure for dispute settlement. Article 9 The right of the employee to claim any of the rights arising from the contract shall lapse one year after the date of expiration or the termination of the employment contract

Ministerial Decision No. 656/2011 Regarding the Circumstances and Occasions in which Women May Work at Night and the Conditions for Employment: Women may be employed during the period between 9pm and 6am in certain occasions, situations and businesses listed in Art. 1 of this decision. These include but are not exclusive to working for travel agencies, airports, airlines, hospitals, pharmacies, clinics, media outlets, hotels, restaurants, cafes, and security services. – An employer who employs women in the aforementioned situations, circumstances and businesses shall ensure the following (Art. 3): Safe working conditions for these women including during transportation. Obtaining the proper permit from the competent authority.

Qatar

Art. 8, Qatari Law No. 21 of 2015.

The employer is expected to return the passport to the employee upon his/her request.

Art. 21, Qatari Law No. 21 of 2015

Minister or his nominee may approve a transfer of the expatriate to any other employer in the event of abuse by the employer.

WPS came under Law No. 1 of 2015

With arrangements made by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and the Qatar Central Bank, all employers were required to pay wages either monthly or fortnightly to approved Qatari banks and in Qatari Riyals. All wages are to be deposited by the seventh day of each month.

Ministerial Decision No. 4 of 2015 Issuing the Regulations for the Wage Protection System for Workers Subject to the Labour Law Employers are required to transfer salaries to the bank accounts of employees within seven days of their due date or face penalties (Zahra, 2016) – Employers who fail to comply with article 2 of this decision will be penalized by either not being granted new work permits for employees or freezing the processing of all applications submitted to the Ministry until they have transferred all pending wages (Art. 4).

Law No. 15 of 2017 Relating to Domestic Workers: In accordance with Art. 3 of this law, domestic workers may only be employed after a labour contract has been signed, which must then be certified by the competent administration within the Ministry of Administrative Development, Labour and Social Affairs. The contract must be written in Arabic and unofficial translation may be annexed. The worker must be given a copy for his own records. The article further sets the provisions that must be included in the contract. Art. 6 grants the domestic worker the right to a paid probationary period. Art. 7 lists the responsibilities of the employer, which include providing suitable housing, food, and medical care. Art. 8 regulates the payment of wages. The maximum working hours per day are set at 10 hours (Art. 12). The domestic worker is entitled to one day of weekly rest (Art. 13).

Decision No. 39 of 2018 Specifying the Probation Period for Domestic Workers and Work Regulations: Art. 1 of this decision sets the probation period for hired domestic workers at three months starting from the first day of employment. The probation period is intended to allow employers to assess the professional qualifications of the employee, as well as his/her personal conduct. The probation period shall be counted as part of the employment period for which an employee is entitled to annual leave and end of service gratuity in accordance with articles 14 & 15 of Law No. 15 of 2017 (Art. 4).

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabian Council of Ministers Decision No. 166 of 12/7/1421

Prohibiting employers from retaining the passports of migrant workers or members of their families and guarantees their freedom of movement within the Kingdom provided they hold a valid residence permit.

Art. 16, Implementing Regulation of the Saudi Labour Law

The ability of migrant workers to access the “transfer of services” (change of employer) in case of conflict between employer and employee supervised by the Ministry of Labour.

Labour Law Royal Decree No. M/51 in 2005

Protections to all workers, foreign and national, but excludes domestic workers. These include limits on working hours, restrictions on salary deductions, rest days, and mechanisms for resolving labour disputes.

Introduction of WPS by Saudi Ministry of Labour in conjunction with the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA)

Each month, employers must submit their payroll file to the Ministry specifying the net wage transferred to the employees’ bank account, the basic salary, and information on allowances and deductions. What is not clear is whether the Ministry keeps the information on wage levels and allowances according to the employment contract that can be independently verified with the information provided through the WPS (GLMM, 2018)

Royal Decree No. M/51 issuing the Saudi Labour Law as amended by Royal Decree No. M/46 issued on 05/06/1436H / 2015: Art. 90 has been amended to require employers to pay wages through approved banks in the Kingdom.

Art. 101 is amended to increase the total number of hours that an employee can be required to remain at the place of work from 11 to 12 hours per day. Paid leave periods for employees have been increased. Paternity, marriage, and compassionate leave have been increased to five, five and three days respectively (Art. 113).

United Arab Emirates

Art. 6, UAE Ministerial Decision No. 826 of 2005

The requirement of obtaining the approval of the old employer could be waived under certain conditions (bankruptcy, not paying wages for 2 months, closure of establishment).

Art. 63, UAE Ministerial Decision No. 360 of 1997

Categories of highly skilled workers were excluded from a ban on return if the employee's contract was terminated before he had completed a year of employment or the employment contract was time limited and the employment was terminated prior to its expiry.

Ministerial Decree No. 764 of 2015

A mandatory employment offer which needs to be submitted to the Ministry of Labour before an entry permit is granted to an expatriate employee. The terms and conditions of the employment contract, which is subsequently signed between the two parties, cannot differ from the employment offer unless more favorable terms to the employee are agreed upon.

Labour law

Introduction of a mid-day break to protect construction and other outdoor workers from heat-related injuries in 2005

Ministerial Decree 788

The Ministry of Labour obliged employers to pay employee salaries by means of an electronic transfer system that allowed the tracking of salary payments to monitor the amount and timeliness of payments.

Labour Law: The Wages Protection System (WPS)

Salaries of employees will be transferred to their accounts in banks or financial institutions under the supervision of the Central Bank of the UAE to provide the service. For any concerns or complaints regarding the salary, employees can contact the MoHRE or lodge a complaint through eNetwasal.

Ministerial Decision No. 739 Regarding the Protection of Wages: In accordance with Article 1 of this decision, establishments employing 100 or more workers are required to pay their employees within 10 days of the date stipulated in their contracts. If not stipulated in the contract then the payment should be done at least once every two weeks. All establishments are required to provide proof of payment of wages through the Wages Protection System. Article 2(1) determines the measures to be taken by the Ministry if an establishment fails to comply with the requirement of article 1:

A) A warning is issued to the establishment stating that it will be subjected to a ban on issuance of work permits if the salary is 16 days overdue.

B) Starting from the sixteenth day, the ban on issuance of work permits shall be imposed and the establishment is issued warnings

Federal Law No. 10 of 2017 On Domestic Workers: Art. 2 of this law defines its scope of application.

Articles 3 and 4 regulate the work of recruitment agencies. Articles 5, 6, and 7 deal with the work contract.

Articles 10 and 11 pertain to workers' wages.

In accordance with Art. 12, the worker is entitled to one day of paid rest per week and to a minimum of 12 hours of daily rest.

Articles 13 and 14 regulate workers' leaves.

Articles 15 and 16 set the obligations of both employers and workers respectively.

Mashreq**Egypt**

Amendment to the Penal Code (Article 3 of Law No. 147 of 2006)

Criminalizing the incitement of discrimination against groups of people for reasons including race and origin.

Decree No. 8180 of 1996, issued by the Ministry of Interior

Refugees generally receive a three-year temporary residency permit. Palestinian refugees may receive a longer residency permit, depending on when they arrived. Palestinian refugees who arrived in 1948 receive residency permits that are renewable every five years, but Palestinians who arrived in 1956 receive residency permits that are renewable every three years.

Iraq

Law No. 21 of the Ministry of Migration and Displacement, voted in 2009

Expands the definition of a refugee in line with the 1957 Convention. However, the country has no internationally recognised legal framework regarding refugees, and the assistance provided generally lacks consistency in terms of rights and entitlements.

Law on Foreigners Residence No. 118 of 1978 Article 16

If deportation or expulsion of a foreigner is impossible or he has no nationality, the Minister may decide to define the place of his residence for a period prescribed in the decision which may be extended when required until his deportation or expulsion from the territory of the Republic of Iraq becomes possible.

2005, Article 37 of the new constitution outlined that, alongside prohibitions against torture, “Forced labour, slavery, slave trade, trafficking in women or children, and sex trade shall be prohibited”.

Jordan

Labour Law

The withholding of passports is a crime under Jordan’s passport law and holds a penalty of six months to three years of imprisonment; a September 2013 amendment increased the financial penalties for the withholding of a passport.

Labour Law Regulation (89) of 2009

Including specifically domestic workers into the labour law governing the employment of non-Jordanian domestic workers by the private sector.

Lebanon

Order No. 5 of the Ministry of Labour, 17 January 2003.

Regulating the work of agencies that recruit migrant domestic workers through Order No. 5

Order No. 142/1 of the Ministry of Labour

Makes it illegal for employers to confiscate workers’ passports.

February 2013, Resolution No. 1/19 opened some professions, such as those involving construction, electricity, and sales, to refugees; those professions were previously restricted to Lebanese citizens.

Article 586 (1) of the Lebanese law sanctioning the crime of trafficking in persons stated that forced labour is one of the aspects of the exploitation of persons that may lead to human trafficking. In this law, human trafficking is a crime, while forced labour is one of the aspects of this crime.

State of Palestine

Presidential Decree n°16/2006 Regulation of the Public Administration of the Crossing Points and Borders
Right of residence is transmitted by one of both resident parents, upon registration. Those not considered as residents since 1967 or after Oslo (on the basis of the negotiated returnees list) can become residents only through family reunification if agreed to by Israel. Family reunification dependent on Israeli measures, though theoretically falls under general jurisdiction of Palestinian civil affairs. Reunification for first degree relatives (spouses and minor children) of residents (with ID number).

Syrian Arab Republic

Prime Ministerial Decision No. 81 of 2006 and Presidential Decree No. 62 of 2007

Regulate the employment and recruitment of non-Syrian female domestic workers.

Act No. 70 of 2001

Constitutional provisions are of general application and make no reference to a specific nationality, demonstrate the degree of compliance with the letter and the spirit of the Arab Labour Mobility Convention, since they make no distinction between Syrians and others.

Article 23 of Legislative Decree No. 84 of 1968, concerning trade union organizations:

“Arab workers are free to join the union of the occupation which they pursue, provided that they are over 15 years old. They cannot join more than one trade union.”

Article 25: “Foreign workers who are not Arabs, and who have been employed in Syria for over one year are entitled to join a trade union, subject to the condition of reciprocity.”

Maghreb
Algeria
<p>Algerian Constitution of 1963 and amendments Article 69 Algeria does not have any specific legislation or procedure for refugees, only constitutional mention of prohibition to extradite political refugees.</p>
<p>Law n°09-01 of February 25, 2009, modifying the Penal code (irregular migration) Immigrants have right to time-limits on detention (30 days renewable) and have procedural protection for some categories of foreign nationals awaiting expulsion (based on vulnerability or links with Algeria).</p>
Libya
<p>Establishing the EWARS system in 2017 To improve the availability of health services to migrants, which is still erratic, WHO, in close collaboration with IOM and the MOH, established a disease early warning system (EWARS) in the detention centres. IOM is now leading the efforts in detention centres to ensure that PHC services are available to detainee migrants, together with providing and facilitating referrals to public and private sector hospitals.</p>
Morocco
<p>Recognition of the UNHCR RSD (Refugee Status Determination)</p>
<p>Morocco's penal code article 467-2 Criminalizing forced child labour through penalties of one to three years imprisonment.</p>
<p>The penal code articles 497-499 Criminalizing "forced prostitution" and "child prostitution" through prescribed penalties of up to 10 years imprisonment.</p>
<p>Ministerial circular 2003 Permitting migrants to receive free preventive and curative care services delivered under communicable disease control programmes (WHO Eastern Mediterranean Region, 2018)</p>
<p>Ministerial circular 2008 On expanding free access to all health services provided by the network of PHC facilities.</p>
Tunisia
<p>2012 Draft Constitution of 14 December 2012 Family reunification: absence of legal provisions.</p>
Arab LDCs
Yemen
<p>Since 2000, the Government of Yemen has taken measures to enhance the situation of refugees. It has established the National Committee for Refugee Affairs (NCRA).</p>
<p>Law on the Entry and Residence of Aliens Article (4): The Minister of the Interior may sign decisions exempting the subjects of some Arab and other countries from the entry visa requirement on condition of reciprocity and after the approval of the Council of Ministers.</p>
Mauritania
<p>Decree 2005-022 of March 3, 2005 Creation of a National Consultative Commission on Refugees to the Ministry of Interior, in charge of eligibility to refugee status, based on UNHCR RSD (Refugee Status Determination).</p>

Sudan

Asylum Act of 2014 (Centre for Human Rights Law, SOAS, International Refugee Rights, 2018)

Community outreach

In 2013, a programme for refugees in Khartoum was started. The programme aimed to work in collaboration with the Government of Sudan's committee on refugees (COR), to carry-out an integrated population assessment to understand the gaps, coping mechanisms and needs of the refugee and asylum-seeking populations in the city (WHO Eastern Mediterranean Region, 2018)

Inclusion of Yemeni refugees in the national health insurance scheme: Advocacy efforts that had been in place for a few years finally paid off through a high-level agreement to include urban refugees within the same health insurance scheme that the nationals receive.

Annex VIII

Legislation on preventing and combatting smuggling and trafficking of migrants

GCC countries
Bahrain
<p>The Anti-trafficking in Persons Law was enacted in 2008, prohibiting all forms of trafficking in persons and prescribing penalties that range from three to fifteen years of imprisonment. The practice of confiscating the passports of workers is criminalized under this law as well as article 389 of the penal code.</p> <p>Art. 2, Law No. 1 of 2008 Issuing the Anti-Trafficking Law. Any person found guilty of trafficking in persons shall be subject to imprisonment and a fine ranging from BHD2,000 to 10,000. The offender will also be charged the costs of the trial, including repatriation expenses when the victim is a foreigner and must be returned to his or her home country.</p>
Kuwait
<p>Law No.91/2013 on Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling Migrants Prohibiting and punishes human trafficking and smuggling in its various forms.</p> <p>Kuwait penal law No. 16/1960 (Article 185) The Kuwaiti penal law punishes smuggling a person in and out of Kuwait with the intention of enslaving him/her, or buying, selling or presenting him/her as a gift to another person.</p>
Oman
<p>Royal Decree No. 126/2008, known as the Law Combating Trafficking in Persons.</p> <p>Anti-Human Trafficking Law Defines the acts deemed to amount to trafficking and imposes both monetary and imprisonment penalties on convicted offenders.</p>
Qatar
<p>2011 Law No. 15/2011 Combating Trafficking in Human Being The Qatari law uses the same definition of human trafficking as the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Moreover, under this law, any person who forces another to work for him (paid or unpaid) is penalized with imprisonment for a term extending up to six months and a fine not exceeding three thousand Qatari Riyals, or one of these two penalties.</p> <p>Law No. 15/2011, Combating Trafficking in Human Beings Exempts victims of human trafficking from penalties prescribed by Law No. 4 of 2009 on the Regulation of the Entry, Departure, Residence and Sponsorship of Expatriates.</p>
Saudi Arabia
<p>Art. 3 & 4, 2009 Anti-Trafficking Law Prohibits all forms of human trafficking, prescribing punishments of up to 15 years' imprisonment and fines of up to 1,000,000 Saudi Riyals.</p>

United Arab Emirates
<p>Art. 2, Law No. 51 of 2006 on Combatting Crimes of Human Trafficking Whoever commits any of the human trafficking crimes as defined by the law shall be punished by temporary imprisonment for a term of not less than five years.</p>
<p>Federal Law No. 51 of 2006 Measure to improve the protections offered to victims, establish harsher penalties for committing crimes defined under the law, and specify investigation and trial procedures in human trafficking cases.</p>
Mashreq
Egypt
<p>Egyptian Law No. 64 (2010) Prohibiting all forms of trafficking and includes forced begging as a form of trafficking. The Act protects victims from both criminal and civil punishment for any crime committed that directly relates to being a victim (article 21). Victims are also provided with health, psychological, educational and social care (article 22), and the right to be removed from the perpetrator at all stages of the evidence gathering, investigation and trial period (article 23). (International Organization for Migration, 2015)</p>
<p>In 2016, the National Coordinating Committee (NCC) initiated a ten-year plan for Combating and Preventing Irregular Migration in Egypt.</p>
Iraq
<p>Law of 2012 Trafficking in Persons Criminalized some forms of labour and sex trafficking. Inconsistent with the definition of trafficking under international law, the law required a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion to constitute a child sex trafficking offense and therefore did not criminalize all forms of child sex trafficking. Additionally, the law required an individual to be sold to be considered a trafficking victim.</p>
<p>The Foreigners' Residence Law No. 76 of 2017 The law aims to regulate the entry and exit of foreigners to and from the Republic of Iraq; identify types of entry and exit visas for foreigners to the Republic of Iraq; and regulate the residency of foreigners inside Iraq.</p>
<p>In April 2012, the Iraqi parliament passed Law No.28 on Trafficking in Persons, covering prosecution, protection of victims and prevention. Perpetrators face sentences of a maximum jail term of life imprisonment and fines of up to 25 million dinars.</p>
Jordan
<p>Protection Against Trafficking of Human Beings Law of 2008 criminalizing all forms of trafficking for sex and labour, and prescribes punishments of 10 years' imprisonment for crimes of forced prostitution and other aggravated circumstances, including trafficking of a child and trafficking involving a public official.</p>
Lebanon
<p>Law No. 164 against trafficking in persons, boosting legal protections for victims of this crime. This law states inter alia that all assets seized from the convicted party shall be deposited in a special fund administered by the Ministry of Social Affairs.</p>
<p>Lebanese Penal Code, Articles 503-506 Criminalizes offences related to trafficking, such as deprivation of a person's personal freedom through abduction or any other means, fraud, deceit, violence, threats and abuse of power, exploitation of the prostitution of others or any other forms of sexual exploitation,⁶⁷ and abandonment of a minor for money or use of a minor for purposes of prostitution.</p>

Syrian Arab Republic
<p>Law No.11/2013 Criminalizing all forms of recruitment and use of children younger than the age of 18 by armed forces and armed groups.</p>
Maghreb
Algeria
<p>Law n°09-01 of February 25, 2009, modifying the Penal code. Penalisation of trafficking in persons (3 to 10 years in prison, 300 000 to 1 million dinars; up to 20 years in prison in case of aggravating circumstances).</p>
<p>Law No.14-01 Criminalizing the buying and selling of children younger than the age of 18, provides for prison terms of three to 20 years imprisonment for individuals and groups convicted of committing or attempting to commit this crime.</p>
<p>Penal Code Section 5 Algeria prohibits all forms of trafficking. Prescribed penalties under this statute range from three to 20 years imprisonment.</p>
Libya
<p>Law n°02 of 2004, Law n°19 of 2010 to combat irregular migration. Prison penalty and fine for the facilitation of irregular entry to or exit from the territory</p>
<p>Article 418 Penalties of up to 10 years imprisonment and a fine between 100 and 500 Libyan dinars (\$74-\$368), which were sufficiently stringent but not commensurate with penalties prescribed for other serious crimes such as rape</p>
<p>Articles 425 and 426 Criminalizing slavery and prescribed penalties of five to 15 years imprisonment. Article 426 criminalized the buying and selling of slaves and prescribed penalties of up to 10 years imprisonment.</p>
Morocco
<p>2016 anti-trafficking law The government demonstrated increasing efforts by investigating and prosecuting more trafficking cases and convicting slightly more traffickers compared to the previous year.</p>
<p>Law 27.14 of 2016 Criminalized sex and labour trafficking and prescribed penalties of five to 10 years imprisonment and fines of up to \$53,465.</p>
<p>National Strategy on Immigration and Asylum The Minister Delegate to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in Charge of Moroccans Residing Abroad and Migration Affairs (MDCMREAM) led the implementation of the government's new rights-based national strategy which includes a project to combat trafficking in persons networks through the establishment of a specialized unit to combat trafficking during the reporting period.</p>
Tunisia
<p>2004 reform of the law of May 14, 1975 on passports and travel documents Implemented the Palermo Protocol against the smuggling of migrants, toughened sanctions against any contribution – organised or otherwise, with or without profit – to irregular migration of foreign as well as of Tunisian citizens.</p>
<p>Article 232 of the criminal code The government does not distinguish between human trafficking and migrant smuggling in its law enforcement data.</p>
<p>Law No. 61 of 2016 Fight against trafficking in persons.</p>

Arab LDCs
Mauritania
<p>Law 25-2003 of July 17, 2003 Human trafficking became punishable with a five- to ten-year hard-labour confinement and a fine of between 500,000 and 1 million ouguiyas.</p>
<p>Law of 10 February 2010 related to combating the smuggling of migrants The offense of smuggling of migrants, organized criminal group or any other person to knowingly derive a financial profit or any other material advantage from the illegal entry of a person in a country of which he is neither a national nor a permanent resident (Article 1)</p>
<p>2015 anti-slavery law Criminalizing hereditary slavery and prescribed sufficiently stringent penalties of five to 20 years imprisonment</p>
Sudan
<p>The 2014 anti-trafficking law Criminalizing seducing, transporting, kidnapping, receiving, holding or grooming them “with the intention of exploiting them or using them in illegal acts.</p>
Yemen
<p>Article 248 of the penal code Criminalizes slavery and prescribes penalties of up to 10 years imprisonment; these penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with the penalties prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape.</p>
<p>Article 279 of the penal code Criminalizing child sex trafficking under its “child prostitution” provision and prescribed penalties of up to seven years imprisonment, which could be increased to up to 15 years imprisonment under aggravating circumstances.</p>

Endnotes

Introduction

1. ST/ESA/STAT/SER.M/58/Rev.1, p. 17.

Chapter 1

1. For detailed information on how migrant stock data is calculated by DESA, see POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2017. Palestine refugees living in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are not included in this definition and estimate.
2. Pursuant to the *Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees as modified by the 1967 protocol*, UNHCR defines a refugee as “a person who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership to a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country” (article 1A(2)); *The UNRWA definition of Palestine refugees is* “persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict”. The descendants of Palestine refugee males, including legally adopted children, are also eligible for registration.
3. See annex II.A for detailed data on migration to the Arab region.
4. In May 2015, registration of Syrian refugees by UNHCR in Lebanon was suspended by the Government, which may be a contributing factor to the decline in the number of migrants since 2015 due to Syrian refugees being unable to renew permits or deciding to leave the country.
5. The Convention on the Rights of the Child defines a child as every human being below the age of 18. The report classifies children as aged 0-14 for statistical purposes and in order to highlight the specific experiences of youth defined as between the age 15 and 24.
6. See annex III to the present report for detailed data on migrant stocks disaggregated by age.
7. UNHCR, 2019b.
8. Ibid.
9. UNRWA, 2018a.
10. UNHCR, 2019b.

11. See Annex II.B for detailed data on migration from the Arab region
12. UNESCO, n.d.
13. OECD countries with available migrant data included in the census and analysed in this section were: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Latvia, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and United States.
14. As per DESA categorization, North America comprises Bermuda, Canada, Greenland, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, and the United States.
15. UNESCO, n.d.
16. Institute of International Education, 2018.
17. DESA, 2017.
18. IOM, 2017b.
19. Persons from Western Sahara are counted separately by DESA and UNHCR, the sources used to provide data for the present report. The designation of Western Sahara as a territory and its presentation separately in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations, the International Organization for Migration or any of the organizations engaged in the Working Group on International Migration in the Arab Region on the status of the territory or its authorities, or about the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.
20. UNESCO, n.d.
21. UNRWA reports that many of the 469,555 Palestine refugees registered in Lebanon left the country without providing notification. While an official Lebanese-Palestinian census conducted in 2017 counted 174,422 Palestine refugees in the country, the census was not exhaustive. A 2015 survey by the American University of Beirut calculated that there were between 260,000 and 280,000 Palestine refugees in Lebanon (UNRWA, 2018a).
22. UNRWA, 2018c.
23. UNRWA, 2018c; UNHCR, 2019b.
24. UNESCO, n.d.
25. Gebrekidan, 2017.
26. UNESCO, n.d.
27. World Bank, 2018e.
28. World Bank, 2018c.
29. World Bank, 2018d.
30. ILO, 2017d.
31. Ibid.
32. Sørensen, Van Hear and Engberg-Pedersen, 2003.
33. Hakimi, 2016.
34. Egypt at 54.5 per cent, Iraq at 71.6 per cent, Syrian Arab Republic at 61.9 per cent, and Yemen at 69.8 per cent.
35. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2018a; IOM Yemen, 2018.
36. The central Mediterranean route is accounting for the largest number of missing or deceased migrants while crossing to Europe by sea. IOM's Global Migration Data Analysis Centre accounts for 1,306 deaths in sea in the Central Mediterranean route from January 1st to December 9th 2018
37. Reach Initiative, 2018.
38. UN WATER, 2013.
39. IOM, 2019b.
40. Ibid.
41. Mixed Migration Platform, 2017.
42. Gleick, 2014.
43. Trigoa, Gouveia and Barriopedroa, 2010.
44. Werrell and Femia, 2013.
45. IOM, 2018c.
46. ILO, 2015.

Chapter 2

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2. الأردن، رئاسة مجلس الوزراء، 2018.
3. Hussein, 2017.
4. UNHCR, 2018a.
5. Ibid.
6. Sadek, 2017a.
7. All currency conversions are given using official OANDA rates (<https://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/>) as at 8 March 2019.
8. Sadek, 2018a; 2018, مصر.
9. United Arab Emirates, Federal Authority for Identity and Citizenship, 2017.
10. ليبيا 2017.
11. ILO, 2018. This number does not include migrant workers in the Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania and Somalia.
12. الكويت، الهيئة العامة للقوى العاملة، 2018.
13. شعيا 2018.
14. Albawaba, 2018.

15. United Arab Emirates, Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratisation, 2018.
16. Dubai, Dubai Development Authority, 2018.
17. Masudi, 2018.
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27. Qatar, Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy, 2019.
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30. United States of America, Department of State, 2018; Kuwait, Public Authority of Manpower, n.d.
31. Qatar, 2017, 2018b.
32. Al Raya Newspaper, 2018b; Qatar, 2017.
33. Gulf Business, 2018.
34. Mohammed, 2018.
35. Al-Shabrawi, 2018.
36. Sebugwaawo, 2019.
37. البحرين، هيئة تنظيم سوق العمل، 2018.
38. Zawya, 2018; 2018، البحرين.
39. International Medical Travel Journal, 2018.
40. United States of America, Department of State, 2018.
41. قطر، 2017.
42. قطر، 2018.
43. Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Labor and Social Development, 2017.
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50. Times of Oman, 2017; عُمان، وزارة الشؤون القانونية، 2017.
51. Qatar, 2018c.
52. Saudi Gazette, 2018.
53. Al-Misbahi, 2019.
54. الكويتية، 2017.
55. Gulf Insider, 2018b.
56. الأنباء، 2017.
57. Middle East Monitor, 2017a.
58. <https://www.manpower.gov.om/Portal/MinisterialDecision.aspx>.
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60. 2019، عُمان، وزارة القوى العاملة، 2019.
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62. Saudi Arabia Vision 2030, n.d.
63. Ernst and Young, 2017.
64. Middle East Eye, 2018a.
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67. عرabi، 21، 2017.
68. ILO, 2017c.
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73. Morocco, National Human Rights Council, 2018.
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79. United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 2000.
80. Policy guidance on the prevention of trafficking and the protection of victims of trafficking in line with international human rights standards is available in OHCHR Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking (E/2002/68/Add. 1) and its extensive Commentary (HR/PUB/10/2).
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101. Emam, 2018.
102. Qatar, 2018a.
103. Sewell, 2018b.
104. Syrian Arab News Agency, 2018a.
105. Intergovernmental Authority on Development, 2017.
106. العراق، 2017.
107. UNHCR, 2017a.
108. Hussein, 2018; Jordan Response Platform for the Syria Crisis, 2018.
109. Jordan Response Platform for the Syria Crisis, 2018.
110. <https://www.unhcr.org/jo/10993-rectification-of-status-campaign-extension-of-the-deadline.html>.
111. Human Rights Watch, 2018; Médecins Sans Frontières, 2018.
112. UNRWA, 2019.
113. Middle East Monitor, 2017c; 2018، سودارس.
114. الأيام، 2018.
115. Bahrain, Labour Market Regulatory Authority, 2017.
116. Izzak, 2018.
117. Al Mukrashi, 2017.
118. Al Sharq Newspaper, 2018.
119. Saudi Gazette, 2017.
120. The minimum recommended monthly wage for domestic workers in Bahrain is between 100-120 Bahraini dinars (approximately \$266-320 at August 2019 exchange rates). See <https://eoi.gov.in/bahrain/?2708?000>.
121. Gulf Insider, 2018c.
122. Taylor Vinters, 2018; العراق، 2017.
123. Gulf Insider, 2018a; Arab Times, 2018b.
124. Times of Oman, 2018d.
125. A cabinet decision will specify applicants' minimum income along with exceptional cases.
126. Al Raya Newspaper, 2018a.
127. Younes, 2018; Sadek, 2018b.
128. Khaleej Times, 2017.
129. United Arab Emirates, 2019.
130. United Arab Emirates, 2018.
131. United Arab Emirates, Federal Authority for Identity and Citizenship, 2018c.
132. Gulf Insider, 2018h.
133. البحرين، 2018.
134. Kuwait Times, 2017.
135. Algeria, 2018.
136. عُمان، وزارة التربية والتعليم، 2018.
137. مصر، وزارة الاتصالات وتكنولوجيا المعلومات، 2018.
138. Sarwat, 2018.
139. Egypt Today, 2018.
140. Kandil, 2018.
141. Egypt, Embassy of Egypt to the United States of America, 2017; 2017، مصر.
142. Saliba, 2018.
143. Gulf Insider, 2018e.
144. Hameed, 2018.
145. Syrian Arab News Agency, 2018b.
146. Tunisia, Ministry of Social Affairs, 2018.
147. Tunisia, 2018.
148. UNHCR, 2019a.
149. The tenth meeting of the Global Forum, held in June 2017, was attended by representatives of Algeria, Bahrain, the Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan,

- Lebanon, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, the Sudan, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen. The eleventh meeting was attended by representatives of Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, the State of Palestine, Qatar, the Sudan, the United Arab Emirate and Yemen.
150. Global Forum on Migration and Development, 2018.
 151. League of Arab States, 2017.
 152. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and International Organization for Migration, 2017.
 153. ESCWA, League of Arab States and United Nations Population Fund, 2018.
 154. The Abu Dhabi Dialogue, also known as the Ministerial Consultation on Overseas Employment and Contractual Labour for Countries of Origin and Destination in Asia, is an intergovernmental consultative process established in 2008 between 12 Asian countries and all six GCC countries regarding labour migration. The members of the Abu Dhabi Dialogue are seven Asian countries of destination, including the six GCC countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Malaysia, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates; and eleven Asian countries of origin: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Viet Nam.
 155. Abu Dhabi Dialogue among the Asian Labor-sending and Receiving Countries, 2018.
 156. See https://www.ilo.org/beirut/events/WCMS_577286/lang--en/index.htm.
 157. Gulf Insider, 2018d.
 158. The Rabat Process is a regional migration dialogue and framework for consultation, which has since 2006 brought together countries of origin, transit and destination of the migration routes linking Central, West and Northern Africa with Europe.
 159. The Joint Valletta Action Plan was launched in 2015 as the outcome of the Valletta Summit on migration. Building on the Rabat Process and on the Khartoum Process (also known as the EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative, a platform for political cooperation between countries along the migration route between the Horn of Africa and Europe), the summit aimed to strengthen the cooperation processes between Africa and Europe on international migration. It established five domains for collaborative work among participating States: 1. Development benefits of migration and addressing root causes of displacement and irregular migration; 2. Legal migration and mobility; 3. Protection and asylum; 4. Preventing and combatting irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons; 5. Return, readmission and reintegration.
 160. Rabat Process, Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development, 2018.
 161. Ibid.
 162. Rabat Process, Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development, 2019.
 163. European Union Neighbours, 2018.
 164. Khartoum Process, 2018.
 165. The regional economic communities are recognized as the building blocks of the African Union. They are: the Arab Maghreb Union, the Community of Sahel-Saharan States, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the East African Community, the Economic Community of Central African States, the Economic Community of West African States, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and the Southern African Development Community.
 166. Agence Marocaine de Presse, 2018.
 167. Morocco, Ministry of Culture and Communication, 2018.
 168. African Union Commission, 2018b.
 169. Intergovernmental Authority on Development, 2018.
 170. The African Union Commission, 2018c.
 171. Egypt, State Information Service, 2018.
 172. Council of the European Union, 2017.
 173. Middle East Monitor, 2018a.
 174. African Union Commission, 2018a; European Union External Action, 2018.
 175. United States of America, Department of State, 2018.
 176. Sudan Tribune, 2018a.
 177. Sudan Tribune, 2018b.
 178. 2018. الجزائر.
 179. France Diplomatie, 2018.
 180. Fanack, 2018.
 181. 2017. الوطن.
 182. Carrel, 2017.
 183. Sudan News Agency, 2018.
 184. Jordan Post, 2018; Daily News Egypt, 2018a, 2018b.
 185. Daily News Egypt, 2018c.
 186. Iraq News Gazette, 2018.
 187. Syrian Arab News Agency, 2017.
 188. Jordan Times, 2018a.
 189. Jordan Times, 2017b.
 190. Toumi, 2018.
 191. Kuwait Times, 2018.
 192. 2018. اليوم السابع.
 193. Prentis, 2017; Reuters, 2017.
 194. Kasraoui, 2018; López-Fonseca, 2018.
 195. Agence de Presse Africaine, 2018.
 196. ILO, 2017e.
 197. Saudi Gazette, 2019.
 198. Mangula, 2017.
 199. Ghana, Government of Ghana, 2018; Qatar Tribune, 2018b.
 200. Kenya, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017.
 201. Ligami, 2017.
 202. Sudan News Gazette, 2017.
 203. 2017. وكالة أنباء الإمارات.
 204. البيان، 2018ب.
 205. 2018. الإمارات اليوم.
 206. 2018. البيان.
 207. United States of America, Department of State, 2018.
 208. Ethiopian News Agency, 2018.
 209. See the Principles and Guidelines, supported by practical guidance, on the human rights protection of migrants in vulnerable situations prepared by the Global Migration Group Working Group on Migration, Human Rights and Gender.”
 210. For more on migration and the SDGs, see E/ESCWA/SDD/2017/1.
- ### Chapter 3
1. From 2000 to 2017, an estimated 33,761 migrants died in the Mediterranean, 59 per cent (19,891) of them after 2011 (Fargues, 2017a).
 2. United Nations, 2018a.
 3. Ibid.
 4. United Nations, 2018b.
 5. Part II of the Global Compact on Refugees is the comprehensive refugee response framework (CRRF) as adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (A/RES/71/1, annex I).
 6. News24, 2018.
 7. Graziano, 2018.
 8. Al Hashemi and Habib, 2018.
 9. Information on Member States» implementation of ILO conventions is contained in the ILO supervisory system. See <https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11000:0::NO::>
 10. Labour Migration, Gender, and Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights, 2013.
 11. Simkhada and others, 2018.
 12. The fund was approved by the Executive Committee chaired by the Crown Prince of Bahrain and endorsed by the Cabinet of Ministers on 30 April 2018 (Bahrain, Labour Market Regulatory Authority, 2018).
 13. The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children; and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air.
 14. Practical guidance for States on how to fulfil their border governance obligations in accordance with international human rights law and other relevant standards is available in OHCHR's Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights at International Borders.
 15. Egypt, 2014.
 16. Egyptian Streets, 2019.
 17. Morocco, 2012.

18. Bidar, 2018.
19. <https://www.diplomatie.gov.tn/en/tunisians-abroad/consular-services/>.
20. <http://www.social.tn/index.php?id=221&L=0>.
21. With regard to health, GCM refers to World Health Assembly document 70.24 on a framework of priorities and guiding principles to promote the health of refugees and migrants.
22. Saudi Arabia, General Authority for Statistics, 2016.
23. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, No. 9464.
24. Fargues, 2017b.
25. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/southern-mediterranean_en.
26. Sutherland, 2013.
27. <https://eduscol.education.fr/cid52131/enseignements-de-langue-et-de-culture-d-origine-elco.html>.
28. <http://www.e-madrassa.ma>.
29. Jaulin and Nilsson, 2015.
30. Algeria, 2016.
31. Morocco, 2012, art. 17.
32. Malit and Naufal, 2016.
33. Council of the European Union, 2013.
34. Limam and Del Sarto, 2015.
35. In March 2019, the European Union's Justice and Home Affairs Council proposed to resume negotiations on readmission agreements with Morocco and Tunisia in exchange for visa facilitation and regular mobility access to the European Union (Council of the European Union, 2019).
36. IOM, 2017d.
37. IOM, 2018a.
38. Taha, Siegmann and Messkoub, 2015.
39. Holzmann, 2018.
40. Holzmann and Wels, 2018.
41. Panhuys, Kazi-Aoul and Binette, 2017.
42. OECD, 2011.
43. As previously stated, GCM refers to World Health Assembly document 70.24 on a framework of priorities and guiding principles to promote the health of refugees and migrants, which addresses eight guiding principles and 12 priority areas. Furthermore, the United Nations, under the 'leaving no one behind' principle, has recognized that countries must ensure that all communities have universal health coverage. The WHO Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean focused on universal health coverage in a 2018 technical paper (EM/RC65/4), which states that «universal health coverage means that all people and communities can use health services they need, of sufficient quality to be effective, without facing financial hardship».
44. Parolin, 2009.
45. Bartolomeo, Jaulin and Perrin, 2011.
46. Morocco, 2012.
47. Almajdoub, 2017.
48. Article 25, "Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and wellbeing of himself and of his family"; article 26, "Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages".
49. The Human Development Index is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable, and having a decent standard of living.
50. ILO, 2010.
51. Khat and Darmon, 2003.
52. Bos and others, 2004; Anson, 2004.
53. Chiswick, Lee and Miller, 2008; Namer and Razum, 2018.
54. Morocco, 2003.
55. World Health Organization, 2018.
56. الجمهورية العربية السورية، مجلس الشعب، 1959.
57. ILO, Protección Social, n.d.
58. Kristiansen and Sheikh, 2014.
59. Zahra, 2018a.
60. Willis Towers Watson, 2016.
61. Alkhamis, Hassan and Cosgrove, 2014.
62. Zahra, 2017.
63. ExpatFocus, 2017.
64. WHO, 2018.
65. De Bel-Air, 2016.
66. WHO, 2018.
67. IOM, 2018e; UNSMIL and OHCHR, 2018.
68. A/HRC/28/51.
69. Grange and Flynn, 2015.
70. IOM, 2018e.
71. State of Palestine, Democracy and Workers Rights Center, 2016.
72. Tunisia, 2014.
73. Hanafi, 2017.
74. Chen and others, 2016.
75. ILO, 2017a.
76. Qatar, 2018b.
77. Qatar, Ministry of Administrative Development, Labour and Social Affairs, n.d.
78. Ibid.
79. UNODC, 2004, p. 42.
80. Ibid. p. 54 and 55.
81. <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/smuggling-of-migrants.html>.
82. United Nations, 2000a, 2000c, 2000d.
83. Fargues, 2017a.
84. Turkey, Ministry of Interior, Directorate General of Migration Management, 2013.
85. European Union, European Parliament, 2009, art. 25.
86. Mixed Migration Centre, 2018a.
87. UNHCR, 2018d.
88. Mixed Migration Centre, 2018b.
89. United States of America, Department of State, 2018.
90. Zahra, 2015.
91. Zahra, 2018b.
92. United States of America, Department of State, 2018, p. 168.
93. IOM, 2018e.
94. UNSMIL and OHCHR, 2018.
95. IOM, 2018e.
96. Altai Consulting and Impact Initiatives, 2017.
97. Altai Consulting and Impact Initiatives, 2017; UNSMIL and OHCHR, 2018.
98. Eaton, 2018.
99. Micallef, 2017.
100. Fargues, 2017a; IOM, 2018f.
101. The following countries are signatories of the Declaration of the Ministerial Conference of the Khartoum Process, also known as the Rome Declaration: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Sudan, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia and United Kingdom. www.khartoumprocess.net.
102. Declaration of the Ministerial Conference of the Khartoum Process, (EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative), Rome, 28th November 2014.
103. A comprehensive note on the topic was produced in November 2017 by the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population's Panel on "Strengthening migration data, research and training, in the context of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration" (International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, 2017). See also Fargues, 2018, pp. 24 and 42.
104. ST/ESA/STAT/SER.M/58/Rev.1, p. 93.
105. DESA, 2009.
106. <http://www.mixedmigration.org/about/>.
107. E/C.12/GC/20, para. 30.
108. WHO, 2014.
109. Hastie and Crépeau, 2017.
110. Altai Consulting and Impact Initiatives, 2017.
111. Euronews, 2019.

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The third edition of the Situation Report on International Migration comes at a time of unprecedented levels of international migration in the Arab region. The region hosts over 38 million migrants and refugees and around 15 million internally displaced persons. At the same time, over 29 million people from Arab countries are living outside of their countries of origin.

Given the inherent transboundary and cross-regional nature of international migration, coordinated and complex responses are as needed as ever. In December 2018, with the historic adoption of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM), the Member States of the United Nations committed to put people at the heart of migration governance and to boost migration's positive development outcomes. This report marks a key moment when countries set off to implement the objectives agreed upon in the GCM. It presents the latest regionalized data analysis on migration trends and patterns, provides an update on migration related policy developments in the Arab region, and outlines priority areas for progress to ensure that migration works for all.

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